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 This companion will prove an invaluable resource for all those engaged in 
research or teaching on Jacob Boehme and his readers, as historians, philos-
ophers, literary scholars or theologians. Boehme is “on the radar” of many 
researchers, but often avoided as there are relatively few aids to understand-
ing his thought, its context and subsequent appeal. This book includes a fi ne 
spread of topics and specialists. 
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 An Introduction to Jacob Boehme 
 This volume brings together for the fi rst time some of the world’s leading 
authorities on the German mystic Jacob Boehme to illuminate his thought 
and its reception over four centuries for the benefi t of students and  advanced 
scholars alike. Boehme’s theosophical works have infl uenced Western  culture 
in profound ways since their dissemination in the early seventeenth century, 
and these interdisciplinary essays trace the social and cultural  networks as 
well as the intellectual pathways involved in Boehme’s enduring impact. 
The chapters range from situating Boehme in the sixteenth-century Radical 
Reformation to discussions of his signifi cance in modern theology. They 
 explore the major contexts for Boehme’s reception, including the Pietist 
movement, Russian religious thought, and Western esotericism. In addition, 
they focus more closely on important readers, including the religious rad-
icals of the English Civil Wars and the later English Behmenists, literary 
fi gures such as Goethe and Blake, and great philosophers of the modern age 
such as Schelling and Hegel. Together, the chapters illustrate the depth and 
variety of Boehme’s infl uence, and a concluding chapter addresses directly 
an underlying theme of the volume, asking why Boehme matters today and 
how readers in the present might be enriched by a fresh engagement with his 
apparently opaque and complex writings. 
 Ariel Hessayon is Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at Gold-
smiths, University of London. He has published extensively on a variety of 
early modern topics, including antiscripturism, book burning, communism, 
environmentalism, esotericism, extra-canonical texts, heresy, crypto-Jews, 
Judaizing, millenarianism, mysticism, prophecy, and religious radicalism. 
 Sarah Apetrei is Departmental Lecturer in Ecclesiastical History at the Uni-
versity of Oxford. She is the author of  Women, Feminism and Religion in 
Early Enlightenment England and is currently working on a book dealing 
with the place of mystical theology in seventeenth-century British religion. 
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 1  Introduction 
 Boehme’s Legacy in Perspective 
 Ariel Hessayon and Sarah Apetrei 1 
 I 
 Jacob Boehme has variously been called “the illuminated Instrument of 
God,” “the prince of divine philosophers,” “the most comprehensive, abun-
dant and multifaceted of all mystics,” “the greatest and most famous of all 
Theosophists in the world,” “the greatest of the mystics, and the father of 
German philosophy,” “a giant in intelligence,” “a religious and philosoph-
ical genius” rarely with “equal in the world’s history,” “the most imagina-
tive genius” of the early seventeenth century—indeed “one of the greatest 
geniuses of mankind,” and, by no less a fi gure than the cultural critic Walter 
Benjamin, “one of the greatest allegorists.” 2 
 Writing in German from about 1600 until shortly before his death in 
1624 he was—by his fi rst biographer’s reckoning—the author of thirty 
works, several of which are extremely long. In addition, Boehme’s extensive 
correspondence survives for the period from January 1618 to June 1624. 
A Lutheran by birth, by formative religious instruction, and steadfastly at 
his death, Boehme’s major theological concerns were with the nature of 
creation and how it came into being, the origin and presence of evil, and the 
attainment of salvation through a process of inward spiritual regeneration 
and rebirth. Nonetheless, infl uenced initially by the teachings of Paracelsus 
and the spiritual reformers Caspar Schwenckfeld and Valentin Weigel as 
well as by popular alchemical and astrological texts, and then, following the 
clandestine circulation of his fi rst incomplete book in manuscript, by a wid-
ening social network of friends, learned correspondents, and noble patrons, 
Boehme began developing certain heterodox views that were furiously de-
nounced by a local clergyman. These included his understanding of the Trin-
ity, which he was accused of denying through his introduction of a fourth 
“person,” Sophia (symbolizing the Noble Virgin of Divine Wisdom); his 
explanations for the fall of Lucifer and the rebel angels (constituting a fi rst 
fall preceding the second fall of humanity from paradise); Adam’s prelapsar-
ian androgynous nature; the existence of seven qualities (dry, sweet, bitter, 
fi re, love, sound, and  corpus ); and the three principles that corresponded 
to the dark world (God the Father), the light world (God the Son), and 
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2 Ariel Hessayon and Sarah Apetrei
our temporal visible world (the Holy Spirit). Moreover, having settled and 
established himself as a cobbler at Görlitz in Upper Lusatia and writing 
against a backdrop of vibrant scientifi c, astronomical, and medical enquiry, 
damaging regional political struggles, religious polemic, apocalyptic specu-
lation, and, from 1618, the earliest phase of the Thirty Years’ War, Boehme 
interposed himself—ignorantly and presumptuously according to his bet-
ter educated critics—in important doctrinal debates over the nature of free 
will and the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper by expounding 
an irenic, anticlerical message. This culminated in his announcement of an 
impending Great Reformation—a new age of love, patience, peace, and joy. 
 Boehme’s writings divided nineteenth- and twentieth-century commen-
tators. On the one hand, he was praised as an “independent, bold and pro-
foundly penetrating thinker,” with an “amazing range of thought and depth 
of experience,” whose “majestic symbols drawn from the Bible” and con-
temporary chemistry expressed particular doctrines of “wondrous beauty” 
to produce, in the words of the existentialist philosopher Paul Tillich, “one 
of the most profound and strangest systems of Western thought.” 3 Further-
more, this “illiterate and untrained,” “simple” “peasant shoemaker” was 
regarded as “one of the giants,” “one of the most amazing phenomena in the 
history of mysticism.” The “great sweep” of his vision, with its “immense 
heights and deeps,” led to comparisons with other Christian poets, nota-
bly Dante, while “a natural genius for the transcendent” also enabled this 
“theosophist” and “myth-creator” to leave his “mark upon German philos-
ophy.” 4 On the other, even Boehme’s admirers acknowledged that, however 
memorable his concepts, they were nonetheless expressed obscurely. This 
“notorious opacity,” this “coagulated cyclone of language,” which under-
standably deterred generations of potential readers, has made Boehme, to 
quote Cyril O’Regan, “one of the most diffi cult reads in the history of Chris-
tian thought.” 5 Less generously, it was suggested that few, if any, were “able 
to pierce the clouds in which his meaning has been charitably presumed to 
lie hid.” 6 The “fantastic disorder” of his “chaotic and shapeless” notions 
supposedly came from an inability to “winnow and arrange” the outpour-
ings of a heated imagination, while Boehme was also “constantly doing 
violence to language” by impetuously attempting to “express the inexpress-
ible” through the introduction of barbarous neologisms. Consequently, the 
French idealist philosopher Émile Boutroux regarded Boehme’s work as “a 
mixture of abstruse theology, alchemy, speculations on the indiscernible, 
and the incomprehensible, fantastic poetry and mystic effusions”; in short, 
“a dazzling chaos.” 7 
 This tendency to polarize opinion was nothing new. As the nineteenth-
century Danish theologian Hans Martensen observed, Boehme: 
 had to pass, not only during his lifetime, but also after his death, 
through honour and dishonour, good report and evil report. Many have 
regarded him as a visionary, and have placed his teaching in the history 
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of human follies. In many libraries his writings are to be found under 
the rubric  Fanatici . Others have extolled him to the skies, and have 
believed that they have found in him all the treasures of knowledge and 
all enigmas solved. 8 
 To illustrate Martensen’s point, the day after Boehme’s burial, one of the 
physicians who had attended him on his deathbed lamented the loss of “a 
precious, enlightened, and highly God-taught” man who should have been 
revered by his fellow citizens rather than openly reviled as “a  Fanatic ,  En-
thusiast , and  Visionary .” 9 Indeed, a spectrum ranging from adulation to 
exasperation to repulsion characterized the main reactions to Boehme’s 
thought—either in the original German or in Latin, Dutch, English, Welsh, 
French, and Russian translations—from the second quarter of the seven-
teenth- to the mid-nineteenth century. 10 
 Thus, Pierre Poiret, a French devotee of the mystics, believed it was 
Boehme alone to whom God had “uncovered the foundation of nature, of 
spiritual as well as corporeal things, and who, with an utterly penetrating 
insight into matters theological or supernatural, also knew the origin of the 
true principles of metaphysical and pneumatic, as well as purely physical, 
philosophy.” In the same vein, Boehme’s early nineteenth-century French 
translator Louis Claude de Saint-Martin (“le philosophe inconnu”) urged 
readers to “dip courageously” into his “numerous writings, which contain . . . 
extraordinary and astonishing expositions of our primitive nature; of the 
source of evil; of the essence and laws of the universe; of the origin of 
gravity; of what he calls . . . the seven powers of nature; of the origin of 
water; . . . of the nature of the disobedience of the angels of darkness; . . . of 
the way of reconciliation which eternal love employed to reinstate man in 
his inheritance.” 11 Then, there was the German Catholic philosopher Franz 
von Baader, who had arrived at Boehme through reading Saint-Martin 
and who defended Boehme from the “absurd” charge of reviving the “blas-
phemous ancient Gnostic error, which would have the Devil as the cook 
and seasoning, and the stimulant in God as well as in Creation.” On the 
contrary, insisted von Baader, Boehme should be recognized for having es-
tablished more profoundly than anyone else before him or since, the fun-
damental teaching of a supernatural, supra-worldly, and uncreated God. 12 
 More ambivalent was the attitude of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, an 
eighteenth-century German scientist who, in a remark subsequently pop-
ularized by Sigmund Freud in a book on the joke’s relation to the uncon-
scious, likened the prose of Boehme’s “immortal works” to particular odes 
in that they are “a kind of picnic, where the author provides the words 
(the sound) and the reader the meaning.” 13 For the poet Samuel Coleridge, 
Boehme was “the great German Theosopher.” Although his “delusions” 
may have been “gross” and easily controverted, and although as a visionary 
he frequently mistook “the dreams of his own overexcited Nerves, the phan-
toms and witcheries from the cauldron of his own seething Fancy, for parts 
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or symbols of a universal Process,” as a philosopher, he surprises rather 
than perplexes. For according to Coleridge, the “unlearned” shoemaker 
“contemplated Truth and the forms of Nature thro’ a luminous Mist, the 
vaporous darkness rising from his Ignorance and accidental peculiarities of 
fancy and sensation, but the Light streaming into it from his inmost Soul.” 14 
Similarly, the nineteenth-century American essayist and Transcendentalist 
Ralph Waldo Emerson regarded Boehme as a poet, sage, and mystic who, 
“tremulous with emotion,” listened “awestruck with the gentlest humanity 
to the Teacher” whose lessons he conveyed. Notwithstanding his “mystical 
narrowness,” “incommunicableness,” and “vague, inadequate” proposi-
tions, Boehme’s “excellence” was merited by his “comprehensiveness”: “It 
is his aim that is great. He will know, not one thing, but all things.” 15 
 At the other extreme, Boehme was denounced as an “ingenious mad-
man” by the eighteenth-century theologian John Wesley. In his journal and 
correspondence, Wesley fulminated against what he deemed to be Boehme’s 
unscriptural, irrational, contradictory, crude, and indigestible blending of 
religion with philosophy. On reading part of Boehme’s allegorical exposition 
of Genesis, he spluttered, “it is most sublime nonsense; inimitable bombast; 
fustian not to be paralleled!” 16 A German church historian agreed: those 
who honored Boehme as an “ inspired messenger of heaven ” or admired him 
as a “judicious and wise philosopher” were “deceived and blinded in a very 
high degree; for never did there reign such obscurity and confusion in the 
writings of any mortal, as in the miserable productions of Jacob Behmen, 
which exhibit a motley mixture of chemical terms, crude visions, and mys-
tic jargon.” 17 Such censure chimed with the objections of two eighteenth-
century English bishops. William Warburton, bishop of Gloucester, believed 
that heavenly and earthly wisdom should be communicable and easily un-
derstood. Accordingly, he dismissed Boehme as an imposter, a “pretender” 
to divine inspiration, whose effusions were nothing but a “heap of unmean-
ing,” “unintelligible words,” “the jargon of the  spirit of infatuation .” 18 
Likewise, George Horne, bishop of Norwich, objected to these “stupendous 
reveries”: either Boehme’s scheme was a “ new revelation , or an explanation 
of the  old .” If the latter, why was it wrapped up in “ mystic jargon ” unheard 
of before in the Christian church and not given in plain “ Scripture lan-
guage ”? If the former, it was “an  imposture and  delusion ” since “ extraordi-
nary inspirations ” were only to be credited if supported by miracles. 19 
 Modern scholarship has generally focused on three complementary ap-
proaches in an effort to comprehend Boehme: the taxonomic, the genealog-
ical, and the contextual. The fi rst asks how we should defi ne Boehme; the 
second, which intellectual and religious traditions he inherited and contrib-
uted towards; and the third, what milieu he should be situated within. As 
we have seen, various Protestant clergymen and church historians tended to 
label Boehme a heretic, fanatic, enthusiast, visionary, or impostor, discredit-
ing his unwelcome plebeian challenge to ecclesiastical power structures and 
doctrinal orthodoxy by ridiculing him as an ignorant, delusional artisan 
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venting derivative, impenetrable gibberish. By contrast, Boehme’s followers 
generally revered him as a divine instrument, sanctifi ed fi gure, prophet, il-
luminate, sincere teacher, and genius. Others, including those intrigued but 
frustrated by his writings, have usually classed him either a mystic, Theos-
opher, philosopher, or prodigy. Boehme, however, does not readily conform 
to a specifi c type. Nor are these neutral terms, because each discloses—
albeit to different degrees—the reader’s perspective. So it may be unhelpful 
to categorize Boehme as one thing or another and more useful to envisage 
him as an exceptional hybrid. 
 Similar issues arise from the second approach. Here, investigators run 
the risk of repeating the methodology of both heresiographers and hagiog-
raphers, who sought to damage or enhance Boehme’s reputation by seeking 
precedents—though rarely with suffi cient attention to subtle doctrinal dis-
tinctions or indeed an adequate explanation for how ideas were transmitted 
to and received by him. All the same, Boehme’s concepts clearly did not 
originate from nothing, so it is worthwhile to briefl y review these traditions 
and his potential sources. Writing approximately a century after the German 
Reformation and calling for a Great Reformation, Boehme was occasionally 
likened to a second Luther, and Lutheran thought—especially as mediated 
in Görlitz—clearly had a big impact on his development. Boehme has also 
been positioned within a tradition of German mysticism, with roots going 
back to pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, which attempted to understand 
and describe the divine nature by emphasizing what God was not. Moreover, 
he has been regarded as an independently-minded successor of the spiritual 
reformers, notably Caspar Schwenckfeld and Valentin Weigel. Then there 
is Paracelsus, whose infl uence is undeniable. Through him and his inter-
preters, Boehme became acquainted with the wider alchemical tradition, 
while his knowledge of heliocentrism shows familiarity with astrological 
texts. These resonances, in conjunction with perceived pantheistic elements, 
have prompted suggestions that Boehme drew ultimate inspiration from an 
ancient theology that embraced currents of Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, Her-
meticism, and Christian adaptations of the Jewish Kabbalah. In addition, 
although not a staunch millenarian, Boehme expected an imminent period 
of great tribulation, and hence his apocalyptic thought has been compared 
with Joachim of Fiore’s eschatological scheme. 
 Despite the paucity of evidence, the third approach, namely the pains-
taking recovery of Boehme’s milieu, has been instrumental in overturning 
enduring misconceptions. Here, biographical discoveries have supplemented 
and corrected the familiar, idealized portrait, while important research on 
the backdrop—Görlitz’s lively intellectual scene; contemporary religious 
controversies between Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists and assorted sectari-
ans; the local impact of the Thirty Years’ War; not to mention Boehme’s cir-
cle of physicians, alchemists, prophets, Rosicrucian sympathizers, customs 
offi cials, tradesmen, and noblemen—has considerably enhanced our under-
standing of how his work was informed by and responded to wider contexts. 
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 Unquestionably, as the essays in this volume indicate, Boehme’s rich and 
diverse legacy spans the four centuries since a legible manuscript copy of 
his fi rst if incomplete book (later entitled “Aurora”) was made. 20 Encour-
agingly, Andrew Weeks’s modern English translation with accompanying 
original German text and critical apparatus is nearing completion. Together 
with relatively recent published work and other ongoing projects, this 
should go some way towards “rescuing Boehme’s thought and discourse 
from the oblivion” into which it has regrettably fallen in Anglophone his-
torical, theological, and philosophical scholarship. 21 Beyond the academy, 
there is a popular audience for Boehme as a simple internet search attests. 
Some, like certain theosophists at the turn of the twentieth century, are un-
doubtedly drawn by a quest for “Higher Wisdom” or an interest in esoteric 
philosophy and mysticism more generally; others, perhaps with a view to 
his teachings about the existence of evil, God’s presence within the creation, 
and the noble virgin Sophia, might see potential for stimulating debates 
on aspects of moral philosophy, environmentalism, poetic expression, and 
female-centered spirituality. 22 Whatever the reason, Evelyn Underhill’s hy-
perbolical observation is worth repeating: Boehme “remains one of those 
cloud-wrapped immortals who must be rediscovered and reinterpreted by 
the adventurers of every age.” 23 
 II 
 As Nigel Smith suggests in Chapter Six of this volume, the interpretation 
of Boehme has been developmental: a kind of “progressive revelation.” For 
this reason, our book is designed to illustrate that diachronic exegetical pro-
cess, stopping at signifi cant landmarks along the pathway towards under-
standing. Several of the essays are concerned with the essential paradox at 
the heart of Boehme’s thought and its reception: the interplay between what 
Andrew Weeks describes as “his anomalous status as a simple shoemaker 
and the incommensurate complexities of his writing.” Ariel Hessayon’s in-
troductory chapter attempts to provide a balanced account of Boehme’s life 
by stripping away both hagiographic myths perpetuated by his earliest biog-
rapher and negative stereotypes conversely maintained in the heresiography. 
He then contextualizes Boehme’s thought, highlighting the process whereby 
he acquired specialist knowledge through a combination of reading and 
conversation. The result was the sophisticated works of Boehme’s intel-
lectual maturity (1619–1624). In Chapter Three, Andrew Weeks burrows 
deeply into the theological and cultural soil in which Boehme himself was 
embedded. His synoptic interpretation of Boehme’s intellectual formation 
illuminates how traditions of anticlerical dissent, medieval and Renaissance 
cosmogony, and Lutheran metaphysics interact in the Teutonic Philoso-
pher’s vastly ambitious project. With sensitivity to the immediate political 
situation of the Empire at the turn of the seventeenth century as well as 
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intellectual inheritance, Weeks also looks forward to explain how Boehme’s 
“liminality” between epochs, and between lay and elite culture, resonated 
so powerfully in later modernism. The contemporary environment, in which 
any three-dimensional portrait of Boehme must be grounded, is further ex-
cavated in Leigh Penman’s chapter on his intellectual networks in the early 
seventeenth century. Defi nitively, Penman explodes the myth of Boehme as a 
prodigious “voice crying in the wilderness,” reconstructing through careful 
prosopographical study the heterodox networks of contemporary Görlitz. 
Just as Weeks maps out the broader intellectual infl uence of the Radical 
Reformation, so Penman illustrates with microscopic precision the patronal 
and personal relationships that linked Boehme with antinomian, Paracel-
sian, Kabbalistic, chiliast, and spiritualist thinkers. 
 The extent and limit of Boehme’s English reception, particularly during 
the politically explosive period of the Civil Wars and Revolution, are ex-
plored in the fi fth chapter. Here, Hessayon points to the pitfalls of trac-
ing too linear a Behmenist genealogy, showing that the English translations 
must be understood as part of a more diffuse dissemination of mystical and 
occult literature. He challenges the assumption that it was primarily a radi-
cal sectarian audience to which Boehme appealed, showing that the impulse 
for translation came rather from irenic and politically moderate milieus. 
Boehme’s signifi cance in seventeenth-century England, Hessayon argues, 
does not lie in the formative contribution he made to the incendiary reli-
gious politics of the Revolution, but rather in the way that he was enlisted 
in the service of existing agendas and intellectual trends. In the following 
chapter, Nigel Smith analyses the appeal of Boehme’s writings, especially to 
English readers, in the decades after their earliest publication. He suggests 
that part of the initial attraction of Boehme’s prose lay in its inherent dif-
fi culty and obscurity: its refusal to yield up readily its meaning to rational 
scrutiny. As the earlier chapters demonstrate and as Smith indicates, the 
long process of digesting and contextualizing Boehme over centuries has 
exposed a coherency in his thought, which even the most well-read of early 
modern interpreters were unable to unravel at fi rst glance. However, it was 
precisely this opacity in Boehme’s writing that helped to confi rm its status 
as authentic prophecy and which encouraged experimental types of inspired 
speech and poetry pointing precociously towards Blake’s distinctive mysti-
cal register. 
 The role of English readers in keeping Boehme’s thought alive into the 
eighteenth century was crucial, as Sarah Apetrei’s epilogue on the London 
Philadelphian Society (founded in the 1690s) indicates. Jane Lead, the vi-
sionary matriarch of the Philadelphians, helped to consolidate Boehme’s 
reputation as inspired magus while establishing herself as his successor. 
Lead’s distinctive interpretations of Boehme—for example, reconfi guring 
his doctrine of “Sophia” or Divine Wisdom or carrying through his escha-
tological discourse to a vision of universal salvation—shaped the preoccu-
pations of the next generation of his readers, including radical Pietists and 
6244-139-001-2pass-r02.indd   7 5/31/2013   8:51:07 AM
8 Ariel Hessayon and Sarah Apetrei
mystical readers in France, England, and Scotland. This reinforces Smith’s 
conclusion that Lead provided a crucial point of reference for all prophetic 
and anti-scholastic (perhaps also anticlerical) appropriations of Boehme in 
the post-Enlightenment age. This legacy provides part of the context for 
Lucinda Martin’s discussion of German Pietism in Chapter Seven. Martin 
examines the channels through which Pietists became reacquainted with 
Boehme and maps out the diverse and vibrant landscape of Pietist interpre-
tations. These range from the deeply idiosyncratic, chiliastic, and sectarian, 
such as Johann Georg Gichtel’s celibate “Angel Brothers” or the sexually 
invasive and controlling “Mother Eva Society,” to Gottfried Arnold’s more 
intellectually mainstream and widely-disseminated exposition of Sophia 
doctrine. The anthropological implications of Sophianic thought suggested 
by the English Behmenists, chiefl y John Pordage and Jane Lead, stimulated 
in Pietism not only the disturbing attitudes to sexuality manifested in certain 
sects, but also, Martin concludes, renewed prospects for female authority. 
 The versatility of Boehme’s thought, potentially amenable to both rigorist 
and antinomian readings, emerges once again in Alan Gregory’s treatment 
of one of his most critical and complex yet also most celebrated interpreters, 
the eighteenth-century English mystic William Law. Gregory shows how 
Law used Boehme to construct a spiritual system centered on the doctrine 
of regeneration and identifi es two signifi cant hermeneutical moves. First, 
within a distinctively Anglican apologetic tradition, Law re-deploys Boehme 
for the orthodox cause, showing how his integrated narrative of creation 
resists both the radically dualist and radically monist implications of con-
temporary philosophies. However, as Gregory argues, Law’s use of Boehme 
is not merely opportunistic. As any truly faithful interpreter must, he rec-
ognizes that Boehme’s prose is essentially performative, written with intent 
upon the reader, not so much to unveil mysteries as to engender change. 
Such an appreciation of the generative quality of Boehme’s writing is char-
acteristic of the Romantic reception of Boehme, discussed in the follow-
ing chapters by Kristine Hannak and Elisabeth Jessen. Hannak and Jessen 
trace the historical channels of Boehme’s reception among seminal fi gures in 
German and English Romanticism and also analyze the aesthetic, intellec-
tual, and emotional appeal of Boehme’s prophetic discourse for a formative 
generation in the history of Western literature. Hannak asks how and why 
Boehme was read as a  poet in the German Romantic movement, explaining 
that for critics of rationalism, such as Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, their 
project was to “poeticize” society, or make visible the spiritual. Turning to 
the English Romantics, Jessen contrasts the Behmenism of William Blake 
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, arguing that the former’s deeply felt, sensually 
animated, and anti-institutional engagement with Boehme made him the 
more authentic reader, while the latter’s assessment was altogether more 
critically circumspect. 
 Blake found inspiration in Boehme for a radical ecclesiology. In distant 
Russia, however, it was the established Orthodox Church that provided the 
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most receptive audience for his ideas. Since the arrival in Moscow of the 
Behmenist prophet Quirinus Kuhlmann in the late seventeenth century, Rus-
sian thought was continually nourished by Boehme’s infl uence. In Chapter 
Eleven, Oliver Smith examines not only the intellectual impact of Boehme, 
initially through Masonic circles and later in Russian religious philosophy, 
but also his role in shaping the ideal landscapes of aristocratic estates in the 
later eighteenth century. Smith’s analysis also illuminates the central im-
portance of Boehme’s Sophiology for the great Russian theologians of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concluding with the surpris-
ing interest in Boehme shown by Marxists and Soviet dissidents. Above all, 
this survey of the Russian reception illustrates the extraordinary variety of 
contexts in which Boehme has resonated as well as the astonishing range of 
modern thinkers to whom his writing has sounded prophetic. 
 A more familiar legacy, though equally signifi cant, is the debt owed to 
Boehme by the German idealist philosophers. In Chapter Twelve, Glenn 
Magee reassesses his infl uence on perhaps the greatest of these, Georg Wil-
helm Friedrich Hegel. As Magee illustrates, mystical infl uences on Hegel, 
and especially that of Boehme, have been somewhat marginalized in ac-
counts of his philosophical development. In many respects, Magee’s narra-
tive picks up where Hannak’s ends—with Schelling, Novalis, and Schlegel 
in Jena, representing the increasingly recognizable pattern of an intellectual 
network collectively seduced by Boehme’s writings. The signifi cance of this 
circle for Hegel, and especially his mentor and friend Schelling, forms the 
starting point for Magee’s contention that Boehme supplied the watershed 
moment in Hegel’s thought. Taking into account Hegel’s own stated ambiva-
lence, he nonetheless suggests that Hegel’s writings continued to be fertilized 
by Boehme throughout his career. George Pattison pursues the evolutions 
of Boehme beyond German idealism, further into the nineteenth century 
and the work of the Danish Hegelian theologian, Hans Martensen. During 
a period in which theosophy and Darwinism became dominant conversa-
tion partners for theologians, Martensen’s long engagement with Boehme 
came to fruition in his monograph on Boehme, published at the end of his 
life in 1881. Pattison suggests that, unlike some other readers of Boehme, 
Martensen’s theosophical trajectory strayed from the apophatic center of 
Christian mysticism—the “wisdom of unknowing”—and towards a kind 
of gnosis. 
 It is the positive and uncompromising truth claims made by Boehme, 
especially the “initiatory” quality of his prose, which, as Arthur Versluis 
explains in Chapter Fourteen, present such a challenge to contemporary 
scholarship. A leading historian and theorist of Western esotericism, Ver-
sluis maps out the different prospects for Boehme’s role in the modern fi eld 
of esoteric studies. Of particular diffi culty for scholars working in this area 
is the ambiguity of Boehme’s intellectual identity: he draws together threads 
from alchemical, astrological, Kabbalistic, and mystical traditions, some of 
which are more congenial to the epistemological assumptions of modern 
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esotericism than others. However, Versluis shows that this dynamic status 
helpfully draws attention to the taxonomical problems inherent in the cat-
egory of the “esoteric” itself. Bringing the question of infl uence and appro-
priation forward to the present moment, the concluding chapter by Bruce 
Janz asks why Boehme matters today. Writing from the perspective of a 
philosopher, Janz suggests that it is the uncontained creativity of Boehme’s 
thinking that provides a source of inspiration for contemporary readers. 
Refusing to be inhibited by conventions of language or conceptual organi-
zation, Boehme is relentless in his appetite for fresh solutions to renewed 
questions. The legacy of this startling originality is not only to be found 
in direct intellectual genealogies or explicit adherence. Janz suggests, “The 
most interesting Boehme today is the one we don’t know is there, the one 
who has become part of the backdrop against which other concepts strive 
for manifestation.” 
 Pathways in the reception history of Boehme—not all of which are cov-
ered in this volume—are bewildering in their variety and divergent courses. 
There is far more to say, of course, about Boehme’s impact on philosophy 
(Nietzsche and Schopenhauer), literature (Emerson, Lawrence, and Yeats), 
psychoanalysis (Jung) and religion (theosophy and Pentecostalism). These 
essays are intended to provide a stimulus for further research and the begin-
ning of a coherent narrative explaining the place that Boehme occupies in 
the “backdrop” of modernity. Our volume underscores the irreducible spec-
ifi city of historical context in Boehme’s reception, while also highlighting 
some themes that transcend the particular. The mysteriousness of the vision-
ary genre, its transformative potency combined with its obstinate opacity, 
has resonated counter-culturally in intellectual environments increasingly 
dominated by positivism and distaste for mystery. But rather than placing 
a traditionalist harness on rampant modernity, Boehme offers a dynamic 
alternative, as much in tune with postmodern critical theory as with seven-
teenth-century prophecy: the creative striving for new ways of speaking that 
will open up new ways of thinking. 
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 Ariel Hessayon 1 
 I BOEHME’S LIFE: DISTINGUISHING TRUTH FROM MYTH 
 There have been few more polarizing fi gures in early modern religious history 
than the German Lutheran mystic Jacob Boehme (ca.1575–1624), who has 
been regarded as a divinely illuminated genius by his most devoted disciples 
yet also reviled in equal measure as an incomprehensible, ignorant heretic 
by his fi ercest critics. Partly derived from his reminiscences in conversation, 
Boehme’s earliest biography was posthumously crafted, embroidered, and 
continually reworked by his principal admirer, the Silesian nobleman Abra-
ham von Franckenberg (1593–1652). It is predominantly hagiographic, the 
eight extant versions produced between 1631 and 1651, supplementing as-
pects of Boehme’s own carefully self-fashioned identity, which emphasized 
that though a humble, innocent artisan, he was the recipient of profound 
God-given knowledge. 
 Contrary to what has usually been assumed, the date of Boehme’s 
nativity is uncertain. Most likely, he was born sometime between mid-
November 1574 and mid-June 1575. Boehme was the fourth of fi ve children 
of Jacob (d.1618) and his fi rst wife Ursula (d.1607?), Lutheran peasants 
undoubtedly not of the “poorest sort” as von Franckenberg claimed—they 
were modest farmers—yet possibly of “sober and honest demeanour.” He 
came from the village of Alt-Seidenberg (modern Zawidów, Poland). This 
was roughly eight miles from Görlitz, a town in Upper Lusatia of around 
10,000 inhabitants by 1600. During his childhood, Boehme was said to 
have tended cattle and subsequently to have attended school, where he 
probably received an elementary education. Young Jacob, whose father was 
a lay jurist, deacon, and vestryman, was, according to von Franckenberg, 
“addicted to the feare of God” and a “willing hearer” of church sermons. 2 
Progressing from shoemaker’s apprentice to journeyman, he registered him-
self as a burgher of Görlitz and purchased a cobbler’s shop there for 240 
marks on April 24, 1599. Just over two weeks later on May 10th , he mar-
ried Katharina Kuntzschmann, a wealthy local butcher’s daughter. They had 
four sons: Jacob (bap. January 29, 1600–fl . 1628), Michael (bap. January 
8, 1602–fl . March 1608), Tobias (bap. September 11, 1603–fl . 1630), and 
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Elias (bap. September 4, 1611–d. November 10, 1625). 3 On August 21 st , 
1599, Boehme bought a large property for three hundred marks on the east 
bank of the river Neisse, which still stands. 4 
 Boehme’s earliest premonitions and visionary experiences are undated. 
While still a boy tending cattle, he climbed the Landeskrone (a hill southwest 
of Görlitz), where among the big red stones he found a wooden container 
full of money. Being honest, he left this untouched, and von Franckenberg 
later interpreted the incident –which may have been invented given its sim-
ilarity to local legends—as an omen of Boehme’s “future spiritual Admis-
sion to the Sight of the hidden Treasury of the Wisdom and Mysteries of 
God and Nature.” 5 On another occasion, when an apprentice minding his 
master’s shop, Boehme was said to have been visited by a stranger who 
predicted greatness for him as well as misery, poverty, and persecution. A 
different time, Boehme had his fi rst supposed visionary experience when, 
having “awakened within himself” and at the same time become alarmed 
by “manifold scholarly quarrelling over religion (to which he could not con-
form and subject himself),” he was enraptured by a divine light for seven 
days. 6 Then about 1600, Boehme was again possessed with a divine light 
and, suddenly seeing a pewter vessel, was “brought to the inward ground 
or  Centrum of the hidden  Nature .” Presently going out into an open fi eld 
he beheld “the  Wonder-workes of the Creator” in the “Signatures, Shapes, 
Figures, and Qualities or Properties of all created things,” very clearly and 
manifestly laid open. 7 
 In 1610, having vended his property but continuing to live there paying 
rent, Boehme bought two houses for 375 marks. He sold the smaller and 
made the other his home. This new dwelling was very close to his old res-
idence, situated within the Neisse Gate at the eastern edge of Görlitz and 
conveniently on the road to Liegnitz (modern Legnica, Poland). That same 
year, he also received a third divine illumination. Unwilling to forget what 
had been imparted to him by the Holy Spirit, he secretly set pen to paper for 
his own edifi cation. Between January and June of 1612, he made a fair copy 
of his celebrated “Morgenröthe im Aufgang” or “Aurora” (literally “Morn-
ing Glow, Ascending”), a long, unfi nished work that seems to have been at 
least twelve years in the making. But following the clandestine circulation 
of the manuscript and the transcription of additional copies—probably on 
the initiative of a good friend, Karl Ender von Sercha (1568–1624), though 
supposedly without the author’s consent—there was trouble. According to 
von Franckenberg, Boehme was subjected to virulent invective poured out 
from the pulpit by Pastor Gregor Richter (1560–1624), who stirred up the 
magistracy against him. Consequently, this humble and “blessed” man was 
committed to custody, had his book seized, was declared an idiot, and ad-
monished to refrain from writing such books that “ did not belong to his 
profession and condition .” 8 
 These events can be corroborated by the diary of Bartholomäus Sculte-
tus (1540–1614), who, besides being a notable mathematician, astronomer, 
6244-139-002-2pass-r02.indd   14 5/31/2013   11:11:37 AM
Boehme’s Life and Times 15
and advocate of Paracelsian teaching, was then Görlitz’s mayor. Although 
Scultetus’s diary is no longer extant, there exist slightly different versions of 
three extracts referring to Boehme. Thus Scultetus recorded that on Friday, 
July 26th , 1613: 
 Jacob Boehme, a shoemaker living between the gates behind the hos-
pital forge, was summoned to the Senate-House for punishment and 
asked about his enthusiastic opinions. Thereupon he was put in prison 
and as soon as his book, written in quarto, was brought from his house 
by Oswald [Krause], he was released from confi nement and warned to 
cease from such matters. 9 
 Then on Sunday, July 28 th , Scultetus noted that Richter used a text against 
false prophets to preach a sharp and “tart” sermon against Boehme the 
shoemaker. Finally, on Tuesday, July 30 th , Boehme was brought before Gör-
litz’s Lutheran ministry and rigorously examined “concerning his Confes-
sion of Faith.” 10 
 By this time, Boehme had already sold his cobbler’s bench and begun to 
engage in small-scale commerce, trading in yarns and gloves. After an in-
terval of several years, he had a fourth spiritual experience that resulted in 
his most creative period. Supposedly stirred up again by the motion of the 
Holy Spirit and encouraged by the entreaties of certain God-fearing people, 
he took up his pen, producing “The Three Principles of the Divine Essence” 
(1619), “The Threefold Life of Man” (completed and copied by September 
1620), “Forty Questions concerning the Soul” (completed by August 1620), 
“The Incarnation of Jesus Christ” (completed between May and August 
1620), “Six Points,” both “Great” and “Small” (1620), and a number of 
other treatises, including “Signatura Rerum” (completed by August 1621) 
and “Mysterium Magnum” (completed by September 1623). Von Franck-
enberg claimed that, although Boehme wrote slowly in a plain, legible hand, 
he never altered nor crossed out a single word in his writing, “but just as 
it was suggested to his Mind by the Spirit of God, so it stood clear and un-
transcribed upon the Paper.” 11 Unless one believes in divine dictation, such 
astonishing fl uency can be discounted. There are, for example, two different 
versions of the “Aurora” extant in the hands of various copyists. One is 
signifi cantly shorter, suggesting that Boehme’s method of composition was 
to elaborate on inchoate drafts. If he then fi nished these works as the op-
portunity arose, this explains how he seemingly wrote so much so quickly. 
 Boehme boasted that his manuscript writings were known throughout 
Silesia as well as in many places in the Margraviate of Brandenburg, Meis-
sen, and Saxony. Even so, they remained in that form until the beginning of 
January 1624 when Johann Sigismund von Schweinichen (1590–1664) paid 
for the unauthorized printing of  Der Weg zu Christo (Görlitz, 1624), which 
contained three short pieces: “True Repentance,” “True Resignation,” and 
“A Dialogue between a scholar and his master, concerning the Super-sensual 
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life.” This transition from scribal publication to print was important. Nev-
ertheless, having a work in the public domain without the approval of Gör-
litz’s town council or clergy antagonized Richter, who denounced Boehme as 
a “common Disturber of the Peace, a turbulent, restless, sorry Fellow, and a 
Heretic.” So bitter was Richter’s tirade that the matter came to the attention 
of Görlitz’s town council. 12 Presented with “manifold” complaints against 
Boehme’s “alleged pernicious doctrine,” they decreed that he be summoned 
before them. Their minute-book of March 26 th , 1624 records that: 
 the shoemaker and confused enthusiast or visionary, says that he com-
posed the book . . . though he did not have it printed . . . Was warned 
by the Council to seek fortune elsewhere, or in default of fair means 
this must be reported to the Illustrious Prince Elector. Thereupon he 
declared that he would take his departure as soon as possible. 13 
 The next day, Richter fi nished the third and fi nal part of his humanist sat-
ire, censuring the “enthusiastic shoemaker’s fanatic books.” Here, Richter 
inveighed against Boehme’s new manner of speaking and the many blasphe-
mies in his text, which stank “ abominably of Shoemakers Pitch  and Black-
ing.” Among these alleged noxious notions were Boehme’s denial of God 
the Father’s eternity and his teaching of a Quaternity, or four-fold nature of 
God. There was also personal vilifi cation: the shoemaker was an unlearned, 
drunken, rascally knave aspiring to be a new prophet when he was really the 
Antichrist. Boehme in turn quickly wrote a letter to the council (April 3 rd ) 
pleading that he was a simple layman whose divinely inspired work should 
not be condemned to be burned and including an impassioned defense re-
futing this horrid libel (10 April). 14 
 Although Richter had demanded Boehme’s banishment, and although a 
fanciful story circulating more than twenty-fi ve years later claimed that this 
falsely accused “patient and blessed” man was banished by majority verdict 
of the town council only to be recalled the following day, Boehme was ad-
monished rather than commanded by the council to go away for a while. 15 
Clearly, it was advisable to leave until the controversy abated; as he put it, 
“the fi re of  Satans Anger and Rage burneth  at Home .” 16 Initially he headed 
south to Zittau. There he met with some adherents before traveling west to 
Dresden at the invitation of certain eminent people attending the court of 
Johann Georg I, Prince-Elector of Saxony. Setting out on May 9 th , 1624, 
and arriving by May 15 th , Boehme stayed at the home of the court’s al-
chemist, Benedikt Hinckelmann (d.1642). Word of his coming soon spread 
among the Prince-Elector’s entourage, and infl uential fi gures such as coun-
cilor Joachim von Loß (1576–1633); the Marshal of the House, Alexan-
der von Ragewitz (d.1629); and Dietrich von Taube (1594–1639), who 
was Master of Horse and chief chamberlain, signaled their desire to meet 
with him. Boehme explained this surprisingly warm reception, which dif-
fered sharply from his treatment at Görlitz, by ingenuously remarking that 
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his little printed book was “loved and liked” by these great personages—
so much so that many consulted it daily, acknowledging it to be a “ divine 
Gift .” Presently, on the feast of Pentecost (Whitsunday), May 26 th , Johann 
Melchior von Schwalbach (1581–1635), von Ragewitz, von Taube, and an 
unnamed councilor visited Boehme at his lodging. They apparently listened 
to him very willingly in an atmosphere of love and kindness, promising their 
“favour and assistance.” The following Thursday, May 30 th , Boehme was 
fetched by coach together with Hinckelmann and a physician to von Loß’s 
castle about a mile from Dresden. Von Loß was considered a very learned 
man and he, too, loved Boehme’s “Cause and  Gifts .” Indeed, Boehme ex-
pected von Loß to act as his patron, thereby enabling him to publish his 
work more freely without fear of retribution. Another noteworthy reader 
and apparent admirer of Boehme’s treatise on “True Repentance” was the 
Lutheran superintendent Ägidus Strauch (1583–1657), who, together with 
the court chaplain, Dr Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg (1580–1645), had begun 
teaching the doctrine of “the New Birth and the  Inward Man.” Even so, 
Strauch still required clarifi cation on certain abstruse points beyond his 
comprehension and arranged for a conference with Boehme at his lodging 
on Sunday, June 16 th . 17 
 While the details of Boehme’s theological discussions at Dresden are un-
known, there is no contemporary evidence indicating that he was formally 
examined about his views. This offi cial silence contrasts with the well-
known account of the Breslau physician, Cornelius Weißner, who, after ini-
tially rejecting Boehme’s ideas, became a follower. Writing in February of 
1651, Weißner maintained that Boehme was interviewed in the presence of 
the Prince-Elector by six Lutheran theologians, including the famous Jo-
hann Gerhard (1582–1637), and two professors of mathematics about the 
“high Mysteries” contained in his writings. He responded to their diffi cult 
theological, philosophical, and astrological questions with such “meekness 
of spirit” and “depth of knowledge” that these eminent men reportedly 
found nothing objectionable in his “mild” answers. 18 Despite being widely 
accepted during the seventeenth century and indeed reinforced with a doc-
ument written by a Görlitz councilor in 1669, modern scholarship has gen-
erally questioned the reliability of Weißner’s narrative even though there is 
universal agreement that no judgment was passed against Boehme. All the 
same, the motivations of the various councilors and court offi cials men-
tioned in Boehme’s correspondence are not entirely clear, nor do we know 
what may have happened behind the scenes. It does appear, however, that 
Boehme’s announcement of the dawn of a Great Reformation, of a new age 
of love, patience, peace and joy, went largely unheeded. 
 By July, Boehme had returned to Görlitz. Despite probable exhaustion, 
he then undertook a journey to the family seat of his supporter von Sch-
weinichen at Schweinhaus, Silesia (modern Sw´iny, Poland). There he spent 
several weeks in the company of von Schweinichen and von Franckenberg. 
Boehme was in ill health, however, and, despite subsisting on a practically 
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vegetarian diet, fell sick about mid-August of a burning fever which he exac-
erbated by drinking too much water. 19 At his request, he was taken back to 
Görlitz, arriving at his house on November 7 th , where the Paracelsian phy-
sician, Tobias Kober (1587–1625), and his colleague, Melchior Berndt of 
Zittau, attended him. But they despaired of his symptoms: rumbling bowels, 
pain in his left side, swollen belly and feet, gaping mouth, great decay of the 
chest and face, and discolored urine. With the end approaching, Boehme re-
ceived Pastor Elias Dietrich, who required his assent to questions of faith be-
fore administering the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper to him. Boehme died 
about six o’clock in the morning on Sunday, November 17 th , 1624. Shortly 
beforehand, he supposedly called his son Tobias, asking him whether he 
heard the “sweet” harmonious music without his chamber. Boehme’s last 
recorded words were “ Now go I hence into Paradise .” 20 
 At Boehme’s request, the funeral arrangements were undertaken by 
Kober, but the dead man’s family and friends were unable to prevent both 
the shunning of his corpse by the majority of Görlitz’s clergy and the subse-
quent desecration of his grave. Although the text fi rst chosen for Boehme’s 
funeral sermon was Revelation 3:5, the new principal minister Nikolaus 
Thomas—Richter had predeceased Boehme by three months—washed his 
hands of it, insisting he would have nothing to do with a man notorious for 
infecting the region with “ Fanaticism and  Enthusiasm .” Boehme’s widow, 
Katharina, and his heirs were thus forced to petition the mayor, who con-
vened a meeting of the town council. After much debate and with legal 
approval, they concluded that it was a humane and pious duty to grant 
heretics a decent burial and for the deceased to have a funeral sermon. The 
next day, Katharina and her children petitioned the town council, request-
ing immediate interment since Boehme’s corpse was rapidly decomposing 
and ready to burst. They consented. Pastor Dietrich who, like his senior col-
league, had refused to preach the funeral sermon, was ordered to do so and 
instructed to pass over Boehme’s doctrinal errors in silence. On Wednesday, 
November 20 th , the church bells of St. Nicholas were rung, hymns sung, 
and Boehme, neatly dressed within his coffi n, was solemnly laid to rest. 
Although the principal minister had excused himself from the occasion by 
pretending to be sick, three other clergymen were obliged to join the pro-
cession to the grave, which was very near the churchyard’s center. They 
slunk off, however, at the nearest opportunity and did not enter church 
with other mourners as was customary. Despite some mockery amongst the 
“great concourse” of people present, the cortege of friends, sympathizers, 
shoemakers, and tanners outnumbered them. Inside, Dietrich began his ser-
mon by saying he would rather be elsewhere, asserting that he did not share 
Boehme’s heterodox beliefs. Having publicly exculpated himself with this 
unusual preamble, he pointedly chose to preach on Hebrews 9:27, “it is ap-
pointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment.” In the evening, 
Dietrich returned his fee and, fearing censure from his fellow priests for 
having complied with the council’s directive, requested an indemnifi cation 
from them. 21 
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 Boehme’s grave was originally marked by a black wooden cross sent as a 
gift by unnamed Silesian friends (probably von Schweinichen and, among oth-
ers, perhaps also von Franckenberg). Erected at least one day after his burial, 
it fi ttingly consisted of an elaborate “Hieroglyphical Monument.” At its top 
was the Hebrew name of Jesus “הושהי” encompassed by twelve golden beams, 
under which a reclining child rested its head on a skull. Below were eight 
initials, V.H.I.L.I.C.I.V., representing Boehme’s motto, “Unser Heil Im Leben 
Jesu Christi In Uns” ( Our Salvation is In the Life of Jesus Christ In Us ). And 
below that, a broad oval circle on which was inscribed Boehme’s epitaph. His 
last words were written on the vertical shaft reading upwards. Yet the most 
enigmatic feature was a threefold painted “mystical” device. On the right from 
the south side was a black eagle on a rock, its left foot treading on a serpent’s 
head, its right clutching a palm, with a lily-twig in its beak (the lily-twig was 
a symbol of new regeneration affected by Christ’s presence within man). On 
the left from the north side stood a lion with a crown and cross on its head, its 
right hind-foot on a cube, its left on a globe, its right fore-paw brandishing a 
fl aming sword, and its left grasping a burning heart. In the middle, below the 
epitaph on the stock of the cross (and resembling the twenty-ninth of Paracel-
sus’s magical fi gures) was a lamb with a bishop’s miter, beneath a palm tree, by 
a spring in a meadow, feeding among fl owers. Each device also bore a single 
Latin word, “veni,” “vidi,” “vici;” an apparent allusion to coming into the 
world, seeing Satan’s fall, and conquering Hell. Within a year, however, this 
elaborate memorial had been “bespattered with Filth,” mangled and defaced 
by the “ blind furious zeale ” of Boehme’s hateful persecutors, who, unable to 
crucify the “blessed” man in life, destroyed his cross after death. 22 
 There are no authentic portraits of Boehme. Those likenesses that exist—
oddly, his hair tends to get thicker rather than thinner over time while his 
weight fl uctuates alarmingly—appear to be based mainly on contemporary 
descriptions of his physical appearance. Best known is von Franckenberg’s 
portrayal: 
 The external physical form of J. B. was time-worn, of ordinary appear-
ance, small stature, low forehead, raised temples, slightly hooked nose, 
grey or intensely sky-blue glittering eyes, which, moreover, were like 
windows to Solomon’s Temple, a short and spare beard, and small thin 
voice; yet gracious of speech, well-bred in manner, humble of conduct, 
patient of suffering, gentle of heart. His spirit, highly illuminated by 
God beyond all natural measure, and his utterly pure, comprehensible 
High German manner of speaking can be judged and recognized from 
these, his unfalsifi ed writings in the divine light. 23 
 Christian Bernhard (d.1649), a toll-collector of Sagan (modern Zagan, Po-
land), depicted him similarly: 
 A middling person, but for the most part smaller rather than larger, lean 
body, black beard, with a staff and little white sack of books, in which he 
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had a little bread, a slight black coat, miserable worn clothes, very dirty 
from pitch, in the manner of a cobbler. The pants wide open at the front. 24 
 If the latter sketch is trustworthy, it represents an impecunious individ-
ual. While Boehme had evidently enjoyed a period of prosperity and indeed 
inherited half his father’s estate in 1618, he apparently soon forsook his 
trade, devoting himself with little distraction to his calling. During inter-
mittent periods of deprivation and devastation following the outbreak of 
 Figure 2.1  Jacob Boehme ’ s house on the east bank of the river Neisse where he 
lived between 1599 and 1610. The property has undergone restoration since then and 
today houses a small museum in Zgorzelec, Poland.  © Copyright Ariel Hessayon, 
June 2012 
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what became known as the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), he received 
gifts of corn from his patron Karl Ender, which provided essential suste-
nance as well as a convenient method of smuggling books hidden within 
sacks. Other supporters sent him food and money, perhaps in exchange for 
permission to copy his anonymous manuscripts, whose contents and author-
ship were sometimes clarifi ed by letters accompanying them. For his part, 
Boehme served as a go-between, negotiating the purchase of books at the 
Leipzig fair and the sale of other people’s works as well as safe passage to 
the intended recipients. Although his wife continued the family yarn trading 
business, this still suggests an almost hand-to-mouth existence. Defending 
himself against Richter, Boehme claimed to be a poor beer-drinking man, 
 Figure 2.2  Plaque placed by the Oberlausitzische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 
outside Boehme ’ s house on the tercentenary of his death in 1924.  © Copyright Ariel 
Hessayon, June 2012 
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unable to afford foreign wine or brandy. Though little is known of his later 
fi nancial affairs, Boehme may have died in relative poverty since a collection 
was taken to defray his funeral expenses. Besides property, the only thing 
of value he bequeathed was his writings, which had been dispersed. He left 
specifi c instructions to his son Tobias to collect them from the people they 
had been lent to, probably intending to deposit his literary remains with von 
Schweinichen. 
 Von Franckenberg added that Boehme had a seal consisting of a hand 
reaching out from heaven holding a stalk of three full-blown lilies. This 
represented the “Kingdom of the Lily in the Paradise of God,” which was to 
 Figure 2.3  One of Boehme ’ s later gravestones. This was erected in about 1800 
on the initiative of Karl Gottlob von Anton, a member of Görlitz city senate, and 
funded by subscription.  © Copyright Ariel Hessayon, June 2012 
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be manifested in the “last Time, when the End shall have been brought back 
to it’s Beginning, and the Circle closed.” 25 Boehme was also fond of signing 
friends’ albums with a stanza: 
 To whom Time is as Eternity, 
 And Eternity as Time, 
 He is freed from all strife. 26 
 Figure 2.4  Top: Boehme ’ s black marble gravestone placed by the Oberlausitzische 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften in 1869. The inscription includes a reference to Rev-
elation 3:5, the text initially chosen for Boehme ’ s funeral sermon. Bottom: Philoso-
phische Kügel placed on top of Boehme ’ s grave in 1922. It was donated by American 
admirers, Mr. Richard A. Beale and an unnamed countrywoman.  © Copyright Ariel 
Hessayon, June 2012 
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 II  REAPPRAISING THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOEHME’S 
THOUGHT IN CONTEXT 
 Boehme’s death served only to increase the aura surrounding this “great 
Wonder of the  German Nation.” His apparent meekness and piety were 
presented as a model of sanctity, his humble occupation compared favorably 
with the lowly trades of Christ’s apostles, and his persecution by scholasti-
cally-trained clergymen likened to Jesus’ fate at the hands of scheming Phar-
isees. Boehme thus became a “Witness of God,” a “rejected Corner-Stone” 
(Psalm 118:22, Matthew 21:42) who had incurred the displeasure of “the 
logically-learned School-Gentry, and the Metaphysical Church-Luminar-
ies.” 27 Primarily disseminated through von Franckenberg’s continually re-
worked hagiography and a trans-European epistolary network, a legend 
began to take shape portraying Boehme as a simple, barely literate artisan 
who had been given the gift of “Universall knowledge of God and Nature,” 
and shown: 
 the Centre of all Beings;  how all things arise from God Originally: con-
sist in God ,  and againe returne, and fl ow in to him . 28 
 Praising Boehme’s “ profound ” and “ deep-grounded ” writings, von Franck-
enberg also believed they hinted at the great wonders God would perform 
in future generations. 29 
 Towards the end of his life, and certainly by 1620, some of Boehme’s 
readers had begun calling him by the code-name “Teutonicus.” Most 
likely this was a necessary expedient to protect his anonymity rather than, 
as von Franckenberg claimed, an honorifi c bestowed by the learned and 
much travelled Liegnitz physician Balthasar Walther (1558–ca.1630). A 
student of Paracelsus, alchemy, magic, and Kabbalah, Walther became ac-
quainted with Boehme in 1617 and was subsequently briefl y appointed di-
rector of the secret laboratory at Dresden. Walther was said to have dubbed 
Boehme the “ Teutonic Philosopher,” and von Franckenberg speculated that 
this either referred to the German Dominican friar Johannes Teutonicus 
(ca.1180–1252), or else indicated Boehme’s nationality coupled with the 
“exceptional gift” of such works being “written in High German.” 30 The 
moniker “Teutonicum Philosophum,” however, did not appear in print until 
a decade after Boehme’s death with the publication of an abridged and unre-
liable German edition of  Aurora (Amsterdam, 1634). By 1647, the English 
translator John Sparrow had adopted the nominative form “Teutonicus Phi-
losophus,” which became anglicized as the “Teutonick Philosopher.” 
 Signifi cantly, despite declaring that he was a simple man and “no 
Prophet,” “Teutonicus” (alias Boehme) was still regarded by certain follow-
ers as a prophet of the Thirty Years’ War. 31 Although Boehme was not moved 
to address the confl ict in a specifi c text, his writings, particularly his epistles, 
contain many references to contemporary events. Here the work of, among 
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others, John Stoudt and, more recently, Andrew Weeks has done much to 
resituate Boehme within an historical context that too many—though by no 
means all—earlier scholars had been inclined to pass over. Thus, in “The 
Three Principles of the Divine Essence” (1619) Boehme despaired of the 
multitude of sects and religious controversies, warning that “great hatred,” 
envy, and persecution fomented war and insurrection, which would lead to 
slaughter, destruction, and ruination. 32 Again, having recently witnessed the 
coronation at Prague of the Calvinist champion Frederick V of the Palati-
nate (the ill-fated “Winter King” of Bohemia), Boehme predicted in a letter 
dated November 14 th , 1619, that there would be “great War and Conten-
tion” resulting in the desolation of many cities and strongholds. Drawing 
on the prophecies of Ezekiel, he foresaw “the great Slaughter of the children 
of  Babel ” at the hands of the Calvinist prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Beth-
len (1580–1629), who had captured the Hungarian city Pressburg (modern 
Bratislava, Slovakia) and was marching on Vienna. 33 Following the passage 
through Görlitz of the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II in 
March of 1620 and then in August of disease-carrying foreign mercenaries, 
the Catholic Emperor’s Lutheran ally Johann Georg I of Saxony invaded 
western Lusatia on September 3 rd . The Elector-Prince initially besieged and 
bombarded Bautzen, which capitulated on October 5 th . Recounting what 
he had learned from soldiers and civilians fl eeing the ruined town, Boehme 
described how Bautzen was ferociously and relentlessly pounded for three 
weeks with “terrible” canon fi re and a variety of incendiary devices. Re-
portedly, 1,700 people were killed and more than 1,100 houses destroyed. 
Many survivors were trapped hidden in cellars among the smoking debris, 
and those managing to escape were robbed by an enemy intent on plunder. 
Fearing the loss of Lusatia, Boehme cautioned: 
 Babel, the beast and the whore are in fl ames. He who now hopes to 
become blessed must gird himself with patience and assume nothing 
worldly for himself, for he will receive nothing and shall indeed lose 
his soul. 34 
 The apocalyptic mood was pervasive. That summer, a Liegnitz toll-
collector named Paul Kaym (d.1634) had written to Boehme enclosing two 
small treatises. These contained chiliastic interpretations of scriptural pas-
sages concerning the “ Last Times ,” “the fi rst Resurrection of the dead,” 
the thousand-year Sabbath, the ruin and imminent fall of Babel (which 
would be utterly destroyed about 1630), and the rebuilding of Zion, which 
would usher in a golden age. Responding on August 14 th , 1620, Boehme 
cautiously agreed that the growth and imminent destruction of Babel was 
manifest. All the same, because there were only hints of these events in 
Revelation and the apocryphal 2 Esdras, he did not know when this would 
happen; nor did Boehme know whether the world would continue for seven 
thousand years or if there was to be a millennial Sabbath, since these were 
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mysteries hidden from mankind. Accordingly, he warned against attempting 
to penetrate God’s secrets without divine illumination. 35 This reluctance to 
become embroiled in the specifi cs of apocalyptic chronology was consistent 
with Boehme’s understanding of the Last Judgment: he believed that, at the 
end of time, God would punish the wicked and reward his martyred saints 
together with the rest of the righteous godly, but he did not risk calculating 
a date. He eventually enlarged on this subject in what appears to have been 
a lost book on the “Last Judgment” (1624?)—a work reportedly destroyed 
during the burning of Gross Glogau, Silesia (modern Głogów, Poland). 
 Though not a committed millenarian, Boehme nonetheless became con-
vinced as the war progressed that a period of great tribulation had begun; 
war, uproar, insurrection, calamity, and death were imminent. In an unusual 
postscript to a letter dated February 20 th , 1623, addressed to von Franck-
enberg, he drew on an established tradition of political prophecy that fused 
biblical symbols with heraldic devices to make a series of bold predictions: 
Babel would be destroyed, the Turks would turn Christian, and the Holy 
Roman Emperor’s underlings would turn upon him savagely, clipping his 
military power. 36 
 While the earliest phase of the Thirty Years’ War provides a crucial if 
sometimes neglected backdrop for reading Boehme’s letters and later trea-
tises, his engagement with contemporary affairs was of longstanding dura-
tion. Thus, he continually despaired of hypocrisy and contention, bemoaning 
the debilitating effect of intra-denominational religious disputes as well as 
untrammeled magisterial authority operating in conjunction with clerical 
self-interest to enforce outward conformity. Moreover, as Weeks has shown, 
sections of many works can also be read as irenic, anticlerical interventions 
in heated doctrinal debates over the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and the 
related issue of scriptural authority. As he notes in our volume, the original 
fair copy of this text was transcribed during a six-month period between 
January and June of 1612, coinciding with important political developments 
and debates about guaranteeing religious toleration in Upper Lusatia. 37 Con-
text, however, is not all. For there is an additional psychological dimension: 
the transformative illuminative experience that impelled Boehme to com-
pose “Aurora” had been preceded by a prolonged bout of melancholy. This 
passage from depression to exaltation, suggestive of a troubled soul, was 
typical of many seventeenth-century Protestant religious autobiographies, 
which frequently culminated with the spiritual suffering, even death, of the 
sinful protagonist and their joyful rebirth in the light and love of God. 38 
 Boehme maintained in his correspondence that he had written “Aurora” 
in sudden bursts of inspiration, like a shower of rain which hit “whatsoever 
it lighteth upon.” He could have written in “a more accurate, fair, and plain” 
manner, yet “the burning fi re did often force forward with  speed ; and the 
hand and pen must hasten directly after it.” When deprived of divine knowl-
edge, however, he could scarcely recognize or understand his own writings. 
Boehme also ingenuously claimed that he was an “illiterate,” simple man of 
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little “understanding, and shallow capacity.” He had not received instruc-
tion from men or learning from reading books, but had written “out of my 
own Book which was opened in me, being the Noble similitude of God.” 39 
This self-serving myth was perpetuated by von Franckenberg, who insisted 
that Boehme wrote secretly for his own benefi t and that, when setting pen 
to paper, he was “furnished with no Books at all but the Holy Bible.” 40 
Elsewhere, however, Boehme was slightly more candid about his sources. In 
“Aurora” and then the “Three Principles,” he acknowledged having read 
the writings of “very high Masters, hoping to fi nd therein the ground and 
true depth.” Among these were works by students of physics, mathematics, 
and astrology. To his dismay, he found nothing his soul lusted after within 
these “Master-pieces,” only “very many contrary opinions,” and a “ half 
dead Spirit.” 41 
 Besides texts, Boehme acquired knowledge through an increasingly wid-
ening social network of friends, correspondents, and patrons—a milieu 
fl eshed out fully in Leigh’s Penman’s chapter. Thus, it appears Boehme drew 
on the same rhetorical techniques as Martin Moller (1547–1606), appointed 
chief pastor at St. Nicholas, Görlitz in July of 1600. 42 The author of sev-
eral works, including  Mysterium Magnum (1595) and  Praxis Evangeliorum 
(1601), Moller’s teachings emphasized regeneration, Christ within, and the 
primacy of inward spiritual experience. Although Moller died when Boehme 
was aged about thirty-one, linguistic parallels suggest that his sermons may 
have left an impression on Boehme’s “Aurora.” 43 Whether or not this book 
was secretly circulated among the remnants of Moller’s “Conventicle of 
God’s Real Servants” (of which Boehme was allegedly a member), it is clear 
that, through scribal publication, it brought him to far wider attention. Re-
peatedly copied, versions of the text passed through villages, towns, and 
cities where they were seen by clergymen, physicians, and members of the 
nobility. Consequently, Boehme was implored by the more receptive of his 
predominantly well-educated readership to reveal more of his “gifts, knowl-
edge, and confession.” Never a lay preacher and uncomfortable in this newly 
assigned role of teacher, he nonetheless relented, acquiring disciples through 
a mixture of receiving guests, personal visits, and epistolary exchange. 44 
 Among Boehme’s circle were physicians, alchemists, mystics, prophets, 
possessors of magical and Rosicrucian works, various toll collectors, offi -
cials, and noblemen. As Weeks, Penman, and others have recognized, this 
apparently exclusively male network, which was spread across parts of the 
Margraviate of Brandenburg, Saxony, Lusatia, Silesia, and Bohemia, played 
an important part in shaping the direction of Boehme’s intellectual devel-
opment. Equally signifi cant were the mercantile journeys that took Boehme 
to Breslau, Prague, Sagan, and Zittau, bringing him into touch with sympa-
thetic tradesmen. Moreover, from 1621 he began visiting supporters among 
the Protestant dissenters in Silesia and elsewhere. These additional contacts 
provided him with news and probably made it easier to acquire writings in 
his native tongue. 45 
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 As we have seen, Boehme seldom named his sources. Even so, he appears 
to have been familiar with a range of doctrines enunciated by Magisterial, 
Radical, and Spiritual Reformers. Among the most important of these were 
Martin Luther and mediators of his thought. Boehme had certainly heard 
Lutheran sermons and hymns; was familiar with Lutheran prayer formula; 
and upheld Lutheran teaching on the importance of personal faith for salva-
tion, on grace being freely given as a gift by God, on Christ’s corporeal pres-
ence within the Communion bread and wine, and on the ubiquity of Christ’s 
body. But though Boehme affi rmed essential articles of Lutheran faith prior 
to receiving absolution and the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper on his death-
bed, he diverged from Luther on several signifi cant points—notably on the 
crucial question of free will, where he also differed sharply from mainstream 
Calvinist thinking on predestination. Furthermore, Boehme’s allegorical 
method of scriptural exegesis went against the grain of Luther’s predomi-
nantly literal biblical commentaries (if not his sermons). Consequently, and 
without biblical justifi cation, Boehme developed beliefs on the process of 
creation, the fall of the rebel angels, and Adam’s prelapsarian androgynous 
nature that were fundamentally opposed to Lutheran orthodoxy. In addi-
tion, and with a measure of justifi cation, Boehme has been regarded as an 
independently minded interpreter and continuator of the Spiritual Reform-
ers and an inheritor of a religious tendency—tradition might be too strong—
incorporating writings by or attributed to Sebastian Franck (1499–1542), 
Caspar Schwenckfeld (1490–1561), and Valentin Weigel (1533–1588). 
 Boehme does not mention or allude to Franck, and if he did happen upon 
his teachings, then these may have been mediated to him indirectly. But he 
does engage critically with Schwenckfeld, conspicuously on the connected 
issues of Christ’s nature and how Christ was present in humanity. There 
had been a substantial and visible Schwenckfelder presence in Görlitz from 
the 1560s, and since a number of Boehme’s most prominent supporters had 
Schwenckfelder backgrounds, it is unsurprising that Boehme was famil-
iar with some of Schwenkfeld’s works. 46 Likewise Boehme knew Weigel, 
sometimes borrowing—most likely from infl uential manuscript works on 
cosmogony—and occasionally controverting. Thus, Boehme asserted that 
Weigel erred in denying that the Virgin Mary had been entirely human, 
yet at the same time concurred with Weigel’s treatment of the “new birth” 
and the “union of humanity in Christ.” Accordingly, he neither condemned 
nor despised Weigel’s writings, nor those who read them. 47 Boehme may 
also have read devotional works by the Lutheran theologian Johann Arndt 
(1555–1621). Drawing on a range of mystical writings, Arndt’s teaching 
emphasized faith, humility, prayer, and true repentance. Examples of simi-
larities of thought, however, may be explained by common dependence on 
the same sources, notably Weigel and Paracelsus. 
 Boehme’s indebtedness to Paracelsus is indisputable. He drew on him 
when writing “Aurora” and defended Paracelsus’s opinions in correspon-
dence with Paul Kaym. From Paracelsus, either directly or else mediated by 
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his medical acquaintances, Boehme derived the alchemically infl ected terms 
 arcana ,  tincture , and  turba together with the three categories of Salt, Mer-
cury, and Sulphur. So extensive was this borrowing that it did not escape the 
notice of contemporary critics: Christian Beckmann found more than twen-
ty-fi ve instances of words and phrases used by Boehme in a manner simi-
lar to Paracelsus and Weigel, while Erasmus Francisci stated that Boehme 
quoted from Paracelsus on more than thirty occasions. 48 Modern scholars 
concur. Yet Boehme’s treatment of Paracelsus was not slavish. As Howard 
Brinton observed, he initially contradicted the Paracelsian or pseudo-Para-
celsian  Philosophia ad Athenienses ( Philosophy to the Athenians ) on the 
question of whether God created heaven and earth out of nothing. 49 Inter-
estingly, the English translation of the Paracelsian  Aurora was published 
with a discourse attributed to Johann Siebmacher entitled  Wasserstein der 
Weysen ( Water-Stone of the Wise Men ; Frankfurt, 1619). In a letter of July 
1622, Boehme commended the printed version of this work as a clear and 
worthy exposition of the alchemical art. 50 
 There were also several comparatively obscure fi gures with whose writ-
ings Boehme engaged: Hans Weyrauch, Balthaser Tilke (fl .1621), Ezechiel 
Meth (d.1640), Esajas Stiefel (1561–1627), Paul Kaym, and perhaps Paul 
Nagel. Weyrauch claimed prophetic gifts and was said to have been a weaver 
from Olmütz, Moravia (modern Olomouc, Czech Republic). Having exam-
ined his writings, Boehme conceded that he may be an “honest Brother,” but 
nonetheless rejected Weyrauch’s boast of secret knowledge. 51 Tilke was a 
Silesian nobleman and suspected crypto-Calvinist who wrote a pasquinade 
against certain notions expounded in Boehme’s “Aurora” and then a refu-
tation of Boehme’s fi fth book. With these libels in hand, Boehme responded 
with two polemical apologies. Meth was an alchemist with messianic pre-
tensions, some of whose letters survive and against whom Boehme wrote 
in 1622. These messianic delusions were shared by Meth’s uncle Stiefel. An 
avid follower of Weigel and an antinomian sect-master who believed him-
self incapable of sinning, Stiefel was among the fi rst to mention Boehme’s 
doctrines in print. The connection was probably established by Stiefel’s for-
mer supporter, Balthasar Walther. Doubtless through a trusted intermediary, 
Stiefel sent a treatise on “The Threefold State of Man” with accompanying 
letter to Boehme. The “Teutonick” completed his response on April 18 th , 
1621, acknowledging that Stiefel “may indeed, be an honest or vertuous 
new born or  Regenerate Man , and in Christ with his  New-birth .” But he 
fervently denied that Stiefel had attained total perfection, believing it im-
possible for the outward body to achieve this on earth. Boehme followed 
this with a response to Stiefel’s exposition of four scriptural texts. 52 As for 
Nagel, he was an alchemist, astrologer, and chiliastic prophet from Torgau, 
Saxony. A reader of Weigel as well as Boehme’s “Aurora” in manuscript, he 
reproduced extracts from the latter concerning the creation of three angelic 
kingdoms in his pamphlet  Prodromus astronomiae apocalypticae ( Herald of 
apocalyptic astronomy ; Danzig, 1620). 53 
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 Taken together, these mediated and directly encountered textual and 
oral sources explain the otherwise problematic presence in the corpus of a 
non-university educated shoemaker of sophisticated mystical, apocalyptic, 
alchemical, astrological, and seemingly Gnostic, Neoplatonic, and Kabbal-
istic ideas—especially since Boehme did not read Hebrew, Greek, or Latin. 
Thus, through Luther’s writings or perhaps Moller’s instruction, Boehme 
may have become acquainted with devotional and mystical works by the 
German Dominicans Meister Eckhart (ca.1260–1328), Johannes Tauler 
(ca.1300–1361), and Heinrich Suso (ca.1295–1366); Thomas à Kempis 
(ca.1380–1471); as well as the anonymous fourteenth-century  Theologia 
Germanica . This could account for the current of negative theology and 
fascination with the abyss in his writings. Certainly von Franckenberg, who 
became a devotee of these “old  German enlightened Men,” purposefully 
positioned Boehme within a tradition of German mysticism. 54 Again, Stoudt 
and, more recently, Cyril O’Regan have suggested that Boehme’s apocalyptic 
thought drew inspiration—however indirectly—from a deeper well, namely 
the tripartite eschatological scheme announced by the Calabrian-born abbot 
Joachim of Fiore (ca.1135–1202). Presumably mediated through Paracelsus 
or Lutheran interpreters more generally, Joachim’s conception of three ages 
corresponding to God the Father (Jewish Law), God the Son (Christian Gos-
pel), and the Holy Ghost (Spirit) must, as O’Regan accepts, have been dras-
tically modifi ed by Boehme; if, that is, he was ever aware of it. For although 
Boehme declared that the “great Day of Revelation and the Final Judgment” 
was approaching, he developed a sevenfold divinely-structured periodiza-
tion of history perhaps taken from the seven seals of Revelation and culmi-
nating in the time of Enoch (“the seventh from Adam,” Jude 1:14). 55 
 With his espousal of Sophia as a symbol of the Noble Virgin of Divine 
Wisdom, Boehme invited the charge that he was reiterating ancient Gnostic 
heresies. This was the opinion of some hostile seventeenth-century com-
mentators and, having been taken up by the nineteenth-century German 
theologian Ferdinand Christian Bauer, subsequently found support among 
a handful of modern scholars. In this vein, Weeks has written of Boehme’s 
“increasing use of Gnostic symbols and images,” while O’Regan has argued 
that Boehme’s body of work is “a privileged site of the return of a Gnostic 
modality of thought in modernity.” 56 As O’Regan admits, however, Boehme 
“neither cites Gnostic nor Valentinian sources in his texts, nor mentions 
them in his letters.” 57 Indeed, there is scant evidence for continuous and di-
rect transmission of unadulterated Gnostic doctrines through the ages. That 
said, traces of Gnosticism could have reached Boehme by way of incorpo-
ration within Neoplatonism and perhaps also Hermetic literature; though, 
in the latter instance, the question of Gnostic infl uence remains open. If this 
were so, mediation would most likely have been through Paracelsus. 
 Just as writings under the name Paracelsus may have been a conduit 
for Gnostic vestiges, so too did they channel streams of Neoplatonism. 
Running from Plotinus through the Florentine Platonist Marsilio Ficino 
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(1433–1499), this Neoplatonic current may, in its appropriation and adap-
tation, partially account for Boehme’s elaboration of a process of emanation 
during the creation as well as what certain commentators regard as a pan-
theistic imbued conception of nature. More striking still are resemblances in 
Boehme’s thought to some concepts in a key Jewish Kabbalistic work,  Sefer 
Ha-Zohar ( The Book of Splendour ), as well as to aspects of later Christian 
Kabbalistic thought as elaborated in Johannes Reuchlin’s  De arte Cabalis-
tica (Hagenau, 1517). Boehme writes in his unfi nished answers to “The 177 
Theosophic Questions” (1624) of “Cabala and Magia” and then the “ Holy 
Cabala,” although by itself this signifi es little; the Paracelsian  Aurora like-
wise used the term to describe a mystical and prophetic art full of “Divine 
Mysteries,” just as magic contained “natural secrets.” 58 Even so, there is 
convincing evidence that Boehme knew specifi c Kabbalistic teachings, albeit 
at several removes. Hence, the Kabbalists’  En-Sof (the Infi nite) has been 
compared with Boehme’s  Ungrund (mystical being of the Deity); their  Adam 
Kadmon (primordial man) with Boehme’s androgynous Adam; the highest 
three attributes of the Zohar’s ten  Sefi rot (potencies of the manifest God), 
that is,  Keter (crown),  Hokhmah (wisdom), and  Binah (intelligence), with 
Boehme’s conception of an imminent Trinity. Penman even demonstrates in 
this volume a specifi c instance of Boehme adopting a Kabbalistic scriptural 
interpretation found in Reuchlin, which was mediated to him through Wal-
ther. Cumulatively, these Neoplatonic and Kabbalistic resonances indicate 
Boehme was no mere plagiarist but a profound and original—if occasionally 
erratic—thinker who veered towards synthesis on a grand scale. 
 Allied to Neoplatonism and Kabbalism was belief in magic. Unlike 
Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, who in his infamous compendium  De occulta 
philosophia sive magia libri tres (Cologne, 1533) delineated three types of 
magic—divine (the secrets of God), celestial (the infl uence of stellar bodies), 
and natural (the properties of things in nature)—Boehme distinguished be-
tween divine and natural magic in “Mysterium Magnum.” Magic, however, 
plays a minor role in Boehme’s worldview, and what knowledge he had of 
it probably derived from Walther, who copied and collected Paracelsian, 
Kabbalistic, and magical texts. 59 Much the same can be said of Boehme’s 
lack of engagement with the  Corpus Hermeticum , a haphazard body of 
ancient Greek literature ascribed to the god Hermes and consisting of ap-
proximately seventeen dialogues. Widely circulated in Latin and then ver-
nacular translations—including Sebastian Franck’s German paraphrase of 
the fi rst colloquy  Poimandres (Augsburg, 1538)—these treatises, despite 
being exposed as forgeries, were nonetheless valued by the English Boehme 
translators John Sparrow and Charles Hotham. Indeed, they constitute a 
distinctive feature of the wider milieu in which the Teutonic’s writings were 
sympathetically received: Sparrow glossed Boehme’s reference to the “Eter-
nal Mind” with a marginal note to  Poimandres , 60 while the ardent Behmen-
ist Abraham Willemsz van Beyerland fi nanced his own Dutch translation 
of Hermetic books published at Amsterdam in 1643. Moreover, the fabled 
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“Tabula Smaragdina” (“Emerald Tablet”) attributed to Hermes was printed 
in Latin translation with commentary by the Paracelsian Gerhard Dorn in 
volume one of  Theatrum Chemicum (Oberursel, 1602; reprinted, Stras-
bourg, 1613), an enormous alchemical compendium that may have been 
owned by some of Boehme’s wealthier acquaintances. 
 Another integral element within this milieu was the Rosicrucian man-
ifestos, the earliest of which was an allegory written in 1605 by the Lu-
theran Johann Valentin Andreae (1586–1654) entitled  Chymische Hochzeit: 
Christiani Rosencreuz Anno 1459 ( The Chemical wedding ; published anon-
ymously in Strasbourg, 1616). Having been circulated in manuscript, these 
works began emerging in printed German and Latin editions from 1614 and 
were, as Penman notes, available in Görlitz through the town’s principal 
bookseller. The most notable advocated a utopian universal reformation 
akin to Boehme’s slightly later vision of a Great Reformation. Their cause 
was furthered by another Lutheran fi gure, Michael Maier (1566–1622), who 
supposed that the Fraternity of the Rosy Cross possessed the secrets of na-
ture and whose own writings blended alchemical motifs with Hermetic wis-
dom. Further afi eld was the English physician Robert Fludd (1574–1637), 
an apologist for the Rosicrucians whose major cosmological works were 
issued in Latin at Oppenheim from 1617. Signifi cantly, some of Boehme’s 
patrons and followers read and collected these Rosicrucian writings. A few 
even participated in the ensuing European-wide printed debate. 
 Then there is the unmistakable adoption of heliocentrism in Boehme’s 
earliest attempt to formulate an explanation for the planets’ motion. De-
spite professing ignorance of the fi ner points of mathematics and astrology, 
he rejected the Ptolemaic system, insisting that the Sun did not orbit the 
Earth in a day and a night. Rather, the Earth imitated the motion of a wheel, 
revolving around the Sun in the space of a year. So too did the planets closest 
to the Sun, Mercury and Venus. But the outer planets—Mars, Jupiter, and 
Saturn—did not complete their revolution in a year because they were too 
far from the Sun and hence their orbit was of greater circumference. This vi-
sion of the heavens corresponded most closely to that advanced by the Pol-
ish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus, though it is unlikely that Boehme had 
read his  De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium ( On the Revolution of the 
Heavenly Spheres ; Nuremberg, 1543). More probable is that Boehme was 
familiar with astrological works then circulating in Görlitz, a town where 
the sometime mayor Bartholomäus Scultetus had corresponded with the as-
tronomers Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. 61 Some years later, Boehme 
elaborated on his conception of the cosmos in “The Threefold Life of Man” 
(1620). Here, the universe was imagined as concentric circles: the outer 
wheel consisted of the twelve signs of the zodiac together with the other 
constellations; within were the seven planets; then the Sun; and fi nally the 
inner wheels of Fire, the heavenly Tincture, Majesty, and the number three 
with the cross. 62 This idiosyncratic heliocentric scheme was remarked upon 
by Christian Beckmann, who dismissed it as an old song. 63 
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 For Beckmann it was incredible that an “illiterate” common man could 
have such a profound and extraordinary knowledge of God and Nature. 
These misgivings made him suspect that Boehme had been incapable of ex-
pounding on such abstruse subjects. Nor was he alone in expressing doubts 
that the books written and circulated under the name “Teutonicus” were 
the work of a lowly shoemaker. 64 Anticipating the authorship controversy 
surrounding the plays of his more famous contemporary Shakespeare, the 
contention that Jacob Boehme did not write Boehme gradually became 
more pronounced. In the 1690s, for example, the Lutheran pastor and Ori-
entalist Abraham Hinckelmann insisted that Balthasar Walther had been the 
real author of these works and that Boehme had not written “a single line” 
of what was attributed to him. 65 Alternatively, some believed it was not a 
learned associate but the father of lies himself who had dredged up some 
“old reprobated  Heresy ” from the “bottomless Pit” of Hell and passed off 
a “visionary Piece of Devilism” under Boehme’s name. 66 
 Such skepticism surrounding Boehme’s authorship was the obverse of the 
hagiographic tendency we have witnessed. The truth of course was that nei-
ther God nor the Devil was responsible. His disciples may have claimed that 
Boehme had been favored with God’s great and secret spirit, which caused 
him to produce amazing writings that in their clarity and purity were unpar-
alleled since the apostolic age. Yet some were also responsible for educating 
him in the rudiments of Latin through conversation and correspondence. 
Hence, whereas “Aurora” was, to quote Stoudt, “a primitive, profound, 
chaotic, exasperating, prophetic work of cant and rant as well as of in-
sight,” the writings of Boehme’s intellectual maturity show he had found 
ways of expressing himself beyond the “barrenness of his mother tongue.” 67 
These included the invention of German neologisms which, on a cursory 
reading, made his writings appear “harsh and uncouth,” even “obscure and 
unintelligible.” Added to this was Boehme’s claim that he knew the “ Lan-
guage of Nature, ” through which he could ascertain not only the inward 
virtues and qualities of plants, herbs, and stones, but also understand the 
gist of conversations in Latin and French—a talent akin to the Pentecostal 
gift of tongues (Acts 2:1–15). All of which meant his writings were unlike 
“other men’s books.” 68 
 Indisputably, at stake here was an unwelcome plebeian challenge to scho-
lastic learning, doctrinal orthodoxy, and the jealously guarded clerical mo-
nopoly of biblical interpretation. On this point, the various hagiographic 
and mythopoeic representations of Boehme’s persona and concomitant ven-
eration of his almost impenetrable writings converge in agreement with the 
hostile portrait promoted in the heresiography. Throughout this struggle 
for interpretative hegemony, Boehme’s authority was strengthened in the 
hagiography by claims of divine illumination while being weakened in the 
heresiography by charges of arrogance, ignorance, heterodoxy, and pre-
sumption. He himself despaired of a wicked world, yet contented himself 
with knowledge of the approaching apocalypse. Moreover, Boehme justifi ed 
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his lack of learning by drawing parallels with God’s “Great” and “Small” 
prophets, mere “vulgar plain and mean” shepherds and herdsmen, as well 
with Christ’s apostles, who were but “poor, despised illiterate Fishermen.” 
Invoking Luther’s fi rst reformation of the church, he declaimed: 
 What were they that in all Ages in the Church of Christ stood to it most 
stoutly and constantly? The poor contemptible despised people, who 
shed their Bloud for the sake of Christ. 
 Therefore, who but a “poor  Mechanic ” drawn from the “lowest Class” 
could herald a second reformation? 
 The Spirit sheweth and declareth, that yet before the End, many a Lay-
man, will know and understand more, then now the Wittiest or Cun-
ningest Doctors know . 69 
 A few months before his premature death, Boehme prophesied that al-
though his writings would be discarded by his fellow countrymen, foreign 
nations would joyfully take them up. This prediction was largely borne out 
during the seventeenth century as Boehme’s works were “vilifi ed and cast 
away” in his homeland but painstakingly published in Dutch and English 
translations. 70 Having endured both vehement clerical opposition and sup-
pression, it was, so his followers believed, a posthumous vindication. In-
deed, they considered the survival of Boehme’s writings providential. 71 And 
it is remarkable how little has been lost. Besides the book on the “Last 
Judgment” (1624?) mentioned earlier, there may no longer exist a treatise 
entitled “The herbs of nature,” a work on the noble virgin Sophia, a few 
minor pieces, and some correspondence. Some writings also remained un-
fi nished: “Aurora” (1612), “The 177 Theosophic Questions” (1624), “The 
Holy Week or a Prayer Book” (1624), and “The Highly precious Gate of 
the Divine Vision” (also known as “A little book of Divine Contempla-
tion,” 1622–24). Regrettable as these losses and incompletions are, they are 
nonetheless outweighed by the huge corpus of Boehme’s extant writings. 
Naturally, it was through their effective dissemination by a combination of 
scribal and print publication, both in the original German and several major 
European languages, that Boehme’s legacy was ensured—a legacy which 
will be explored in subsequent chapters of this collection. 
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 3  Radical Reformation and the 
Anticipation of Modernism 
in Jacob Boehme 
 Andrew Weeks 
 The Nobel Prize-winning postwar German author Günter Grass once wrote 
a novel that re-imagined the seminal postwar German writers’ conference 
Group 47. Instead of 1947, his  Meeting at Telgte takes place at the end of 
the Thirty Years’ War. The parallel suggests that thinking people in either 
era were shipwrecked by history: they were forced to recover a lost culture 
and restore a language debased by ideological or confessional propaganda. 
As a  roman à clef , Grass’s  Meeting requires Baroque counterparts for the 
Modernists and Realists of his own period. Who could stand in for Franz 
Kafka as the guiding light of a resurgent German Modernism? In Grass’s 
novel, it is Jacob Boehme who inspires the Baroque Modernists. 
 The analogy is appealing. Modernism departs from Realism in rendering 
invisible things visible, as in Paul Klee’s dictum, “Art does not reproduce the 
visible but rather makes visible”. 1 Boehme articulated invisible metaphysical 
realities that made his readers see with the eye of the mind. The mystic as 
Modernist is a literary joke with a profound meaning. The intricate images 
that adorn early editions of Boehme’s books evoke the world as a symbolic 
mystery. The puzzle of his life and work encourages us to seek coherence 
among the seemingly incoherent elements in his writings and between the 
work, its author, his time, and our own. 
 The incoherence begins with our image of the shoemaker-mystic. He 
wants us to believe that his writing is as simple as his self-representation. 
Yet nothing in German Baroque literature is as complicated. His life, as we 
know it, was ordinary. Of prosperous peasant origin, he learned the craft 
of a shoemaker and established a family. Around 1600, his experience of 
illumination and sense of religious calling propelled him to write for himself 
and others like him. 
 We need to uncouple the dual aspects of his paradox: his anomalous 
status as a simple shoemaker and the incommensurate complexities of his 
writing with its threefold worlds, seven divine spirits, and vast array of ar-
cane concepts. From the start, Boehme attracted a lay readership consisting 
of the middle class of his time. How could such daunting expositions serve 
ordinary readers? To reconcile the discrepancy between his simple person 
and his intricate mode of expression, we need to understand how simplicity 
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and complexity—tantamount to the anticlericalism and Paracelsism in his 
work—were, in reality, two sides of the same coin. 
 A shoemaker practicing theology violated the prerogatives of the clergy. 
Boehme did so within a long tradition of medieval and Reformation anti-
clericalism. There has been much recent interest in the rebellion of the lay 
folk against the power, authority, and privilege of the clerical estate or offi ce. 
Though there were certainly various motives for early modern anticlerical-
ism, Hans-Jürgen Goertz states convincingly in the  Oxford Encyclopedia of 
the Reformation that “Anticlericalism then was much more a matter of criti-
cizing those holding offi ce in the church out of a deep, fundamental religious 
need.” 2 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century anticlericalism is associated with 
atheism and materialism. Medieval and early modern anticlericalism typi-
cally reacted to the failure of religious institutions to measure up to their 
religious principles. Though more religious than its post-Enlightenment 
manifestations, Reformation anticlericalism was not less strident. Empow-
ered by Luther’s doctrine of the universal lay priesthood and his verbal at-
tacks on the pope and the monastic estate, it culminated in revolutionary 
violence, in excesses we might associate with atheistic Bolshevism or radi-
cal Islam. Images were destroyed, graves desecrated, sacred objects defi led, 
churches degraded to stables, and the religious harassed and persecuted. 3 
Luther retreated from the lay priesthood of the believer, 4 condemning peas-
ant revolt and doctrinal dissent, but radical reformers maintained the anti-
clerical thrust of his doctrine, even against Luther himself. 
 Anticlericalism also lay at the heart of a Reformation tendency opposed 
to externals in religion. The tendency is referred to in German as  Spiritu-
alismus . The Spiritualists raised the spirit above the letter and disdained 
what they called the “church of walls.” 5 They condemned Pharisees and 
false teachers. In Luther’s German, Pharisees are “Schriftgelehrten,” schol-
ars of scripture. The Spiritualists considered them unregenerate authoritar-
ians who imposed the dead letter of doctrine from above. Throughout his 
writings, Boehme asserted himself in opposition to authoritarian pastors 
and scholars.  Aurora denounced the arrogance of “Doctores” who forbid 
him his theological speculation while instigating confl ict with their incessant 
quarreling. 6 He pillories them as “Maul-Pfaffen” (mouth-priests) who know 
only the letter of scripture. 7 
 The Spiritualists were dissenting individualists with diverse ideas and be-
liefs. Despite their shared infl uences and similarities, they constituted some-
thing more like a tendency than a tradition. Caspar Schwenckfeld, Sebastian 
Franck, and their kindred spirit Paracelsus were all born prior to 1500. 
The notorious revolutionary and mystic Thomas Müntzer is sometimes in-
cluded, though he was exceptional in advocating force. Toward the end 
of the sixteenth century, Spiritualist thought matured in Valentin Weigel 
(1533–1588). The more refl ective Spiritualists did not plunder monasteries, 
harass priests, or circulate woodcuts of monks emerging from the devil’s 
anus. With some justifi cation, they indicted the clergy as the source of strife 
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and dissension. Boehme even blamed the clergy for the exploitation of the 
poor and the aggression of the secular princes. In his usage, “der Laye,” or 
lay person, is both the clerically unanointed and the materially oppressed. 8 
The Spiritualists reinforced their opposition with elaborations of theory that 
included the paradoxes of Franck, the epistemology and cosmology of Wei-
gel, and the metaphysical speculations of Boehme. 
 Spiritualist theory responded to the contradictions of a Reformation which 
had set out to simplify and purify faith but instead created an irresolvable 
perplexity of contending doctrines. The second half of the sixteenth century 
was dominated by Protestant internecine quarrels. The Gnesio Lutheran con-
troversies and the disputes between Lutherans and Calvinists raged on in the 
shadow of a Catholic resurgence. These quarrels were Weigel’s point of de-
parture. 9 He was a dissenting Lutheran pastor who read Paracelsus, Franck, 
and the medieval mystics. Weigel not only raises spirit above letter, he at-
tempts to transcend the superfi cial understanding of nature, which appears 
to be a correlative of the superfi ciality of biblical literalism. His objective 
is not to propound some new doctrine. He criticizes the terms of theology 
and the relationship of the knower to the known. Reality itself cries out for 
spiritualization. Authorized by certain biblical passages (among them 2 Cor-
inthians 3:6, the killing letter and life-giving spirit; Luke 17:21, the kingdom 
of God within us; and John 1:1–3, the divine creator Word), the theorizing 
dissent of the Spiritualists seeks the living spirit not only beneath the letter of 
the Bible and within the believer, but even inside the inert elements of physi-
cal nature. The Spiritualist receptiveness to alchemy, nature philosophy, and 
introspection takes shape in Boehme’s complicated positive objectives. 
 But fi rst we need to consider yet another aspect of his anticlericalism. This 
was the age of  cuius regio, eius religio . Dynastic successions resulted in the 
imposition of new doctrines on territorial populations. Boehme’s Lutheran 
Lusatia was not only threatened by the Catholicism of its Habsburg over-
lord, it was also destabilized by Lutheran, Crypto-Calvinist, or Philippist 
rulers who traded places and insults in neighboring Saxony. In the confes-
sional free-for-all of the late sixteenth century, a stable orthodoxy was more 
elusive than later. In many regions, Lutheranism was considered an achieve-
ment of the popular will. The people clung to it. Calvinism was more thor-
ough in eliminating vestiges of Roman Catholicism and imposing discipline 
on communities, but those tendencies also made its followers more confron-
tational. When the Calvinist territorial rulers imposed their rational doctrine 
of the bread and wine, substituting baker’s bread for the sacred host, their 
Lutheran subjects resisted. There were spectacular riots and insurrections. 10 
 These events help to explain Boehme’s outspoken defense of the contro-
versial Lutheran doctrines of Christ’s corporeal presence in Communion 
and the ubiquity of Christ’s body. The Calvinists ridiculed the doctrine of 
the real bodily presence in the bread and wine and its corollary doctrine 
of ubiquity. Modern thinking brushes aside such doctrines as residual pre-
modern dogma. We should instead ask what they meant to their defenders. 
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Boehme defends the real presence, but protests against all quarreling theolo-
gians. Divine corporeal presence in the bread and wine confi rmed the imme-
diate relationship of the layperson’s being to God. 11 In Boehme’s Lutheran 
community surrounded by confessional rivals, these beliefs were more than 
just doctrine. They embodied personal and popular freedoms, the salvation 
of the individual soul, and the autonomy and experience of the community. 
 Boehme’s vision of a God omnipresent resonated with Lutheran Lusa-
tians surrounded on three sides by Catholic and Calvinist powers on the eve 
of the Thirty Years’ War: 
 Therefore you human child, is it not so that the false shepherds without 
calling perpetually quarrel, and each of them says: “Come hither to me: 
Christ is here, Christ is there”; and each of them condemns the other 
and consigns him to the devil, destroys harmony, and extinguishes the 
love, in which the spirit of God is born; and engenders nothing but 
bitterness, and seduces the laity into believing that Christ is a shepherd 
of quarrelling, attacks his opponents, instigates war and murder: this 
is supposed to be the spirit of God. This is supposed to be the path to 
Paradise. 12 
 Those exclaiming, “Christ is here, Christ is there!” 13 are the Catholic and 
Calvinist dogmatists who would impose their exclusive path to salvation. 
Against their injunctions, Boehme reaffi rms the omnipresence of the invisi-
ble God. Christ’s body with all persons of the Trinity is everywhere because 
the seven divine source-spirits that constitute nature as the body of God 
inform all things. 
 Boehme’s simple negatives are balanced by his complex positives. His an-
ticlericalism is complemented by his view of nature as revelation. His  Rising 
Dawn or  Aurora (written in 1612) begins with a tree metaphor. Like the 
branches of a tree, knowledge of God (the theology of the subtitle) and the 
knowledge of nature (exemplifi ed by astrology and philosophy, which study 
the celestial and terrestrial worlds, respectively) possess a common mother 
or root. Theology and natural science sprout from this same root, and the 
growth of the tree is the unfolding totality of knowledge. First comes re-
vealed truth. It is falsifi ed by a venal merchant (the pope), who profi ts from 
the tree’s fruit. When truth is restored (by the Reformation), bitter disputes 
commence over the root. These are the doctrinal quarrels of the present 
time. As the tree grows toward the fi nal stage in the life of the world, one 
last green branch sprouts, not from the proud heights of learning, but from 
the very root itself. In this last green branch, the fi nal revelation proceeds 
from all nature. What is revealed in this last greening is nothing other than 
the content of Boehme’s work itself. 
 To know what is revealed, we therefore have to read his work. After 
reconstructing the coherence of its elements, I will offer practical sugges-
tions for reading Boehme: where to begin and what to expect. One key 
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component is the new heliocentric cosmology. 14  Aurora heralds it ecstati-
cally. Much like anticlericalism, heliocentrism turns the world upside down. 
It also calls for recognition of force fi elds that assure order in the free-
fl oating cosmos. However, in the fi nal revelation of nature, one can scarcely 
overestimate the role of the speculative Paracelsism, which Boehme presum-
ably knew from physicians or scholars in his region, which was a center for 
collecting and editing his writings. Though Boehme’s Paracelsism has long 
been recognized, it is now becoming more accessible through the edition 
of the theological writings of Paracelsus by Urs Leo Gantenbein and the 
translation of the main theoretical writings into English. 15 Just as Luther 
had placed the Bible in lay hands, Paracelsus appeared to promise a fresh 
and more direct access to nature. 16 Lutheran anticlericalism and Paracelsian 
nature theory are therefore two sides of the same paradigm shift toward a 
new and unmediated knowledge. 
 Paracelsism made grandiose claims; it is hardly a direct empirical ap-
proach to nature. The Paracelsian concepts of microcosm and macrocosm, 
of the doctrine of signatures, and of the three principles that embody an 
essential fi re in nature have medieval origins. 17 The notion of divine powers 
in nature is Neo-Platonic and patristic. The Augustinian  rationes seminales 
might differ in characterization from the “seeds” and divine infl uences of 
Paracelsus, which differ in turn from Boehme’s seven source spirits in God, 
but all these concepts of divine power in nature are vindicated by biblical 
tropes of God as all things in all and the Word through which all things are 
created according to the Prologue of the Gospel of John. By whatever name, 
they confi rm that divine powers inform created nature. Nor are Boehme’s 
multiple worlds new. Nicholas of Cusa, Johannes Reuchlin, and Agrippa 
von Nettesheim could have served as precedents. 
 This brings us to a pivotal distinction that emerges with Paracelsus and 
breaks ground for Boehme: the displacement or inversion of medieval hier-
archy. Typical for the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, Agrippa’s  De occulta 
philosophia reproduces a multistoried hierarchy of worlds: the terrestrial, 
celestial, and divine. Knowledge of their ascending powers is reserved for a 
hierarchy of elite scholars who hold philosophical, mathematical, and theo-
logical qualifi cations, respectively. The symbolic medieval or Neo-Platonic 
hierarchy is an architecture of ascending dignity. The spatial and metaphys-
ical hierarchy suggests a pyramid of authorities, crowned by clerical and 
theological supremacy. This is as true of the canonical hierarchies of Pseu-
do-Dionysius as it is of the thirteenth-century Dominican preacher Bertold 
of Regensburg. Bertold’s popular sermons projected ten celestial choirs that 
betokened the ordered ranking of the estates and professions. First and 
highest was the clergy. 18 
 Luther cast scorn upon these celestial and ecclesiastic hierarchies. 19 In 
the same vein, Paracelsus disputed the special authority of both the learned 
humanists and the clergy. Teaching and writing in the vernacular, he confi -
dently took up matters of theology, medicine, magic, and astronomy (though 
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the latter is transformed in his hands into something without resemblance 
to the mathematical science of Copernicus or Kepler). Paracelsus explic-
itly reclaimed all provinces of knowledge, fi rst for the physician in  Opus 
Paragranum (H 2:53; W 191) 20 and subsequently for every human being 
in his infl uential  On the Foundation of the Sciences and Wisdom ( Liber de 
fundamento scientiarivm, sapientiaeque , H 9:414). In his worldview, the 
elements, the  astra or stellar powers, and the spirit-like infl uences of God 
all inhabit an accessible realm of nature. 21 Paracelsus insists that knowledge 
of nature is immediate. Nowhere in his writings do we fi nd the hierarchy of 
higher worlds, intelligible only to learned elites. For Weigel as well, knowl-
edge that had been higher now lies deeper within us. The ascending order of 
elements, astral powers, and God has shifted to an inner hierarchy accessi-
ble to the inspired seeker. 
 For many readers, then and now, the result has seemed dauntingly opaque. 
Yet in casting off the “fool Aristotle,” Paracelsus promised to do for nature 
what Luther had done for the Bible. The problem was to discover from 
his widely circulating writings what this meant. Weigel and Boehme were 
among those attempting to sort out Paracelsus’s ill-defi ned alchemical and 
astral forces.  Aurora follows the lead of Martin Ruland by consolidating the 
Paracelsian forces into a sequence of seven prime qualities. 22 In implicit ful-
fi llment of its subtitle,  Aurora associates the seven planetary infl uences with 
Ruland’s seven alchemical spirit qualities. Earthly elements and celestial stars 
are integrated into the fl exible formula of the seven eternal source-spirits 
and their dynamically intermingling qualities. The atom-like paradigm of 
the seven evokes both the astral powers and the alchemically disclosed inner 
forces in the elements and, by extension, heaven and earth, the angels in the 
former and the elemental entities in the latter. Common to all spheres are the 
divine source-spirits and their dynamically ordered qualities. 23 
 The source-spirits are a utopian model of unity in diversity. Their pattern 
is a microcosm of all divine and created being. The regenerative harmony 
of the source spirits is sublimated in the political concord of the angelic 
kingdoms. The love play of the source spirits is paralleled by the benevolent 
diplomatic exchanges of the angelic hosts. Without subjugation or banish-
ment, the angels enjoy both freedom of movement and a natural right, “ein 
Naturrecht,” each to its own place of birth. No angelic kingdom begrudges 
any other its particular qualities. Lest we miss the point, the author cautions 
us that the angelic world is the mirror of an ideal earthly justice. 24 
 The surviving autograph of  Aurora is dated in the author’s own hand. It 
was written out in the fi rst six months of 1612. This coincided with the in-
terval between the transfer of power in Bohemia and Lusatia from Rudolph 
II and the crowning of Matthias as the new emperor. During this interval, 
the Lusatians could hope for an extension to their homeland of the Bohe-
mian letter of religious tolerance, for which they had been lobbying since 
1609. When Matthias is crowned without fulfi lling their hopes, the  Aurora 
fragment breaks off after a note of somber prophecy. 25 
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 Nevertheless, the universalism of  Aurora has a cosmic authority, with the 
source spirits as a microcosm of all divine and created being. The creating, 
ordering, and transforming power of the source-spirits and their associated 
qualities gives meaning to Boehme’s assertion that the terrestrial and celes-
tial worlds are all of a piece. He claims to have experienced the universality 
of heavens and earth with his senses aided by the Holy Spirit. The ubiquity 
of the divine spirits or “essences” negates the cosmic, metaphysical, clerical, 
and academic hierarchies with a single stroke. Recognition of the sun as the 
centre of the cosmos reconfi rms the homogeneity of the all-encompassing 
heavens and thereby highlights the divine forces. Without them, the order of 
the free-fl oating cosmos would be inconceivable. In scholastic-Aristotelian 
cosmology, the heavens were substantially distinct from the sublunary 
realm. Boehme’s seminal illumination of 1600 recognizes that “the true 
heavens are everywhere.” He claims that everything else follows from this. 
Indeed, we can connect the dots in a logical order from his interpretation of 
his recounted illumination to the stated program of  Aurora with its helio-
centrism and alchemy, its penetration of celestial and elemental realms, and 
fi nally to the ubiquitous order of divine spirit and the ecstatic sense of rev-
elation pervading his work. The problem for the reader is that there seems 
to be no end to the dots: Boehme’s concepts and terms multiply as if there 
were strength in numbers. 
 His vast arsenal of concepts and symbols supports the simple idea that 
nature, witnessed by the untutored human being inspired by the Holy Spirit, 
is a second Bible: a divinely-authored Book of Nature. The light of nature 
augments scripture. It offers a new revelation that should resolve all dis-
putes. The reader is induced to seek out the harmony between the terms of 
nature and the truth of scripture. This is somewhat like searching for hidden 
treasures that have been cleverly concealed for children in places they are 
sure to look. The contrived mystery is more urgent than the correlation 
of terms. In Paracelsus, key concepts had been associated with the Bible. 26 
Boehme refi nes their biblical associations. Sulphur, Mercury, and Salt, found 
already in the fi fteenth-century  Book of the Holy Trinity , had been likened 
by Paracelsus to the three divine persons. 27 Boehme redeems their latent 
potential, just as his “signatures of things” expands upon a medieval think-
ing that had recognized divine signs and vestiges in nature. 28 Medieval al-
chemy had hardly been foreign to Christian symbolism, nor to the exercise 
of parsing nature in terms of microcosm and macrocosm. Even Luther had 
no problem with these terms. 29 
 Boehme extends their pattern so that even the smallest circle of nature 
is said to contain the entire being of the divinity. If this seems unbiblical, it 
conforms to the Pauline trope of God as all in all. 30 This commonplace of 
so-called mystical writing captures the facets of his vision and echoes his 
tradition. The erudite Nicholas of Cusa handled this trope as a syllogism. If 
all things are in God and God in all, then all things are in all other things. 31 
This makes for a vastly enriched conception of divine ubiquity. In search 
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of the complex in the simple and vice versa, the artisan polishes a lens for 
contemplating nature through faith by construing all things in all. 
 Boehme applies the lens of  omnes in omnibus to the elements, vegeta-
tion, bodies—human or angelic—and to the heavens. He applies it to our 
conscious or subliminal inner life of desire, anxiety, unrest, and equilibrium. 
This results in what can be aptly called a metaphysics of will. Schopenhauer 
cited pertinent passages in Boehme’s  Vom irdischen und himmlischen Mys-
terio before he discovered the ancient Hindu thought, which he preferred 
to claim as his philosophical precursor. 32 Boehme’s work imagines a primal 
cosmic will materializing out of vain longing to grasp the light. His specula-
tive  tour de force is intentionally mysterious. It has its antecedents. 
 The fi rst will is called the  matrix of all being. The Paracelsian medical 
treatise  On the Matrix had recycled a medieval gynecology that equated 
gestation and birth with the creation of the world: macrocosm and micro-
cosm  in statu nascendi . 33 And what about the light shining in the darkness? 
We know this trope from John 1:5. Boehme’s metaphysics of will adapts and 
develops the Paracelsian  matrix to elaborate a riff on the Prologue of John. 
The light shines in the darkness, but the darkness cannot grasp the light. 34 
The self-absorbing concentration of the blind darkness, the reifi cation of 
its frustrated longing and incomprehension, materializes in the birth of the 
elemental world out of which stuff we are made. Boehme’s cosmic puzzles 
reward the simple lay reader who knows Luther’s Bible chapter and verse. 
 The identity or congruity of theogony, cosmogony, birth, and spiritual 
rebirth is not set out discursively. It is intimated, as in poetry or music, by 
the repetition of motifs: the fi rst will, darkness and light, the spiritual pho-
togeneration of whatever is good in nature. We can only guess in a leap of 
faith. The correct association might be found in a nearby passage. The inner 
and outer, spirit and nature, are everywhere allegorical of one another. This 
leads to an ultimate revelation. The creation of the world and the human 
being, the fall, the torment of birth, death, and rebirth, and the fi nal reso-
lution of things: these are the alpha and omega of Holy Scripture. Applying 
his mystical lens of  omnes in omnibus to the Bible brings Boehme’s Spiri-
tualism full circle. His late, massive treatise  Mysterium Magnum interprets 
Genesis chapter by chapter in the light of Paracelsian nature philosophy. His 
exegesis surmounts the despised historical faith by transfi guring each event 
in ever richer combinatory codes and coordinates.  Mysterium Magnum sur-
veys all nature, temporal and divine. In a manner of speaking, the quick-
ening spirit resurrects itself from the tomb of the dead letter. Riddles latent 
from the very beginning of the world are to be clarifi ed in the end of time. 
 How can we classify Boehme’s writings, and how should we read them? 
He has certainly been a source of religious inspiration and philosophical in-
sight. One could also place him in the sphere of popular religion studied by 
Robert Scribner. 35 In Boehme, there is a fi ne line between the naïve and the 
sublime. Circulating by hand, his writings would have appealed to a popular 
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culture of symbol that fl ourished without higher learning or codifi cation. Nu-
merology and sacred symbols were important both in popular religion and 
Boehme’s work. But the same habits of mind, the same symmetries and sa-
cred numbers that make him appear naive and popular, infuse Dante as well. 
Boehme was infl uenced both by lay piety and learned theological disputation. 
 Our term “mysticism” is an anachronism that offers little insight into the 
intentions or thinking behind such writing. No matter how complex and 
diffi cult, Boehme’s texts can hardly be read as transcripts of spontaneous, 
passive, or ecstatic experiences (except, of course, insofar as any intense in-
spiration can be ecstatic and illuminating, even to the most secular writer or 
reader). Though much can be learned from social history and much gained 
for the study of the history of philosophy and religion, his writings are a 
kind of creative literature and must be appreciated as such. Grass’s conceit 
of the Baroque mystic as Modernist was more than whimsy. Boehme had 
an impact on German Baroque poetry. The attraction of the Baroque for 
Modernists is borne out by the appeal that John Donne and the metaphys-
ical poets held for T. S. Eliot and of Góngora for the avant-garde Spanish 
Generation of ’27. My remaining remarks are advice for the prospective 
reader and suggestions about what the student of literature might hope to 
fi nd in Boehme’s work. 
 Readers should take the author at his word. Of course, we must under-
stand his words in his sense (bearing in mind, for example, that not only 
Boehme but others of a more practical bent of mind would have claimed the 
Holy Spirit as the source of whatever was true and good in their efforts). 
We should respect the sequence of his treatises, beginning with his fi rst, pro-
gressing to his second, and so on. Titles, subtitles, and tables of contents re-
veal much about structures and objectives—without which his work might 
seem like a trackless labyrinth. Passages taken out of context and offered as 
oracular pronouncements are not the best guide to his meaning. Like other 
writers, he has stronger and weaker moments. He has formulae that become 
depleted. There are lapses and inconsistencies. His sources of inspiration 
are transformed into extended compositions through what appears to be an 
experimental trial-and-error process. 
 I would suggest that the patient reader of  Aurora begin with the fi rst 
twenty-six sections of chapter nineteen, roughly its fi rst four pages. They 
can be read as an account of the seminal experience which Boehme implies 
took place in 1600 (twelve years prior to his actual writing in the fi rst half 
of 1612). In his region, those years were a time of dangerous tensions be-
tween Saxon Lutherans and Philippists or Crypto-Calvinists. The fi rst six 
months of 1612, in which Boehme wrote out the long fragment of  Aurora , 
coincided with the interregnum between the death of Emperor Rudolph II 
and the accession of his rival and brother Matthias as the crowned head of 
the Holy Roman Empire. Several chapters are devoted to the vision of the 
peaceful and tolerant angelic kingdoms, which the author calls exemplary 
for the human world. 
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 The broader historical-eschatological perspective is outlined in the beau-
tiful parable in the Preface to  Aurora : “I will compare all of  philosophia ,  as-
trologia , and  theologia , together with its mother, to a fi ne tree which grows 
in a pleasure garden.” The symbolic tree, which grows and bears the fruit 
of revealed truth, despite repeated assaults by the forces of the devil, incor-
porates three biblical sources (the tree of knowledge of good and evil in 
Gen. 2–3, the root of Jesse in Isaiah 11:1, and the parable of the wheat and 
weeds in Matthew 13). The tree alludes to three main intellectual sources of 
 Aurora : (1) nature theory derived from alchemical philosophy, (2) cosmic 
speculation that encompasses astronomy and astrology, and (3) Lutheran 
theological speculation centered in the doctrines of real presence and divine 
ubiquity. 
 Aurora is nothing less than the ultimate fruition of revealed truth. In 
comprehending the theological convergence of the heavenly and earthly na-
ture, the reader brings about God’s fi nal revelation of the eternal secrets of 
the creation. The self-referential preface, which embodies the knowledge it 
announces, calls to mind the self-referential meta-narratives of Modernist 
authors. In  Aurora , however, the telling of the tale is not about the telling 
of the tale. Rather, the comprehending of what is being told creates the 
revelation that it treats of, which is nothing less than the ultimate age of 
knowledge itself. The prophecy does not predict; it institutes. 
 After the memoir of chapter nineteen and the parable of the preface, the 
fi rst few chapters of  Aurora offer an entirely new mode of writing: Boehme 
appears intent upon composing a philosophical treatise based on defi nitions 
and stated premises. In order to understand what God is, one must regard 
the forces in nature. Doing so, one recognizes that everywhere on, in, and 
above the earth there are two qualities: good and evil. Next comes his defi ni-
tion of “Qualität” as “the agitation, emanation, or driving force of a thing” 
(“die Beweglichkeit, Quallen oder Treiben eines Dinges”). Immediately, he 
enumerates qualities. He begins like an objective physical observer with the 
qualities of warmth and cold, but soon it becomes evident that the qualities 
are personalized and theologized, divided up into mirroring good and evil 
versions and compounded, insofar as warmth can issue in light and the life-
force or exhibit grim, dark destructiveness. The enumeration soon resolves 
itself into the dual substance referred to as the  Salitter , the Trinitarian pat-
tern of three, and the no less signifi cant pattern of seven source-spirits or 
qualities. Not unlike a modern experimental narrative, the play of the seven 
source-spirit qualities takes on a life of its own in an inner drama, which is 
as erotic as it is eschatological. 
 In chapter nine,  Aurora ’s focus and tone shift to deliver an anticlerical 
manifesto. The lay and the learned are integrated into a sweeping eschato-
logical perspective and insinuated into the sequence of the seven qualities in 
nature. No mere digression, the thematic turn of chapter nine embodies the 
revelatory triumph of the humble and thus fulfi ls the promise couched in the 
title. What was hidden is dawning. As in Modernism, this experimentalism is 
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revolutionary and utopian. The author proceeds to the angelic utopia and its 
admonitory contrast with the infernal realm. Later chapters of the fragment 
discuss the planets. Their coherence in the scheme of the seven qualities con-
fi rms the harmonies of the philosophy, astrology, and theology in the subtitle. 
 Since the  Aurora manuscript is a fair copy, representing the premature 
discontinuation of a decade-long compositional process, we are justifi ed in re-
specting its order of chapters. We are not justifi ed in supposing that their order 
divulges the chronology of Boehme’s interests. Even chapter nineteen, which 
stands out in its presentation of an experience twelve years prior, cannot be 
read as a psychological report. It is far too saturated with terms derived from 
Boehme’s refl ections and sources to be read as psychological description. 
 The reader would do well to consider that the various modes of writing 
found in  Aurora can be seen as several treatments of the same problem. The 
memoir recounts how the author had been deeply depressed by his sense of 
the remoteness of the heavens from the earth and by that of himself from 
God and the heavenly world. Heavens and heaven in his remembered de-
pression appear as one, as indeed they are designated by the same word in 
German. The seminal illumination of the author—that the true heavens are 
everywhere—was therefore an intuition of the object pursued speculatively 
in the theory of the qualities and forces, a pursuit placed in eschatological 
context by the Preface parable. In yet another sense, the gulf between the 
heavens and earth is closed in  Aurora . The qualities of the alchemically 
disclosed earthly elements discussed in the fi rst eight chapters coincide with 
the planetary qualities explicated in the penultimate ones. They implicitly 
surmount the Aristotelian and scholastic distinction between the qualities of 
the celestial and terrestrial worlds: everywhere the dynamic pattern of the 
seven and the Trinitarian three prevail in the substance of nature, in human 
life, and in the key to all, the divine being. 
 The Three Principles of Divine Being begins by boldly inquiring after 
the nature of God: “If we want to speak of God, what He is and where He 
is, then we indeed must say that God is himself the being of all beings: for 
from Him have all things been born, created, and proceeded; and everything 
has its fi rst beginning in God.” 36 This expanded corollary of monotheism 
enables the author to do several things. It allows him to construe Paracelsian 
alchemy as an allegory of the divine nature while spiritualizing and psy-
chologizing the dynamics of the three principles. It permits him to construe 
as variants of a single archetypal pattern or event the eternal birth of the 
divinity, the cosmic birth of the natural world, and the birth and spiritual 
rebirth of the human being. It licenses him to interject the narrative of “an-
gelic Adam,” whose wholeness as a true image of the divine being is to be 
restored by divine knowledge and rebirth at the end of time. 
 Aurora and  The Three Principles of Divine Being are the workshops in 
which the reader can attend to the concepts and materials that are shaped 
and adapted for all writings to come. However, the extended substance of his 
writings also articulates biblical sequences and doctrinal and philosophical 
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concepts. In  Mysterium Magnum, the entire Book of Genesis is explicated; 
in  Aurora and  Three Principles its initial chapters. The latter work explicates 
the Paracelsian three “principles.”  Aurora also devotes considerable attention 
to microcosm and macrocosm, and  De Signatura Rerum to a meditation on 
the concept of its title. Writings are directed to devotional matters and to con-
troversial doctrines such as the Lord’s Supper, Incarnation, baptism, spiritual 
rebirth, and the election of grace. Astronomy and the theories of alchemy and 
nature philosophy enter into a spiritualized synthesis, uniting celestial and el-
emental realms and yielding what the author himself regards as a new style of 
discourse. Revealing God everywhere and in all things validates the Lutheran 
doctrine of real presence and reinforces the notion of lay priesthood. 
 We only hear the peculiar music of his writing when we become aware 
of the overtones and harmonies that tie any one theme to its equivalents in 
other frames of reference, so that the alchemical theme evokes the spiritual, 
the biblical the astrological, and so on. This lends Boehme a unique style 
and voice, or actually several of them, each with its own peculiar authority. 
The voice of  Aurora combines that of a lay preacher, teller of folk tales, 
and master of riddles with that of a shrewd Socratic ironist, philosophical 
inquirer, and ardent people’s advocate, lodging protests against the powers 
that be. The voice of the subsequent writings is more somber, oracular, and 
at times pretentious. The color and resonance usually echo the historical cir-
cumstances and atmosphere of the catastrophic junctures in which he wrote. 
Boehme’s invention of his “language of nature,” for interpreting sounds and 
syllables allegorically, might strike us as a whimsical concoction, but it rein-
forces his poetic attention to the harmonies of sound and sense. 
 Written in 1620 when the Bohemian phase of the Thirty Years’ War was 
in full swing in Lusatia,  The Threefold Life of Man begins with a note of 
universal introspection that calls to mind the coincidence of the Gnostic 
with the Existentialist in Hans Jonas. The objectifi cation of despair or hope 
in extreme images can resemble German Expressionism. 
 If we consider the beginning of our life and want to hold it up against 
the eternal life which is promised to us, we cannot say or conclude that 
we are at home in this external life. . . . And if we consider life, and 
[inquire] what it is, we observe that it is a burning fi re which consumes; 
and when it has nothing left to consume, it goes out, as can be seen 
from all fi res. . . . We see clearly that the elemental life is in a state of 
seething, that it is that very seething; and when it ceases to seethe, it 
goes out. We also know that the stars ignite the elements and are the 
fi re of the elements; and the sun ignites the stars, thereby causing them 
to fl ow forth and seethe into one another. Yet the elemental life is fi nite 
and perishable, and the life of the soul eternal. 37 
 The exposition of  The Threefold Life of Man resolves and clarifi es the 
seething cauldron of elements and stars into which the human being is 
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thrust. The complexities of alchemical and astronomical theory again re-
veal that beneath the puzzle of being, the triune body and spirit of God are 
omnipresent: “But it is the corporeality of nature in which all seven forms 
of all nature stand, and in them are the seven spirits of God, manifest as 
seven burning torches . . . ” (3:83). This alchemical-astronomical vision 
evokes the Book of Revelation (4:5), where seven torches burn before the 
throne of God. The apocalyptic omnipresence of God offers the antidote to 
the literalistic “Pfaffen” (clerics) who cry out, “God is here, God is there!” 
(3:224–25). Of course, divine omnipresence reconfi rms that the believer re-
ceives the fl esh and blood of Christ in the sacrament (3:261). 
 After rejecting factional adherence to Luther, Calvin, Schwenckfeld, or 
the pope (3:130), the later chapters of  The Threefold Life rise to an anticler-
ical crescendo in exalting the lay-priest (3:254) and condemning “falsche 
Bischöfe” and “Pfaffen-Teufel,” the clergymen-devils whose quarreling has 
now become religious war (3:277, 278).  The Threefold Life thus begins 
with the mystery of human existence, magnifi es it into the conundrum of 
the cosmos, and fi nally resolves it by reaffi rming Boehme’s universalistic 
articles of faith in opposition to all partisan authorities of the time. It can be 
objected that the author remains partisan while claiming universality.  The 
Threefold Life is indeed at once partisan in its Lutheranism and universal-
istic in declaring even the Indians of remote America better Christians than 
those ruling Christendom (3:228). 
 Like Modernism, the literary vision of Boehme is conditioned by the con-
fusions and catastrophes of his age. He is akin not only to the Romantics, 
whom he infl uenced, but also to such Modernists as Franz Kafka, Rainer 
Maria Rilke, or Paul Celan. Like them, though without the modern skepti-
cism in religious matters, Boehme shifts the locus of transcendence inward, 
into the human psyche and the hidden inner life of the world. He creates 
hermetic symbols and systems of symbols that draw upon, yet transcend, 
the confl icts and conundrums of his world. 
 Boehme is a master of ambiguity, allusion, symbol, and neologism. Con-
sider a passage such as this one from  Aurora : 
 And the seven spirits of God are all together God the Father: for no 
spirit exists without the other; rather, they give birth to all seven one 
after the other. If not for the one, the other would not be. Yet the light 
is a different person [of the deity]: for it is perpetually born from the 
seven; and the seven perpetually ascend [or rise in force] in the light; and 
the forces of the seven spirits perpetually proceed out in the radiance of 
the light into the seventh nature-spirit, and form and shape everything 
in the seventh spirit; and this going out is the Holy Spirit (1:146). 
 We notice fi rst of all how he accommodates the Trinity: the totality of 
the nature spirits is the Father, the light perpetually born from the Father 
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the Son. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father  and Son. So far, so good. 
This is simply Western Trinitarian orthodoxy. Yet the plurality of the seven 
is also pluralistic and integrative. It takes all kinds to make a divine whole. 
It takes the darkness of the Father and the light of the Son to generate the 
third person of the Trinity. Darkness and light hold keys to the synchronous 
understanding of the world. The order of spirits is the order of revelation in 
time. The seventh is the author’s ultimate knowledge. As in Johannes Scotus 
Erigena, history unfolds out of God. 
 The divine ubiquity is extended in depth. The layers of meaning descend 
to the opposite end of the Great Chain of Being, from the sublime to the 
physical and the sensual. We took note that the paradigm of seven spirits 
resembles the heliocentric world. Boehme is also thinking of the alchemy of 
niter or potassium nitrate, which he calls  salitter . Niter was a banal gun-
powder ingredient and an object of intense speculation around 1600. In the 
Latin of Pliny,  nitor meant splendor or brilliance. The spirit forces in the 
 salitter release light and warmth, embodying the solar heart of the cosmos 
and the Son of God. But it is not all sweetness and light in the inner world 
of the elements. Benign or malignant forces arise from the mixture of the 
spirit qualities. Nature is nowhere neutral. Good and evil powers, literally 
Paradise and Hell, are present in the inert element. There are the powers of 
light and healing balm, but there are also powers which are dark, explosive, 
pestilential, and destructive. Most of this was anticipated by Paracelsus. 
 One of the niter-related qualities hints at how experiential his alchemy 
might indeed have been. He refers to a triumphant, rising source of laughter, 
associated with a sweet smell (1:88). These aspects would fi t the properties 
of nitrous oxide or laughing gas which is thought to have been synthesized 
only much later. The “all in all” of the source spirits is raised back up, from 
the lowly element to the exalted heights of angelic bliss: 
 Observe the depth: Just as when the fl ash of life rises up in the midst of 
the divine force, when all the spirits of God receive their life and highly 
rejoice, there proceeds a loving and holy embracing, kissing, tasting, 
feeling, hearing, seeing, and smelling; [and] thus it is too with the an-
gels: when the one sees, hears, and feels the other, in its heart the fl ash 
of life rises up, and one spirit embraces the other within the divinity 
(1:152). 
 After this orgy of love, the life of the spirits is replicated in the harmo-
nies of the angelic world: “Every angel is created like the entire divinity, 
and is like a small god. For when God created the angels, he created them 
out of himself. Now God is in one place as he is in the other: everywhere 
he is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (1:152). This passage introduces a 
pivotal theme. The angels, their kingdoms, and pristine Adam all replicate 
the divine ubiquity in depth. Boehme rejects the  creatio ex nihilo in favor of 
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a  creatio ex se : God creates everything out of his own being. This explains 
why we are free and not doomed, as in his caricature of Calvinist theology. 
It is also why the angels, elements, and human beings reproduce within their 
respective beings the tensions and dynamics of the divine nature. Everything 
is created in God’s image and out of his being. Everything has God’s DNA, 
so to speak, though the paths of “evolution” were bifurcated in Satan’s fall. 
Yet only an inner, spiritual turn separates the base from the exalted. 
 In  The Three Principles of Divine Being , Boehme explains how God cre-
ated everything out of his own being. We can revisit the theme and see 
where it takes us: “The true heavens in which God dwells are everywhere, 
in all places: He encompasses Hell, in which the devil dwells; and there is 
nothing outside of God . . . all things have been born from him; and God 
is called God because he alone is the good, the heart, or the best, the light 
or power, from which nature arises.” 38 God is only God because the eternal 
light of the pure divinity overcomes the darkness in the divine being. Evil 
is unregenerate or relapsed darkness. So is God everything? Or is God only 
the good? The author wants to have it both ways. This leads to his theodicy 
of the  Ungrund, which infl uenced Friedrich Schelling and Nikolai Berdyaev, 
both of whom incorporated the term in their thought. A common response 
is to declare him a certifi ed mystic and forget about him. We should instead 
see where his contradictions lead us. 
 The art of his riddles and paradoxes shifts the focus. Like Weigel, or 
for that matter like Montaigne, Boehme directs us to regard our inner life. 
To recognize how nature arises, we have to imagine the eternal darkness 
outside of God: “[the darkness] has a great yearning for the light, since 
the light is mirrored in the darkness and shines within itself” (68/721:22). 
The darkness is nowhere and nothing. Yet, oddly, this nothingness yearns 
for the light: its yearning becomes the foundation of the world. The au-
thor tells us that we can experience this yearning in the depth of our soul. 
“Depth” is often his key word and signal direction. We know deep down 
that we are nothing and therefore crave enlightenment. This, of course, 
makes a different and more modern sense. 
 Next comes the creation of the human being: Adam was initially created 
by God as an androgynous creature in the likeness of the angels. Like God, 
he is whole. This Adam never sleeps. Though androgynous, his impulsive as-
pect is the male youth who lusts after the female principle within his pristine 
being: the Noble Virgin of Divine Wisdom. She is the light within his angelic 
being. He has an improper longing to possess and become pregnant with her. 
Based on the biblical book of Job, the apocryphal books of the Wisdom of 
Solomon and Sirach (Ecclesiasticus), as well as on the Paracelsian reifi cation 
of wisdom in nature, the Noble Virgin embodies truth and goodness in na-
ture. Wisdom is a female aspect of divinity. Again we fi nd the same motifs: 
the darkness longs for the light but cannot possess or comprehend it. The 
Noble Virgin of Divine Wisdom fl ees lustful Adam whereupon he sinks into 
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a male darkness and sleeps the sleep of all mankind. By endeavoring to give 
voice to the inconceivable, Boehme expands the capacity for refl ection and 
self-recognition. Angelic Adam can be interpreted on many different levels. 
 The struggle of darkness and light recurs in theogony, cosmogony, astron-
omy, alchemy, and anthropology, always in allusion to Genesis and John. 
The cosmos is born when the light shines into the darkness, which cannot 
comprehend it. The human mission is to overcome the uncomprehending 
darkness within ourselves by knowing that we cannot possess the beauty 
and goodness which are the divine light toward which all things grow and 
mature. All of nature is in agony to give birth to the light. The devil’s usurp-
ing shortcut to radiant bliss leads to hell. 
 There are more concrete examples of the tendency of Boehme’s thought 
to coordinate life and nature with the Bible. He supplies his readers with 
practical advice for daily devotions. Hour by hour, the devout soul reenacts 
the odyssey of the human race. Getting up out of bed on Monday morning, 
one’s prayers recall the nakedness of Adam and Eve after their fall from 
grace. Setting off to work recalls the human expulsion from Paradise. Pre-
paring for bed at night means putting on angelic garments in preparation for 
the return to Paradise. Boehme provides practical advice for the spiritually 
challenged. The melancholy should avoid Calvinist books about the elect 
and gird themselves to conquer the devil’s outlaw castle, from whence the 
attacks of melancholy are launched. Boehme’s exemplary soul is to Adam 
and Eve as Joyce’s Bloom is to Ulysses (4:237–52). 
 But the same patterns of thought are extended to the tragic current 
events. Here is how he responds to the religious war in progress: “You per-
secute one another, revile and despise one another, [you] instigate war and 
insurrection, devastating the country and the people . . . [all] for the sake 
of the true knowledge of God” (which means knowledge disclosed by him): 
“[Yet] you do not know your own selves. This is why you are furious and 
fi ght over God, who is a sustainer and creator of all things, who is the centre 
in all things. . .” (3:13). As always, God is ubiquitous. As always, the dark-
ness cannot comprehend the light. And as always, the failed  coup d’état of 
darkness to seize possession of the light—“Christ is here! Christ is there!”—
leads to the hellish fi re-world of confessional war. Boehme’s quixoticism is 
overshadowed by historical tragedy. 
 Modernism signals a crisis of nineteenth-century Realism and progressiv-
ism. Boehme’s thought signals a crisis of medievalism and Renaissance hu-
manism. Agrippa’s humanistic  De occulta philosophia ascends from the lower 
to the higher, from the elemental to the celestial to the divine. Instead of a ris-
ing hierarchy, Boehme projects an inner one that goes ever deeper into worlds 
within worlds. Though essential to his meaning, this creates a compositional 
chaos, as if Dante’s architecture of worlds had been shattered by the Reforma-
tion and commingled. The dark fi re-world and the angelic light world, good 
and evil, heaven and earth, inner and outer, eternity and time, are said to be 
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“in one another like a single thing.” Good and evil are distinct yet insepara-
ble. Our world is heaven and hell in one. Our daily newspaper confi rms it. 
 As for the initial paradox of simplicity and complexity, one might resolve 
it by assuming that Boehme was only pretending to be simple but was, in re-
ality, utterly steeped in learning and tradition. One can also take him at his 
word but understand him properly. When he introduces Paracelsian theory, 
it is to him neither pharisaic dogma nor mystical lore. It is the experienced 
wisdom of the lay people harmonized with the Bible. One of the aspirations 
of the Spiritualists, shared by Weigel and Boehme, is to teach the lay believer 
how to outsmart the better-educated elite. The purpose is served by the par-
adoxes of Franck and by Boehme’s complex puzzles with their simple bibli-
cal keys. His worldview is overly complex because it oversimplifi es nature. 
 For future study, we need better access to the literary sources so that 
readers can decide for themselves and so that we can discern whether “Beh-
menists” in other countries continued in his path or went off in new direc-
tions. We need modern translations with adequate commentary. We need to 
examine the culture of late-Reformation Germany. Its ambience of polariza-
tion and demonization is documented in pamphlets denouncing rival theo-
logians as minions of Satan, in so-called folk songs celebrating the burning 
of witches, in the  Historia of Dr. Faustus , and in the compendious  Theatrum 
Diabolorum , where everything from natural calamities and peccadilloes to 
magicians and heretics represents the devil’s carnival masquerade. The pre-
dominance of the devil in the age of faith was a precondition for Boehme’s 
dialectic of good and evil in God. His writing is a counterpoint voice in and 
against the dialectic of destructive polarization in the late Reformation. 
 Without the horrors of his age, Boehme appears pointlessly overwrought. 39 
 Aurora is one of the most unique and beautiful works in the German lan-
guage. Like any other great and complex literary work, it must be read 
also as an expression of its moment. German historian Johannes Burkhardt 
recently described the propagandistic print battle over the centenary of the 
 Ninety-Five Theses in 1617 as a signifi cant factor in polarizing the Germans 
for war. 40 Arguably, one of the earliest public anti-war campaigns began 
with the circulation of Boehme’s manuscripts together with the posthumous 
publication of Weigel and appeals by Bernegger, Staricius, Opitz, and Ke-
pler. Unfortunately, it was not destined to have any real impact. 
 On the last pages of Boehme’s  Three Principles of Divine Being (1618), 
the Noble Virgin of Divine Wisdom draws the hounded soul out of the 
thorns of its exile and pledges it to spread truth against hatred and war. 
Stirring as this is, the infl uence of Boehme in Germany was more cultural 
than political. He inspired poets and philosophers from Angelus Silesius and 
Novalis to Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. Boehme’s work remains lim-
inal between the medieval and the modern, between the lay and the learned. 
Not by chance, he was a product of the same years and epochal shift that 
gave us another inspired layman: Don Quixote 
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 4  Boehme’s Intellectual Networks 
and the Heterodox Milieu of 
His Theosophy, 1600–1624 
 Leigh T. I. Penman 
 Numerous myths have concretized around the Görlitz theosopher Jacob 
Boehme, which have obscured the true nature and sources of his volumi-
nous works. The most infl uential of these myths stems from Boehme’s own 
sophisticated rhetorical self-presentation within his books and letters as a 
simple hand-worker who wrote only for himself, inspired by the grace of 
God, following a series of divine visions he experienced from 1600. 1 This 
notion was perpetuated by contemporary supporters eager to shield them-
selves from charges of heresy and has since also been commonly found in 
more modern accounts of Boehme and his works. But Boehme’s self-presen-
tation, particularly with regard to the sources of his doctrines, was not uni-
form. In a letter to Martin Moser in March of 1624, for example, Boehme 
wrote: “I did not receive my scholarship by manner of learning in schools 
and in books, but rather from the great book of all beings.” 2 However, in 
his earlier  Aurora (1612), Boehme wrote that “I have read the writings of 
many high masters.” 3 Which statement is true? 
 Strictly speaking, both might be. There are aspects of Boehme’s thought 
and work that are highly idiosyncratic and original, and aspects that are 
not. But the two statements are enough in and of themselves to demonstrate 
that Boehme’s corpus, as a philosophical product, did not spring from an 
intellectual vacuum. The reason why Boehme’s work communicated a cos-
mogony resembling that of the Zschopau pastor Valentin Weigel (1533–
1588) and ideas of matter that echoed those of Paracelsus (1493–1541), as 
well as featured a heterodox eschatology that refl ected that of contemporary 
chiliastic prophets like Paul Nagel (d. 1624) was because Boehme was, most 
assuredly, infl uenced by their works. Boehme was a heliocentrist as early 
as 1612, complained about specifi c aspects of Calvinist doctrine, and was 
a critic of Caspar Schwenckfeld (1489–1561), precisely because he knew 
and engaged with persons and works, both printed and manuscript, which 
communicated such material to him. In no way is Abraham von Francken-
berg’s (1593–1652) statement that Boehme only “learnt to read and write 
a little” to be accepted uncritically. 4 Boehme consistently portrayed himself 
as a “babe” (Psalms 8:2, Matthew 21:16); a simple, enlightened laborer, 
specifi cally in order to increase the appeal of his writings among his fellow 
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men, as well as to insulate himself—unsuccessfully, as several persecutions 
in Görlitz demonstrate—from charges of heresy. 
 The present chapter has two major aims. First, it is devoted to presenting 
some insight into Boehme’s intellectual world. It illustrates that, in contrast 
to his self-representations—and the misleading representations of occult-
ists, novelists, and several historians who have furthered his myth—Boehme 
emerged from a distinctly heterodox intellectual milieu. Second, it is hoped 
that this chapter, by fi nally locating Boehme within a concrete intellectual 
tradition, will provide a spur to further research concerning his sources and 
infl uences. While much ink has been spilled over the possible meanings of 
Boehme’s philosophy, there has been comparatively little effort devoted to 
situating Boehme within solid historical contexts and identifying the sources 
of his intellectual debts. 5 Here, I suggest some possible avenues to identify-
ing these further infl uences. 
 The chapter is structured in three parts. The fi rst examines the intellec-
tual and religious climate that predominated in Boehme’s home town of 
Görlitz during the theosopher’s spiritual awakening in 1600. The second 
points to a selection of personalities from within Boehme’s networks, in 
particular the several physicians, chymists, and religious enthusiasts with 
whom Boehme traffi cked during his most intensive creative period, be-
tween 1619 and 1624. The third presents some examples that demonstrate 
the impact of these historical traditions and people on Boehme’s thought, 
with particular regard to his reception of Kabbalistic and chiliastic ideas. 
Thereby, I hope to demonstrate that, despite stories of divine illumination, 
Boehme was not a man apart from his contemporaries, but very much one 
of their fellow travelers. 
 I BOEHME’S GÖRLITZ AROUND 1600 
 Görlitz today, as Germany’s easternmost town, is an isolated place nestled 
in a crook of the river Neiße on the Polish border. In Boehme’s time, how-
ever, it was at Europe’s heart. Situated in the semi-autonomous territory of 
Upper Lusatia, administered from distant Prague, Görlitz was located on 
the  via regia , Europe’s major trading road, which spanned from Krakow 
to Paris. As such, it was a bustling commercial center and a major mar-
ketplace in Europe’s woad trade. It was also a major intellectual center. 
The Reformation reached Görlitz from below in 1524, namely through the 
wish and striving of the populace. The Görlitz Gymnasium Augustum was 
established in 1565, and its Philippist curriculum—a humanistic Luther-
anism developed by Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560)—attracted locals 
and students from Saxony, Thuringia, Bohemia, and the Silesian duchies, 
creating a late-blooming of humanist culture in the town. 6 With a spiritual 
ministry subject to the authority of the city council, Görlitz was relatively 
liberal in confessional terms, and as the second Reformation took hold in 
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surrounding territories, the city received numerous disgruntled and dissatis-
fi ed Protestants of Calvinist, Schwenckfeldian, and other backgrounds. By 
1600, the population of Görlitz had swelled to some 10,000 inhabitants, 
making it one of the largest towns in Germany between Erfurt and Breslau 
(Wrocław). This was the Görlitz in which Boehme lived, worked, and expe-
rienced what he believed to be his fi rst encounter with the divine. 
 As something of a harbor of religious tolerance and a destination of 
choice for those fl eeing their home territories, Görlitz gradually attracted 
an eclectic assortment of freethinkers, spiritualists, and dissenters during 
the latter half of the sixteenth century who fl ed persecution in other territo-
ries. The most prominent movement was that of the Paracelsians, 7 and their 
fi gurehead was Bartholomäus Scultetus (1540–1614). 8 Eight times mayor 
of Gorlitz, Scultetus was Görlitz’s arch-humanist: a mathematician, astron-
omer, author, and cartographer, and a correspondent of Tycho Brahe and 
Johannes Kepler. In addition to issuing an annual astrological almanac, he 
also authored a tract about the portentous comet of 1577. Furthermore, 
Scultetus presided over an important collection of Paracelsus’s radical theo-
logical and medical manuscripts. 9 These he collected from around 1567, 
and his now lost diaries record his meetings with a host of visitors interested 
in Paracelsianism as they wandered through the territory, where matters in-
cluding Paracelsus’s teachings on medicine and religion were discussed. 10 In 
1570, these gatherings of Paracelsians led city offi cials to investigate “meet-
ings of physicians of the Paracelsian sect” ( collegium medicorum sectae 
Paracelsi ) and to attempt to determine whether the group posed a threat in 
religious matters. The investigation appears to have come to naught and did 
little to dissuade Scultetus from his interests. Nor did it make the town less 
attractive to Paracelsian visitors. While Scultetus served as mayor during 
the fi rst controversy over Boehme’s  Aurora in 1613, the available evidence 
cannot demonstrate a personal connection between the two men. 
 As Carlos Gilly has observed, linked by the necessity of secrecy, hetero-
dox and oppositional personalities, together with the writings that they 
traffi cked, tended to move along and through the same channels. 11 And in 
Görlitz, Paracelsianism went hand in hand with Weigelianism. One visi-
tor to the Paracelsian gatherings in and about Görlitz was the physician 
Abraham Behem (ca. 1545–1599), Scultetus’s brother-in-law. A prominent 
physician and friend of Conrad Gesner, Behem knew Weigel personally, and 
in 1579 corresponded with him concerning cosmogony. 12 As Andrew Weeks 
has shown, several of the ideas presented in this letter were later paralleled 
in Boehme’s works; it is also noteworthy that the extant manuscript derives 
from the collection of one of Boehme’s adherents, Benedikt Hinckelmann. 13 
It was not only that Weigel’s cosmogony decisively infl uenced his  Aurora. 
In September 1620, Boehme attempted to procure for his disciple Christian 
Bernhard (d. 1649), toll-collector in Sagan (Zagan), a copy of the Pseu-
do-Weigelian third part of the  Gnothi seauton (1619) as well as what may 
have been a further Pseudo-Weigelian text,  Vom alten und newen Jerusalem 
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(1619). 14 Additionally, in a 1621 letter to his Beuthen (Bytom) follower Kas-
par Lindner, Boehme wrote: 
 Otherwise Weigel accords with our writings concerning the new birth 
and the union of humanity with Christ quite well, which, while I write 
about the matter somewhat more clearly in my works, I leave aside 
here, and do not reject them, nor those who read them. 15 
 While Weigel’s followers thus exercised some infl uence in Görlitz, a larger 
part in the city’s spiritual life was played by followers of another radical 
reformer: Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossig. Many of these Schwenckfelders 
had fl ed to Upper Lusatia during the late sixteenth century on account of 
persecution in nearby Silesian duchies and ultimately accounted for a sub-
stantial minority of the population. 16 The movement’s chiefs were sometime 
mayor Sebastian Hoffmann (d. 1605) and his brother-in-law, Michael Ender 
(d. 1595). 17 
 A direct link between the Paracelsian and Schwenckfeldian communi-
ties was the alchemist and physician Balthasar Walther (1558–ca. 1630) 
of Fraustadt (Wschowa) in the duchy of Liegnitz. 18 Probably of Schwenck-
felder stock, in 1587 Walther met Scultetus in Görlitz and received from 
him a host of Paracelsian, magical, Kabbalistic, and prophetic writings, 
which he copied the next year while living in the Schwenckfeldian vil-
lage of Harpersdorf (Twardocice). He was also befriended by the Liegnitz 
physician Abraham Meffert (d. 1617), who was a copyist of Paracelsus’s 
works and an editor of Paul Lautensack’s prophetic texts, which circulated 
among Boehme’s followers. In 1599, after undertaking a trip to the Orient 
in search of magical knowledge, Walther authored a biography of the Wal-
lachian warlord Michael the Brave (1558–1601) dedicated to both Scultetus 
and Hoffmann. Although he fl irted initially with the antinomian doctrines 
of the Langensalza prophet Esajas Stiefel (1561–1627), after about 1617, 
Walther would become perhaps Boehme’s foremost follower as well as 
infl uence—both as a disciple and teacher. 19 He was a tireless promoter of 
Boehme’s theosophy and furnished the forty questions that inspired one of 
the theosopher’s most infl uential works. The common intellectual thread 
that would link the Paracelsian, Weigelian, and Schwenckfeldian traditions 
to Boehme’s outlook was their radical spiritualistic anticlericalism. Like the 
founders of each of these movements, Boehme rejected the authority of the 
 Mauerkirche —the worldly churches of mere walls—and instead claimed di-
rect inspiration from the eternal school of the Holy Spirit. 
 Finally, an additional name must be mentioned as crucial to the spiritual 
and intellectual life of Boehme’s Görlitz. This was Martin Moller (1547–
1606), after 1600, chief evangelical pastor at the  Nikolaikirche . 20 Along 
with Philip Nicolai and Johann Arndt, Moller is one of the most prom-
inent fi gures in the so-called  Frömmigkeitswende (devotional change) in 
Lutheran society during the early seventeenth century. A reaction against a 
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dogmatic orthodoxy, Moller’s works, in particular his  Mysterium Magnum 
(1595) and  Praxis evangelicorum (1601), offered a meditative approach to 
practical spiritual Lutheranism. According to a disputed report by the eigh-
teenth-century historian Christian Knauthe—who presided over a library 
of unpublished material—Boehme was apparently a member of a small 
conventicle ( Hauß-Convent ) that met regularly at Moller’s home to discuss 
issues of personal devotion, the soul’s welfare, and practical Christianity. 21 
 This brief sketch therefore illustrates something of the spiritual and intel-
lectual characteristics of Görlitz society when Boehme fi rst emerged there. 
This was a town where Philippists, Schwenckfelders, Weigelians, and Para-
celsians were well-known members of society, and where opportunities to 
express and discuss these ideas existed in the form of conventicles or meet-
ings in private homes—some of which Boehme is thought to have attended. 
Boehme’s fi rst work “Aurora” (1612) was an attempt to engage with the 
divine mysteries he believed he had encountered. This unfi nished treatise, 
suffused with Paracelsian and Weigelian notions, speaks directly to the mi-
lieu in which it was produced. 
 II  PATRONS, PHYSICIANS, AND PROPHETS: BOEHME’S 
INTELLECTUAL NETWORK, 1618–1624 
 The success of Boehme’s writings in central Europe after 1618 owed much, 
naturally, to the inherent appeal of his work, but this appeal was also fos-
tered by broader conditions. The injustices and instabilities of the nascent 
Thirty Years’ War, all too visible in and around Lusatia, had awoken numer-
ous locals to the utility of practical and spiritual theosophical Christianity. 
Additionally, the climatic disaster of the little ice age, together with rampant 
infl ation, had inspired angst, uncertainty, and unrest among the populace, 
as well as a longing for insight into God’s plans. Furthermore, it also re-
lied upon the tireless efforts of readers, copyists, publicists, and followers, 
which he attracted from several levels of society. The spread of Boehme’s 
 Aurora is a prime example. This text was copied before its completion in 
1613 by Karl Ender von Sercha (1568–1624). The already familiar fi gure of 
Balthasar Walther championed the work on his travels as a physician and, 
in or around 1618, Walther showed some of Boehme’s work to the Sagan 
(Zagan) revenue collector, Christian Bernhard, who was captivated by what 
he read. Thereafter, Bernhard became the chief copyist of Boehme’s material. 
The mechanisms behind the spread of  Aurora epitomizes the interlocking 
associations of the local gentry, and both the highly educated and mercantile 
classes, which not only assisted the distribution of Boehme’s works, but, I 
argue, also informed his writings. In the following sections, based primarily 
on a consideration of Boehme’s extant epistles, I aim to outline some of 
the major fi gures in Boehme’s energetic and sometimes volatile networks 
and point out the roles that they played in informing and disseminating his 
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writings and ideas. The point here is to demonstrate, in a further context, 
that Boehme was not a man apart from his contemporaries during his most 
creative period between 1619 and his death in 1624, but rather was very 
much connected to the personalities and ideas circulating around him. 
 III PATRONS AND PROFESSIONALS 
 The important facilitating role of patronage within Boehme’s networks has 
long been realized. Less frequently acknowledged, however, are the general 
heterodox inclinations of several of these patrons. Indeed, three of Boehme’s 
foremost supporters among the local gentry were locally educated sons of 
major fi gures in Görlitz’s Schwenckfelder community. The brothers Karl 
and Michael Ender von Sercha the younger (1590–1637) of Leopoldshain 
(Łagów), for example, were sons of the aforementioned Schwenckfelder 
patriarch Michael. 22 Additionally, Johann Sigismund von Schweinichen the 
younger (1590–1664), son of another major Schwenckfelder, fi nanced the 
publication of Boehme’s  Weg zu Christo (Görlitz, 1624) and secured a pub-
lication privilege from Georg Rudolf II of Liegnitz (1595–1653). 23 
 Further noble supporters of Boehme included Abraham von Sommerfeld 
(d. 1651), who visited the theosopher on numerous occasions and prepared 
copies of several of his works, giving them outlandish Latin titles. 24 Another 
patron, Kaspar von Fürstenau (1572–1649) of Lissa (Lasów), practiced 
alchemy and read and collected the works of Weigel and the Rosicrucian 
manifestos. 25 Both also knew the chiliast Paul Nagel. Rudolf von Gerßdorf 
(1598–1629) of Weichau (Wichów) was one of Boehme’s correspondents 
and regularly received visits by Balthasar Walther and Boehme himself. 26 
Abraham von Einsiedel, also a friend of Nagel’s, not only supported Boehme 
in his battle against Esajas Stiefel but would later go on to experience a se-
ries of terrifying millennial visions in the 1630s. 27 
 Not only did these friends and patrons advance and support Boehme’s 
intellectual and spiritual interests, their lands also provided economic op-
portunities for the wandering theosopher, who spent much of his time sell-
ing his cloth and yarn wares along the  via regia . During his travels, Boehme 
also encountered several other supporters, primarily among the professional 
classes. In addition to—among others—the Sprottau (Szprotawa) tanner 
Berend Nitsche 28 and Augustin Köppe, the manager of Fürstenau’s Döb-
schutz property, 29 Boehme’s foremost supporters were two copyists of his 
work: a Beuthen toll collector, Kaspar Lindner, 30 and the aforementioned 
Bernhard. 31 Both men were followers of the philosophy of Weigel, and Ber-
nhard soon gave up his employment in order to devote himself to copying 
Boehme’s works as well as other heterodox texts. 
 Boehme’s reliance upon fi gures within his immediate network is empha-
sized by the fact that, when his works fi rst came to the attention of alarmed 
Lutheran pastors outside Görlitz, such as Valentin Grießmann in 1623 and 
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Peter Widmann in 1624, these opponents were located in Wählitz (near 
Leipzig) and Lauban (Lubbin): cities well-known to Boehme and his sup-
porters. 32 Furthermore, apart from the aforementioned Georg Rudolf and 
August von Anhalt-Plötzkau (1575–1653), his manuscripts appear not to 
have circulated more widely within contemporary heterodox epistolary and 
interpersonal networks whose participants were otherwise inclined towards 
mystical, chiliastic, alchemical, and Weigelian ideas. 33 
 IV JURISTS, PHYSICIANS, AND CHYMISTS 
 While his patrons and professional contacts thus also shared Boehme’s inter-
ests in heterodox thought, it appears that the greatest audience for his works 
were the educated classes, with a great deal of Boehme’s initial friends and 
correspondents being university educated jurists, physicians, and chymists, 
who were based in Görlitz and further afi eld. Only the most signifi cant of 
these fi gures will be listed below. Foremost among those after Walther was 
Tobias Kober (1587–1625), a correspondent and Boehme’s personal phy-
sician, a convinced Paracelsian who attended the theosopher on his death-
bed. Kober was said by Franckenberg to have supplied Boehme with Latin 
and Greek equivalents for several words and concepts in his writings. 34 The 
“exceptional alchemist and adept” Johann Rothe (ca. 1580–d. 1640) of 
Görlitz was another infl uential contact. 35 He was a keen reader of Tauler 
and Arndt, and, as the historian Ernst-Heinz Lemper speculates, may have 
brought earlier theosophical doctrines to Boehme’s attention. 36 Two physi-
cians and alchemists from Boehme’s circle had direct familial contact with 
radical Paracelsian fi gures. Johann Hartig (1573–1632), who met Boehme 
in Zittau in May of 1624, had studied medicine in Basel and was the son-
in-law of the famed Paracelsian Johann Montanus of Striegau (Strzegom, 
1531–ca. 1604). 37 Johann Huser was master of the Glogau (Głogów) mint 
and a relation of the editor of the famous edition of Paracelsus’s surgical and 
medical writings. 38 
 Several further physicians from Boehme’s circle also took part in the con-
temporary Rosicrucian debate, which was ignited by the printing of the 
 Fama Fraternitatis (1614) and the  Confessio Fraternitatis (1615) in Kassel. 
These millenarian tracts, which called for a “universal and general reforma-
tion of the whole wide world” were available in Görlitz through the town’s 
major printer and bookseller, Johann Rhambau (1563–1634), and expressed 
an eschatology which, as we shall see, would be echoed in Boehme’s fi nal 
works. Adam Brux, city physician in Sprottau had, like Balthasar Walther, 
served as a personal physician to August of Anhalt-Plötzkau. 39 His  Helias 
Tertius (1616) praised the Rosicrucian fraternity. Similarly, Valentin Tsch-
irnes corresponded with Boehme about matters alchemical and issued two 
tracts addressed to the Rosicrucian fraternity, one of which was printed at 
Görlitz. 
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 Some physicians were signifi cant in building Boehme’s readership through 
their own personal networks. Tschirnes, for example, was part of the infl u-
ential circle of Boehme-adherents in Striegau, which centered around the 
fi gure of Johann Daniel Koschwitz. 40 Koschwitz knew the Brieg (Brzeg) 
jurist and mystic Johann Theodor von Tschesch (1595–1649). 41 Further-
more, his sister, or daughter, was married to Michael Ender von Sercha, 
one of Böhme’s key patrons. Friedrich Krause, physician in Goldberg and 
Liegnitz, 42 was a correspondent of the Torgau chiliast Nagel, author of the 
manuscript devotional tract  Via Salutis , and brother-in-law of the Schwenck-
felder Balthasar Tilke. 43 A major infl uence on Boehme, on account of the 
many manuscripts he collected, may have also been Benedikt Hinckelmann 
(d. 1642), leader of Elector Johann Georg I’s secret laboratory in Dresden. 44 
Befriended by Balthasar Walther, Hinckelmann hosted Boehme when the 
theosopher visited the city in summer 1624. 
 V RELIGIOUS ENTHUSIASTS 
 However, if the “learned people,” those “physicians, chymists and philos-
ophers” with whom Boehme traffi cked, provided him with “various Latin 
phrases and technical terms,” as Franckenberg remarked, he must have 
taken something more from the overlapping associations of religious en-
thusiasts, chiliasts, prophets, astrologers, and visionaries, with whom he 
also interacted. Mentioned several times previously, the Torgau chiliast Paul 
Nagel—who predicted that a spiritual millennium would begin in 1624 in 
the wake of the grand conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn—was one of the 
foremost champions of Boehme’s works in Saxony, as well as a correspon-
dent who was visited at least once by Boehme. He authored some thirty 
prophetic works during his lifetime and excerpted Boehme’s then unpub-
lished  Aurora in his  Prodromus astronomiae apocalypticae (1620). 45 Like 
Balthasar Walther, Nagel was also initially a follower of the Thuringian an-
tinomians Esajas Stiefel and Ezechiel Meth (d. 1640). 46 Among other things, 
Meth and Stiefel asserted that it was possible to embody the same heavenly 
substance of Christ if one truly interiorized his word. Compelled by Abra-
ham von Einsiedel, Johann Rehefeldt, Nagel, and Walther, Boehme wrote 
two tracts against Stiefel and Meth in 1621 and 1622, in which he fur-
ther honed his own theosophical doctrines. Although both men ultimately 
advocated an antinomianism that Boehme and his followers rejected, they 
sprung from the same intellectual tradition of disaffected Lutheranism as 
Boehme. Moreover, many of their immediate inspirations, such as Weigel, 
were shared by their Görlitz counterpart, as evidenced by Boehme’s initially 
friendly approbation of their work. 
 Another member of the circle was the Sprottau clothier Christoph Kot-
ter (1595–1647), who after 1616 experienced a series of ecstatic visions. 47 
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Although unmentioned in Boehme’s letters, he was one of the close friends 
who attended Boehme’s deathbed. Another visionary was Paul Kaym 
(d. 1634), a Görlitz native employed as a revenue collector in Liegnitz. 48 
He issued a response to the Rosicrucian brotherhood in 1616 and there-
after authored several unprinted millenarian works, some based on Paul 
Lautensack’s (1478–1558) apocalyptic tracts, which he sent to Boehme for 
comment. 
 An intriguing member of Boehme’s circle, albeit one not mentioned in his 
letters, was Gottfried Gloger von Schwanbach, a jurist and theosopher from 
Sprottischdorf (Henryków) and a close friend of Bernhard and Walther. 49 
As we shall see, he collected works by a variety of heterodox fi gures and 
apocalyptically styled himself as “the least worthy of the sixth community 
in Philadelphia, who possess the sense of Christ in the Spirit of the Lord” 
(cf. Rev. 3:7–13), signing the copies he prepared “in God’s wisdom of the 
time of the Holy Spirit.” 
 Another fi gure with whom Boehme came into contact was Johann Stari-
cius, an editor of Weigelian and Paracelsian works, 50 who held a disputation 
with Boehme at Liegnitz in 1622 concerning the election of Grace ( Gnaden-
wahl ). Staricius was among the learned elite of central Europe interested in 
theosophical and magical doctrines, and he was also acquainted with two of 
Boehme’s most prominent followers, the Christian Kabbalist Abraham von 
Franckenberg, who met Boehme at the end of 1623, and the aforementioned 
Tschesch, whom Boehme encountered before 1622. 51 Franckenberg, in par-
ticular, emerged from an intellectual tradition similar to that of Boehme. In 
1617 he experienced a mystical awakening (which he described as a  stillen 
Sabbath ) in which God informed him that the old Adam must die in order 
for Christ to live in the human heart. According to his own account, Franck-
enberg found this doctrine explicated in Tauler, the  Theologia Deutsch , 
Weigel, Johann Arndt, Schwenckfeld, “and yet others.” 52 Although both 
Franckenberg and Tschesch were apparently disinterested in the chiliasm 
that characterized the thought of Nagel, Kotter, Kaym, and Schwanbach, 
they nevertheless championed the idea of a School of the Holy Spirit, or 
“Pentecostal School” in which the true doctrine of God could be learned 
without worldly interference. 
 Boehme also corresponded with fi gures further afi eld through connec-
tions established by Walther, Franckenberg, Nagel, and others. In Lübeck 
and Lüneburg lived, for example, Joachim Morsius (1593–1643/4) and 
Leonhard Elver (1564–1631). 53 Both were converted to Boehme’s theoso-
phy in 1622 by Balthasar Walther and later corresponded with Boehme. 
Morsius and Elver possessed numerous magical, Rosicrucian, and chiliastic 
texts, and Elver was furthermore a patron of the aforementioned Nagel. 54 
While their own potential impact on Boehme’s thought was perhaps limited, 
Elver and Morsius nevertheless remain emblematic of the types of personal-
ities that populated the margins of Boehme’s networks. 
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 VI  CHRISTIAN KABBALAH AND CHILIASM: IMPACT OF THE 
HETERODOX MILIEU ON BOEHME’S WORKS 
 The preceding survey indicates that, between 1618 and 1624, Boehme dealt 
with numerous persons with experience in medicine, alchemy, astrology, 
prophecy, trade, politics, and education and was thereby probably exposed 
to a variety of intellectual, spiritual, and religious infl uences. But how, if at 
all, did these contacts infl uence the development or content of his theoso-
phy? The most obvious way in which we can assess the impact of Boehme’s 
networks on his writings is to look for direct infl uences within them. Yet this 
is no easy task. Boehme’s output was voluminous, and the range of his prob-
able and possible sources immense. Outside of the Bible, none are named 
directly. Complications also arise following the nature of many of Boehme’s 
appropriations. As Will-Erich Peuckert and Arlene Miller-Guinsberg 
have pointed out with regard to alchemy and Paracelsian works, although 
informed by them, Boehme was certainly “no slave” to their content. 55 Fur-
thermore, it appears that at least some of the material that he apparently ap-
plied in his works stemmed from oral communications and were no doubt 
transformed by Boehme, and his intermediaries, before they reached the 
page. Other apparent infl uences may not actually be infl uences at all. Al-
though the title of Boehme’s  De triplice vita hominis ( On the Three-fold Life 
of Man , 1620) evokes Marsilio Ficino’s  De triplici vita (1489), its content 
is representative of a very different intellectual tradition. Still, such infl u-
ences  can be found. In this section, I provide two examples. One, concerning 
Boehme’s reception of Kabbalistic speculation, is an instance of specifi c bor-
rowing through an oral source. The second, concerning Boehme’s chiliastic 
eschatology, is indicative of a more general infl uence. 
 Within Boehme scholarship, there has long been debate about the precise 
impact of Jewish and Christian Kabbalah on his thought. While structural 
similarities to Kabbalistic concepts abound within Boehme’s corpus, proof 
of direct knowledge of a single appropriate work has proven diffi cult to 
pinpoint. Skepticism is increased by the fact that Boehme knew no Latin, 
let alone Hebrew. However, in his lengthy explication of Exodus 34 in his 
 Mysterium Magnum (1624), Boehme noted that, when receiving the Ten 
Commandments atop Mount Sinai, Moses had not received two tablets of 
stone from God, but instead a second covenant “written upon a globe.” 56 
 This strange declaration may have escaped notice were it not for Gottfried 
Richter (1594-aft. 1660), son of Boehme’s chief antagonist Gregor Richter 
(1560–1624) and editor of the so-called  Thorner Ausgabe (eight volumes, 
ca. 1653–1660) of Boehme’s works. 57 Drawing on the benefi t of direct con-
tact with many people who knew Boehme and his friends personally, Rich-
ter wrote of this passage: 
 What the author here writes appears to contradict the clear text of Moses 
(Exodus 34:1, Deuteronomy 10:1 and 1 Kings 8:9), which expressly 
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speak of stone tablets. This may be explained thusly: the thoughts 
of Jacob Boehme of blessed memory concerning the two globes [ sic ! 
Boehme only mentioned one] upon which the law was recorded derived 
from a conversation with Dr. Balthasar Walther, who read it in Reuch-
lin, and lived with Boehme for an entire quarter-year. 58 
 If we examine Reuchlin’s  De arte cabalistica (1517), we indeed fi nd the state-
ment that “at fi rst, the Kabbalists assert, God wrote his Law onto a fi ery 
globe, applying dark fi re to white fi re.” 59 According to Reuchlin, the sources 
of this doctrine were Moses ben Maimon, or Ramban (1135–1204), and the 
writings of the thirteenth century Genoan rabbi Nachmanides, or Gerun-
densis. The globe of the covenant in the  Mysterium Magnum is, therefore, 
an unambiguous demonstration that Boehme knew of, at third or fourth 
hand, Kabbalistic traditions, knowledge of which was mediated through 
members of his immediate circle. 60 A thorough investigation of Boehme’s 
later works will undoubtedly reveal further similar infl uences, both specifi c 
and more general. 
 But where might we start such an investigation? Certainly, one begin-
ning might be in comparing Boehme’s works with books he was known to 
possess. Unfortunately, we have little idea of the content or extent of his 
personal library. We have, however, already seen that, after 1619, Boehme 
acquired Pseudo-Weigelian books for Kaspar Lindner and also read the al-
chemical tractate  Wasserstein der Weysen (Frankfurt, 1619). 61 As there are 
few other leads at this time, I suggest that a useful starting point for fur-
ther investigation of these infl uences might therefore be a comparison of 
Boehme’s works with the contents of texts written, read, copied, collected, 
or circulated by individuals within his network. As I shall show with ref-
erence to Boehme’s eschatological expectations, such a comparison can be 
very fruitful. 
 Fortunately, several collections of material—as well as inventories of 
further manuscript and book collections—which document the intellectual 
interests of several of Boehme’s closest followers, are still extant. The most 
signifi cant of these is undoubtedly the collection of magical and Kabbalistic 
manuscripts, copied in 1588 by Balthasar Walther and preserved today in 
Lübeck (mentioned above and discussed elsewhere). 62 Given Walther’s de-
monstrable signifi cance to the shape and character of Boehme’s mature the-
osophy, any investigation of possible sources of infl uence should begin with 
these texts although there are also a handful of lesser-known collections that 
might prove equally interesting. 
 One of these is a four-volume set of copied works prepared between 
1618 and 1628 by Gottfried Gloger von Schwanbach, preserved today in 
Leipzig. 63 In addition to copies of several of Boehme’s works, the collection 
preserves texts by, among others, Paul Nagel, Christoph Kotter, Aegidus Gutt-
mann, Paracelsus, Weigel (in an extract given Schwanbach by Walther), as well 
as extracts from Rosicrucian manifestos. In other words, these manuscripts 
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preserve works not only dovetailing with the interests of Boehme’s closest 
companions, but also works by members of the circle itself. 
 A second collector of heterodox manuscripts close to Boehme was 
the aforementioned Benedikt Hinckelmann, at whose Dresden residence 
Boehme composed one of his fi nal tracts, the  Gebetbüchlein (1624). As the 
inventory of his collection reveals, Hinckelmann possessed a selection of 
manuscript works by Boehme, Weigel, Friedrich Krause, Helisäus Röslin, 
Johann Valentin Andreae, Guillaume Postel, Johann Tauler, Christoph 
Kotter, Paul Linck, Christoph Weichart, Julius Sperber, Andreas Karlstadt, 
Abraham Behem, Eustachius Poyssel, and other contemporary prophets and 
theosophers, all of which may very well have been at Boehme’s disposal. 64 In 
addition to these major collections, we might also add that several volumes 
from the libraries of Franckenberg, Tschesch, and Johann Sigismund von 
Schweinichen are today extant in Wrocław, covering ground similar to the 
works indicated above. 65 A further list of books belonging to Karl Ender 
von Sercha was discovered in May 1943, but unfortunately can no longer 
be traced. 66 
 More distant members of Boehme’s networks evidently held interests sim-
ilar to those of Schwanbach and Hinckelmann. The manuscripts collected 
by Johann Rehefeldt (1590–1648), an Erfurt-based Stiefelian and reader 
of Boehme, contain works on magic, Kabbalah, chiliastic prophecy, and 
dissident religiosity. 67 A further relevant inventory is that of the Hamburg 
librarian Joachim Morsius (1593–1644), who, in addition to correspond-
ing with Boehme, collected numerous prophetic and theosophical works by 
Adam Haslmayr, Helisäus Röslin, and others, the vast majority of which 
concerned a chiliastic fi nal age. 68 
 Of course, the mere fact that several of Boehme’s friends and correspon-
dents also authored or collected works by heterodox fi gures is no guarantee 
that Boehme himself was also interested in these same texts or that they in-
fl uenced his work. However, I argue that there is clear evidence that Boehme 
 was receptive to the ideas in several of these texts; in particular, the chiliastic 
notion of a forthcoming age of the Holy Spirit. 
 In 1621, in an incident long overlooked by researchers, Boehme experi-
enced an ecstatic vision during which he learned that a new Reformation, 
as a prelude to what he called an  aureum seculum (golden age), would soon 
dawn. In mid-1624, he announced that this “Reformation” was already 
in progress. 69 What did Boehme mean by this? Its fullest expression may 
be found in a letter which predates the vision of 1621 in a missive to Paul 
Kaym (August 14 th , 1620): 
 In this time a Zion shall indeed be discovered, and heaven will give its 
dew, and the earth its fat, but not to the extent that evil shall cease alto-
gether. But that the Holy Spirit will be in the hearts of believers in Zion, 
I declare and know, for Zion will not come from outside, but inside the 
new man. It is already born. Who seeks it, he must seek only himself 
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and depart the old Adam into a new life, and shall discover whether 
Jesus is born in him. 70 
 While the emphasis on interiority and rebirth in the last days echoes the 
expectations of both Guillaume Postel (1510–1581) and Weigel, this dec-
laration also mirrors the spiritual chiliasm of several of Boehme’s contem-
poraries—including Paul Nagel. In 1624, for example, the same year that 
Boehme championed his new Reformation, Nagel wrote in strikingly similar 
terms of the  aureum seculum : 
 Thus shall follow and begin a new, short time, the anticipated period 
that we call a  secula aureum , a right golden age . . . in which shall fl our-
ish a gilded freedom, love and fi delity, justice, understanding, wisdom 
and truth, virtue, holiness and the fear of God.Those who possess no 
divine riches ( aurum divinum ), but remain in the old birth and will per-
sist in sin, they shall have no part of this golden age, and will be judged 
alongside the beasts. 71 
 Irrespective of the question of who infl uenced whom, Boehme’s expecta-
tions were therefore consistent with the eschatology contained in any num-
ber of the heterodox manuscript works copied or possessed by Schwanbach, 
Hinckelmann, Morsius, or Rehefeldt, many of which promised a new birth 
and were condemned by Lutheran theologians as constituting the heresy 
 chiliasmus subtilis . 72 Indeed, if Boehme’s expectations infl uenced Nagel—
one of the most notorious chiliasts in contemporary Germany—then he 
is more crucial to the history of seventeenth-century heterodoxy than has 
heretofore been recognized. 
 But did Boehme himself see his doctrines in the same light as the expec-
tations of persons like Nagel? It seems so. For, tellingly, he made several 
statements that explicitly compared his expectations with those contained 
in other contemporary books and manuscripts. In May 1624, for example, 
Boehme informed Tobias Kober that similar books to his, concerning the 
last days and the new birth, were available at the Leipzig Book Fair. 73 In a 
subsequent letter, he declared that these books were also openly available in 
Dresden bookshops. 74 
 What books were these? Who were the authors? A search of the “Verzeich-
nis der im deutschen Sprachraum erschienen Drucke des 17. Jahrhunderts,” 
the major bibliographical catalogue of German books of the seventeenth cen-
tury, for texts that use terms adopted by Boehme to describe his expectations— 
aureum seculum ,  güldene Zeit ,  neue Reformation —printed between 1621 
and 1625, provides some clues. It reveals a list of titles that conforms en-
tirely with the expectations engendered by the manuscript inventories and 
works of members of Boehme’s circle, including books alchemical, devo-
tional, prophetic, Weigelian, and chiliastic. 75 Most fascinating of all is a text 
by Christoph Adolphi, evangelical pastor in Lauban, Upper Lusatia, whose 
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 Reformation (1624), strongly infl uenced by Calvinist meliorism, closely 
mirrored not only Boehme’s expectations about an imminent “universal and 
general Reformation” of the church, but also Boehme’s language in predict-
ing an “aurora” which would precede the Judgment Day. 76 
 In an overlooked passage in yet another letter to Kober shortly after 
Pentecost 1624, however, Boehme himself provides us with an even more 
specifi c indication of the works he had in mind when speaking of books 
supporting his vision of the last days. There, he declared that “identi-
cal theological grounds” of the “great Reformation soon to come” were 
taught “entirely correctly” not only by himself, but also “by many others in 
Meißen, Saxony, Thuringia and the Hanseatic towns.” 77 This is an explicit 
reference to the output, both printed and manuscript, of the likes of Nagel 
(Saxony), Kaspar von Fürstenau and Kaspar Lindner (Meißen), Johann 
 Figure 4.1  Paul Nagel, from the title page of his  Prognosticon astrologicum (1619). 
 Harvard University, Houghton Library, *GC6 N1317 619p  Courtesy of Imaging 
Services, Harvard College Library. 
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Rehefeldt and the reformed Stiefelians (Thuringia), and Joachim Morsius 
and Balthasar Walther (Hamburg, Lübeck, and Lüneburg), with whom 
Boehme identifi ed his intellectual mission and, directly or indirectly, informed 
his output. 
 Figure 4.2  Christoph Kotter, from Jan Amos Comenius’s  Lux e Tenebris (1667). 
 Harvard University, Houghton Library, *ZCC6 C7345 657lc  Courtesy of Imaging 
Services, Harvard College Library. 
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 VII CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has endeavored to sketch the heterodox intellectual climate 
from which Boehme’s works emerged and to demonstrate, concretely, 
Boehme’s intellectual debt to this milieu. It shows, fi rst, that Boehme’s ini-
tial mystical experiences occurred in a town whose intellectual life was suf-
fused with Paracelsian, Weigelian, Schwenckfeldian and other heterodox 
strains of thought. Second, it demonstrates that his early supporters, read-
ers, and friends consisted of a surprising number of chymists and physi-
cians with connections to Görlitz’s Paracelsian milieu, and also, critically, 
a substantial number of visionaries, chiliasts, and religious enthusiasts who 
were supported by a small group of like-minded regional gentry. Third, it 
demonstrates, through the examples of Kabbalistic thought and chilias-
tic eschatology, that this constellation of fi gures made an impression on 
Boehme and infl uenced the content of his works in manners both specifi c 
and more general. Finally, as part of a demonstration of this infl uence, it 
has pointed out some tangible new avenues for researching further possible 
infl uences on Boehme’s work, by bringing to light a series of overlooked 
inventories and collections of manuscript tracts that circulated or were pre-
served among Boehme’s closest supporters. 
 Much work, however, remains to be done to elaborate on this back-
ground. An intellectual geography of Görlitz—concentrating particularly on 
the city’s heterodox fi gures during the second-half of the sixteenth century 
and their relationship with similar fi gures in Silesia and elsewhere—remains 
to be undertaken. This will synthesize the scattered evidence concerning 
Schwenckfeldian, Paracelsian, and Weigelian presences in the city. A critical 
edition, or even in-depth study, of Boehme’s  Sendbriefe will allow greater 
insight into the geography, participants, and nature of his intellectual enter-
prise, smoothing the way for further studies of Boehme’s networks. Finally, 
a systematic consideration of Boehme’s complete works with regard to the 
books known within his networks will provide a new platform for the ap-
preciation and analysis of his philosophy, its sources, and infl uences. Only 
then can the historical fi gure of Boehme and his work be rescued, defi ni-
tively, from the specter of his own self-representations. 
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 5  Jacob Boehme’s Writings During the 
English Revolution and Afterwards 
 Their Publication, Dissemination, 
and Infl uence 
 Ariel Hessayon 
 On August 4 th , 1653, Samuel Herring of Swan Alley in Coleman Street, Lon-
don petitioned Barebone’s Parliament to consider thirty propositions for the 
good of the nation. The second was that two colleges at Oxford and Cam-
bridge should be devoted to the study of “attaining and enjoying the spirit 
of our Lord Jesus.” Few books would be needed besides the Bible and En-
glish translations of “Jacob Behmen, and such like, who had true revelation 
from the true spirit.” 1 This proposal was not adopted, nor is there evidence 
for how much support it attracted among Herring’s fellow parishioners or 
in Parliament. Though he may have acted alone, it is equally possible that 
Herring represented the public face of a group promoting the dissemination 
of English versions of the German mystic’s writings. Indeed, it is signifi cant 
that between 1645 and 1662 most of Boehme’s treatises and the majority 
of his letters were printed in English translation at London. Moreover, two 
shorter pieces were rendered from English into Welsh in 1655. 
 This chapter begins by examining the processes through which transla-
tions of Boehme’s works were made and circulated within the wider context 
of the breakdown of prepublication censorship during the English Revo-
lution. Locating these translations within the broader framework of the 
dissemination of continental alchemical, astrological, millenarian, and mys-
tical writings during a turbulent period of English history, I will also look 
at the question of what happens when texts are circulated within contexts 
for which they were not intended. Boehme’s principal English translator, 
the barrister and linguist John Sparrow, had hoped his efforts would be re-
warded with the settlement of religious controversies and the disappearance 
of sects and heresies. But instead of doctrinal unanimity, there was discord. 
Indeed, Boehme’s readers responded in largely unforeseen ways: sometimes 
with enthusiasm, but on other occasions with exasperation, ambivalence, 
and even revulsion. 2 A handful were convicted of blasphemy, others formed 
spiritual communities, while others still fulminated against what they re-
garded as Boehme’s incomprehensible nonsense and vile falsehoods. All the 
same, I will suggest that engagement with Boehme’s teachings was not only 
more extensive at this crucial moment in English history than has usually 
been recognized, but also that his infl uence was neither straightforward nor 
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always easy to untangle from the wider tradition of continental mystical, 
prophetic, and visionary writing that he epitomized. 
 I THE TRANSLATIONS 
 Between 1641 and 1660, an estimated 32,238 titles were published in the 
British Isles or by English speakers elsewhere in the world; that is roughly 
26% of the total amount of such publications between 1475 and 1700. 3 
Although the number of English translations of continental European writ-
ings printed or reissued during this period has yet to be established, this 
heterogeneous corpus of material consisted of writings by more than 220 
nonnative authors, including texts by or attributed to Greeks, Romans, and 
Church Fathers, as well as alchemists, anti-Trinitarians, astrologers, astron-
omers, cardinals, geographers, grammarians, heralds, herbalists, heresiog-
raphers, historians, lawyers, librarians, linguists, magicians, millenarians, 
monarchs, mystics, novelists, occultists, philosophers, physicians, physiog-
nomists, poets, politicians, popes, prophets, satirists, soldiers, theologians, 
and travelers. Added to this were several untranslated works that appeared 
predominantly in the original Latin, but also in other languages. 
 Despite Christopher Hill’s claim that the English Revolution was a 
short-lived age of “freedom” when relatively cheap and portable printing 
equipment may have made it easier than ever before for new and some-
times radical ideas to see the light of day, the desire to censor—as is widely 
recognized—remained in many quarters. 4 There were three effective ways 
in which this could be achieved: through prepublication, postpublication, 
or self-censorship. Prepublication censorship, particularly of religious liter-
ature, which had been used to increasing effect during the 1630s, became 
a lost cause after 1641. For in that year, the secular court of Star Chamber 
and the ecclesiastical court of High Commission were abolished by act of 
Parliament, leading to a disintegration of the London Stationers’ Company 
monopoly. With the collapse of prepublication censorship, the licensing sys-
tem upon which it had been built became increasingly used to protect the 
publisher’s copyright rather than to indicate offi cial approbation. Despite 
initial Parliamentary attempts at reasserting control by examining those 
considered responsible for committing abuses in printing and licensing, and 
subsequently through legislation, without an equivalent to the Papal Index 
of prohibited books, prepublication censorship appears to have been almost 
entirely at the licenser’s discretion. As such, it was utterly ineffective. Indeed, 
during the later 1640s and much of the 1650s, licensing was characterized 
by inconsistent practice and the absence of a universally agreed upon strat-
egy. By contrast, postpublication censorship proved most effective when 
implemented by those with intimate knowledge of the printing trade. And 
in exceptional circumstances, its outcome could be dramatic. For although 
no one had been burned at the stake for heresy in England since 1612, the 
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published writings of blasphemers and seditionists were still consigned to 
the fl ames in public book burning rituals that resembled Protestant  Autos 
da Fé by proxy. 5 
 Besides these upheavals in the publishing world, the dissemination and 
early reception of Boehme’s writings must also largely be set against a back-
ground of devastating Civil War and rebellion in the three kingdoms of 
England, Scotland, and Ireland; widespread poverty, harvest failure, des-
perate food shortages, economic decay, and outbreaks of plague; the aboli-
tion of episcopacy and emasculation of the Church of England; petitioning 
campaigns to introduce religious toleration and initiate ecclesiastical, ed-
ucational, electoral, legal, medical, and taxation reforms; the associated 
emergence of political movements with radical demands such as the Level-
lers; impassioned apocalyptic speculation sometimes allied with anticlerical-
ism, including clamoring to abolish the maintenance of ministers by tithes; 
the dramatic act of regicide, regarded by Royalists as the sinful shedding 
of innocent blood akin to the Jews’ cruel crucifi xion of Christ; and a brief 
period of oligarchic republican rule afterwards supplanted by an uncrowned 
Lord Protector (Oliver Cromwell) presiding with the aid of his council and 
successive Parliaments over a perpetual Reformation implemented by an 
unsteady alliance of magistracy, ministry, and military power. 
 Elsewhere I have discussed at greater length why Boehme’s writings were 
translated into English and showed the mechanisms behind this process. 6 
Among his followers there circulated a garbled story that Charles I had been 
the main patron of the venture before his execution in January 1649. Some, 
like Francis Lee (a founder of the Philadelphian Society), also maintained, 
probably correctly, that after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the 
remaining works were brought out under the auspices of Philip Herbert, 
fi fth Earl of Pembroke. In their eyes, this tradition of royal and aristocratic 
support gave the undertaking prestige; yet it simplifi ed developments, ob-
scuring the involvement of a number of people with common aims. Actu-
ally, there were three overlapping phases. Initially, several individuals with 
knowledge of Latin or German received abstracts of Boehme’s teachings 
or selected treatises from their associates in Amsterdam. Then manuscript 
translations were made from German and Latin versions of works published 
in Amsterdam, as well as from copies of the original texts. These circulated 
privately in much the same way as had the writings of the sixteenth-century 
mystic Hendrik Niclaes and other conspicuous members of his heretical sect 
known as the Family of Love. Finally, there was an organized scheme for 
publishing the extant corpus. While some of the cost was met by the trans-
lators themselves, it is clear that Samuel Hartlib, a Prussian émigré resident 
in London since 1628, and members of his circle acted as go-betweens by 
using agents to purchase books, subsequently shipping them to England. 
 Hartlib’s circle, as is well known, promoted reconciliation between the 
Protestant churches and planned to establish a University in London with 
a College for Oriental Studies to assist with the conversion of the Jews to 
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Christianity. They also advocated educational and medical reform and dis-
seminated the Moravian exile Johannes Amos Comenius’s theories concern-
ing universal knowledge (pansophy) and the importance of translation as a 
fi rst step towards establishing communication through a common tongue. 7 
Although it had gone unheeded by many of his compatriots, Boehme’s an-
nouncement of the dawn of a new reformation thus chimed with their vision 
of universal reformation. Similarly, fearing the consequences of making such 
things known in his native language to “ so many various minds, as are now 
sprung up ,” John Sparrow nonetheless contented himself with the knowl-
edge that his public-spirited efforts might provide “ much comfort ” to “ trou-
bled doubting ” souls, enabling them to attain that “ inward Peace which 
passeth all understanding .” It was, however, to prove a vain hope. Instead 
of the promised “Day of Pentecost,” when the “ true sence and meaning of 
all Languages ” would be united into one tongue, there was a new Babel. 8 
 All the same, the contributions of various intermediaries, patrons, trans-
lators, biographers, printers, publishers, and booksellers were crucial in fa-
cilitating the project through which Boehme’s texts were copied, rendered 
into English, issued, and transmitted. Furthermore, uncovering the transla-
tors’ social networks disclosed their ties through kinship and friendship as 
well as shared professional and commercial interests. Indeed, these extensive 
connections, which included sympathetic publishers, largely explains why 
Boehme’s works were acquired so readily in printed English translations and 
later selectively rendered into Welsh. Moreover, it should be remembered 
that this was at a time when legislation empowered civil and military offi -
cials to fi ne or imprison the authors, printers, publishers, and booksellers 
of unlicensed material. This repressive element of postpublication censor-
ship doubtless prompted strategies to avoid punishment: spurious imprints, 
anonymity, pseudonymity, and varying degrees of self-censorship. While 
Boehme’s writings were not suppressed—the copyright of seven books was 
entered in the Stationers’ Register—it is worth emphasizing that a few of his 
readers were punished by authority. 9 The most notable, both of whom we 
shall encounter later, were TheaurauJohn Tany (imprisoned for blasphemy) 
and Dr. John Pordage (ejected out of the rectory of Bradfi eld, Berkshire). 10 
 II CRITICS AND ADMIRERS 
 Taken together, evidence from law suits, advertisements, auction catalogues, 
and commonplace books gives some indication of the sale price of Boehme’s 
books, while marketability is indicated by their inclusion in  A Catalogue of 
The most vendible Books in England (1658) under “Divinity.” 11 Although 
it is not possible to determine every buyer, titles by Boehme are recorded in 
the libraries of a number of Englishmen. Among the most prominent were 
the antiquary Elias Ashmole; the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth; 
George Digby, second Earl of Bristol; Benjamin Furly, Quaker merchant of 
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Rotterdam; Samuel Jeake, nonconformist, lawyer, and political activist of 
Rye; Adam Littleton, chaplain to Charles II and headmaster of Westmin-
ster school; Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society; John Owen, 
Cromwell’s chaplain and afterwards Vice-Chancellor of Oxford Univer-
sity; the diarist Samuel Pepys; the English jurist and Oriental scholar John 
Selden; the Cambridge Platonist Peter Sterry; the educational reformer John 
Webster; the Irish alchemist and physician Benjamin Worsley; and John 
Worthington, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge. Moreover, correspon-
dence, autograph inscriptions, and a variety of other sources enable us to 
add more names—including a handful of women such as Anne, Viscountess 
Conway and Elizabeth Foxcroft—to the list of people who owned printed 
works by Boehme in English. Ownership, of course, is not synonymous with 
readership, and in the case of some scholars and aristocrats who possessed 
thousands of books, having one or two Boehme titles listed in the auction 
catalogues of their libraries tells us very little. Nonetheless, more than one 
hundred seventeenth-century owners and readers have now been identifi ed, 
ranging from the Civil War army offi cer John Lambert to the self-proclaimed 
High Priest of the Jews TheaurauJohn Tany and from the Cambridge Pla-
tonist Henry More to the Ranter Abiezer Coppe. 12 
 In addition, according to a plausible story related after the Restoration 
by John Sparrow, it seems that Charles I was given an edition of  XL. Qves-
tions Concerning the Soule during the period of his confi nement by the army 
in 1647. When asked what he thought of it, the king supposedly replied 
 that the Publisher in English seemed to say of the Author, that he was 
no Scholar, and if he were not, he did believe that the Holy Ghost was 
now in Men, but if he were a Scholar, it was one of the best Inventions 
that ever he read. 13 
 If true, this was just one of a variety of responses, for as noted earlier, 
Boehme’s readers reacted in a range of ways: from passionate engagement 
to being in two minds and from frustration to aversion. On the continent, 
the doctrines of “Teutonicus”—to borrow the code name used by some of 
Boehme’s earliest followers—had been refuted by Gisbertius Voetius, pro-
fessor at the University of Utrecht, and by the German Calvinist Christian 
Beckman in  Exercitationes theologicæ (Amsterdam, 1644). These foreign 
critics exerted a degree of infl uence on the initial reaction to Boehme’s writ-
ings in England. Thus, Beckman’s work was cited with approval by both 
Meric Casaubon and the minister Richard Baxter, the latter maintaining 
that Boehme took his doctrine neither from Scripture nor from angels, but 
from that “drunken conjurer” Paracelsus. Baxter developed this judgment, 
later condemning Boehme’s admirers for being duped by the “cloudy non-
sense” and “willful obscurity” of Boehme’s “enigmatical expressions,” lik-
ening his “ridiculous” language to the “hideous bombardical” words used 
by ancient Gnostic heretics. 14 This censorious characterization of Boehme 
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as a reincarnated Gnostic whose fanciful mysticism had, through Jesuitical 
cunning, spawned a hidden sect that helped prepare the way for the Quaker 
movement was adopted, at least in part, by several hostile commentators. 
 Another important association was the linkage between the “mysteri-
ous and divinely-inspired” Teutonic Philosopher’s notion of signatures—
that “signal and wonderful secret” to quote John Webster—and the “highly-
illuminated fraternity” of the Rosy Cross’s understanding of the “language 
of nature.” 15 Others, however, associated Boehme, that “Father of Non-
sense,” with the Rosicrucians because, like the Quakers, he was perceived 
to conceal his unintelligible meaning behind newfangled barbarous expres-
sions. 16 Signifi cantly, Boehme was also studied by alchemists, such as Sir 
Kenelm Digby, and physicians eager to discover the secrets of nature and 
medicine. As the translator John Ellistone explained in his preface to  The 
Epistles of Jacob Behmen , true knowledge of the “ Three Principles ” and the 
“Threefold” life in man 
 must needs  advance all Arts and Sciences, and conduces to the attain-
ment of the Universall Tincture, and signature; whereby the different 
secret qualities, and vertues, that are hid in all visible and corporeall 
things, as Mettals, Minerals, Plants, and Hearbes,  & c . may be drawne 
forth and applyed to their right naturall use for the curing, and healing 
of corrupt and decayed nature. 17 
 Among medical practitioners, Boehme appealed to advocates of iatrochem-
istry—that is, physicians who favored cures manufactured in laboratories 
over those extracted from naturally occurring substances. They promoted 
the teachings of Paracelsus, often in conjunction with Hermetic philosophy 
and innovative modifi cations by Jean Baptiste van Helmont, as a challenge 
to traditional Galenic medicine. These readers included well-known Fellows 
of the College of Physicians like Luke Rugeley and Nathan Paget. Rugeley 
was regarded as a skillful, modest, and faithful man inclined to alchemy, 
while Paget was appointed physician to the Tower of London and after-
wards delivered the Harveian oration as well as brokering the blind poet 
John Milton’s marriage by license to his young cousin. 18 
 Though he claimed not to have studied astrology, Boehme asserted that 
the “Starry Art” had a “ true foundation.” 19 So it is noteworthy that his 
publications were promoted in almanacs and read by the famous astrologer 
William Lilly, who was presented with a copy of Boehme’s  The High and 
Deepe Searching out of The Threefold Life of Man (1650) by his publisher 
Humphrey Blunden. 20 This approbation in turn provoked a denunciation of 
the “ diabolicall practises ” of “those subtill  Engineirs of Satan the ASTROL-
OGERS, whose religion is the same with  Jacob Behmens , the  German-
Conjurer .” In the same vein, clergymen condemned the “ wild and ungodly 
studies of Jacob Boehme, Astrology” and the like, one styling Boehme the 
“ Teutonick Wizard .” 21 
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 III THE CAMBRIDGE MEN AND THEIR ASSOCIATES 
 Turning to England’s two universities, it was certain Cambridge-educated 
scholars rather than their Oxford counterparts who initially proved most 
willing to engage with Boehme’s teachings. 22 Most of these readers can be 
considered as being part of a particular generation: they were largely born in 
the second decade of the seventeenth century and mainly admitted to Cam-
bridge between 1625 and 1635. Some are also commonly regarded as having 
been Cambridge Platonists even though this anachronistic term is mislead-
ing: it came into usage during the nineteenth century, while those who read 
Plato alongside Plotinus and other ancient philosophers did not necessarily 
call themselves Platonists. Lacking formalized membership in the manner 
of Italian Academies, the so-called Cambridge Platonists formed a loosely 
confi gured intellectual circle in some measure because, as Sarah Hutton has 
pointed out, identifi cation with this group was determined retrospectively. 23 
Even so, there is a consensus as to who constituted the core—predominantly 
scholars connected with Emmanuel and Christ’s Colleges—and who was 
on the periphery. The most familiar names are Benjamin Whichcote, Peter 
Sterry, John Worthington, Ralph Cudworth, Nathaniel Culverwell, and 
John Smith (all matriculated at Emmanuel) and Henry More (Christ’s). Also 
included in recent studies are Nathaniel Ingelo (Queen’s) and John Sadler 
(Emmanuel), while more attention has increasingly and rightly been paid to 
some of the Platonists’ bluestocking family, friends, and patrons—notably 
Anne, Viscountess Conway and Elizabeth Foxcroft (Whichcote’s sister). 
 We are not concerned here with the Cambridge Platonists as such, but 
with just a few of them together with their comparatively lesser-known 
friends and acquaintances. In several cases, the social networks formed 
when these young men entered University endured, occasionally even after 
profound disagreements, for the duration of a lifetime. Furthermore, it ap-
pears that the connections established during this period helped account 
for how Boehme’s writings were disseminated and interpreted within these 
learned circles. Nor was there a uniform response to the Teutonic Philoso-
pher’s writings. While most of these readers bemoaned his lack of clarity, 
they were divided as to whether it was worth the effort attempting to discern 
Boehme’s light shining within a sea of darkness. Some clearly had personal 
reasons for turning to Boehme. His translator Charles Hotham, for exam-
ple, suffered a reversal of fortunes in academic politics and seems to have 
read him despondently for psychological comfort. Similarly, his biographer 
Durand Hotham witnessed the public decapitation of his half-brother and 
may have become attracted to Boehme because of the potential he perceived 
within his teachings for reforming and regenerating a divided, decaying so-
ciety. At the same time, we must be careful not to examine Boehme’s re-
ception in isolation but to appreciate that he was read in conjunction with 
other works. These of course varied from reader to reader according to 
motive and taste. Nonetheless, it is clear that his writings can be located 
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within broader currents: alchemy and alchemical medicine; apocalypticism 
and prophecy; astrology; heterodox writings; utopian literature; mystical 
theology, with a particular emphasis on Neoplatonic authors; and spiritual 
contemplation. 
 It is noteworthy that the Hotham brothers were educated at Christ’s, 
as was their associate Luke Rugeley who amassed a considerable collec-
tion of Boehme’s writings by the time of his death. All three along with 
John Milton—and around ninety others for that matter—shared the same 
tutor. Charles Hotham and Rugeley were also friends with Henry More. 
So it comes as no surprise to learn that titles by Boehme are recorded in 
the libraries of the well-known Platonists Ralph Cudworth, Peter Sterry, 
and John Worthington. Cudworth liked the “practical” parts of Boehme 
“very well” but did not approve of his “Revelations” unless they were 
to be explained by way of reason. 24 Sterry, for his part, could not decide 
whether Jesus had appeared to Boehme in a glorious vision or if Boehme 
had been tricked by a dark satanic minion in the guise of an angel of light. 
Yet he confessed to his correspondent Morgan Llwyd of Wrexham that 
he had profi ted from reading Boehme, meeting with “rich Depths, Sweet 
Heights” in these writings, which seemed to him to have an “Authority & 
Glory” in them beyond that of the “scribes & Pharisees.” He therefore 
concluded: 
 1. The Lord gave him his Spirit by measure leaving much Darkeness 
mingled with his Light. 2. They y t reade him, had neede come to him 
well instructed in y e Mystery of Christ . . . Others will bee perverted by 
him. 25 
 By contrast, Worthington believed that Boehme had been wrapped up in the 
“fooleries of enthusiasm” but still felt bound to praise his writings—along 
with those of his fellow mystics Thomas à Kempis and Johannes Tauler—for 
the “savoury truths” he discerned amongst “the stubble and wood and hay.” 26 
 It was Henry More, however, Fellow of Christ’s College, who among the 
Cambridge Platonists engaged at greatest length with Boehme. Although 
it is not known when More began to read Boehme, he regarded him as a 
“holy and good” man whose imagination was so preoccupied with “ divine 
things ” that he could not (save for a miracle) avoid becoming an “ Enthu-
siast ” and receiving “divine truths.” 27 Returning to this theme in  The Two 
Last Dialogues (1668), More acknowledged that, although Boehme was 
a “ pious ” and “ well-meaning ” writer who had engendered sentiments of 
“ sincere Piety ” in others, he remained an enthusiast. As one of More’s char-
acters explained, the “invincible Obscurity” of the Teutonic Philosopher’s 
writings would prevent him being “over-popular,” while his “mistakes in his 
pretended Inspirations in matters of Philosophy ruin his Authority amongst 
the more knowing and sagacious sort of persons.” 28 Similarly, in a letter 
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dated September 15 th , 1670, sent to Anne, Viscountess Conway at her 
country seat of Ragley, Warwickshire—where More had apparently had his 
“ears full of Behmenism”—he declared: 
 Honest Jacob [Boehme] is wholsome at the bottome though a philoso-
pher but at randome. 29 
 About 1670, possibly at Lady Conway’s behest, More wrote a lengthy pri-
vate epistle, afterwards published in Latin translation as  Philosophiæ teu-
tonicæ censura (1679), in which he discussed questions such as whether 
Boehme was inspired, whether he was mad, and what his chief errors were. 
Despite reproving Boehme, like the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, for 
conceiving of God as corporeal, More admitted: 
 I was not a little averse to reading such an obscure author; but truly, 
the rich veins of morality and divinity contained in them so invigorated 
and enraptured me that the aversion which I feared was turned to pure 
pleasure and delight. 30 
 IV DIGGERS, RANTERS, AND MUGGLETONIANS 
 a Diggers 
 Given the justifi able claims made by the editors of the complete works of 
the Digger leader Gerrard Winstanley, that he was not just the “foremost 
radical of the English Revolution” but also one of the “fi nest writers” of 
a “glorious age of English non-fi ctional prose,” his possible reading of 
Boehme deserves close attention. 31 For more than a century, various scholars 
encompassing a range of backgrounds and ideological commitments have, 
with varying degrees of caution, drawn a number of rarely convincing and, 
unfortunately, usually ill-informed parallels between the Teutonic Philoso-
pher and Winstanley. Aspects of Winstanley’s thought exhibiting suggested 
Behmenist resonances include his belief in human beings as microcosms or 
epitomes of the macrocosm; understanding of the nature of evil; conception 
of an inner light in confl ict with darkness; conviction that the risen Christ 
would save all humanity and restore the creation to its former prelapsarian 
condition; identifi cation of fl esh with the feminine part of human nature, 
which is subordinate to and corrupted by evil masculine powers; usage of 
the Virgin as a fi gure representing mankind’s plain heartedness; likening 
God the Father to a consuming fi ery orb which burns up the dross within 
man and envisaging this spiritual purifi cation as akin to an alchemical pro-
cess; appeal to universally shared reason; preference for allegorical readings 
of Scripture; and the anticlericalism that imbued his reformist zeal. 
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 All the same, it seems certain that Winstanley did not consult any of 
Boehme’s works while writing his own. It also appears very probable that he 
never read Boehme. The disparities between them are far too great. Absent 
from Winstanley’s writings is a vocabulary of technical alchemical, astrologi-
cal, cosmological, and soteriological terms found in Boehme. Indeed, there is 
no analogue in the relevant texts by Boehme for a number of Winstanley’s doc-
trines and exhortations. Furthermore, Winstanley never quotes, paraphrases, 
or alludes to Boehme. His prose style differs from the way in which Boehme’s 
translators rendered him into English. Nor does Winstanley adopt any of the 
neologisms introduced by these translators. This is not surprising. Winstanley 
was not a university trained scholar or clergymen, nor a rich merchant, but 
rather a former bankrupt with a fi nancially modest if settled existence when 
he began writing. So the likelihood is that, during the period of his literary 
activity from 1648 to 1652, he possessed only a handful of printed works, or 
at most a modest library intermittently supplemented with books borrowed 
from friends and relations. At the same time, in this particular case, greater 
consideration needs to be given to how ideas were transmitted not textually 
but orally since it is probable that some of the seeds that germinated into Win-
stanley’s mature philosophy were sown in this manner. He heard Protestant 
clergymen preach sermons, for example, and seems to have discussed his doc-
trines privately in conversation and publicly during disputations. 32 Moreover, 
for all the inconsistencies and contradictions within his published writings, it 
must be recognized that Winstanley had a gift for original thought. Coupled 
with his undoubted literary achievement, this deserves our respect. 
 b Ranters 
 Since there is extensive literature on the Ranters, it is curious that little has 
been said about Boehme’s possible infl uence on their ideas. 33 Concentrating 
on the printed texts rather than manuscript letters and reported speech, 
several scholars have drawn attention to the Ranters’ understanding of the 
nature of God; good and evil; the signifi cance of dualism in their thought; 
their use of paradox and combination of opposing properties such as light 
and dark, fl esh and spirit; as well as their pantheistic speculation cum nature 
mysticism. Literary experts, moreover, have followed those contemporaries 
who remarked on the Ranters’ elevated language by focusing on typogra-
phy, genre, imagery, mimicry, parody, vocabulary, and modes of address. 
Together with these generally acute observations, there have been several 
intriguing though seldom adequately documented assertions concerning cer-
tain Ranters’ unacknowledged debts to Boehme. What these commentators 
have highlighted is a problem not restricted to the Ranters: can Boehme’s 
unmediated infl uence be distinguished from the wider tradition of theo-
sophic and prophetic writing that he epitomized? 
 There is no mention of Boehme in the extant writings of those individ-
uals whom sensible historians agree to have been onetime Ranters: Jacob 
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Bothumley, Lawrence Clarkson, Abiezer Coppe, Joseph Salmon, Thomas 
Webbe, Andrew Wyke, and the anonymous author of  A Justifi cation of 
the Mad Crew (1650). Nor did contemporaries connect the Ranters with 
Boehme. Regularly demonized as a lustful, ungodly crew given to all man-
ner of wickedness, they were frequently perceived as a horrible, monstrous 
sect. Some condemnations were modeled upon and positioned within a long 
line of anti-heretical writing that stretched from Paul, Epiphanius, and Au-
gustine to Luther and Calvin. Intemperate, alarmist, and often inaccurate, 
their purpose was to represent doctrinal and behavioral errors as inversions 
of truths so as to facilitate their extirpation. Constantly alert to precedents, 
several polemicists also provided the Ranters with a distinctive identity and 
genealogies that variously linked their blasphemous doctrines and abom-
inable, fi lthy practices to a range of ancient and near-contemporary here-
sies. Yet unlike the Quakers, with whom they would be lumped together, 
there is a signifi cant silence concerning the Ranters’ alleged descent from the 
teachings of Paracelsus, Valentin Weigel, and Boehme. And for good reason, 
since with one notable exception, Boehme’s infl uence on the Ranters was 
negligible. That exception, however, was signifi cant. For Abiezer Coppe’s 
“An Additional and Preambular Hint,” which was written as a preface to 
Richard Coppin’s  Divine Teachings (1649), demonstrates in the marginal 
annotations a familiarity with Behmenist terms. Nonetheless, Coppe’s in-
terest in Boehme appears to have been brief, perhaps only extending to the 
duration of his known involvement with John Pordage, rector of Bradfi eld, 
Berkshire. For nothing Coppe wrote after September 1649 can be said to 
indicate deliberate use of expressions and ideas particular to Boehme. 
 Despite contemporaries not associating Boehme with the Ranters, one 
would have expected the Teutonic Philosopher to have had a greater infl u-
ence on their writings, especially since there are traces of other mystical infl u-
ences. There are, for example, fascinating resonances of Sebastian Franck’s 
 The Forbidden Fruit (1642) in one of Joseph Salmon’s texts and possible 
hints of Nicholas of Cusa in Lawrence Clarkson. All the same, Boehme’s 
unmediated infl uence on the Ranters was unimportant. There are several 
possible explanations. First, by the time of the Ranters’ demise, the bulk of 
Boehme’s writings had still to be published in English translation, though it 
is noteworthy that among the hundreds of works issued or sold either indi-
vidually or in partnership by the radical London bookseller Giles Calvert 
were some by Clarkson, Coppe, Coppin, Salmon, and Boehme. Second, be-
sides Coppe, the Ranters were not university trained scholars, so perhaps 
they found Boehme’s writings inscrutable or unsuitable for their purpose. 
 c Muggletonians 
 It is not known when the heresiarch Lodowick Muggleton, an artisan who 
believed he was one of the two witnesses foretold in Revelation 11, fi rst 
learned of Boehme. But there are no references to the Teutonic Philosopher 
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in the writings of his fellow commissioned prophet John Reeve, who died 
in July 1658. Even so, this has not stopped some modern commentators 
from discerning supposed Behmenist overtones in certain aspects of Reeve’s 
thought: notably, his conviction that God created the universe out of preex-
isting matter; his understanding of eternity; his belief that heaven would be 
populated entirely by males; his concept of Hell; and the notion that Satan 
was responsible for sin, that Cain and his offspring were descended from 
Eve and the evil one’s sexual union, and the presence of two confl icting 
seeds—of Adam (elect, faith) and of the Serpent (reprobate, reason)—within 
human nature. Equally importantly, A. L. Morton and then Christopher Hill 
maintained that Reeve’s central doctrine of the three commissions could be 
traced back through Boehme and the sixteenth-century Spiritual Reformers 
to the teachings of the twelfth-century abbot Joachim of Fiore. 34 On closer 
examination, however, these ostensible parallels are without foundation. 
Unfortunately, as I will show in greater detail elsewhere, they stem from ill-
judged assumptions and a misreading of the evidence, thus partly undermin-
ing E. P. Thompson’s overstated claim that “Muggletonianism was grafted 
upon Behmenist or Ranting stock.” 35 
 As for Muggleton, following his trial in 1677 on the charge of having 
published blasphemous books and subsequent imprisonment at Newgate, 
he reportedly declared with characteristic lack of modesty that: 
 He knew  Behmen and his works; but he was a fool, and talkt of things 
that he did not understand: and that in truth there had been no books 
printed these 1500 years worth reading but his own. 36 
 The fi rst mention of Boehme in Muggleton’s writings comes after Reeve’s 
death, in a letter dated March 29 th , 1660, to Edward Fewterell, surgeon of 
Chesterfi eld. 37 In another letter of November 28 th , 1661, responding to Ellen 
Sudbury of Nottingham, he claimed that Boehme was “utterly ignorant” 
of the doctrine of the six principles (the essential articles of Muggletonian 
faith). Boehme talked of God, the Devil, and angels but knew nothing of 
their true nature since he wrongly imagined them to be incorporeal beings. 
All the same, Muggleton conceded, perhaps in the spirit of conciliation to a 
prospective disciple, that Boehme’s “philosophical light was above all men 
that doth profess religion, until this commission of the Spirit came forth.” 38 
Elsewhere, Muggleton indicated that the conception of God as an immortal, 
eternal being dwelling in spiritual form exercised a defi nitive infl uence in the 
formation of Quaker thought. 39 He even supposed that “ Jacob Behmont ’s 
Books were the chief Books that the Quakers bought,” insisting that the 
“Principle or Foundation of their Religion” was to be found there. Although 
Muggleton’s abhorrence of formless “Spirits without Bodies,” whether di-
vine or angelic, impaired his ability to observe subtle doctrinal distinctions, 
and although he seems to have associated Behmenism with a conception of 
God as immanent in direct opposition to his own view of him as corporeal, 
he was still right to emphasize Boehme’s Quaker readership. 40 
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 V QUAKERS 
 The question of Boehme’s infl uence on the early Quakers and the reasons 
why many Friends eventually repudiated his writings has been long debated. 
Thus on the one hand, it has been claimed that “the Quaker spirit and the 
spirit of Behmen were one,” that no careful student could doubt that there 
were “so many” marks of the Teutonic Philosopher’s infl uence apparent in 
George Fox’s journal. On the other, however, it has been strongly argued 
by Geoffrey Nuttall in particular that Quakerism grew out of “the soil and 
climate of the time;” that while much in radical Puritanism was in sym-
pathy with Quaker practice, there was something in Quakerism contrary 
even to the radical Puritans’ beliefs. Quakerism, for Nuttall, was therefore 
explained as the product of English contexts—a “spiritual climate”—and 
studies of Quaker origins against a largely continental background of Ana-
baptism, spiritualism, and mysticism dismissed as primarily of academic in-
terest. Consequently, within the framework of this greater debate, Boehme’s 
infl uence upon the Quakers was pronounced specious. 41 
 In reexamining the early Quakers’ attitude towards Boehme, I have shown 
elsewhere how polemicists provided Quakers with a genealogy linking them 
to Paracelsians, Behmenists, and Familists and then outlined the manner in 
which Boehme’s Quaker readers responded. 42 I suggested that both their 
engagement with his writings and their association in contemporaries’ 
minds with his teachings was more extensive than has hitherto usually been 
acknowledged. Although it is clear that only a minority of early Quaker 
printed texts and extant manuscripts show familiarity with Boehme’s terms 
or doctrines, nonetheless, among those that were infl uenced by Boehme 
were several important fi gures in the British Isles, Europe, the West Indies, 
and North America at a time when Quakerism was taking shape. It is also 
signifi cant that some of Boehme’s Quaker readers became schismatics: Rice 
Jones, John Perrot, Robert Rich, William Bradford, and Daniel Leeds. A 
few were also active outside England: Ralph Fretwell, Benjamin Furly, and 
John Crabb. Others were foreigners: Jan Claus, Jacob Claus, Hilary Prache, 
and Johann Georg Matern. Moreover, I have argued that we need to reopen 
the larger debate on the origins of Quakerism as well as reassess the extent 
to which several Quaker leaders were able to transform their followers into 
an organized, disciplined, doctrinally coherent group. Indeed, as with prob-
lematic sectarian labels such as Seeker and Ranter, there was an initial lack 
of consensus—whether through ignorance, confusion, misinformation, or 
deliberate distortion—as to what was understood by the pejorative name 
“Quaker” beyond the notion that adherents trembled before the presence 
of God. The early Quakers’ relationship with Boehme’s writings is therefore 
a crucial aspect in understanding the formation of their individual identities 
and that of the movement as a whole. 
 Doctrinal uniformity, silent meetings, and a preference for Friends’ plain 
style over Boehme’s abstruse notions accounts for why many who became 
convinced of Quakerism turned away from the Teutonic Philosopher—as 
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they did from other authors too. But the crucial sticking point in this in-
stance was that, unlike the Behmenists, Quakers denied the validity of the 
sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper as well as the Lord’s Prayer 43 —
so much so that in a couple of undated treatises John Pordage attacked cer-
tain “errors of the Quakers” as a way of accentuating the doctrinal differ-
ences between Friends and Behmenists. 44 Accordingly, it is to Pordage and 
his spiritual community that we now turn. 
 VI JOHN PORDAGE AND HIS “FAMILY” 
 John Pordage and his “family,” who lived together in “community,” were 
denounced by Richard Baxter as the “chiefest” Behmenists in England. Es-
tablished at Bradfi eld, Berkshire before September 1650, they were said to 
have abhorred “fl esh & carnal Relations” and appear to have objected to 
the lawfulness of marriage as well. Moreover, theirs was a Behmenist uni-
verse, consisting of a dark world (“Mundus tenebrosus”) and light world 
(“Mundus Luminosus”) and a cosmos populated by good and evil angels 
visible to the “inward eye.” Members adopted biblical names; thus Pordage 
was “Father  Abraham ,” his wife Mary, “ Deborah ,” while a follower named 
Mary Pocock was “ Rahab .” This community was to be joined by Thomas 
Bromley and Edmund Brice, two members of Oxford University, who heard 
Pordage preach a sermon at St. Mary’s, the University church. Another who 
became convinced of the “Extraordinary Power & operation of y e Spirit” 
and joined himself and waited with them was Philip Herbert, fi fth Earl of 
Pembroke. In his last years, Pordage wrote a number of treatises infl uenced 
by Boehme. Though none of the original texts appear to have survived, 
manuscript copies of some of these works circulated both during and after 
his lifetime. Shortly after his death and apparently at his behest, an abbre-
viated version of Pordage’s untitled work on “The Archetypal Globe” (no 
date) together with his treatise “Of Eternal Nature” (1671) were published 
under the title  Theologia Mystica (1683). Pordage, moreover, appears to 
have collaborated with his son Samuel in writing the Behmenist “sacred” 
poem  Mundorum Explicatio (1661). 45 
 Thomas Bromley of Upton upon Severn, Worcestershire, favored com-
munal ownership of property and possessions (community of goods) but 
not polygamy (community of women) since he advocated celibacy; indeed, 
he died unmarried and childless. In 1655, after Pordage was ejected, he 
published  The Way to the Sabbath of Rest , a mystical treatise infl uenced 
by Boehme, which Baxter judged a “most clean and moderate piece” of 
doctrine. Bromley was also a correspondent of Anne, Viscountess Conway 
through whom he became acquainted with Henry More and Francis Mer-
curius van Helmont. His library contained works on the apocalypse, Socini-
anism, atheism, and heresy as well as the Latin version of Charles Hotham’s 
introduction to the Teutonic philosophy. 46 For his part, Edmund Brice was 
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“a Lover of the  Hermetick Science ” and translated alchemical works. He 
owned a copy of Boehme’s  Aurora (1656) that passed into the hands of a 
founding member of the Philadelphian Society. 47 As for Pembroke, he re-
ceived Bromley and Pordage at Wilton, Wiltshire, his country seat. About 
1661 John Sparrow loaned him English translations of four treatises by 
Boehme. Two were either manuscripts or printed copies taken from  The re-
mainder of the books written by Jacob Behme (1662) and two were printed 
copies from  Several Treatises: of Jacob Behme (1661). According to the 
physician and non-juror Francis Lee, both publications were brought out 
“under the auspices” of the Earl of Pembroke. 48 Also noteworthy is that 
Edward Phillips, Milton’s “sober, silent” elder nephew and “industrious” 
multi-lingual biographer, was employed by Pembroke both as tutor to his 
son and—because of his “incredible patience”—to assist with interpreting 
“some of the Late Teutonic philosophers, to whose Mystic Theology his 
Lordship” was “not a little addicted.” 49 
 As Pordage’s enemies charged, however, these were not the only visitors 
to Bradfi eld. One alleged guest was Richard Coppin, to whose “erroneous 
and blasphemous” book  Divine Teachings (1649) Pordage “gave his appro-
bation.” Another man Pordage was said to have “entertained” was Abiezer 
Coppe, notorious for “blasphemy, and  rantisme ,” whom we encountered 
earlier. Other callers at Bradfi eld included the prophetess Elizabeth Poole, 
the former Digger leader William Everard, and TheaurauJohn Tany, who 
allegedly styled himself King of the Jews. Tany’s debts to Boehme were nu-
merous; most strikingly was his heterodox adaptation of Boehme’s teach-
ings on cosmogony and soteriology. But as I have written on him extensively 
elsewhere, it is best now to conclude. 50 
 VII CONCLUSION 
 The essential narrative of the English Revolution would have been the same 
whether or not Boehme’s writings had been translated. His texts made no 
signifi cant contribution to debates about the political and religious settle-
ment, or to electoral and legal reform, liberty of conscience, the readmission 
and conversion of the Jews, even the timing of the anticipated apocalypse. 
More surprising was his muted impact among many religious radicals and 
heterodox thinkers: Diggers, all bar one of the Ranters, most Muggleto-
nians, and the majority of—though by no means all—Quaker authors. Ini-
tially, he seems to have mainly been read by continental Protestant exiles, 
university-educated ministers, scholars, lawyers, physicians, alchemists, 
army offi cers, and a handful of artisans turned lay preachers. Even then 
their responses ranged, as we have seen, from condemnation, exasperation, 
and ambivalence to qualifi ed approbation and unbridled enthusiasm. Con-
sequently, one could be forgiven for asking the question why bother with 
Boehme? 
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 The answer lies in the contribution his writings made to debates in sev-
eral spheres and the ways in which particular individuals, learned circles, 
and spiritual communities appropriated and reworked his central teachings 
for their own ends. Thus Boehme’s infl uence can be seen in alchemical ex-
perimentation and attempts to create universal medicines within the labora-
tory; in almanacs and astrological predictions; in mystical thought, notably 
speculation about the creation of the universe, the nature of angels, and 
the fall of Adam; in the literary expression of prophetic experience; in the 
development of heterodox doctrines about God’s presence within all living 
things, the nature of the soul, and the denial of an external heaven and 
hell; in spiritual contemplation and psychological comfort from melancholic 
temptations such as suicide; in utopian literature through his vision of a 
new age; in the enrichment of the English language through neologisms; in 
the evolution of semiotics with his notion of signatures; and in attempts to 
regulate sexual conduct through the imposition of celibacy. Taken together, 
I would suggest this adds considerably to our knowledge of how poten-
tially powerful albeit somewhat strange and incomprehensible ideas were 
disseminated, received, and adapted at this crucial moment in early modern 
English history. 
 VIII EPILOGUE: JANE LEAD AND THE PHILADELPHIAN SOCIETY 
 Sarah Apetrei 
 The peculiar fascination with Boehme among seventeenth-century English 
readers persisted, and a vital link in the chain between the translations of 
1644–62 and the mysticism of William Law can be found in the writings of 
Jane Lead (1624–1704) and her circle known as the “Philadelphian Society” 
at the turn of the eighteenth century. Lead’s works were published in English 
between 1681 and 1702 and have enjoyed a remarkably wide and enduring 
circulation, disseminating his thought as successfully as any more learned 
assessment of Boehme. An elderly, impoverished widow with failing eye-
sight at the high point of her prophetic activity, Lead seems an unlikely con-
duit of Boehme’s dense theosophy. Yet each generation of English-speaking 
readers has rediscovered Lead alongside Boehme. Jane Lead ( née Ward) em-
bodied in herself the paradoxes of Boehme’s own intellectual profi le. She 
was an example both of what Andrew Weeks characterizes as “folk piety” 
or popular spiritualism, but also of that distinctive species of omnivorous 
early modern autodidacticism. 51 
 Ward experienced her earliest spiritual breakthrough in the early 1640s 
shortly before her marriage to William Lead, when she heard the controver-
sial preacher Tobias Crisp on “the New Covenant of Free Grace.” 52 A later 
landmark in her biography was the association with John Pordage, which 
began in around 1673. 53 An almost monastic society directed by Lead, 
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Pordage and their friend Thomas Bromley eventually started “to wait to-
gether & Exercise ye Gifts of Prayer Exhortation Singing & under a Living 
P[owe]r & Operation of ye Holy Spirit.” Privately, members kept visionary 
journals, some of which were published in the 1690s. After Pordage’s death 
in 1681, Lead struggled to continue his work, publishing her fi rst tract  A 
Heavenly Cloud Now Breaking in that year, and Pordage’s  Theologia Mys-
tica together with her second book  Revelation of Revelations shortly after-
wards.  A Heavenly Cloud eventually found an audience in Germany and 
by 1694 had won Lead a wealthy German patron. 54 From 1694 onwards, 
prophetic gatherings in London venues started to grow. 55 Based on a con-
temporary prophecy that a new spiritual epoch was to be inaugurated in 
August 1697, Lead’s group consciously sought a public platform and began 
a promotional campaign. They called themselves the “Philadelphian Soci-
ety,” denoting both the sixth church of Revelation which would replace the 
“Sardic” age of institutional churches and an era of brotherly love bringing 
to a glorious end the confessional infi ghting of preceding decades. 56 
 The Philadelphians elaborated on Boehme’s eschatological emphasis on a 
coming “age of the spirit.” The third age of the Spirit would be distinguished 
by the operation of Sophia in a generation of holy women: “constituting 
Female Representatives & commissioning them to Joyn in ye Preparation 
work of ye K[ing]dom of X[hrist] in Spirit.” 57 This female-centered vision of 
Sophia’s work in the last days would inspire feminist ecological and Jungian 
theorists. 58 In Lead’s visions, Virgin Wisdom appears as the mother of the 
second birth: through a sacrifi cial death to the body of sin, the spirit would 
break through to a new virgin life akin to that enjoyed by paradisiacal 
Adam (a clear development of Boehme’s anthropology). This process of re-
generation was the preparation for bridal union with Christ in his heavenly 
fl esh, for “he will match himself only to a Virgin Spirit, incorporating, and 
thereby changing into his own pure Humanity: and this is a Begetting into 
a Living Substance.” 59 In Lead’s visions, she describes this new incarnation 
of Christ through Sophia’s maternal agency in the fl esh of the saints. Lead 
envisioned a regenerate existence “not in gross Corporality, but rather like a 
Seraphick, or as a fl aming Body,” that “in nothing I might be inferior to the 
Glorifi ed and Angelical Spirits, who have not such a gross Animal Nature to 
deal withal as I have.” 60 Lead herself was regarded as one of those who had 
attained a “Seraphick” body. 
 Her intellectual passivity aligned Lead with Boehme’s maternal Sophia, 
the divine mirror or image, the fertile ground in which the seed of divine 
life was sown. For the Philadelphians, rooted in the writings of Boehme, 
Wisdom understood as passive imagination was the precise converse of 
the critical, probing ratiocination that prevailed in scholastic approaches 
to theology. Revelation came through the  via negativa , the shedding of all 
acquired knowledge. Though William Law might have described Boehme, 
memorably, as the “the mother of Pordage and Lead,” it was Boehme’s 
own dynamic conception of Sophianic revelation that liberated Lead from a 
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slavish dependence. 61 Her insights, like those of Boehme himself, had “not 
been taught me by men, or books, but by following the Lamb whethersoever 
he hath guided me.” 62 They were “discovered from the Central Light, and 
Original Copy, wherein the mind of God was made known unto me, in these 
things; which are now no longer to be concealed, or shut up, but are to have 
their use and service throughout the whole Creation.” 63 Indeed, her German 
translator Loth Fischer wrote tentatively to her in June of 1701 on the sub-
ject of eschatology, pointing out rather nervously that her views were “dia-
metrically opposed” to those of the “the highly illuminated Jac. Behme.” 64 
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 6  Did Anyone Understand Boehme? 
 Nigel Smith 
 Only let not the Non or Misunderstanding of the most rational Reader 
(if not a little sublimed above the Sphere of common Reason) be im-
puted as a fault to this Elevated Philosopher, no more than ‘twas to the 
Divine Plotine, whose highest Notions many, even of his own School, 
after much Study were not able to reach. 
 The Publishers Preface to the Reader Edward Taylor,  Jacob 
Behmen’s Theosophick Philosophy Unfolded 1 
 ‘Boehme is diffi cult’ 
 Northrop Frye 
 In the entrance hall of Victoria College in the University of Toronto is a 
portrait of one of its former masters, Northrop Frye. It is famous, in Can-
ada at least. In it, Frye, older in years, is portrayed by Barbara Braunohler 
sitting, but to my eye almost fl oating, in a brightly colored academic gown, 
no doubt doctorate of divinity robes (there is another portrait of Frye, more 
soberly dressed, in which he does fl oat). 2 The picture is startling; it symbol-
izes to me not just Frye’s huge array of learning all directed at interrogating 
the imaginative in literature, but also his encounter with Jacob Boehme. 
 Famously he proclaimed, repeating an observation he had heard that 
referred to the notorious density of Boehme’s prose, “It has been said of 
Boehme that his books are like a picnic to which the author brings the 
words and the reader the meaning.” 3 I always thought that was a splendid 
recommendation to the student, since it meant that you could say what 
you liked about Boehme’s text with no fear of ever being wrong. For Frye, 
Boehme is a “psychopomp,” or Hermes fi gure who engages in a descent 
into the dark night of the soul, the  Urgrund . 4 The descent constitutes a 
“deifi cation of the void,” the darkness in us or in the cosmos, but it wor-
ried Frye because, in Boehme’s version, this descent does not involve the 
redemptive personality of Jesus. 5 In his fi rst encounter with Boehme, Frye 
found the theosophist impenetrable and diffi cult. “I’ve never got much out 
of Boehme” he said, although this impenetrability, which focused for Frye 
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on the “abyss-fi re-wrath” world, was worthy of description as one big vi-
sionary poem. 6 This changed for Frye in his later years: during the 1980s he 
wrote in a notebook that Boehme’s writing made a link between the Bible 
and the creative imagination for which he had always been searching. For 
Frye, it was a writing of visionary revelation typifi ed by its ecstatic meta-
phors and where, crucially, the inner properties of things are manifested in 
outer forms—an approach that he sees as typically Paracelsian. In other 
words, Boehme’s writing was a confession or an unrepressing of that which 
Biblical fundamentalism did not and does not want to hear: 
 Of all those in the Christian theological tradition, perhaps Boehme is 
the most thoroughgoing in showing that the conception of God is essen-
tially connected with nothingness, that the presence of God appears in 
an  Urgrund from which all conditions and attributes of being have been 
withdrawn. Boehme’s vision of creation anticipates Hegel in speaking 
of a negation of negation, a transforming of God from a nothingness 
to an infi nite something, which left the nothingness behind as a kind 
of vacuum suction, drawing everything within its reach into nonbeing. 
The abandoned nothingness is the principle of evil, the Lucifer or light-
bearer which turns into the adversary of light, or Satan, after the light, or 
Word, has freed itself. This may sound diffi cult but Boehme is diffi cult. 7 
 The point of my invocation of Frye is to return to the conclusion he reaches 
in this last quotation: “Boehme is diffi cult.” Indeed. Much contemporary 
Boehme commentary seeks to show that he connected things that orthodox 
theology very rarely connected or did not connect: God as abyss and abyss 
extending into outspoken world (our world) through the membrane, so to 
speak, of the light and dark spiritual worlds; cosmic existence, the passing 
of time in the phenomenal universe, as a permanent and ongoing act of cre-
ation, and, signifi cantly, the Godhead in some sense involved in this process 
of change through time and hence subject to change; and action and stasis, 
light and dark, good and evil, as interconnected and inter-involved. The 
addition or recovery of the fi gure of Wisdom or Sophia, seen by some as 
a fourth person of the Trinity, is also notable, as is the originally androgy-
nous Adam, who falls into sexual difference through self-desire (although 
sexual desire has a positive aspect elsewhere). Then there is the use of com-
plex occult terms in ways at once both literal and symbolic, such as the 
“tincture,” the joyous energy that suffuses all things, that transforms them, 
and which, because it comes from the “light,” is always evident in visible 
aspects of creation—refl ected gleams of sunlight or the growth of plants. 8 
Many of these themes had been addressed in earlier writing in the longer 
esoteric and occult traditions, much of it Gnostic in nature. No one man-
aged to offer quite such a rich synthesis as Boehme did—one that escaped 
from the trammels of strict alchemy in a richer form of refl ection: what we 
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know as theosophy. Only Paracelsus’s writings come close to Boehme’s in 
this respect, but much of the former’s more theological work was unknown 
until very recently. 9 Paracelsus it was with whom contemporaries compared 
Boehme. 10 For some, Boehme, like Paracelsus, was to be regarded as an al-
ternative medical authority. 11 
 The fact is that many people, like the younger Northrop Frye, found 
Boehme so diffi cult that they either avoided him or remained confused and 
put him down. But others did not, and among all the readers and appreci-
ators of Boehme in the century after his fi rst publication, two remarkable 
phenomena stand out. First is the publishing of his works in Amsterdam, 
safe from the power of German Lutherans, and the acquisition of his man-
uscripts by an Amsterdam merchant, Abraham van Beyerland, followed by 
the appearance of many of these works from 1634–5 in Dutch translation 
by van Beyerland and Michel Le Blon. 12 Second, it was the German and 
Latin Amsterdam editions of Boehme’s works that provided the sources for 
the translation of all of Boehme’s writings into English between 1644 and 
1661, although there is occasionally the presence of Dutch intermediaries 
and other Dutch materials in some of the translations. 13 
 Yet, as I argued in my fi rst monograph, few, if any, early English readers 
of Boehme were able to understand him in as full a sense as we now do 
today, or as I think became the case increasingly from the early to mid-
eighteenth century onwards. 14 That is partly why we have had so many 
illuminating modern studies of Boehme and why, for some, that process of 
understanding is ongoing in an as yet unfi nished progressive revelation. 15 
The citations and allusions to Boehme’s writings are widespread in mid-
seventeenth-century English publications. But what they said of Boehme 
and how they used him is, in the written and printed world, seemingly far 
short of how we think of him today. Why were people so interested in an 
author they could not seemingly comprehend? Is it precisely because they 
could not understand him, or only very partially understand him, so that the 
attractiveness lay in his very mysteriousness? 
 I 
 We are likely to fi nd more interest today in the fact that two of the earli-
est translators of Boehme into English, John Sparrow and John Ellistone, 
were either involved in or related by kin to Commonwealth fi gures invest-
ing in a project to settle the Bahamas in 1649 as a utopian society called 
“Eleutheria” (“Liberty”), or that in Interregnum England Boehme was rec-
ommended to be established on university syllabuses by act of Parliament, 
rather than in the understanding of Boehme’s writings themselves. 16 These 
are fascinating facts that come nowhere near the complexity of understand-
ing demanded by Boehme in his writings. There is very little in the prefaces 
by the translators that points to a grasp of what we now consider to be 
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the crucial parts of Boehme’s theosophy. In his preface to his translation 
of  Signatura Rerum, John Ellistone professes himself unable to understand 
Boehme’s sense with any informed expertise, despite being impelled to do 
so by that “ little spark of breathing desire which is in me after true knowl-
edge .” 17 But he is “ an unlearned A. B.C. Scholler in Sophia’s School, that 
would fain learn to read her Christs Cross line .” Then comes a series of 
commonplace, scripture-based invocations to follow wisdom—not, at fi rst 
glance, very exciting. There might be a conventional expression of humility 
here and a sense that full revelation will only come on the “Day of Pente-
cost,” but there is also something more. First of all, Ellistone sees Reason as 
a useless tool in this pursuit: 
 Herein lieth that simple child-like way to the Highest Wisdome, which 
no sharp Reason, or worldly learning can reach unto; nay it is fool-
ishness unto Reason, and therefore so few go the way to fi nde it: The 
proud Sophisters, and wiselings of this world, have alwaies trampled 
it under foot with scorn and contempt, and have called it Enthusiasm, 
madness, melancholy, whimsey, phancy, &c. 18 
 Only the adept will understand it: “ none can understand their obscurely-
clear writings, but those that have had admittance into the same School, and 
have tasted of the Feast of Pentecost.” 19 And so, for the sake of purity of 
doctrine: “ a parabolical or Magical Phrase, or Dialect is the best, and plain-
est habit, and dress that Mysteries can have .” 20 You do not just have to be 
educated as an adept; you also have to be reborn into these mysteries. Those 
who use Reason will soon fi nd themselves in “ a maze of doubtful Notions, 
wherein he will bewilder himself, and think the Authors tedious, irkesom, 
and strange .” 21 For another early translator, Charles Hotham, Boehme was 
undoubtedly using “imagination” (imagination, which translates in German 
as  Einbildnis , is a distinctive part of Boehme’s theology) against reason. 
To trust to reason is to miss the point, says Ellistone, as he quotes his own 
translation of Boehme: “It is a very clear Gate of the Great Mystery of all 
Beings; by Glosses, Comments, Curiosity and Self-wit, none shall be able 
to reach or apprehend it in his own ground.” 22 Indeed, said John Sparrow, 
Boehme was a short-cut because he provided remedies that would other-
wise take much exegetical machinery to compass, “without neede of having 
any reference to the vast Commentaries of Authours.” 23 As Ariel Hessayon 
shows, Sparrow regarded Boehme as superseding all previous commentaries 
on the Bible and enabling readers to reconcile their differences. 24 The [Holy] 
Spirit guides the interpreter, an idea that was deeply fashionable with the 
Puritan establishment as well as with the enthusiasts of these years. 25 For 
Ellistone, Boehme spoke of the deepest mysteries in God and nature, and in 
accordance with experimental theology, another key aspect of Puritan piety, 
each person who read him would be affected according to their own capac-
ities. 26 Ellistone’s cousin and fellow Boehme translator Sparrow came to 
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understand that such access to the inner word was equivalent to a meeting 
with the uncreated mind of God, and so he maintained that Boehme pointed 
to truths present but not explicitly explained in the Bible. 27 
 Despite Ellistone’s protestations to the contrary, he did in fact have some 
sense of what he understood in Boehme. He saw the texts as curative, part 
of a quest to make a universal medicine: “how the outward Life may be 
freed from sickness by its likeness or Assimulate, and be again introduced 
into its fi rst Essence,” 28 because Boehme understood how the light may be 
transmuted from the dark and how its inward state emanates to outward 
qualities—how the cosmos redeems. 29 It is a cure that addresses the soul as 
well as the body. That which is part of the dark principle will be turned light 
and quite without taint, but the explanation is only made with the help of 
an astrological jargon: 
 thy doubtful, unsetled Jupiter  will be turned into a Plerophory, or most 
full assurance of true joy, and saving comfort in thy Religion; thy earthly 
Venus  into heavenly Love, and thy eclipsed mutable Luna  into the pure, 
perfect, and cristalline streams of Light, Life and Glory . 30 
 Ellistone gives no evidence that he can analytically and extensively discuss 
Boehme’s theosophy (he tends to name parts of the theosophy but stops 
there: “Virgin Sophia” and “Three Principles”), yet as a translator at least, 
he claims to know exactly what it does. And in his preface to Boehme’s  Epis-
tles (1649), he describes its focus as the work of Sophia, that is, wisdom. 
Their teaching is a revelation of the “abyss” (i.e., ground or foundation) of 
philosophy that must be encountered so that it can be restored to its “orig-
inal purity” in the reader’s mind. This description imitates Boehme’s idea 
of God as a negation and is about as insightful as anything you will fi nd in 
English on Boehme in this half of the seventeenth century. Note that it is a 
comment on philosophy rather than the actual abyss that is so important 
to Boehme. Boehme’s notion of evil inter-involved with good is not present 
in Ellistone’s formulation, but the defi nition of an essential and deep inner 
being is there, a manifestation of a personal self-knowledge coterminous 
with the idea that creation is God’s own coming to self-knowledge: 
 the Centre of all Beings (of which his Writings speake) we come rightly 
to understand what Time and Eternity is; and therein the Science of the 
Nothing, Something and All things; whereby we may come to fi nd out 
whence the inward radicall  Ens , working essence, true subsistence, and 
full existence of every thing proceedeth; and also to what end every 
thing hath such an Essence, life, power, vertue, forme, colour; and then 
whither it goeth, and what it shall be hereafter in Eternity. 31 
 Ellistone understands that this knowledge leads to the true understanding 
of the order of nature so that it may be cured and healed, divorced from its 
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corruption and decay. Sparrow saw Boehme’s insights into “inwardness” 
as a completion of theology, without which we are endlessly lost in intra- 
confessional disputes and worse still, religious wars. It is within this context 
that we should note Sparrow’s readiness to lend his works of Boehme to 
various people, including the relatively infl uential fi fth Earl of Pembroke. 32 
 Like Ellistone, a more contextually attuned Sparrow relates Boehme to 
very current 1650s debates, asserting Boehme’s Christ as unifi ed, inner and 
outer, against the alleged Quaker view that Christ was merely an inner di-
vine being, distinct from the historical Jesus. This seems to be a position 
that he was to state with an increasingly sure grasp in the later 1650s, but 
it was one that remained within the same conceptual boundaries. Sparrow 
argues that Boehme helps us understand what earthly perfection might be, 
an issue that was part of the debate concerning Antinomianism in these 
years. “How could anything be more useful?” he says, locating Boehme 
fi rmly within English theological disputes, demonstrating the relevance of 
Boehme to his contemporaries and justifying the effort involved in translat-
ing him. The same goes for his discussion of salvation, where he carefully 
skirts the predestination/free will issue and makes Boehme sound uncon-
troversial, whereas Calvinists took offence at Boehme’s belief in free will. 
Where Sparrow lacks Ellistone’s facility with occult concepts, he makes up 
for it in intellectual history, placing Boehme at the end of a line of reno-
vators that includes the politician and philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–
1626); the lawyer and scholar John Selden (1584–1654); the proponent of 
universal education Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670); the mathematician 
John Pell (1611–85); the poet Edward Herbert (1583–1648), fi rst baron 
Cherbury; and the French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650)—all of 
whom have, he says, plumbed the depths of nature. 33 Boehme has exceeded 
them in looking into the spiritual world and therefore belongs with “Her-
mes Trismegistus, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Plato, and other deep Men, con-
versant in the Operative Mysteries of Nature, and the Modern, Trevisanus, 
Raymundus Lullius, Paracelsus, Sendivogius, and others: 34 by which men 
will be satisfi ed, that not only they have gotten, but that we also may get 
that Lapis Philosophorum, the Philosophers Stone, indeed,” and is headed 
for the  prisca theologia itself, which can reconcile the differences between 
discrete knowledge systems. 35 There is a big hint of Rosicrucian utopianism 
in these sections. 36 This is undoubtedly a distinctive lineage: Bacon would 
not have enjoyed keeping company with Comenius. Sparrow was pushing 
hard to cross the divide between the natural philosophers and the occult-
ists, and his syncretism bears comparison with that of the sometime Anti-
nomian or Seeker minister, educational reformer, and natural philosopher 
John Webster. 37 Ellistone is also well attuned to the religious atmosphere 
and reading tastes of his time. He objects to those who refuse to read other 
books through the certainty of their own position and those who read vo-
raciously but nonetheless refuse to be sympathetic to an unusual author. 
He favors the genuine “seeker,” the open-minded, unprejudiced, selfl ess, 
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experientially directed Christian and argues that Boehme is the way out of 
the confusion that typifi es commonwealth religious disputes: 
 The true way and meanes for a man to free himselfe from all blind con-
tentions, disputes, doubts, errours, and controversies in Religion; and 
to  get out of that tedious Maze, and wearisome laborinth of perplexing 
thoughts, wayes, and opinions concerning God, Christ, Faith, Election; 
the Ordinances, or the way of worship, wherein the World doth trace 
it selfe, is faithfully set downe, and declared according to  the ground of 
the Scripture , and  true experience in this Authour. 38 
 So Boehme’s writings represent a new kind of discourse, an elevation into 
the world of the spirit. 
 Sparrow agrees with Ellistone that obscurity is a problem but one that 
Boehme himself tried to resolve: 
 And because this Author could not so deepely and fundamentally dis-
close these mysteries, but in such signifi cant though hard  Termes of ex-
pression as he * [*  See the preface to Jacob Behmes  clavis, vers. 10. 11.] 
 useth; he wrote therefore for the satisfaction of his loving friends, some 
explanatory Tables, and a Clavis, which are already printed in English: 
yet still for all that, they are accompted very diffi cult to be understood . 39 
 The anonymous author of a prefatory address, possibly the publisher Hum-
phrey Blunden, acknowledged that Boehme’s language could even seem 
“monstrous” but that the writings reward, “far exceeding in recompence” 
the effort that goes into confronting their diffi culty. At fi rst it seems un-
settling, just as when children learn their alphabet. This person describes 
understanding Boehme as a gradual enlightenment, requiring frequent con-
sultation, which he calls a “conversation.” The reader will be bewildered 
at fi rst but will then return again and again with a growing understanding, 
on a certain path to self-knowledge: “to free his minde from those mentall 
Idolls of hypocrisie and opinion.” 40 What is at fi rst dark will fi nally become 
exceedingly clear; if the reader consults the  Three Principles of the Divine 
Essence , “though hard at fi rst, easie at last, and then all his other Bookes 
easie and full of Deep Understanding.” 41 
 Boehme cannot be translated in a regular way, accommodating his Ger-
man to the idioms of English: fi delity to his text requires verbatim transla-
tion, which makes him read unusually in English. 42 There is no space here 
to discuss the extensive marginal annotations in several of the English trans-
lations, most of them supplied by Sparrow, in which English terms for the 
German (and a little Latin), and alternative renderings in English, are ex-
plained. 43 Sparrow goes so far as to begin to provide literal descriptions of 
Boehme’s symbols. These annotations suggest the challenges that Boehme’s 
rich and polyvalent German presented to his translators, and it is surely 
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here, in the act of translation, that much of the early thinking about Boehme 
took place. The text Blunden fi nds most illuminating is the  Morgenröthe , 
the ABC for the later more complicated books. Elsewhere, Sparrow makes 
the point that, if Boehme was misunderstood in Germany, it is no surprise 
he is hard-going in English translation, “ wherein much of the accurateness, 
and apt expression of an Author is lost,” but no one in Germany ever said 
he was incomprehensible, or, as some English have claimed, just “not  to be 
understood.” 44 
 There is even a sense of humor in the prefaces with regard to diffi culty. 
The short Boehme treatise has advantages over the longer one, claims 
Charles Hotham: “this Paradise of usefull truths stands not guarded by a 
fi ery Cherubim hindring the Readers access, and dazling his eyes with a 
fl aming sword of obscurities.” 45 If, says Hotham, philosophers and various 
technical adepts are to be allowed hard specialist words and phrases, why 
not a man “rapt up in the third heaven” of mystical illumination. 46 Because 
Boehme is so diffi cult, English translators are in fact on an equal footing 
with German editors. And in any case, it is necessary to speak Angel as 
well as “Dutch” (Hotham might mean German here) to translate Boehme. 
If you do not have the Spirit, you certainly cannot translate Boehme with 
any assurance of accuracy, he claimed. Daniel Foote translated into English 
Charles Hotham’s Latin dispute on the transmission of the soul, which was 
indebted to Boehme, who is described throughout as the “Teutonic Philoso-
pher.” The sense of humor here comes from the thought of reading and then 
translating this obscure writing: 
 As to the matter of the matter and Authour of the Teutonick Philoso-
phy, which you here abbreviate, though you know I always affected it 
and him, yet durst never saile into the Ocean of his vast Conceits with 
my little Scull; methought the reading of him was like the standing upon 
a precipice, or by a Canon shot off, the waft of them lickt up all my 
brains. 47 
 Others were more evidently reverential. Humphrey Blunden (again, prob-
ably) regarded Boehme not merely as an author but as virtually a saint: 
miracles are the only things that do not accompany the life of someone who 
can write in such a holy way. Boehme writes by affi rmation because he is 
directly in touch with the Spirit, not needing logic and not needing to have 
been so trained. His words here sound like Milton’s defi nition of true faith 
in  Paradise Regained : “having not received his Knowledge from men, or 
from the imperfect fallible Principles of the Schools, but from the true Foun-
tain of Wisdom and Knowledg.” 48 And indeed, it is claimed that Boehme 
has been led by God to recuperate the “language of Nature” lost by Adam 
at the Fall. 49 
 Similarly, writing on Christmas Day 1658, Sparrow seems to under-
stand the extraordinary dimensions of that which contemporaries called 
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the “inward” or “inner” Word, that it is an aspect of the uncreated being 
of God. Sparrow amplifi es in a distinct way the call for believers to listen 
to an inner light, and, as we have seen, marries it indissolubly with the 
Puritan idea of experimental religion, a message he persistently pushes in 
his prefaces. In this respect, Boehme seems to exemplify the most optimis-
tic dimension of Interregnum religion and utopianism (perhaps a religious 
counterpart to Harringtonian republicanism). Nothing could be clearer, al-
though it is undoubtedly a sanitizing of Boehme that other fi gures—not 
translators, but prophets or the associates of prophets like John Pordage 
and Jane Lead—could simply not accept. Finally, some time after Ellistone, 
Sparrow informs us that Boehme is a guide to perfection in this life. Here, to 
be sure, there is a glimpse in Sparrow’s own writing by 1661 of the Behmen-
ist idea of the dark elements in the individual soul being purged, in imitation 
of Boehme’s notion of creation, and of the presence and powers of desire 
(“the eternal Magia” that “maketh, frameth and imageth”) in both light 
and dark worlds. 50 We should submit in this life, Sparrow claims Boehme 
teaches, to a fi ery consumption of our self-love, so that we may escape the 
fi res of hell. 51 By the time he is fi nished, Sparrow begins to sound more like 
a Philadelphian, from the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
despite the marginal notes that do everything to dress the text as a piece of 
Puritan morality: 
 if we suffer vices and Evill thoughts  to possess our Hearts, our Image 
will be darke, and that will forme us into ugly deformed Beasts or Dev-
ills, and we shall no more appeare  in the right Colours, fi gures, formes, 
beauty and brightness, but be as the Blackness of Darkness in anguish 
and Torment thence forth and for Evermore: As when we have a Sick-
ness, our beauty decayeth, the Blood is Corrupt, lookes pale, yellow 
and sometimes Black, by the distemper of the Feaver, which disturbes 
the whole constitution of a Man, so that the Light of the Sun, Garden, 
Pictures, Musick , or any thing that delights us most in health, is Irksom 
to us, then Darkness, the Night and Sleepe doth most affect us, but then 
also the Fire of the Disease in the Corruption of our Mortall Body of 
Flesh, troubles us within, and the most pleasing Thoughts we have had, 
doe much molest us, which shewes that the inward Corruption and the 
wrath of God, hath gotten a life in Our Bodyes. 52 
 This is undoubtedly Behmenist, although it still does not sound or read 
quite like Boehme himself. Let us look at the English translation of Boehme 
himself in the example here from the  Three Principles of the Divine Essence : 
 Now seeing Man knoweth that he is such a twofold Man, in the  s [ s  Or , 
Potentiality of being good or evill.]  Capacity of Good and Evill, and 
that they are both his own, and that he himselfe is that Onely Man 
which is both good and evill, and that he shall have the reward of either 
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of them, and to which of them he inclineth in this life, to that his soule 
goeth when he dieth: and that he shall arise at the Last Day in power, in 
his Labour [ and Works ]  which he exercised heere, and live therein Eter-
nally, and also be Glorifi ed therein: and that shall be his Eternall foode 
and  t [ t Source or sustenance.]  subsistence: therefore it is very necessary 
for him to learne to know himselfe, how it is with him, and whence the 
impulsion to Good and to Evill cometh, and what, indeed the Good 
and Evill meerly are in himselfe, and whence they are stirred, and what 
properly is the Originall of all the Good, and of all the Evill, from 
whence, and by what [ means ]  Evill is come to be in the Devills, and in 
Men, and in all Creatures: seeing the Devill was a holy Angel, and Man 
also Created Good, and that also such  u [ u  Or , Evill disposition.]  untow-
ardnesse is found to be in all Creatures, biting, tearing, worrying, and 
hurting one another, and such Enmity, strife, and hatred in all Creatures: 
and that every  x [ x  Corpus or body or naturall substance.]  thing is so at 
oddes with it selfe, as wee see it to be not onely in the Living Creatures, 
but also in the Starres, Elements, Earth, Stones, Mettalls, in Wood, 
Leaves, and Grasse, there is a Poyson and Malignity in all things: and it 
is found that it must be so, or else there would be no life nor mobility, 
nor would there be any colour or vertue, neither thicknesse nor thin-
nesse, nor any perceptibility or sensibility, but all would be as Nothing . 53 
 The repetition, whereby the words embody the concepts Boehme is trying 
to impart, is missing in the earlier quotation. It rhetorically enacts the mys-
tery Boehme is seeking to convey. This is part of what Andrew Weeks cor-
rectly identifi es as Boehme’s “word magic.” 54 It is only later, by the 1680s, 
that we have a perceptible English way of writing Boehme that is faithful 
to Boehme’s own expressive universe. Before then, it is fair to say that if 
Boehme was understood in a profound way, that profundity was not re-
fl ected in English expression, with a very few exceptions to which I will 
come. His texts were read. They mystifi ed some, repelled some, and con-
vinced others that they were so “deep” they should be revered. Yet talking 
about them in extensive depth remained a challenge. 
 Neither is the earliest, to my knowledge, piece of Boehme-infl uenced 
printed discourse in England anything less than Boehme mastered. It is 
Charles Hotham’s Cambridge dispute of 1647 concerning the birth of the 
soul, published fi rst in Latin in 1648 and then in an English translation 
almost certainly by Daniel Foote in 1650. 55 Here, Boehme’s style has been 
mastered by the rigors of Cambridge Platonism. None other than Henry 
More provides a commendatory poem to the volume, together with a verse 
reply from Hotham in which he asserts that fruitful matter may be gleaned 
from the obscure genius. 56 Hotham borrows from Boehme on 32 ff. in the 
English translation in respect of the defi nition of God as an abyss. The abyss 
or deep (so named in the biblical Hebrew תהום) is the body of God, a space 
from which creation is made. תהום is translated as “creation.” In the abyss 
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is a force of creating, or coagulation, and a force against it, the fi re of the 
abyss. Hotham (who was also, at least later in life, a practicing chemist) 
likens this to the interaction of metals and acids, which he saw as part of the 
same chemical process. Within this abyss is hell, not actualized until Lucifer’s 
fall. Hotham uses a faithful rendering of Boehme’s three principles to argue 
that the soul is engendered by God, and by God through someone’s parents, 
the position known as traduction. 57 He does this by showing how creation 
is a permanent replication, in the natural world, of the divine processes that 
occurred in the creation of the original three regions from the abyss and in 
the creation of earth and mankind after the fall of the angels—exactly as 
Boehme describes it. But it was an academic dispute. The publication of the 
translation was an attempt to reach out to a broader audience. Since the 
original occasion was a Latin disputation in front of the Vice-Chancellor, we 
may suppose that Hotham, recently intruded by the Earl of Manchester as 
a Fellow of Peterhouse, was trying to convert the University with a refi ned 
type of Platonism, and it is in this tradition that he presents Boehme. 
 II 
 The efforts of the English translators made possible an encounter with 
Boehme for a far greater and more diverse number of people than would 
otherwise have been possible. Writing in February 1678 to Francis Mer-
curius van Helmont, then resident at Ragley Hall with Lady Conway, the 
Quaker Charles Lloyd confessed that he had been glad to meet “one [i.e., 
either Lady Conway or Helmont], who had trodden some of mine unusual 
paths—amongst the Seekers, Levellers, Familists Behmenists & them above 
ordinances.” 58 One can see why some Quakers, with their stress on the 
“inner light” as a manifestation of Jesus, were interested in Boehme, even 
as others saw him a threat (initial limited interest was followed by offi cial 
disapproval). 59 The reading of Boehme among this widespread group, some 
learned, some decidedly not, has been the subject of considerable atten-
tion. 60 Like much of this kind of evidence, Lloyd merely mentions Boehme 
by name. Matters change with the confession of John Pordage, published in 
1683 (but written earlier; Pordage died in December 1681): 
 I acknowledge that none could lay a deeper ground, as to this Subject, 
than divine Behme hath done; yet I fi nd withal that he hath brought it 
forth something obscurely, so that he is understood by few, and misun-
derstood by most: This hath moved me to search into the Nature of this 
Subject for my own private satisfaction, according to the innate light 
of my own intellect, and the inward discoveries of the Triune Deity to 
the Spirit of my Soul. . . . for reason with all its Academical knowledge 
cannot comprehend it, it being only to be discerned by an intellectual 
sight. 61 
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 Pordage perceived in Boehme a way to view God’s complexity in nature: 
 This Divine  Behme well understood, therefore he saith,  If the Spirit of 
the Soul could sink down into this Eternal Nothing and Abyssal still 
Essence, then he would come into that ground, where God was when 
he brought forth Eternal Nature and Creatures, and from which he 
brought forth Eternal Nature. And thus I have led you to the original 
ground of Eternal Nature, even the  Abyssal still Essence of Eternity . 62 
 But, says Pordage: 
 me thinks I hear some body object against what hath been said, that I 
seem clearly to contradict  Behme , who place’s [ sic ] Darkness and Light 
back to back, as opposite to one another, and makes the Fire, a dis-
tinct center from the Light; speaking of a  Cross birth in Eternal Nature , 
which divides the fourth form of the Fire, from the fi fth of the Light? 
 To which I answer, that what  Behme saith is most true, but it must 
be noted that  he speaks this of Eternal Nature in its fallen and degen-
erate state , whereas  I speak of it, in its original spotless purity .  Behme 
speaks  of God in Nature , but  I speak  of Eternal Nature’s birth in order 
to God’s introducing himself into Nature’s Essence . So that it appears 
that I do not in the least contradict  Behme’s writings. 63 
 This stated desire to be close to Boehme is one piece of evidence that could 
be used to make the case for Pordage as the fi rst genuine English Behmenist, 
someone who wrote within a paradigm defi ned by Boehme’s understanding 
and expression. 
 Pordage was an educated and, by all accounts, deeply contemplative man. 
It would seem that his familiarity with “teutonic” philosophy resulted in an 
early, very signifi cant cultural achievement: the publication in 1661 of his 
son Samuel’s creation epic  Mundorum Explicatio , fi ve years before Milton’s 
 Paradise Lost , the fi rst extensive and serious poetic application of Boehme 
in English letters, and over a hundred years before William Blake’s Behmen-
ist prophetic books. It has been argued that Milton is in fact disagreeing 
with Boehme in his own presentation of the creation. 64 It is not insignifi cant 
in this respect that Daniel Foote says in his translation of Hotham’s treatise 
that Milton is the only author who writes great English prose because this 
gives further evidence of a connection between the serious Behmenists and 
Milton’s text, if not his person. 65 While the epic contains prefatory epideictic 
of Boehme, and while it undoubtedly harbors many aspects of Boehme’s 
thought within its occult mix (light and dark spiritual worlds preceding the 
“outspoken” world, fi rst principle as dark, a second as light; evil angels 
having bodies made up of sulphur, mercury, and salt; Adam as androgyne; 
and a fall into sexual difference), the narrative structure of the poem, its act 
of mimesis, and its engagement with allegory works at one remove from the 
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discovery of the processes that in Boehme’s own discourse are part of the 
very act of writing. 66 
 Moreover, writing poetry mostly takes place in the domain of the study. 
It is philosophical. Either Samuel Pordage was himself at a greater remove 
from Boehme’s thought than was his father, or the very process of writing a 
creation epic put Boehme’s ideas at a further distance from the way in which 
John Pordage encounters the “Teutonic philosophy” in his prose. Moreover, 
Pordage had also been working with his communities, fi rst at Bradfi eld and 
then in London, to experience being in the world according to Boehme’s 
description of the cosmos. You cannot just read Boehme as if he were but a 
philosopher, you have to go and see the outspoken word as it permanently 
manifested itself in nature. This is what brought charges of blasphemy and 
immorality to Pordage’s community in Bradfi eld in the 1650s, involving 
allegations that angels (or demons) were present in the rectory, in a practice 
of evidently sometimes ecstatic household worship that the local Puritan 
divines regarded as disordered, heretical, and Satanic, and where Pordage 
was eventually ejected from his position. 67 Twenty-four years ago I argued 
that it is in the fragmentary evidence of this community that we see the fi rst 
evidence in England of a lay, non-academic understanding of Boehme in the 
writings of one MP, Mary Pocock or perhaps Mary Pordage, in a treatise of 
1649 (just one year after Charles Hotham’s use of Boehme in his Latin trea-
tise), where the ongoing fall of man is regarded as an alienation of human 
reason (Kingliness or Adam is alienated from divine reason, Eve); the rec-
onciliation of the two, and therefore of Boehme’s inner and outer worlds, 
connecting emanating abyssal godhead to “outspoken” world, was inter-
preted as a solution to the country’s damaged churches: “true Independants 
indeed.” 68 We might agree with Cyril O’Regan that the functioning of this 
community amounted to a return of the Gnostic within English reformed 
religion. 69 
 It is only when a prophetic lifestyle is adopted that Boehme’s peculiar 
mode of writing is answered. The rhetorical invocation of cosmic activity is 
to be borne out not in the realm of applied reason, but through an affective 
and visionary demonstration of its truth. This explains the extraordinary 
activities and writings of Thomas Tany, as demonstrated by Ariel Hessayon, 
where Tany is shown to derive from Boehme, among others, a distinctive 
cosmogony, anthropology, and soteriology, and the growth of the Philadel-
phian Society, in which Pordage played a founding role. 70 There is sharp dis-
agreement about the depth of Tany’s knowledge of Boehme, but no doubt 
that his prophecies embody an autochthonous, dynamically transforming re-
sponse to the experience of God in nature. The Philadelphian Society found 
its fullest realization after Pordage’s death when its fi gurehead, Jane Lead, 
now blind, began to prophesy. In 1670, Lead had been left destitute by her 
husband’s death (she lived at that point in Lady Mico’s College, a refuge for 
widows): her visions of the Virgin Wisdom, exhorting her to follow a virgin 
life, begin in this period. In 1674, she began to share a house with Pordage, 
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and in 1697, she was given a house in London by a German baron; in these 
dwellings, the Philadelphians received Lead’s visions, written down daily, 
sibyl-like, on single sheets of paper, and organized the dissemination of their 
views, not least through the publication of books and a serial journal. 
 There has been a welcome revival of interest in Jane Lead, and her vo-
luminous writing has been the subject of several recent readings. 71 What 
is said here is therefore of the briefest nature. The heart of Lead’s vision is 
believers being saved as Lead imagines them reborn in her dreams. She is the 
mother of redemption, bringing on an age of new spiritual revelation and 
universal salvation. This is undoubtedly Paracelsian, Hermetic, and alchem-
ical material, and we learn that Lead’s words are indeed the “pure language 
of nature” that had been lost at the Fall (elsewhere, the original language 
is also discussed), fused with an optimism in the powers of medical science: 
“there will also be outward Medicines discovered that have not yet been, 
that will have a wonderful Effi cacy for the preserving and fortifying Nature, 
and recovering the lost Paradisal Body.” 72 
 Boehme’s fi gure of Sophia or Wisdom plays a bigger role in Lead’s world 
than she does in Boehme’s. In a further vision, the union between prophet 
and Wisdom is described as an erotic coming together of two females, an-
drogynous in its mixture of categories: 
 lustrous Presentation of her [Wisdom’s] perfect Comeliness and Beauty 
into one Spirit I was all infl amed, making complaint, bemoaning our 
selves, how we might possibly compass the obtaining this matchless Vir-
gin-Dove for our Spouse and Bride, who with her piercing fi ery Arrow 
of Love, had wounded us so deep, as no Cure throughout the Circum-
ference of this lower Sphere could be found. 73 
 Even at a relatively early stage, Sophia had become in Lead’s imagination a 
“goddess,” reconciling the light and dark elements of the Godhead: “The 
Divine Wisdom kept all in their place and station inviolated in himself.” 74 
There is even a claim that Wisdom will excel the witness of Jesus (in effect, 
she becomes a feminine incarnation of Christ), which parallels the claims 
made for the birth in the dreams of a new generation of spirits. 
 I have discussed elsewhere the argument recently made by Phyllis Mack 
that eighteenth-century religious enthusiasm is characterized as a quest 
through experience for transcendence of bodily limitations, rather than the 
decidedly in-the-body experiences and behavior of their seventeenth-century 
predecessors. 75 In this context, I contended that Jane Lead’s dreams and vi-
sions might be seen as a middle state in which the dream remakes the body 
in ideal imaginary terms, beyond the limits of its mortal constraints and 
the orthodox modes of defi ning it. That Wisdom after her third appearance 
said she would no longer appear as a visible fi gure but would be a presence 
in Lead’s mind is also important evidence of a kind of turning of visionary 
prophecy and ecstasy to conscience. What it also suggests is a prophetic 
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voice of no little originality, where Boehme has undoubtedly been learned 
from in a very fundamental way but also quite distinctly left behind, despite 
the notable investment by Lead in further obscurity. Her prophecies were 
explicitly conceived by Lead as an attack on the rationalists, both philoso-
phers and new scientists. 
 Lead was widely read, and the English Philadelphians may be understood 
as a precursor of the German Pietist movement for whom her writings re-
mained important, as the autobiographies of some early Pietists attest. 76 
Lead’s visionary writing connects with a Germanic tradition of piety and 
expression that, at least at fi rst glance, has little to do with English tradi-
tions. In this context, it would be unforgiveable not to mention the writ-
ing of another favorite of the Pietists, Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651–1689), 
poet and millenarian, famously burned in Moscow for heresy, a profound 
follower of Boehme, and a visitor to England among many other places. 
Kuhlmann’s discovery of both the combinatory arts of the Jesuit Athanasius 
Kircher ( Ars Magna Sciendi , 1669) and the  Mysterium Magnum (1640) of 
Jacob Boehme in Leiden in 1673, where he was fi nishing his legal studies, 
dramatically changed his life. 77 Before then, Kuhlmann was immersed in 
classical and patristic authorities, but Kircher and Boehme opened up pro-
phetic possibilities. As he put it in one of the handful of his works translated 
into English: 
 In my three and twentieth year, I was very powerfully stirred up, driven, 
and compell’d, until all of a sudden the  Paradisick Light-world visibly 
in the Inward, surrounded me with thousand-thousand-thousands with 
 Powers, Colours, Splendors, Glances, Changes, Wonders , and  Aspects , 
being all unexpressibly surrounded with Light, from the most Holy Tri-
angle of the  Lightest-Lightest-Lightest Lights-Light-Light . 78 
 This turns out to be near the time he fi rst encountered theosophy: 
 After that  Jehovah , beyond my expectation, had snatched me out of the 
Accademical  Babel , and Mediately excited by Immediate Knowledge, 
by the Writings of the most highly Illuminated  Jacob Behmen , and that 
I was immediately called, forced and pressed with great Power to the 
Purging of the Learned  Babel . 79 
 By the late 1670s, Kuhlmann wanted to establish an interim 1000-apoca-
lyptic-year realm before the second coming of Christ in his own name as 
“Kuhlmannsreich” (Kuhlmann’s Empire), led by the “Kühlmonarch” in the 
city of Kuhlmannopolis. This is the time of the “Coolman” (a literal trans-
lation of the meaning of Kuhlmann’s name), when all will be refreshingly 
cooled down. 
 In many ways, Boehme remained alive and well in Kuhlmann’s ongoing 
work. The  Kühlpsalter (1684–87), his poetic record of his prophetic mission, 
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has prefatory engravings that imitate quite precisely engravings found in 
Boehme’s commentary on Genesis,  Mysterium Magnum (1623). The sym-
bols relate to the biblical Henoch (i.e., Enoch), whom Boehme interpreted 
as “divine breath,” the symbol of the last, sixth period of the world; Kuhl-
mann himself is a re-realization of Henoch; with Henoch’s arrival comes 
the fall of Babylon and the furious fi re that will consume sword and rod. 80 
The lilies and roses are Behmenist emblems for eternal blessed life. Not the 
quietist mystic that some have made of him, Kuhlmann’s reading of Boehme 
identifi ed him as a prophet of the great renovation that was to come and 
tied him directly to the ideals of the Rosicrucians and in response to other 
prophecies that related to the Thirty Years’ War. Indeed, Boehme’s original 
prophecies had found ready application in the revolutionary England of 
1649. 81 Kuhlmann called for an alliance of Protestant princes, the Tzar, and 
the Ottomans against the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope: one reason 
why he was regarded as subversive in Moscow. 
 Philology—“speculative philology”—is at the heart of Kuhlmann’s later 
poetry. “Kuhl” comes from the Vulgate text of Acts 3:20, referring to a cool-
ing down of the world after the new coming, which the  Kühlpsalter was de-
signed to bring on. Like Boehme, Kuhlmann is interested in the kinetic and 
creating power of the Word. Language is important because it commands, 
not because it denotes. Like Boehme, who believed that German was close 
to God’s creating language, Kuhlmann made German as like as possible to 
the original creative language, the  Ursprache . 82 Thus, he verbalized nouns to 
underline the effect of kinesis. In this respect, Kuhlmann became a Messiah 
in poetry, using the name “Jesuel,” where “E” is a divine name, “an hypo-
static person, an angel,” according to Dionysius the Areopagite. Here, the 
essence of God’s primordial ideas is named: 
 The dark, how deep it darkens me 
 For essence begins secretly, 
 O fortune rare, o fortune’s gem. 
 Inside me rises the high stream 
 Which outside hardly ever seems 
 A brook to normal men 
 An ocean groe[w]s and swells and fi lls 
 Though only trifl ing slender rills 
 Provide its fundament. 
 Then light is visible on earth, visible for the fi rst time because Kuhlmann 
has seen it: 
 3.13 Ach Nacht! Und nacht, di taget!   Oh night! And night, that 
dawns 
 O Tag, der nacht vernünftger Vernnunfft!  O day, the night reason of 
reasons 
 Ach Licht, das Kaine plaget,    O light, that torments Cain, 
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 Unde helle strahlt der Abelszunfft!   And the light illuminates 
Abel’s tribe! 
 Ich freue mich ob deiner fi nstern Kunfft. 83  I rejoice at your dark 
future. 
 As these poems push against the boundaries of intelligibility, they feel in-
deed like those of William Blake before his time: a fusion of the primitive 
Behmenism seen in some parts of Henry Vaughan’s verse with the geograph-
ical particularizing of mystical experience that we see later in Blake. 84 Blake 
subsumed Boehme into his own particular visionary system; over a hun-
dred years earlier, Kuhlmann sees himself poetically as the re-articulation 
of Boehme’s original vision: not merely echoing Boehme’s language and 
concepts but possessing his spirit, presenting obscurity as a profoundly sig-
nifi cant divine code. With militant prophetic edge, Kuhlmann endows both 
London and himself with the power of delivery, according to the presence 
of Boehme’s “Lilirose”: 
 1. London, Ort der Lichteswunder, 1.  London, city of miraculous 
delight 
 In dem Gott mein leid versüsst!  Where God sweetened my 
suffering! 
 Du wirst neu von mir gegrüsst, You will be greeted anew by me, 
 Weil du gibest fl amm und zunder!  Because you give fl ame and tinder! 
 Schau, wi Gott dich angethan, Look, how God clothed you, 
 Das kein Rom dir schaden kan So that Rome cannot harm you 
 Um der  Lilirose bahn! In the presence of the Lilirose! 
 2. Von dir bin ich ausgegangen 2. From you I came out 
 Durch den Ost und Mitternacht! Through the East and midnight! 
 Zu dir ward auch hergebracht.  What you became was also 
brought to you. 
 Was in Ost und Nord empfangen!  What was received in the East and 
North! 
 Was so rings dort Rom unringt, What so around there vexes Rome, 
 Und ihm seine Macht verdringt, And pressed his power 
 Weil di  Lilirose singt. Because the Lilirose sings. 
 3. Wiclef is aus dir enstanden 3. Wycliff is Created out of you 
 Der das stoltze Rom verschrekkt: Who scared proud Rome: 
 Wiclef wird erst recht geschmekkt, Wycliff is only tasted right 
 Nun das falsche Rom wird landen. Now false Rome will arrive. 
 Wiclef, der erst Rom anwiest, Wycliff, who fi rst warned Rome 
 Ist nun, der den zirkel schleust, Is now scattered to the compass, 
 Weil di  Liliros aufscheust! 85 Because the Lilirose awes! 
 Perhaps it was status and some infl uential connections that kept Kuhl-
mann out of trouble in England, even though he was associated with the 
Fifth-Monarchist platform. In England, he defended Boehme against several 
academic adversaries, including among Lady Conway’s circle, and in doing 
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so may have been responsible for perpetuating some rumors concerning 
Charles I’s admiration for Boehme. 86 
 It is signifi cant that John Pordage, Lead, and Kuhlmann were unqualifi ed 
admirers of Boehme and that the latter two saw themselves as genuine proph-
ets in their own right, retransmitting his message. Many others who read 
and then wrote about Boehme chose to engage often sympathetically with 
him, like the thoughtful Lady Conway and her companion Elizabeth Fox-
croft. Henry More was polite about Boehme, if ultimately critical, claiming 
that, despite his piety, he had been unable to overcome his embodied state 
and enter in this life a suffi ciently purifi ed state; others, like Richard Baxter, 
were less respectful. 87 But those who followed him to the degree of Pordage, 
Lead, and Kuhlmann created the fi rst authentically “Behemenist” literature, 
truthful to the full range of Boehme’s interests and modes of expression, not 
least in expounding the dual nature, light and dark, of divinity, and in per-
ceiving the principles of androgyny that reach out into the physical universe. 
In doing so, they also perpetuated that obscurity or “diffi culty” and made 
it part and parcel of the Pietist and spiritualist literature of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and beyond. As the fi rst English translators of 
Boehme began to see, you cannot engage with Boehme with earthly rea-
son: you have to be open to what they regarded as extra- or supra-rational 
perception. That would lead to the extraordinary verbal performances that 
we know from the writings of Tany, Lead, and Kuhlmann. Did those fi rst 
translators understand this? Yes, fi nally, I think they did. Not only did they 
acknowledge that Boehme would not play well with rationalists, they also 
proposed an engagement with Boehme based on intuition: “it [Boehme’s 
 Three Principles ] will rise in the Minde of it selfe, with a ravishing sweetness 
and content; and he will fi nde that the Threefold Life is tenfold deeper than 
this, and the fourty Questions to be tenfold deeper than that.” 88 They could 
not precisely tell you what was in Boehme beyond starting points (although 
Sparrow’s competence clearly grew over time), but they knew it would reach 
out automatically once it was published. Do not think too hard about this 
material; just read it; once experienced, you will know how to use it. Did 
this matter? Yes it did. Boehme answered an old quest for the integration 
of imagination and the perceived operations of the cosmos, including the 
“darkness” in God’s universe. The history of theology, philosophy, and ulti-
mately literature owes a lot to Boehme. 
 NOTES
 1.  Edward Taylor,  Jacob Behmen’s theosophick philosophy unfolded (London: 
Thomas Salusbury, 1691), b2 v . 
 2.  This is the “Frye in the Sky” painting that hangs in the E. J. Pratt Library, 
University of Toronto. 
 3.  Northrop Frye,  Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1947; repr. 1969), 427–28. 
6244-139-006-2pass-r02.indd   115 5/31/2013   10:49:42 AM
116 Nigel Smith
  4.  Northrop Frye,  Notebooks and Lectures on the Bible and Other Religious 
Texts , ed. Robert D. Denham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 
228. 
 5.  Northrop Frye,  The “Third Book” Notebooks of Northrop Frye, 1964–
1972: The Critical Comedy , ed. Michael Dolzani (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002), 214. 
 6.  Northrop Frye,  Late Notebooks, 1982–1990: Architecture of the Spiritual 
World . 2 vols.  Collected Works of Northrop Frye , vol. 5 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2000), 2.480. 
 7.  Northrop Frye,  Words With Power: Being a Second Study of “The Bible and 
Literature ” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 289. 
 8.  Andrew Weeks,  Boehme. An intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-
Century Philosopher and Mystic (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 122–3. 
 9.  Charles Webster,  Paracelsus: Medicine, Magic and Mission at the End of 
Time (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008). 
 10.  And for good reason since, as other contributors to this volume show, 
Boehme was infl uenced by him. 
 11.  Hence the Latin translation of half of  Signatura Rerum from Boehme’s Ger-
man made in 1631 for the physician Richard Napier: Bodl. MS Ashmole 
756. See, W. Poole, “Theodoricus Gravius (fl . 1600–1661): Some Biographi-
cal Notes on a German Chymist and Scribe Working in Seventeenth-Century 
England,”  Ambix 56 (2009): 239–52. 
 12.  A. Hessayon, “ ‘The Teutonicks writings’: translating Jacob Boehme into 
English and Welsh,”  Esoterica 9 (2007): 129–65. http://www.esoteric.msu.
edu/VolumeIX/EsotericaIX.pdf; Frank van Lamoen,  Abraham Willemsz van 
Beyerlanden het Nederlandse hermetisme in de 17e eeuw (Amsterdam: In de 
Pelikaan, 1986). 
 13.  Jacob Boehme,  A Consideration of the Divine Revelation in  Several Treatises 
of Jacob Behme , trans. John Sparrow (London: L[odowick] Lloyd, 1661), 
72–3. 
 14.  Nigel Smith,  Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English 
Radical Religion, 1640–1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), chap. 6. 
 15.  Gerhard Wehr,  Jakob Böhme. Ursprung, Wikrung, Textauswahl (Wiesbaden: 
marixverlag, 2010). 
 16.  Ariel Hessayon, “ Gold Tried in the Fire. ”  The Prophet TheaurauJohn Tany 
and the English Revolution  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 310–11; John Nick-
olls, ed.,  Original Letters and Papers of State (1743), 99. 
 17.  Jacob Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. John Ellistone (London: Giles 
Calvert, 1651), A2 r . 
 18.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, A2 v . 
 19.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, A3 r . 
 20.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, A3 r . 
 21.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, [A4 r ]. 
 22.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, [A4 v ]. 
 23.  Jacob Boehme,  Aurora , trans. John Sparrow (London: Giles Calvert, 1656), 
A1 v . 
 24.  Hessayon, “Teutonicks Writings,” 148. 
 25.  Boehme,  Epistles , trans. Ellistone, [A3 r ]. 
 26.  Boehme,  Epistles , trans. Ellistone, [A4 r ]. See also Jacob Boehme,  Of Christs 
Testaments , trans. John Sparrow (London: Humphrey Blunden, 1652), B4 v . 
 27.  Jacob Boehme,  The Fifth Book of the Authour (London: Lodowick Lloyd, 
1659), trans. John Sparrow, a7 r-v . 
 28.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, A3 v –4 r . 
 29.  Jacob Boehme,  Several treatises of Jacob Behme not printed in English be-
fore , trans. John Sparrow (London: Lodowick Lloyd, 1661), A2 v –3 r . 
6244-139-006-2pass-r02.indd   116 5/31/2013   10:49:42 AM
Did Anyone Understand Boehme? 117
 30.  Boehme,  Signatura Rerum , trans. Ellistone, [A4 r-v ]. 
 31.  Boehme,  Epistles , trans. Ellistone, a2 v . 
 32.  As recorded in Sparrow’s diary, Bodleian Library, MS Rawl., Essex 23. I am 
most grateful to Ariel Hessayon for showing me his forthcoming edition of 
this diary. 
 33.  John Sparrow, “ To the Earnest Lovers of Wisdom ,” in Boehme,  Forty ques-
tions of the soul concerning its original, essence, substance, nature or quality 
and property, what it is from eternity to eternity , trans. Sparrow (London: 
Lodowick Lloyd, 1665), A3 r –A5 v . 
 34.  Hermes Trismegistus, purported author of the  Corpus Hermeticum ; Zo-
roaster, ancient Persian founder of Zoroastrianism; Pythagoras of Samos 
(580?–c.500 BC), Greek philosopher and mathematician; Plato (424/423–
348/347 BC), Greek philosopher; Bernard Trevisan (1406?–1490), Italian 
alchemist; Ramon Lull ( d .1315), philosopher; Michael Sendivogius / Michał 
Sedziwój (1566–1636), Polish alchemist. 
 35.  Prisca theologia : notion of an ancient, God-given, true theology which 
threads through all religions; regarded as embodied in Hermetic philosophy 
and popular with Italian Neoplatonists such as Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola. 
 36.  Susanna Åkerman,  Rose Cross over the Baltic: The Spread of Rosicrucianism 
in Northern Europe (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1998). 
 37.  See John Webster,  Academiarum Examen (London: Giles Calvert, 1654); 
 ODNB. Further comparison with the related but not identical intellectual 
genealogies of Henry More, Henry Vaughan, and Thomas Traherne would 
be appropriate. 
 38.  Boehme,  Epistles , trans. Ellistone, A2 v-3 . 
 39.  Boehme,  Aurora , trans. Sparrow, B v -(a)2 r . The text referred to is Boehme’s 
 The Clavis ,  or Key , trans. John Sparrow (1647). 
 40.  Jacob Boehme,  Mercurius Teutonicus (London: Humphrey Blunden, 1649), 
A2 v . 
 41.  Jacob Boehme,  Four Tables of Divine Revelation , trans. H[umphrey] B[lun-
den?] (London: Humphrey Blunden, 1654), H4 v ; Jacob Boehme,  The Second 
Booke. Concerning the Three Principles of the Divine Essence , trans. John 
Sparrow (London: Humphrey Blunden, 1648), A2 r . 
 42.  Boehme,  Four Tables , trans. B[lunden?], [A3 r ]. 
 43.  Boehme,  Second Booke , trans. Sparrow. 
 44.  Jacob Boehme , The Remainder of Books written by Jacob Behme , trans. 
John Sparrow (London: Giles Calvert, 1662), A2 r . 
 45.  Jacob Boehme , A Consolatory Treatise of the Four Complexions , trans. 
Charles Hotham (London: Humphrey Blunden, 1654), A2 r . 
 46.  Boehme , Consolatory Treatise , trans. Hotham, A2 v . 
 47.  Charles Hotham,  An Introduction to the Teutonick Philosophie , trans. D[an-
iel] F[oote?] (London: Nathaniel Brooks, 1650), A3 v . 
 48.  Boehme,  Four Tables , trans. B[lunden?], [H4 r ]. 
 49.  Boehme,  Four Tables , trans. B[lunden?], H4 v ; cf. Boehme,  Second Booke , 
trans. Sparrow, A3 r . 
 50.  Boehme,  Several treatises , trans. Sparrow, A3 v . 
 51.  Boehme , Remainder of Books , trans. Sparrow, 10–11. 
 52.  Ibid., 12–13. 
 53.  Boehme,  Second Booke , trans. Sparrow, [a3 r-v ]. 
 54.  Weeks,  Boehme , 86, 151, 193. 
 55.  For the attribution (as opposed to Hotham’s brother Durand) and Foote’s 
career as a translator and associate of Francis Mercurius Van Helmont, see 
R. Lewis, “Of ‘Origenian Platonisme’: Joseph Glanvill on the Pre-existence 
of Souls,”  Huntington Library Quarterly 69, No. 2 (June 2006): 272, n. 21. 
6244-139-006-2pass-r02.indd   117 5/31/2013   10:49:42 AM
118 Nigel Smith
 56.  For More’s objections to as well as respect for Boehme, see below. 
 57.  For the full context, see Lewis, “Of ‘Origenian Platonisme.’ ” Henry More 
himself believed in the soul’s pre-existence. 
 58.  BL, MS Add. 23217, f. 25 r . 
 59.  Hessayon, “ Gold ,” 311–15. 
 60.  G. F. Nuttall,  James Nayler: A Fresh Approach (London: Friends’ Historical 
Society, 1954); Smith,  Perfection Proclaimed, chap. 5; Hessayon, “ Gold ,” 
294–317. 
 61.  John Pordage,  Theologia Mystica (London [s.n.]), 108–9. 
 62.  Pordage,  Theologia Mystica , 112. 
 63.  Ibid., 127. 
 64.  James Grantham Turner,  One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Rela-
tions in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 154–55, 164, 
171. 
 65.  Hotham,  Introduction to Teutonick Philosophy , trans. F[oote?], A3 v . For 
Foote’s authorship of the preface, see above n. 55. 
 66.  Samuel Pordage,  Mundorum Explicatio , ed. Harriet Spanierman Blumenthal 
(New York: Garland Publishing Inc. 1991); note, for instance, the Behmenist 
explanations at 145, 178, 187–8, 317. 
 67.  As documented in Pordage’s defense:  Innocencie appearing, through the dark 
mists of pretended guilt (1655). The events are the subject of many interpre-
tations; for the most recent, see Joad Raymond,  Milton’s Angels: The Ear-
ly-Modern Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 125–61. 
 68.  M[ary] P[ocock?],  The Mystery of the Deity in the Humanity (1649), 33–35; 
Nigel Smith,  Perfection Proclaimed , 190, 210–2. The Behmenist language of 
this treatise is matched by that of Pordage and his followers as they appear 
in  Innocencie appearing . 
 69.  Cyril O’Regan,  Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob’s Boehme’s Haunted Narrative 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 1–2. 
 70.  Hessayon, “ Gold ,” 16, chap. 12. 
 71.  In the light of Sarah Apetrei’s work in particular, the claim that “after Pord-
age’s death, . . . the spiritual leadership of Jane Lead and Francis Lee, is 
less vibrant with experimental theology, visionary communication and the 
occult” is unwarranted: Raymond,  Milton’s Angels , 161. 
 72.  Jane Lead,  The Ascent to the Mount of Visions (London: [s.n.,] 1699), 27. 
 73.  Jane Lead,  A Fountain of Gardens (London: [s.n.], 1697), II, 106. 
 74.  Jane Lead,  The Revelation of Revelations (London: A. Sowle and J. Lead, 
1683), 35. 
 75.  P. Mack, “Religious Dissenters in Enlightenment England,”  HWJ , 49 (2000): 
1–23; Nigel Smith, “Pregnant Dreams in Early Modern Europe: The Phila-
delphian Example,” in Johanna Harris and Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, eds., 
 The Intellectual Culture of Puritan Women, 1558–1680 (Palgrave MacMil-
lan, 2011), 190–201. 
 76.  Johanna Eleonora Petersen,  The Life of Lady Johanna Eleonora Petersen, 
Written by Herself , ed. and trans. Barbara Becker-Cantarino (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2005), 15–17, 22, 93. 
 77.  Quirinus Kuhlmann,  Der Neubegeisterte Boehme (1674), ed. Jonathan 
Clark, (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1995). 
 78.  Quirinus Kuhlmann,  A. Z! Quirin Kuhlman a Christian Jesuelit his Quinary 
of slingstones (London and Oxford: Printed for the Author, 1683), 6. 
 79.  Kuhlmann,  Christian Jesuelit , 12–13; cf. 26. 
 80.  Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Salvation Through Philology: The Poetical 
Messianism of Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651–1689),” in Peter Schäfer and 
Mark R. Cohen, eds.,  Toward the Millennium: Messianic Expectations from 
the Bible to Waco (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1998), 262. 
6244-139-006-2pass-r02.indd   118 5/31/2013   10:49:42 AM
Did Anyone Understand Boehme? 119
 81.  Boehme,  Mercurius Teutonicus ; Smith,  Perfection Proclaimed , chap. 3. 
 82.  For a comprehensive treatment of this tradition in seventeenth-century Ger-
man thought and Kuhlmann’s place in it, see Arno Borst,  Der Turmbau von 
Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen 
und Völker , Band III Umbau, Teil I (Munich: Deutscher Tashcenbuch Verlag, 
1995), 1342–76 (1362). 
 83.  Quirinus Kuhlmann, “Der 2. (62.) Kühlpsalm,” Weiter Theil, “ Des Kühlpsal-
ters Fünfftes Buch ,”  Der Kühlpsalter , ed. Robert L. Beare, (2 vols., Tübin-
gen: M. Niemeyer, 1971), vol. 2, 12. 
 84.  Blake’s fullest vision of London is contained in  Jerusalem: The Emanation of 
the Giant Albion (1804–1823). 
 85.  Kuhlmann, “Der 7. (52.) Kühlpsalm,” “ Des Kühlpsalters Virdtes Buch ,” 
 Der Kühlpsalter , vol. 1, 227–8. The “Lillyrose” is Boehme’s adaptation of 
the Rosicrucian use of the rose as a symbol of reformation. 
 86.  Hessayon, “ Gold ,” 293. 
 87.  Sarah Hutton,  The Conway Letters , rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 297, 306, 381–2, 512; Sarah Hutton,  Anne Conway. A Woman 
Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 56, 61, 64–6, 
79, 178, 195 n., 236; Robert Crocker,  Henry More, 1614–1687: A Biogra-
phy of the Cambridge Platonist (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2003), 54–5, 58. 
 88.  Boehme,  Second Booke , trans. Sparrow, A2. 
 
6244-139-006-2pass-r02.indd   119 5/31/2013   10:49:42 AM
 7  Jacob Boehme and the Anthropology 
of German Pietism 
 Lucinda Martin 
 I INTRODUCTION 
 Pietism ranks second in importance only to the Reformation in the history 
of Protestantism. 1 The movement swept through the German-speaking ter-
ritories in the mid- to late seventeenth century and continued for much of 
the eighteenth century. 2 It was closely related to reform efforts throughout 
Europe and the North American colonies, so some historians conceive of 
a “transatlantic evangelical revival movement,” of which German Pietism 
was but one part. 3 Pietism included movements in the Lutheran and Re-
formed churches as well as separatist groups. Yet all of these factions, de-
spite holding a range of beliefs, shared certain core concerns: a desire for a 
more heart-felt religion, more lay participation in church matters, the use of 
conventicles, and the experience of “rebirth.” 
 The treaty ending the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 had made three confes-
sions possible in the German states of the Holy Roman Empire: Catholicism, 
Lutheranism, and Calvinism, with the ruler of each principality determin-
ing the faith for his subjects. New “sects” were expressly forbidden and 
punishments were severe. This situation defi ned the shape of Pietism since 
participants, wishing to avoid legal trouble, had to claim that their meetings 
were merely private gatherings of friends and in no way an alternative to the 
offi cial church. Those who rejected these limitations stayed underground or 
emigrated. 
 Yet Pietism, especially before 1700, encompassed a whole spectrum of 
reformers who were in dialogue with one another about how to improve 
church and society. Only in the late seventeenth century did the lines harden 
between those who wanted to improve the state churches and those who 
thought they were beyond reform and advocated separatism. From the role 
of sacraments to the toleration of other faiths, the central debates in early 
Pietism owed much to Jacob Boehme. 
 Boehme’s profound infl uence on Pietism has not received as much schol-
arly attention as it deserves. Boehme was long uninteresting to church 
historians who were more concerned with clerical fi gures in their own con-
fessional histories than with lay thinkers such as Boehme. Another problem 
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is that Boehme’s thought mingled with other traditions, so it is diffi cult to 
tease out precisely which ideas owe their genesis to Boehme. 
 Some historians categorize Boehme as a “spiritualist,” although many 
of those who took up his teachings in the late seventeenth century have 
been designated “radical Pietists.” 4 In this chapter, I outline the reception 
and transformation of Boehme’s thought among German Pietists, as well 
as sketch his impact in three key areas: Pietists’ ecclesiology, language, 
and anthropology. 5 I then fl esh out in more detail Pietist transformations 
of Boehme’s anthropological thought. In a fi nal step, I show how Pietist 
women relied on Boehme’s anthropology to claim the authority to write and 
speak in the public sphere. 
 II  “LIKE TOADS CRAWLING FROM A BOG”: THE EARLY 
CIRCULATION OF BOEHME’S WRITINGS 
 The ideas of the “Teutonicus Philosophus” often reached his fellow Ger-
mans through circuitous routes. Boehme’s writings spread from under-
ground communities in German territories—where his texts were almost 
always censored—to German religious exiles in the Netherlands, to English 
sectarians, and fi nally back to the German lands in the translated works of 
English authors inspired by Boehme. 
 During his lifetime and afterwards, hand-written copies of Boehme’s 
writings—as well as a few early publications—circulated secretly among 
German speakers. 6 German polemical literature of the seventeenth century 
mentions “Böhmisten” and the “Jakob Böhme sect” as if they constituted 
a cohesive group, but these were actually disparate groups and individuals 
who adhered to selected aspects of Boehme’s thought. 7 As Leigh Penman 
discusses in his chapter on Boehme’s networks, they included Rosicrucians, 
pansophists, alchemists, Kabbalists, and natural philosophers. Further-
more, German poets and religious writers such as Daniel Czepko, Quirinus 
Kuhlmann, and Angelus Silesius (that is, Johann Scheffl er) took much from 
Boehme’s creative use of language, as did the Dutch poet, Jan Luyken. 8 
 Following Boehme’s death, Abraham von Franckenberg had several of 
Boehme’s writings published at Amsterdam from 1631. 9 Policies regarding 
publishing and religious freedom were much more liberal in the Netherlands 
than in the German states. 10 Indeed, in the history of Boehme reception on 
the continent, two places bordering the German territories are central—the 
Netherlands, especially Amsterdam, and Altona (then ruled by Denmark). 
Both Amsterdam and Altona offered religious nonconformists refuge, and 
both cities were leading hubs of publishing. Amsterdam in particular played 
a key role in the publication and dissemination of Boehme’s writings. 
 Anti-Boehme literature of the period took note of the Dutch role in the 
spread of Boehme’s thought. The author of one such polemical work, Eras-
mus Francisci, wrote, “The writings of Boehme, which for some time now 
have been coming out of Holland like toads crawling from a bog, are nothing 
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but a misuse of the holy Scriptures.” Francisci blamed Boehme’s popularity 
on “profi teering Dutch accountants” who sought fi nancial gain from the 
sale of sectarian literature, but in fact it was most often German-owned 
presses in the Netherlands publishing works that would have been censored 
in the German states. 11 
 In the 1630s, the Dutch businessman Abraham Willemszon van Beyer-
landt (1587–1648) collected Boehme manuscripts, had them translated into 
Dutch, and even had some texts published in the original German. 12 In his 
essay in this volume, Ariel Hessayon details how, by the 1630s, German and 
Latin editions of Boehme’s works also reached English shores, so that by the 
1640s the writings of “Jacob Behmen” were being translated into English. 
 Furthermore, it was not only the writings of Boehme himself that were 
traveling strange roads. From the 1620s on, a number of German-language 
disciples of Boehme were publishing in Amsterdam, including Paul Felgen-
hauer, Johannes Theodorus von Tschesch, and Ludwig Friedrich Gifftheil. 
Sketching the complete network of Boehme descendents who infl uenced Pi-
etism would go beyond the bounds of this essay, but if there is one common 
denominator, it is Friedrich Breckling (1629–1711). 
 Breckling had been a Lutheran pastor in North German Flensburg. He 
fi rst ran into trouble with authorities when he published a text criticizing 
corruption in the German Lutheran church and especially the church’s en-
tanglement in war. 13 Fleeing impending imprisonment, Breckling went to 
Amsterdam and soon became pastor of a German-speaking congregation in 
nearby Zwolle. Breckling’s home in Zwolle quickly developed into a mag-
net for spiritualists such as Joachim Betke, Christian Hoburg, and Johann 
Georg Gichtel. Scholars sometimes classify these men as “radical Arnd-
tians” because they took much from the ecclesiastical and social criticism 
of Johann Arndt (1555–1621). 14 However, the men were just as concerned 
with the writings of Jacob Boehme. 
 Through his prolifi c publications and extensive web of correspondents all 
over the continent, Breckling constituted an important conduit of Boehme’s 
thought. He compiled lists of the “witnesses to Truth” throughout history 
and believed that Boehme was one of the greatest of these. Breckling’s lists 
fed into Gottfried Arnold’s infamous  Impartial History of Church and Her-
esy, which portrayed so-called heretics throughout the ages as the “true 
church” and the offi cial churches as “Babylon.” Arnold’s book would be-
come one of the most popular and infl uential in German Pietism and be-
yond, going into multiple editions. 15 
 Breckling also facilitated the career of Johann Georg Gichtel (1638–
1710), perhaps the most fl amboyant promoter of Boehme’s thought. Al-
though Gichtel held radical views long before his association with Breckling, 
his interest in Boehme intensifi ed after meeting Breckling. Gichtel hailed 
from the southern German city of Regensburg, but because of his repeated 
anti-church polemics was driven into exile in the Netherlands. Like other 
German critics of the state church, Gichtel found refuge in Breckling’s home. 
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 In 1672, Breckling moved to Amsterdam where he eked out a living 
through writing and editing. In 1688 he published his defense of Jacob 
Boehme and spiritualism, “Anti-Calovius,” part of a public dispute with 
the theologian Abraham Calov (1612–1686). From 1690 until his death, 
Breckling lived in poverty in The Hague and was only able to survive due to 
meager fi nancial support from Princess Elisabeth of the Palatinate, Mary of 
England, and William III of Orange. Later, the so-called father of “church” 
Pietism, Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705), arranged for Breckling to re-
ceive a pension from Princess Anna Sophia of Saxony, a constellation that 
raises the question of a Boehme/Breckling infl uence even in the most conser-
vative branches of Pietism. 
 III BOEHME’S “GRAIL KEEPER”: JOHANN GEORG GICHTEL 
 By the late seventeenth century, there were pockets of Boehme enthusiasts 
across Europe, and many were connected through correspondence net-
works. Yet Boehme’s wider reception was only possible because of the life’s 
work of Johann Georg Gichtel, sometimes called by historians the “self-
appointed Grail Keeper of Boehme’s legacy.” 16 
 When Gichtel’s views forced him to fl ee the German territories, Fried-
rich Breckling offered him refuge, but their friendship did not last long. 
When Breckling decided in 1667 to marry, Gichtel was outraged since he 
interpreted Boehme’s writings as advocating chastity. Around the same time, 
Gichtel undertook to “defend” Breckling in a disagreement with church 
offi cials in the Netherlands. Gichtel’s anonymously written letter to the au-
thorities was so incendiary that Gichtel was jailed for a time and Breckling 
lost his post. 
 Gichtel soon left for Amsterdam, where he drew his own followers, 
becoming the head of a celibate household. Outsiders referred to them as 
“Gichtelianer,” but they called themselves the “Angel Brothers” because 
they strove to achieve the purity of angels (Matthew 22:30). 17 Although 
Jacob Boehme had seen no harm in marriage, the Angel Brothers rejected it, 
believing that the born-again must await spiritual marriage with the divine 
Sophia. Convinced that they could count on God to provide for them, Gich-
tel’s followers rejected paid work. Nonetheless they lived a fairly luxurious 
life since Gichtel proved to be adept at winning patrons. The Angel Brothers 
could thus devote themselves full-time to what they saw as their holy duty: 
the preservation and distribution of Boehme’s writings. 
 Gichtel’s accomplishment was nothing less than monumental. He edited 
all of Boehme’s theosophical works and published them in 1682–1683 in a 
15-volume edition in Amsterdam. 18 Gichtel’s followers put out subsequent 
expanded editions: Johann Otto Glüsing, who led a cell of Angel Brothers 
in Altona, published an edition in 1715, and Johann Wilhelm Überfeld, who 
led the network from Leiden in the Netherlands after Gichtel died, released 
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another edition in 1730. 19 These texts stirred great interest in German Pietist 
circles and beyond; leading fi gures had to take a stand on Boehme, and his 
most important tenets were hotly debated in literary battles. 20 
 From 1668 on, Gichtel and Breckling increasingly saw one another as 
rivals, and as Gichtel built up his own network of followers, he became 
increasingly critical of other religious activists of the day as well: Antoinette 
Bourignon was too rich; the Labadists allowed marriage; the Mennonites 
worked; Philipp Jacob Spener was too bound to the churches; August Her-
mann Francke was too interested in “reason”; the Quakers did not respect 
hierarchies, and so forth. 21 For his part, Breckling was especially critical of 
the English Philadelphians since he saw them as corruptors of Boehme’s leg-
acy. Of course, all of these factions were competing for funding and mem-
bers from the same limited pool of people interested in religion outside the 
bounds of the state church. 
 Competition may also help explain some of the in-fi ghting in Gichtel’s own 
household. Two men in particular helped Gichtel to edit Boehme’s texts, the 
theologian and Hebrew scholar Alhart de Raedt and the wealthy politician 
Coenraad van Beunigen. The three fell out over Beuningen’s patronage of 
the Boehme-inspired prophet Johannes Rothe, who preached that a “Fifth 
Monarchy” would replace “Babylon”—that is, the state-church complex—
in 1674. 22 According to Rothe, Amsterdam was the “city of God” where the 
new order would come into being. 23 Rothe was one of the most theatrical 
of the era’s radical prophets, and he attracted many advocates of Boehme’s 
thought, such as the poet Quirinus Kuhlmann, who saw in Rothe’s chiliastic 
writings a confi rmation of Boehme. 24 
 Yet, as in so many other instances, Gichtel revealed his shrewdness by 
choosing the most politically advantageous position. Rothe agitated against 
the aristocracy and especially against the Prince of Orange, despite the 
prince’s toleration and fi nancial support of religious nonconformists. In 
1676, offi cials in The Hague imprisoned Rothe, and by the end of the affair 
they declared his sponsor, Coenraad van Beuningen, insane and institution-
alized him, his wealth and connections notwithstanding. In contrast, Gichtel 
confi rmed that God had established traditional social hierarchies. Far from 
condemning the aristocracy, Gichtel fl attered them whenever possible since 
he depended on noble benefactors for his livelihood. In letters to one of 
his most important patrons, Princess Elisabeth of the Palatinate, Gichtel 
argues that the Quakers’ leveling of social rank undermines her God-given 
authority. The clear message was that Elisabeth should support Gichtel and 
his followers, portrayed as peaceful subjects, rather than rabble-rousing 
Quakers. 25 
 This episode reveals Gichtel’s practical side. He was charismatic, able 
to draw followers and to persuade donors to give generously. Yet he was 
eccentric and diffi cult company. A contemporary biography written by one 
of his supporters was printed with Gichtel’s  Theosophica Practica in 1722. 26 
Among other things, the work describes how Gichtel suffered for years from 
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a threatening hallucination: a great wheel that he interpreted as a symbol 
of the world’s temptation. Over the years, Gichtel experienced many visions 
induced by fasting and especially by sleep deprivation. Since, according to 
Boehme, the Fall into sin was brought about by sleep, Gichtel believed that 
sleep was sinful. 
 Beyond describing his religious development, Gichtel’s biography espe-
cially emphasizes his “shyness” around women and his success in avoiding 
falling into their clutches. A number of episodes recount how Gichtel was 
chased by passionate female admirers, but always managed to escape. 27 In 
one case, Gichtel was in such panic that he fl ed home on foot through the 
snow, leaving his horse and carriage behind. 28 In other texts, Gichtel boasts 
of marriage proposals from wealthy women who offered him high dowries, 
as if to prove that he could have married if he had wished to do so. 29 Gichtel 
justifi ed his celibacy by pointing to the New Testament (1 Corinthians 6:19) 
as well as to Boehme’s writings on Sophia, although sources reveal that 
Gichtel’s revulsion at the opposite sex predated his exposure to Boehme. 30 
This has led some researchers to suggest he may have been homosexual, a 
speculation that might help to explain the attraction of a celibate commu-
nity like the Angel Brothers. 31 
 Small communities of Gichtel’s Angel Brothers—some of which existed 
into the nineteenth century—sprung up in Prussia, the Netherlands, Lithu-
ania, Denmark, and Switzerland, but more signifi cantly, dozens of cohorts 
participated in a correspondence network. 32 Gichtel even corresponded 
with Anna Magdalena Francke, the wife of August Hermann Francke, the 
founder of the most important Pietist center, the Francke Institutes in Halle. 
Gichtel’s ideas about celibacy led to a crisis in the Francke marriage and 
may have been a factor in August Hermann Francke’s turn away from more 
radical forms of Pietism. 33 Gichtel corresponded with ordinary believers 
as well as the wealthy and powerful, always seeking not only spiritual ex-
change, but also donations for his community. Hundreds of these letters 
were printed in Gichtel’s  Theosophische Sendschreiben , but many others 
survive only in manuscript. 34 
 Gichtel himself produced only one independent theological treatise. 35 
The work, based on Boehme’s cosmology, discusses the “three principles” 
and deals primarily with the ideal of celibacy to enable the born-again indi-
vidual to achieve spiritual marriage with Sophia. Jacob Boehme taught that 
marriage with Sophia and the subsequent restored androgyny would come 
only in the afterlife, but Gichtel believed that these things could be accom-
plished by the righteous in this life. 
 IV “PHILADELPHIAN YEAST” IN GERMANY 
 Even after Gichtel published his edition of Boehme’s writings, the texts 
remained censored and scarce in German territories. Many Germans fi rst 
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came into contact with Boehme’s thought through the translated writings 
of Jane Lead (1623–1704) and John Pordage (1607–1681), who had read 
English versions of Boehme’s texts. Near the end of the seventeenth century, 
Lead was at the center of a circle known as the Philadelphian Society. The 
group combined Boehme’s thought with their own chiliastic expectations to 
conceive of “Philadelphia,” a union of true believers in all confessions (Rev-
elations 2 and 3:1–13). Although not explicitly part of Boehme’s system, the 
notion of a “Philadelphian” community had already been present among 
German followers of Boehme in the fi rst generation after his death. 36 Yet 
the idea gained traction only when the writings of English Philadelphians 
reached German Pietists. 
 In 1694, Jane Lead’s  Heavenly Cloud was translated into German and 
many other texts soon followed. 37 These works found resonance among rad-
ical Pietists, such as the couple Johanna Eleonora Merlau Petersen (1644–
1724) and Johann Wilhelm Petersen (1649–1727), who adopted many of 
the Boehme-inspired tenets of the Philadelphians and spread them further 
in their own writings. By 1703, Johann Wilhelm Petersen was one of about 
70 people listed in a  Catalogus amicorum in Germania of the Philadel-
phian Society, a list of prominent continental nonconformists that the group 
planned to contact, some of whom actually opposed the Philadelphians. 38 
In the same year that he appeared in the catalog, Petersen wrote that he had 
“recognized that dear truth” as early as three years before, referring in this 
context to the writings of Gottfried Arnold and John Pordage on Sophia. 39 
As early as 1695, the Petersens had possessed a copy of Lead’s  Eight Worlds , 
and Johanna describes in her autobiography how she absorbed Lead’s ideas 
but then “corrected and completed” them. 40 She believed that Lead had mis-
calculated the order of events for the coming apocalypse and establishment 
of God’s kingdom on earth: Satan would be redeemed after 50,000 years, 
not after only 8,000 years. She also criticized Lead for relying too much on 
her own revelations instead of seeking confi rmation of them in Scripture. 
Yet, with the exception of such technicalities, the Petersens did not reject 
Lead’s revelations. Rather, they were convinced that they had found proof 
of them in the Bible. 41 
 The English Philadelphians sent a German missionary, Johann Dithmar, 
to spread their message on the continent. In particular, the group targeted 
Pietists, believing that they would be most receptive. Indeed, a Philadelphian 
correspondence network thrived and German enthusiasts even donated 
money to the English group. The Philadelphians employed a translator in 
Amsterdam, and their German works also met with success among Pietists. 
 In terms of spreading their tenets, the Philadelphian Society was ex-
tremely successful. Hans Schneider has written that, “Nearly all of eigh-
teenth-century radical Pietism was leavened with the yeast of Philadelphian 
thought.” 42 Yet Dithmar’s efforts to persuade Germans to pledge allegiance 
to the Philadelphians’ offi cial creed failed dismally. Although many Pietists 
adopted the general goal of “Philadelphia,” few were willing to become 
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formal members of the group. Joining a “sect” could have serious legal con-
sequences. Beyond that, many Pietists believed in the ideal of an “invisible 
spiritual church” but did not see the need for yet another “walled church.” 
 Although “Philadelphia” did not take root in the form the English group 
had hoped, the most socially signifi cant radical Pietist groups were all trying 
to realize a supra-confessional Philadelphian “fl ock” (John 10:16). This in-
cludes the  Herrnhuter , later called in English the Moravian Church, as well 
as numerous small circles that believed they were preparing for the “time of 
Philadelphia.” These groups were careful to label themselves “societies” or 
“clubs” to underscore that they were not separatist sects. 
 In a few cases, sympathetic rulers enabled “Philadelphia” to thrive. 
Under the rule of Count Casimir (1687–1741), the town of Berleburg 
became a haven for Philadelphians and other nonconformists in the fi rst 
quarter of the eighteenth century. Berleburg would infl uence German cul-
ture for decades due to its prolifi c publishing program. 43 The physician 
Johann Samuel Carl (1676–1757) edited a periodical, the  Geistliche Fama , 
which spread radical Pietist and Philadelphian thought in thirty issues 
between 1730 and 1744. Even more signifi cant was the  Berleburg Bibel 
(1726–1742). 44 Under the leadership of the theologian Johann Friedrich 
Haug (1680–1753), the eight-volume work re-translated the Bible and 
included extensive scriptural interpretations. In keeping with the Phil-
adelphian ideal, the annotations drew on a wide range of international 
religious thinkers, including not just Philadelphians but also Pietists, Qui-
etists, Catholic mystics, and others. 
 V  BOEHME’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO GERMAN PIETISM: 
CHURCH, LANGUAGE, AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
 From early underground followers in the German territories, to German 
exiles in the Netherlands, to the English Philadelphians, Boehme’s ideas en-
tered Pietism through multiple channels. His thought thus saturates Ger-
man Pietism, especially in three crucial aspects: Pietists’ understanding of 
“church,” their use of language, and their ideas about anthropology—all of 
which were conditioned by chiliasm. While Boehme never specifi ed a date 
for the end of mortal time, many of the Pietists who picked up his ideas did 
try to predict the date when God would establish his kingdom on earth. 
For this reason, Pietists’ apocalyptic speculations were often associated 
with Boehme, even if their utopian plans bore little resemblance to anything 
Boehme had conceived. 
 Yet Boehme’s infl uence went beyond chiliasm. Boehme had contrasted 
“walled churches” to an “invisible spiritual church” of the godly in all 
faiths. His view, that the individual had to fi nd God on his own, challenged 
the authority of the church to mediate between God and parishioner and 
undermined the necessity of sacraments. 
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 In Pietist circles, Boehme’s ideas merged with those of others, especially 
Johann Arndt in his writings on “true Christianity.” Yet Pietists took “true 
Christianity” further than anything Boehme or Arndt had in mind. Pietists 
styled themselves as a supra-confessional, spiritual elite, which they con-
trasted with a superfi cial, “worldly” Christianity practiced by their or-
thodox neighbors. To distinguish themselves from the “worldly,” Pietists 
displayed outer signs of their supposed superiority: a plain (although uncod-
ifi ed) mode of dress, a rejection of “frivolous” entertainment, and the use of 
a unique sociolect, the so-called “Language of Canaan,” an idiom that drew 
extensively on Boehme’s language. In fact, theosophical terms came to stand 
for Pietist speech in general, especially for critics of Pietism. 45 
 Perhaps the most lasting artifact of the Pietist Language of Canaan stems 
from Boehme’s text, “On the new Birth” ( Von der neuen Geburt ). For 
Boehme, the central Lutheran doctrine of grace did not suffi ce to justify 
sinners; the individual had to make a conscious choice to slough off the “old 
Adam” and be “born again” free of sin. In Boehme’s system, rebirth occurs 
through the divine Sophia in a way analogous to the birth of a child or 
the Creation itself. More than any other trait, being “born-again” became 
the litmus test for who counted as a “true Christian,” that is, a member of 
the elite Pietist community. Indeed, Martin Brecht wrote, “Whenever Pi-
etism replaces justifi cation with rebirth, it usually goes back to the tradition 
of Boehme.” 46 Although the concept of spiritual renewal has many sources, 
it was in particular the German Pietist understanding of rebirth that accom-
panied Boehme-inspired Pietist sects to North America to become a core 
criterion of modern, “born-again” Protestant Evangelicalism. 
 Pietists gave Boehme’s theological concept of “rebirth” a new social sig-
nifi cance. They believed that God would endow the born-again with a dif-
ferent—divine—nature. According to Pietists, rebirth actually produced a 
new kind of human being, one stripped of the consequences of sin. Bearing 
a divine semiotic, “true Christians” would be recognizable in their speech, 
behavior, and even in their physical appearance. 
 The idea of a God-given “natural language” permeating the cosmos has 
many sources but came into Pietism particularly through the writings of 
Boehme and Arndt. Signifi cantly, both men were deeply indebted to Paracel-
sus, the great sixteenth-century physician, botanist, and alchemist. 47 Para-
celsus had theorized that medicinal plants contain the iconic “signature” of 
the body part or disease that they treat. 
 In his  Signatura Rerum (1621), Boehme further developed Paracelsus’s 
idea of signatures. Boehme recounts how he learned through visions that 
the relationship between God and humanity is signifi ed in all things. A con-
cealed kernel of truth, God’s “signature,” lies beneath the surfaces of words, 
of things, and of the soul itself. The fact that each person, animal, or sub-
stance exhibits innate, specifi c properties proves this “signature.” 
 The notion of underlying signatures was central for many Pietists’ Bib-
lical interpretations. Pietists applied Kabbalah and other esoteric systems 
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to the Bible with the aim of revealing hidden meanings. “Signatures” were 
also one motivation behind some Pietists’ attempts to separate themselves 
from their “worldly” contemporaries. In dressing, speaking, and behaving 
differently, they wanted to bear a holy signature. The idea of a “signature of 
the soul” went through many permutations in Pietism, most famously in the 
writings of Johann Caspar Lavater. The late eighteenth-century theologian 
is best known for his physiognomic studies in which he correlated the outer, 
physical characteristics of a person to inner, moral ones. For many Pietists, 
exhibiting their “born-again” status through outer appearances proved that 
they had achieved an inner marriage with the divine Sophia. 
 VI  SOPHIA BETWEEN JACOB BOEHME 
AND GOTTFRIED ARNOLD 
 The doctrine of “Sophia” or a personifi cation of “divine Wisdom” has 
ancient roots going back to the Bible and early church fathers. 48 German 
Pietists, however, knew of Sophia primarily through Boehme’s writings or 
through the texts of others who transformed Boehme’s ideas. In fact, schol-
ars regard the theosophist as the “Father of Western Sophiology.” 49 Through 
his writings and those of his adherents, the Sophia doctrine spread through-
out Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Boehme 
understood his insights as a “divine science,” revealed to him through “eter-
nal Wisdom” or Sophia. 50 For Boehme, Sophia is an integral part of the cos-
mos and the godhead. Indeed, Sophia is the mechanism through which God 
creates himself out of the  Ungrund . Literally the “un-ground,” the  Ungrund 
is God’s lack of knowledge or certainty, a primal state in which matter is 
still unfi xed in any defi nite form. According to Boehme, the forms of plants, 
animals, and minerals only become fi xed when the divine Will “births itself” 
out of the divine Sophia. In the act of self-refl ection through Sophia, God 
creates the entire cosmos so that all the things of creation emerge with a fi rm 
identity. Sophia is God’s “tool for creation” and for revelation. 51 
 God, according to Boehme, encompasses everything in the cosmos and 
simultaneously reconciles opposites such as hot/cold, life/death, or male/
female—all principles that, Boehme underscores, are important and nec-
essary in nature. Since Boehme claims that God possesses both male and 
female characteristics, he also believes that the fi rst human being, created 
in God’s image, had both masculine and feminine qualities: this  Urmensch , 
or original human, had the “tincture of all being” within himself. As a mi-
crocosm of the universe, the original human shared a measure of all the 
substances and principles of the cosmos, including the male and female. 
 In Boehme’s model, the  Urmensch destroyed the integrity of humanity 
with God and the cosmos when he fell asleep, thus directing his attention 
away from God. Through this sinful act, the original human being lost his 
God-like powers. His body became mortal, susceptible to illness and the 
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forces of nature. He would have had the ability to reproduce through So-
phia, who had been united with him, but through sin, he lost Sophia and 
the power of regeneration. God thus created out of the  Urmensch , or fi rst, 
“angelic Adam,” a new, mortal Adam and a mortal companion for him, 
Eve. According to Boehme, it was not Eve’s eating of the “forbidden fruit,” 
but the fi rst Adam’s egoistic turn away from God—his sleep—that led to 
the Fall. Boehme insists that it is the goal of all human love to gain back 
this original unity with God and the universe: men and women seek in the 
opposite sex that which they lack, but no matter how hard they try, mor-
tals cannot overcome the separation into two irreconcilable sexes. Boehme 
emphasizes that it is only in heaven that human beings will regain their lost 
“paradisiacal” form, that is, their androgynous bodies. 
 Pietists read and debated Boehme’s writings, as well as Boehme-inspired 
texts by English Philadelphians, Gichtel, the Petersens, and others. Yet it was 
primarily through the publication of Gottfried Arnold’s  The Secret of the 
Divine Sophia in 1700 that the Sophia doctrine reached a large readership 
in Germany. 52 Among German Pietists, Arnold was probably the most im-
portant proponent of a radical understanding of church since he was able to 
spread his thought in academic literature that also appealed to a lay public. 
 In 1693, Arnold took up a private teaching post in Quedlinburg in central 
Germany, where he lodged in the home of Susanna Margaretha Sprögel and 
Johann Heinrich Sprögel. The couple’s home was a stopover for traveling 
nonconformists, the conventicle they hosted was an incubator for radical 
Pietism, and they distributed Philadelphian and other sectarian literature. In 
September 1697, Arnold began a position as professor of history at the Uni-
versity of Giessen, but in March of the following year, he resigned to escape 
the state-church and all its trappings. He then returned to Quedlinburg. It 
was during this period that Arnold began to study mystical authors, and—
even more important for his subsequent work—Boehme and the English 
Philadelphians. 
 Although most Pietists would learn of “Sophia” through Arnold, his ac-
count in  The Secret of the Divine Sophia was very much informed by life 
in the Sprögel household. Since at least 1699, Arnold corresponded with 
Gichtel about their mutual interests. Yet Arnold’s host, Susanna Margaretha 
Sprögel, had been writing to Gichtel much longer, since at least 1696, and 
was an ardent supporter of the Sophia doctrine. 53 In 1701, Arnold married 
the Sprögel’s daughter, Anna Maria, and the couple would later name one 
of their children Sophia. Obviously, “Sophia” was discussed at length in 
the Sprögels’ home, which raises interesting questions about the origin and 
genesis of Arnold’s thought. 
 Certainly, Arnold’s Sophia owes much to John Pordage, whose own 
Sophia text had appeared two years previously. 54 Like Pordage, Arnold 
draws on Boehme, but transforms the Sophia concept. Arnold’s Sophia does 
not play the same central role in creation and is much less complex than 
Boehme’s Sophia. Arnold also does not rely on Boehme’s dense, metaphorical 
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language, and he circumvents the discussion about biological androgyny, 
thereby avoiding many of the criticisms aimed at Boehme. Like Boehme, 
he conceives of the fi rst human, the  Urmensch, as having both male and 
female characteristics; but, for Arnold, these are only in spirit and not in 
body. 55 Boehme and Arnold see Sophia differently because they understand 
the workings of the natural world differently. Arnold conceives of a purely 
spiritual plane and contends that spirits have no body. 
 Boehme maintains, however, that all spirit must have some kind of phys-
ical existence, a “body,” and that conversely, all bodies, that is, all physical 
things, must possess some kind of spirit, regardless whether those things be 
human, animal, or mineral. For Boehme, the fact that substances exhibit 
unique chemical and physical properties is proof of what he calls “spirit.” 
Boehme thus differentiates between the “fl eshly bodies” of living creatures 
and the “light bodies” of angels, of the original human, or of Sophia. Ar-
nold, too, conceives of a “spiritual power” or a “light body” made up of a 
“heavenly spiritual substance.” 56 Yet in contrast to Boehme, Arnold believes 
that angels have no materiality and stones have no spirit. 
 Like Boehme, Arnold claims that his knowledge about Sophia derives 
from divine revelation. Yet Arnold’s  Secret of the Divine Sophia relies not 
on revelation, but on his training as a theologian. Arnold cites Scripture 
and supports his claims with quotes from church fathers to show that So-
phia was widely accepted in the early Church. 57 Arnold devotes much of 
his argumentation to explaining Sophia’s relationship to the Trinity. Christ 
and Sophia are different aspects of the same spirit, but Sophia is also the 
“essence” of all three persons of the Trinity and therefore not an indepen-
dent entity in the same way as Christ. 58 Although he legitimizes Sophia with 
canonical sources, Arnold states that such divine mysteries exceed human 
understanding. 59 
 Despite their different conceptions of Sophia, both Boehme and Arnold 
agree that she is passive. Boehme stresses that God “births himself” through 
Sophia, as opposed to her birthing him. Similarly, Arnold makes her only 
a “mirror.” In seeing himself refl ected, God becomes self-aware and wills 
himself into being. 60 This passive role of the Sophia stands in contrast to 
the very active and creative role that she came to play in radical Pietist 
experiments. 
 VII BOEHME AND SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS IN PIETISM 
 Despite Boehme’s insistence that “Zion” is to be found in the human soul, 
many Pietists saw in his writings a justifi cation for building “Zion” or 
the “New Jerusalem” on earth. Since Pietists wanted to reform not just 
the churches but also the world, their interest in Boehme soon inspired a 
variety of experiments with gender roles, sexuality, and social structures. 
In much of Pietism, Boehme’s Sophia obliterated the traditional reading 
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of Genesis in which Eve is responsible for the woes of humanity. The 
conventional interpretation had always argued that women were unfi t for 
“male” endeavors requiring leadership, strength, or moral character. But 
with God having both masculine and feminine attributes, the “female” 
gained a new respectability at the same time as the “male” took on a new 
burden of sin. 
 Based on Sophia, Pietists drew conclusions about the organization of so-
cial life that Boehme himself had not imagined. When Arnold wrote that 
the Christian becomes increasingly like God while on earth (the process is 
completed only in heaven) and that God is androgynous, he implied that 
women should become more like men, and men should become more like 
women. To some extent, this is what happened in Pietist circles: Pietist 
women moved into the previously male realms of religious leadership, bib-
lical interpretation, and theological writing. At the same time, male Pietists 
such as Zinzendorf touted and strove after “female” traits like spiritual em-
pathy and the ability to nurture. 
 Pietists’ experiments with gender roles and family structures did not sim-
ply result from religion; rather, theology offered solutions for contemporary 
problems. Because of changes in economic structures, many people were 
unable to attain the fi nancial basis required to establish a family (these mat-
ters were strictly governed by law). This was true for a variety of people: the 
lower nobility was crumbling and many women, in particular, from poor 
aristocratic families could not marry. At the same time, new methods of 
production displaced whole classes of craftsmen. 
 In fact, historians refer to the seventeenth century as a time of “general 
crisis,” which included wars, economic shifts, natural disasters, famines, 
and plagues. The “crisis” was especially acute in the German territories, 
which had been devastated by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Pietists, 
many of whom expected the Final Judgment in the immediate future, cer-
tainly felt an urgent sense of crisis. It would go too far to analyze all of these 
factors here, but it is clear that Pietists had many motivations for trying to 
shape their lives “differently.” Boehme’s Sophia doctrine justifi ed such ex-
periments in the social fabric. 
 Many of the Pietists’ experiments with marriage, sex, and living arrange-
ments found an ideological basis in the notion of Sophia and the androg-
ynous  Urmensch . Some Pietist groups, such as the Herrnhuter, conceived 
of the relationship between men and women in a new way. Instead of see-
ing women as subservient “helpers” to men, they viewed both men and 
women as servants of God. As a result, the Herrnhuter developed a system 
in which both men and women worked in parallel ecclesiastical and com-
munity structures. There was even a child-care program to enable women 
to pursue careers, including as church administrators, alongside their male 
counterparts. The criteria for success in this system were individual ability 
and religiosity, not education or social status. Men and women lived in 
separate but comparable houses. Marriage existed within the community, 
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but was subordinated to the needs of the church, with elders arranging mar-
riages between members as they saw fi t. 61 The Herrnhuter viewed marital 
relations positively, since sex within marriage constituted a “sacrament,” 
but one that served God and not individuals. 
 Some of the continental groups inspired by Boehme understood the re-
ligious community as a new kind of “family.” This was the case for the 
Labadists, who were active in Germany and the Netherlands and formed a 
settlement in Maryland in 1683. The Labadists’ two most important leaders 
were Jean de Labadie and Anna Maria van Schurmann, whom members re-
ferred to as “Papa” and “Mama,” while other group members were “broth-
ers” and “sisters.” The Labadists initially rejected marriage, preferring 
spiritual marriage with Sophia, but after an unmarried woman in the group 
became pregnant, they decided to allow marriage between members. 62 The 
public was incensed that the Labadists, like many other Pietist groups, ig-
nored social boundaries and that aristocratic ladies like van Schurmann 
lived and worshiped side by side with rustic craftsmen. Members of such 
groups increased their numbers not through childbirth but by gathering the 
“children of God” through conversion. In this way, Pietists who could not 
marry for economic reasons or who did not wish to marry could nonetheless 
have a “family.” 
 Other Pietists understood the existence of the male and female sexes as 
nothing more than evidence of sin, a result of the division of the  Urmensch 
into two sinful halves. These Pietists rejected sexuality completely and tried 
out various forms of celibacy, including chaste “spiritual marriages.” They 
wanted to await their “true” or “spiritual” marriage in heaven, where the 
sinful mortal body would be restored to its perfect androgynous state. Both 
men and women were seen as “stained” and incomplete. Many German Pi-
etists took the same attitude as Jane Lead, who, although her marriage had 
apparently been a happy one, later commented that it had delayed her “true 
marriage of the soul with the Heavenly Sophia.” 63 
 The leading Pietist proponents of celibacy based on Sophia were Gichtel 
and, for a time, Arnold. Only a year after writing his  Secret of the Divine 
Sophia and two years after distancing himself from the state church, Arnold 
softened his views, taking a wife and an offi cial church post to support 
his family. Upon hearing the news, Gichtel expressed the hope that Arnold 
“wanted not a wife, but a sister for a wife,” but later had to note in disap-
pointment that Arnold had “lapsed” into having children. 64 
 While there were small communities of Gichtel’s “Angel Brothers” net-
work all over the continent, many other small celibate households existed 
independently. In such homes, a handful of like-minded believers structured 
the day with prayer, worship, study, and work. One such community was 
led by Gerhard Tersteegen, often considered the greatest Pietist poet. Ter-
steegen, who fi rst turned to radical religion after reading Boehme, preached 
before groups of hundreds of seekers and traveled extensively, advising 
other “spiritual households.” 
6244-139-007-2pass-r02.indd   133 5/31/2013   10:47:17 AM
134 Lucinda Martin
 This kind of private Pietist monasticism developed furthest in North 
America, where many of the most socially radical Pietists congregated hav-
ing fl ed persecution in Europe. A group consisting mostly of scientists and 
mathematicians made the fi rst attempt to create a celibate utopia in the 
colonies. They lived as hermits in the woods of Pennsylvania and kept as-
tronomic watch of the night sky with their telescopes, since they expected 
“heavenly signs” such as comets to announce the return of Christ (Matthew 
24: 29–30). The group rejected all names as smacking of sectarianism, but 
locals called them the “Woman in the Wilderness” community, because they 
awaited the woman prophesied in Revelations 12:1–6, whom the group in-
terpreted as the divine Sophia. 
 This group combined with other Pietists infl uenced by Boehme and even-
tually formed the Ephrata Cloister near Lancaster, Pennsylvania, a large-scale 
Protestant institution that accommodated male and female inhabitants. 65 As 
in the settlements of the Herrnhuter, men and women lived in separate but 
parallel structures—an architectural expression of the androgyny principle. 
Furthermore, Boehme’s writings on Sophia inspired yet other Pietist com-
munities in North America, such as the so-called “Rappists” who settled in 
Pennsylvania and Indiana and persisted into the nineteenth century. 
 Doubtless the most infamous Sophia-inspired sect on the German reli-
gious scene was the Mother Eva Society or “Buttlar gang,” named after 
their leader, Eva Margaretha von Buttlar. 66 The group tried to rise above the 
sinful mortal body by enacting sexual rituals as sacraments, aiming to rec-
oncile the male and female. Through their “cleansing” ceremonies, they be-
lieved that they could cancel out the sexual differences that sin had imposed 
on humanity. For men, purifi cation essentially consisted of intercourse with 
Eva von Buttlar. The procedure that female members underwent was much 
more grisly: a manual crushing of the uterus that was extremely painful 
and led to years of health problems for some group members. The group 
thought that this gruesome ritual—carried out by a member who was a 
medical student—was necessary in order to kill “the beast,” that is, Satan, 
whom they believed to reside in the uterus. 
 VIII SOPHIA AND PIETIST WOMEN’S WRITING 
 Boehme’s anthropology led many Pietists to believe that sexuality held the 
key to salvation, whether through celibacy or through the elevation of in-
tercourse to a sacrament. Yet Pietist experiments based on Boehme’s an-
thropology were not limited to separatist sects. The Sophia doctrine also 
inspired Pietist women to take up the pen and to argue for an expansion 
of women’s sphere of activity. Thus Johanna Eleonora Merlau Petersen ex-
plains that Sophia is really just another name for the Holy Ghost. 67 
 Gottfried Arnold had declared that it is unimportant that the term, “der 
Geist” (spirit), has a neuter or feminine gender in other languages, but this 
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question is central for Petersen. 68 She points out that the Hebrew word for 
“spirit” ( rûah ) is feminine. 69 For Petersen, the original gender of the word 
proves that God encompasses female as well as male elements. Indeed, she 
asserts that it is the female “fertile mother or breeding dove” which makes 
the “invisible in God visible,” that is, the Holy Spirit is the medium of God’s 
revelation. Without her, there is no  Logos , no word. 
 Petersen thus takes up a very old discussion in Christianity, that between 
“word” and “spirit.” Pietist women writers like Petersen gave “spirit” pri-
macy over “word” because “word” was forbidden to them. Women were 
allowed neither to study at universities, nor to hold clerical positions, and 
the texts that women were forbidden to study were the very texts used to 
justify women’s exclusion. “Spirit,” on the other hand, cannot be regulated 
by institutions. Although Johanna Eleonora Merlau Petersen relies on ex-
tensive theological and philological knowledge in her writings, she always 
appeals in the end to “spirit” to justify her activity. 
 While Petersen refers to Sophia in veiled terms as the “great secret” be-
hind her writings, another woman writer, Susanna Margaretha Sprögel, is 
more forthright in her assertion of the doctrine. In 1705, a new book in 
which the Sophia doctrine played a central role arrived on the German book 
market, written by an anonymous author but with a preface by Arnold. 70 
Scholars have attributed  Consilia und Responsa Theologica to Susanna 
Margaretha Sprögel, Arnolds’ mother-in-law. 71 The fact that she issued the 
work anonymously attests to the controversial nature of women’s publish-
ing, especially on questions of theology. In the preface, Arnold avoids men-
tioning the author’s sex by referring only to a “person taught by God.” 72 
He also calls the book’s author a “Theologus” (a designation meant either 
to mislead or provoke), and describes the book as the “inner biography of 
this soul,” indicating its origin as a Pietist spiritual journal. 73 Much of the 
work consists of dialogues between the author’s soul and God as well as var-
ious theological questions to which God “replies.” The book also contains 
prayers, poems, and the dreams and visions of the author. 
 Boehme and Arnold both imagined Sophia as a passive “tool” of God, 
but according to Sprögel, Sophia is an active agent of redemption. It is So-
phia who works change in the soul and leads erring humans back to God. 
In  Consilia , Sophia “speaks” forcefully in the fi rst person in a way reminis-
cent of the scriptural Sophia. 74 For Arnold, Sophia is a “spirit,” but not a 
“person,” and Boehme writes confusingly that Sophia is not a “person,” but 
nonetheless a “personality.” Yet for Sprögel, Sophia is the person within the 
godhead who creates all that is good in the universe and who has dominion 
over life and death. 75 Sprögel also makes clear that it is Sophia who will 
restore a state of androgynous perfection to the born-again. 76 
 Furthermore, Sprögel maintains that Sophia shares her mysteries not 
with ordained theologians, but with the “voiceless” in society. The notion 
that God reveals himself through the meek and not the proud was one of 
the most widespread ideas in Pietism. Women and lay Pietists countered the 
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argument that only ordained theologians had the authority to speak publicly 
on religious issues by claiming that the “chosen” were not the privileged of 
this world, but rather often those with the least infl uence in human affairs. 
 Similarly, Pietists looked to doctrines like Sophia and an androgynous 
“fi rst Adam” to argue for social alternatives. Arnold saw in Christ’s birth 
through Mary a fusion and thus reunifi cation of the male and female ele-
ments in the divine. According to Arnold, when mortals answered the call 
of Sophia, they could thus become “new creatures.” Sprögel and Arnold 
thus agree that Jesus and Sophia are united as different aspects of God, but 
Sprögel adds a social dimension. She sees in the union of Jesus and Sophia a 
theological solution for a real-world problem: that of “unclean” marriage. 
 Like many Pietists, Sprögel subscribed to the belief that the end of mortal 
time was at hand. She argued that God was already setting up his king-
dom on earth and that as it progressed, worldly differences between men 
and women would melt away. Not only would born-again Christians take 
on new, androgynous bodies, but God, or rather, “Jesus-Sophia,” would 
also initiate a new kind of marriage in which man and woman are “one in 
Christ” and in which neither dominates the other. 77 
 Sprögel melds Jesus and Sophia into one person as Arnold does, but in-
stead of writing in the theological idiom of Arnold, she writes in an alchem-
ical language reminiscent of Boehme or her correspondent, Gichtel. Sprögel 
identifi es the “godly-masculine” and the “godly-feminine” “tinctures.” 
According to Sprögel, the “manly tincture” is strength, and the “feminine 
tincture” is wisdom. She writes that the enemy, Satan, wants to divide the 
powers of female wisdom and male strength, and that believers must unite 
the “perfect virginal man and the manly maiden in one undivided guise” in 
order to achieve “the right true new birth.” 78 
 Sprögel makes wisdom itself a feminine quality, a clear elevation of the 
female. Yet she argues that wisdom and strength are available to both men 
and women because they are  inner characteristics of the soul, not physical 
attributes. Rules and customs regulating the behavior of the sexes should 
thus be applied to the “inner human” and not to the “outer creature.” 
Sprögel therefore interprets Paul’s prohibition on women’s speaking in the 
church to mean that the weak and cowardly had to remain silent, that is, 
those who were “female” on the  inside . She writes of male and female “dis-
positions.” The author advises her readers to seek within themselves to dis-
cover whether they are “male” or “female” and thus whether or not the 
apostle’s injunctions apply to them: 
 The women should stay silent in the congregation / says Paul / and this 
is also true according to the  correct meaning of the spirit . Because all 
 weak womanly and lazy dispositions should stay silent [. . .] So let each 
look into his heart / and seek what the  womanly silence consists of [. . .] 
since in Christ there is neither man nor woman / but rather all are one 
in him [. . .]. 79 
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 Sprögel’s advice includes men as well as women. According to her anthro-
pology, nature determines what one is on the outside—be it man, woman, 
or child—but spiritual maturity defi nes what one is on the inside. She thus 
argues, “[. . .]  many men still have to learn to stay silent / who may be called 
men / but who have not even become converted  little children in Jesus / [. . .] 
let alone  able to teach others . They [. . .] should learn to stay silent / as the 
Spirit commands them.” 80 
 According to Sprögel, the female represents that which is weak and 
should therefore remain silent. Yet she claimed the right of religious speech, 
reserved by the apostle Paul for men. Embedded in a world in which “fe-
male” had few positive connotations, this author relied on Boehme’s an-
thropology to redefi ne herself. Based upon her understanding of male and 
female as inner attributes, she clearly saw herself as a man. 
 IX CONCLUSION 
 The belief that God created human beings in  his image is a central tenet of 
Christianity—one that had long justifi ed the male domination of women, 
from “house fathers,” to “church fathers,” to the king as “father of the 
land.” Boehme’s Sophia doctrine encouraged men and women to see their 
world with new eyes. The doctrine taught that God had not created the fe-
male sex to serve the male, but instead that the female was an intrinsic part 
of the divine with an important role to play in God’s plan for the cosmos. 
The androgynous “fi rst Adam,” not Eve, was culpable for humanity’s Fall 
into sin. The notion that God charged men to master over women thus lost 
its foundation in many Pietist circles. In this environment, women could 
take on roles previously reserved for men. Some Pietist groups enabled 
women to hold leadership positions that went far beyond anything offered 
by the secular Enlightenment. 
 Based on Boehme’s writings, Pietists not only challenged religious hier-
archies but also opened up new debates about the possible shape of society. 
They experimented with gender roles, social structures, and even the forms a 
family could take, yet many of their ideas did not survive the eighteenth cen-
tury. Pietist cloisters and celibate “spiritual marriages” could not compete 
with other ways of organizing life. After 1760 most radical Pietist experi-
ments petered out, including expanded opportunities for women. Protestant 
women would not regain such prospects until the twentieth century. 
 Yet the promotion of women’s writing did take hold. The Pietist em-
phasis on individual spiritual development led Pietists to observe the inner 
workings of the soul and to record these in spiritual journals. Sophia, or 
“divine Wisdom,” inspired many women Pietists to take up the pen. As 
women increasingly wrote and published their own insights, traditional no-
tions that such activities were unfi tting for women gradually subsided, and 
clichés about the supposed inability of women lost ground. This expansion 
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of opportunities for women (and lay men) to write and publish is one of Pi-
etism’s enduring contributions to the modern world. What is more, through 
their writings, the radical Pietist idea that the inner essence of a person is 
more important than outer, “worldly” attributes like gender, race, or social 
standing lived on to inspire radicals in epochs to come. 
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 8  “No New Truths of Religion”
William Law’s Appropriation 
of Jacob Boehme 
 Alan Gregory 
 In 1737, William Law (1686–1761) published  A Demonstration of the 
Gross and Fundamental Errors of a late Book, called “ A Plain Account of 
the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper .” This was the 
fi rst of his books to refl ect the infl uence of Jacob Boehme, albeit less thor-
oughly than  The Grounds and Reasons for Christian Regeneration , which 
followed it two years later. Exactly when Law started to read Boehme is un-
clear, but his adoption of a Behmenist vocabulary is quite sudden and, once 
adopted, dominates all the major works of the last twenty years of his life. 1 
At some point between 1733 and 1737, Law was introduced to Boehme’s 
writing through an anonymous treatise,  Faith and Reason Compared, rec-
ommended to him by the physician George Cheyne. 2 Following this up, 
though, proved strenuous. Law’s fi rst reading of one of Boehme’s works put 
him “into a  perfect sweat .” Boehme’s terms shaping his recollections, Law 
explained his persistence as due to fi nding “glimmerings of a deep ground 
and sense.” The work was worth the sweat: “[I] perceived that my heart felt 
well and my understanding kept gradually opening.” 3 By the early 1740s, 
Law was teaching himself the “High German language” necessary for a 
direct engagement with Boehme’s books. 
 By the time Law picked up  Faith and Reason Compared, he was respected, 
and also denounced by some, as the author of two widely-read treatises on 
Christian life and devotion,  A Treatise upon Christian Perfection (1726) and 
 A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (1729). Both works exhort a thor-
oughgoing renewal of Christian practice involving the return to a rigorous 
life of self-denial, generosity, and prayer inspired by an apostolic urgency 
and integrity. The “highest Degree of Christian Perfection,” Law reminded 
the spiritually half-hearted, “is also the lowest Degree of Holiness which 
the Gospel alloweth.” 4 What is striking, especially about the  Serious Call , 
is the combination of demanding strictness with a measured, reasonable 
tone and considerable charm. Law’s style, however, changed markedly under 
the infl uence of Boehme: forceful and clear, almost syllogistic argument, 
illustrated by well-observed, memorable vignettes, disappears in favor of 
meditative expositions, some in dialogue form, that gradually unfold their 
themes, turning around key symbols and events in an overarching narrative 
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of creation, and fall and redemption. Though Law writes very differently 
under Boehme’s inspiration, there is still a profound stylistic contrast be-
tween the two writers. It is not simply that Law is a far clearer, more orderly 
writer, but that he deploys Behmenist ideas as elements in a largely settled 
and stable doctrinal presentation. Whereas Boehme struggles for expression, 
revising and developing terms and theological structures as he proceeds, 
groping under the pressure of creativity, Law handles Behmenist language as 
an established discourse with which he is familiar and that he has mastered. 
 In addition to his fame as the author of  A Serious Call , Law was known as 
a sharp theological controversialist who had tackled, with sober argument 
as opposed to pious fulmination, both Bishop Hoadly (1676–1761), whose 
views on Church and State we shall discuss below, and the Deist Matthew 
Tindal (1657–1733). Law’s fi rst “Behmenist” work was also a contribution 
to theological dispute, not Christian spirituality, and, once again, the target 
was Bishop Hoadly. That said, all Law’s later works include a polemical 
dimension, as indicated by dialogue characters such as the Deist Humanus 
and the scholarly but spiritually obtuse Academicus. When he entered the 
row provoked by Bishop Hoadly’s “plain account” of the Lord’s Supper, 
which had appeared anonymously in 1735, Law defended a sacramental 
theology of Holy Communion from a position suggested by his recent grap-
pling with Boehme. Since his use of Boehme here is quite modest compared 
with later works, the  Demonstration indicates the original inspiration for 
Law’s use of the “Teutonic Philosopher.” 
 According to Hoadly’s eucharistic theology, the relationship of Christians 
to Christ, in connection with the Lord’s Supper, is external, historical, and 
mediated by a clear understanding as to what is involved. Christians, there-
fore, must participate in the communion with a correct grasp of its meaning 
and recognize that it is not a way to receive the benefi ts of Christ’s death 
but rather an act of remembrance whereby communicants are to gird up 
their loins for the “actual Amendment and Reformation” of their lives, that 
being the truly necessary condition of enjoying any benefi ts from God. The 
supper is a “memorial,” and nothing but a memorial, therefore it cannot 
involve the presence of Christ. We remember, do we not, only someone who 
is absent? So important is this that Hoadly instructs us to tell ourselves, 
when we receive the elements, that Christ is not there. Should we momen-
tarily imagine him present in some particular way, we disobey him. Christ 
has taught us the moral conditions for salvation, and, in his death, given us 
the pledge that, assuming we have done our best, God will reward us when 
our eschatological due date pops up. That done, Christ absents himself to 
heaven, leaving us the  aide memoire of the Lord’s Supper. Rejecting this 
hyper-Zwinglian doctrine, Law draws on Boehme to provide a language 
for the present working of Christ—the formative energies of grace—within 
the believer. Boehme, therefore, funds Law’s account of interior change 
as a transforming of the Christian through the active presence of God in 
Christ, a continuous divine working of which moral improvement, Hoadly’s 
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“Amendment and Reformation” of life, is a fruit, not the cause and sub-
stance of grace. Taking up Boehme’s vocabulary, Law insists that Christ is 
a present and “real Principle of Life to us,” 5 and so His work can never be 
a past or “transient” act but “something that is always doing, and never 
will be done.” At each reception of the sacrament, at each approach and 
feeding in faith, we receive all of that vivifying principle “that we are then 
at that time capable of.” 6 Christian life, therefore, is a process of continual 
growth, an infusing of divine life that overcomes the turbulence of selfhood 
and issues in the “fruit of the Spirit.” However different the style and mode 
of argument from  A Serious Call , Law’s concern, in both his early and late 
works, is the spiritual renewal of the individual Christian. 
 Given his wide reading in pre-Reformation as well as early modern Cath-
olic and Protestant mysticism, Law might have found a vocabulary for in-
terior change without putting himself into the “perfect sweat” of reading 
Boehme. Law, however, wanted a doctrine of spiritual renewal in which the 
divine sources of that renewal were continuous with, and exemplifi ed at, an-
other level, the formative powers of God in nature. Law needed Boehme for 
theological work at the level of ontology. Specifi cally, Boehme enabled him 
to develop what he considered to be a thoroughgoing alternative system to 
the “mechanical philosophy.” Since the mechanical philosophy was synon-
ymous with Newtonianism, Law could hardly have barked at a more pres-
tigious target. He did, however, try to excuse Newton himself, claiming, if 
not exactly arguing, that Newton had “plowed with Boehme’s heifer,” and 
failure to appreciate this meant that Newton’s work suffered from hope-
lessly reductive misunderstanding. 7 In Law’s reading, the mechanical model 
of nature severed the Creator from creation and posited a dualism between 
nature and spirit that fostered the kind of resolution proposed by Hoadly: 
an essentially mechanistic reduction, which emptied any doctrine of believ-
ers’ participation in divine grace and fl attened the relationship between God 
and humanity to a species of moral contract. Law found in Boehme a doc-
trine of creation animated by divine activity, open to a continuous divine 
expression and fulfi llment, and unifi ed through the divine working. 
 Though Law’s later writings were never as popular as his “practical trea-
tises,” he achieved a considerable reputation as a “disciple” of Boehme. 
Shortly after his death, the English translations of Boehme were repub-
lished, trading on Law’s reputation by including, with prominent adver-
tisement, “Figures, illustrating [Boehme’s] Principles, left by the Reverend 
William Law, M. A.” 8 The “fi gures” were lifted from the work of the early 
Behmenist scholar Dionysius Andreas Freher (1649–1728), whom Law had 
certainly read but without being inspired to diagrammatize. John Byrom 
(1692–1763), diarist and inventor of a form of shorthand, lovingly versi-
fi ed sections of Law’s later books, including  Way to Divine Knowledge and 
 Spirit of Prayer , so as to extend his friend’s readership to those who “averse 
to res’ning may be taught by rimes.” 9 Much of the reaction, though, was 
hostile. Law’s readers liked being told that “the incomprehensible Trinity” 
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is “eternally breaking forth” in “Eternal Nature” even less than they liked 
exhortations to avoid the theater and knock off swearing. So, if Law had 
earlier been castigated for casting “a noxious and baleful shade o’er all the 
comforts of life,” now the Bishop of Oxford accused him of having “with-
out explanation, or proof, thrown together such a heap of monstrous enthu-
siastical absurdities, and impieties, unintelligible jargon, and raving dreams, 
as in my life I never saw before. I appeal to the world; let any man  in his 
wits read, and judge.” 10 Holding a very different theological position from 
the Latitudinarian Joseph Trapp, John Wesley also wrote a strong condem-
nation of Law’s dependence on Boehme, denouncing the heretical wayward-
ness of a man he had once regarded as a spiritual mentor. 11 
 There is some irony in all this, since, without referring to it in any way, 
Law abandons all the most obviously heterodox elements in Boehme’s the-
ology. Holding by the injunction to “put away all needless curiosity in Di-
vine matters,” Law is confi dent that he has brought Boehme’s teaching to 
the aid of “practical Christianity,” demonstrating, against “Deists, Arians, 
and Socinians,” the accordance of Nicene Trinitarian Christianity with the 
truth of “Nature” and the way of human redemption. Consequently, the 
most striking thing about Law’s Behemism is the absence of almost every-
thing that the Romantics and German Idealists were to admire in Boehme, 
most specifi cally his exposition of the “living God” in developmental, nar-
rative terms. We shall now look at that deed of radical excision a little more 
closely, after which we shall return to the apologetic side of Law’s writing 
before concluding with a brief discussion of his “orthodox” purpose. 
 I RECASTING BOEHME ’ S NARRATIVE 
 In Boehme’s narrative, God himself changes and develops, attaining his 
own nature as creative love and grace. This, therefore, is a “theogony”: 
there is a history of both becoming and overcoming in the divine being. 
In the “Unground,” Boehme tells us, the “unnatural, uncreaturely Deity,” 
“there is nothing more than a single will . . . ; and he wills in himself noth-
ing more than just to seize and fi nd himself, go out from himself, and with 
the outgoing bring himself into an intuition.” 12 Law, by contrast, follows 
the classical Christian tradition in which only created reality is capable 
of formation and, therefore, of being told as a story. Removing Boehme’s 
theogonic narrative is not as straightforward as “excision” may suggest, 
though. If he wished to achieve any theological and narrative coherence, 
Law could not simply ignore those beginnings within the Divine being and 
start with “Eternal Nature” and the creation of the angels, even though, 
superfi cially, that appears to be just what he does do. The appearance of 
naive bowdlerization contributed, at least in part, to Louis Bouyer’s famous 
judgment that Law revised Boehme into “a very British kind of mild dotti-
ness.” 13 Boehme’s narrative, however, proceeds from stage to stage through 
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anticipations and repetitions distinctive to each level. Also, though Boehme 
does make a clear distinction between God and the material creation, it is 
still the case that the temporal creation has a role in divine self-constitution. 
Recasting the narrative, therefore, so that change, becoming, and confl ict 
begin with creation demands considerable reworking both as to logic and 
the arguments deployed to justify the telling—and with respect to content. 
Before outlining Law’s reworking of Boehme’s narrative, we shall look at 
two examples: Law’s interpretation of God’s “wrath,” which mainly illus-
trates a new argumentative basis for a claim inspired by Boehme, and his 
description of “Eternal Nature,” in which there is a decisive change as to 
doctrinal content. 
 Cyril O’Regan has argued that, whilst Boehme is greatly indebted to the 
tradition of “negative theology,” especially by way of Eckhartian mysticism, 
his use of the “apophatic,” the language of negation, is subversive. 14 Led by 
God’s transcendence of all naming, negative theology privileges unknowing 
over knowing and speechlessness over speech. God is “beyond all being 
and knowledge”; the mysteries of “God’s Word lie simple, absolute, and 
unchangeable in the brilliant darkness of a hidden silence.” 15 The being of 
God, though, precisely as beyond all naming, is an inexhaustible plenitude, 
the perfect fullness named “apophatically” by such negative terms as “un-
knowable,” “beyond being,” “immaterial,” “nameless,” “infi nite,” and so 
on. The language of “kenosis” or self-emptying, as applied to the incarna-
tion, for instance, derives its force from the originating perfection of God 
(cf. Philippians 2:6–11). Boehme, however, reverses this association of the 
apophatic with fullness. Thus, the divine “Unground,” the God “beyond” 
and “behind” the God who fi nds himself as light and love, and who creates, 
is “natureless, passionless, creatureless . . . as it were an eternal nothing.” 16 
This reality beyond being, however, is not the divine plenitude but, as yet, 
only the potential for self-consciousness: the potential for God’s subjectiv-
ity, both as internally self-related and as related “externally” to creatures. 17 
The quiescence of the Unground, therefore, is disturbed and set in develop-
mental motion by the agency of the “unfathomable will,” which, in itself, 
undergoes becoming and change in its realization as the will of the creative 
and communicative God. 
 Abandoning the theogonic narrative, Law reasserts the plentitude and, 
with it, the incomprehensibility of God. More than anything, God is to be 
enjoyed as: 
 an Infi nity of mere Love, an unbeginning, never-ceasing, and forever 
overfl owing Ocean of Meekness, Sweetness, Delight, Blessing, Good-
ness, Patience, and Mercy, and all this as so many blessed Streams 
breaking out of the Abyss of universal Love, Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost, a Triune Infi nity of Love and Goodness, for ever and ever giving 
forth nothing but the same Gifts of Light and Love, of Blessing and Joy, 
whether before or after the Fall, either of Angels or Men. 18 
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 That “Infi nity of mere Love,” Law tells us, means that God is “absolutely 
free” of wrath, which is “as inconsistent with and as impossible to have 
any existence in the Deity, as lumps of ice, or the hardness of intolerable 
frosts.” 19 Law can hardly just abandon such a prominent biblical symbol as 
“divine wrath,” however, so he projects it outwards, into the creation, inso-
far as the creation resists God’s love. Turning from God is self-destruction, 
and that self-destruction is experienced as “wrath,” as nature putting it-
self to the rack. All biblical talk of wrath leads to “two infallible truths”: 
that wrath “worketh nowhere but in the wrathful, disordered elements and 
properties of fallen nature,” and that God uses even this self-torment for 
the purposes of love. 20 Here, Law follows a similar move by Boehme. God 
“dwells in the abyss of the godless soul; but He is not recognizable to her in 
any other way than as a wrath.” 21 Wrath itself, though, does “not penetrate 
the heart of God; but His benevolent love issues from His heart, penetrating 
into the most external generation of wrath, and extinguishing the latter.” 22 
In Boehme’s case, though, the unqualifi ed character of divine love is an out-
come, an overcoming. On the way to love and light, the “First Principle” is 
generated from the divine being, not directly from the “Unground” but from 
the fourfold structure of immanent Trinity together with Wisdom. Boehme 
identifi es the “First Principle” with desire, darkness, and wrath, and God 
the Father with the “fi re” that overcomes this dark chaos and mediates the 
Son, who is light, love, and life. Law abandons this—whilst maintaining 
the opposition between “love,” which is divine, and wrath, which does not 
belong to a fully divine life—he is forced to fi nd new argument for the op-
position. He does so, fi rst by appealing to God as an eternal plenitude and 
identifying as love the expression of that plenitude. God’s love, therefore, is 
his “eternal immutable Will to all Goodness.” 23 Wrath, on the other hand, 
can only be understood as a passion, “storms of rage and resentment” that 
are manifested in the will to do harm. This allows Law to make the re-
quired hermeneutical move that interprets biblical assertions of God’s wrath 
in terms of subjective—but more than merely subjective—experience and 
the internal contradictions of a fallen nature. Wrath is the “natural” out-
working of the unnatural; it is, so to speak, coded into creation. We should, 
therefore, still speak of  God’s wrath: 
 the Psalmist . . . saith of God, ‘He giveth forth his ice like morsels, and 
who is able to abide his frosts’. Now, Sir, if you know how to explain 
this scripture and can show how ice and frost can truly be ascribed to 
God, though absolutely impossible to have any existence in Him, then 
you have an easy and unerring key. 24 
 Law’s transformation of “Eternal Nature” may be described more briefl y 
since we have already referred to Boehme’s version by another name. Boehme 
associates “Eternal Nature” with the “First Principle.” Eternal Nature in-
troduces opposition into the divine itself, a “virulent realm of anti-divine 
activity.” 25 That said, Eternal Nature also teems with life, a boiling chaos of 
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potential essence and entity, and, as such, is necessary for the emergence of 
real essence and freedom. Eternal nature is formless, but it provokes further 
the “theogonic struggle [which] is to get form.” 26 Thus the “wrath of the 
Eternal Nature” is “mortifi ed” and “does as it were die to its self-good, 
and is taken into the  Only-Spirit .” “The Wrathfulness and painful source is 
the Root of Joy, and the Joy is the Root of the Enmity of the dark Wrath-
fulness; so that there is a  Contrarium , whereby the good is made manifest, 
and known that it is good.” 27 Love overcomes wrath and issues in eternal 
freedom, but “God’s love would not have been made manifest without the 
eternal nature, that is, because the fi re of love would not have been mani-
fested without the fi re of wrath.” 28 
 Excising the element of divine progress, Law transforms Boehme’s Eter-
nal Nature from a threatening chaos, which he relocates, as part of the 
consequence of angelic and human falls, to a community of blissful Pla-
tonic forms. Again, plenitude is recovered as primordial. “Eternal Nature” 
is “an Infi nity, or boundless opening of the properties, powers, wonders, 
and glories of the hidden Deity.” 29 God knows his own wisdom, his own 
goodness, his own beauty, and “Eternal Nature” is the “opening,” the in-
fi nite and eternal expression in which He knows it. In this exposition of the 
ideal forms of every creative possibility, God enjoys all the ways in which 
He might give  finite form to His wisdom, goodness, and beauty. “And this 
is not  once done , but ever doing . . . for ever and ever breaking forth and 
springing up in new Forms and Openings of the abyssal Deity, in the Powers 
of Nature.” 30 The elements of Boehme’s “three principles” persist—Law 
even acknowledges their dynamic connection—but their relationship of 
confl ict and struggle is reserved for the fallen world. In Eternal Nature, their 
harmony is without shadow of any overcoming. “Fire, Light, and Spirit” 
image the Trinity, as they do for Boehme, but they do so in their plenitude, 
not in terms of the movement of their becoming. Law’s Eternal Nature is not 
a chaos but form, and its forms are the “fi rst Workings of the  inconceivable 
God ” in which “the Trinity appears in an outward State of Glory in the 
Splendour of united Fire, Light, and Spirit, all kindled and distinguished, all 
united and beatifi ed by the  hidden Three .” 
 How, then, does Law develop his Behmenist inspirations into a soterio-
logical narrative, a narrative in which creation and salvation are intimately 
related, but one without Boehme’s stages of divine self-constitution? Law’s 
later meditations and dialogues repeat, expound, and expand on a story of 
two falls and a continuous work of redemption. The narrative begins with 
the creation of the angels and their angelic kingdoms. The latter is import-
ant. Law picks up Boehme’s connection between creation and imagination, 
a link that was to be very important in Romanticism. Both angels and, in 
their turn, human beings exist in worlds the forms of which proceeds from 
their creative, collective imagination. The resistance of “world” to imag-
ination, or its capacity to engender dark and poisonous imaginings, is a 
tragedy of fallenness. The angels, therefore, have their “angelic kingdoms” 
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in which “all the  Powers of Eternity, treasured up in their  glassy Sea , un-
folded themselves, and broke forth in ravishing Forms of Wonder and De-
light, merely in Obedience to [the angels’] Call.” 31 Imagination, however, 
is both glory and temptation; it is ready to turn sinister. So, the angels 
become enamored with this power and, considering it as their own, begin 
“to fancy that there was  some Infi nity of Power hidden in themselves.” 
With this “proud Imagination,” they strove to take “their Kingdom, with 
all its Glories, to themselves, by eternally abjuring all Meekness and Sub-
mission to God.” 32 They suffer a twofold self-contradiction, seizing that 
which they already possess as a gift, and seeking to hold that which exists 
only in a generous communication. Disaster follows; instead of “rising up 
above God (as they hoped) by breaking off from Him, there was no End 
of their eternal Sinking into new Depths of Slavery, under their own self- 
tormenting Natures.” 33 
 Those “angelic kingdoms” now implode into the chaos spoken of in 
Genesis 1:2. The angels are trapped in this ontological broil which is 
the outward form of their furious and desperate desire, the true formless 
form of “their own Nature,” as they had sought it, “without God.” 34 
That once heavenly environment falls to “a horrible Chaos of Fire and 
Wrath, Thickness and Darkness, a Height and Depth of the confused, 
divided, fi ghting Properties of Nature.” The counter-point of redemption, 
however, begins with God’s halting of this otherwise eternal implosion 
and use of these fi ery ruins of a heavenly realm as the material for a new 
creation. The darkness and harshness, the destructive force, is taken up 
and put to service in this second world. The demonic forces are thus 
held, bound within the order of what will be the environment for Adam. 
Adam’s condition recapitulates that of the angels, albeit in the particu-
lar material mode proper to him. Thus, the joyful imagination reappears 
again, this time as a force for sustaining peace, the world being “a mix-
ture of heaven and hell.” Adam is “an heavenly artist, that had power and 
skill to open the wonders of God in every power of outward nature.” 35 
His subsequent fall proceeds, at least in the version Law provides in  Way 
to Divine Knowledge , in analogy with the angels. Law follows Boehme, 
though, in adopting a more differentiated account of Adam’s ruin, ex-
panding upon Genesis 3. 
 Adam, Law tells us, is also captured by the workings of his own imagina-
tion, and he begins to love the creation rather than God, desiring to know 
this Paradise as his  own world, a world apart from God. Once again, the 
redemptive counter-point appears. In mercy, God splits this androgynous 
creature by creating Eve out of Adam himself. Since Adam has turned to-
ward the creaturely, God gives him a companion, a fellow-creature whom 
he may love wholeheartedly, and yet, in doing so, be referred constantly 
back to God through His image. A second and fi nal fall comes quickly 
upon the pair, however. Adam and Eve make the disobedient choice of the 
“knowledge of good and evil,” a choice that opens them to the darkness and 
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the misery of insatiable desire. The narrative has already shown, though, the 
principle of divine working, the dialectic of opposition and its overcoming 
that Law found in Boehme. Redemption begins at the same moment as the 
pair fall since God does not leave Adam and Eve in their ruin but implants 
in them an “inspoken Word,” “a seed of Christ,” an “ Immanuel or  God 
with them , [that] should be born in all their Posterity, and be their Power of 
becoming again such Sons of God.” 36 
 The “inspoken Word” makes God’s salvifi c action continuous with the 
time and space of creation. “Christ within” is always drawing the orien-
tation of human wills towards God, a persistent counterforce to the pre-
vailing and self-consuming curve of the heart towards itself. Law inherits 
the centrality of the “Will,” theologically, anthropologically, and also cos-
mologically, from Boehme. “The Will,” he insists, “whether in God or the 
creature, is the Ground and Seed of every Thing; is the generating working 
Power.” 37 The fallen will, however, as Law had learned also from Paul and 
Augustine, is set in self-referential patterns, distracted and discordant loves. 
Those loves are excited and reinforced by our environment, in which the 
violence of hatred and confl ict has broken out and shattered the peace of 
Eden. Not only this, our environment is imaginatively invested, as we render 
it “godless,” absent of hope, or “secular.” “Wherever, and in whatever,” 
Law warns, “the  working Will chooseth to  dwell and  delight , that becomes 
the Soul’s  Food , its  Condition , its  Body , its  Clothing , and  Habitation : For 
all these are the true and certain Effects and Powers of the working Will.” 
The “inspoken Word” strives against the working will of fallen humanity, 
without which such good as there is might have long since been smothered. 
What is needed, however, is a new beginning, which must be “truly only a 
Growth of Life, or magical Birth from the Powers of Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost, upon the working Will in the Soul.” 38 Law opposes the doctrines of 
Christ as the Word “inspoken” from the beginning, and of a necessary new 
birth for the will, to Hoadly’s elimination of grace as an interior work of 
God. Also, in response to the Deist fl attening of soteriology and creation 
into a universal “religion of nature,” Law mounts his own “universalist” 
coordination of nature and salvation, grounded in God’s continually active 
presence within nature and humanity, and having its culmination in the 
 Incarnate Word, the Christ without. 
 The importance of the incarnate, as opposed to the “inspoken” Word, 
was not obvious to some of Law’s sympathetic readers, among whom were 
Quakers and others infl uenced by Boehme. Law, however, is very defi nite 
on the subject: 
 Let no one here think to charge me with Disregard to the Holy Jesus, 
who was born of the  Virgin Mary , or with setting up an  inward Saviour 
in Opposition to the outward  Christ , whose History is recorded in the 
Gospel. . . . [I] will assert no inward Redemption but what wholly pro-
ceeds from, and is effected by that Life-giving Redeemer, who died on 
the Cross for our Redemption. 39 
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 On the other hand, Law rejects not only the historicizing reductionism of the 
extreme Latitudinarians, and the Socinian emphasis on Jesus as our teacher, 
but also the much more normative account of justifi cation as “imputed righ-
teousness,” based upon a forensic understanding of atonement. Boehme, 
whose criticism of Lutheran orthodoxy on the matter of “imputed,” rather 
than actual, righteousness, was furious, confi rmed Law in interpreting “jus-
tifi cation” as a “regeneration” that made the believer actually righteous, 
if not fi nally so. Christians, then, are not merely recipients of the imputed 
righteousness of Christ: Christ works within them a righteousness that is 
their own. If salvation is regeneration, and regeneration a new working of 
the will, Christ’s own righteousness must be the originating power of the 
believer’s own “devout and holy life.” Jesus thus possesses a twofold signifi -
cance. In his life and death, as the Incarnate Word, the “wrath and hell that 
sin had brought forth” was extinguished. By this overcoming within himself 
of the wrathful and destructive will, Christ “became a fountain of the fi rst 
heavenly life to the whole of mankind.” 40 Here, incarnate Christ and inspo-
ken Word become correlative, via Law’s other term for the Christ within, 
the metaphor “seed of Christ.” Law takes up the Pauline identifi cation of 
Christ as the “Second Adam,” who has become “a life-giving spirit” and, 
as such, a formative environment for the “seed of Christ” within human 
beings. “As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive,” as Christ 
works upon and within believers through the outwardness that is his bodily 
presence in Scripture, sacrament, and Church. 41 Crucially, for Law, there is 
nothing “arbitrary” or “unnatural” about this, arbitrariness and contradic-
tion with nature being accusations that Deists routinely leveled at Christi-
anity’s narrative of revelation and salvation. On the contrary, Law argues, 
the dynamic of desiring and adapting, fl ourishing, and growth enjoyed by 
creatures within their proper environments is found throughout nature and 
cannot possibly be opposed to spiritual renewal, which is simply the high-
est instance of it. Inward and Outward, universal seed and historical, and 
incarnate Christ are brought together in an analogy that holds throughout 
creation: 
 Inwardly Man has a  Seed of the Divine Life given into the Birth of his 
Soul. . . . Outwardly he has  Jesus Christ , who as a  Sun of Righteousness, 
is always casting forth his enlivening Beams on this  inward Seed , to 
kindle and call it forth to the Birth, doing that to this Seed of Heaven in 
Man, which the Sun in the Firmament is always doing to the vegetable 
Seeds in the Earth. 42 
 Christ is thus “naturally” the “quickener” of life in us. God does nothing 
except “in a  natural Way, or according to the Nature of Things.” It takes the 
poverty-stricken rationalism of a Deist to miss the point that God’s working 
“in a  natural way,” a way that, according to His nature and that of His 
creation, “must be  mysterious to Man, because it is doing something  more 
and  higher than his Senses or Reason ever saw done.” 43 
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 II BOEHME CONTRA DEISM 
 All is done “in a  natural way, or according to the Nature of Things.” Having 
explained Boehme’s doctrine of the “seven properties,” Law’s spokesman, 
Theophilus, reiterates his warning that these weighty teachings should not 
merely serve intellectual satisfactions. They are not for the building up of 
opinions about the world, a storehouse of knowledge to be held in the mind, 
possessed like the angels wanted to seize their heaven, and Adam his Eden. 
Instead, their sole purpose is “to compel you,  by every Truth of Nature , to 
turn to Christ . . . not as notionally apprehended, or historically known; 
but as experimentally found, living, speaking, and working, in your Soul.” 
This alone is the purpose of “all that  Jacob Behmen has written.” 44 Law’s 
claim for Boehme’s teaching is that it opens creation, so that we recognize 
in “every Truth of Nature” the single working of God. “For this is the Will 
and Working of Heaven; it has but one Will, and one Work; and that is, 
to change all the Wrath, Evil, and Disorder of Nature, into a Kingdom of 
God.” 45 Believers are those who allow this Will to be born in them, for the 
regeneration of the human will and the peaceful ordering of Nature’s forces 
now contending within them. Put differently, Law read Boehme as offering 
an account of nature and grace that is neither dualistic nor monist, one 
that reads all creation as the expressive and formative fi eld of divine Spirit 
without compromising the distinction between Creator and creature. 46 The 
narrative that we have outlined, therefore, unifi es soteriology and the doc-
trine of creation; it is an ontologically freighted narrative that discloses the 
“one Work” that operates diversely, but to a single end, at all times and at 
all levels of created existence. 
 Arguing that Christianity is “according to Nature” is the marker of Law’s 
continuing apologetic concern. His Behmenist writings contend, as had his 
practical treatises, for an “authentic Christianity,” in an age Law judged 
as astray in Christian practice and lacking an understanding that revealed 
the necessity of that practice—its ground in our humanity and our world. 
“According to the Nature of Things,” then, is a polemically loaded phrase. 
It challenged Deism in general and, specifi cally, the notorious writing of 
Matthew Tindal, “ Christianity as old as the Creation: or the Gospel a Re-
publication of the Religion of Nature. ” 47 Law had already written against 
Tindal a few years before he got into that Behmenist sweat. His principle ar-
gument against the Deist anticipated the later books in that Law recognized 
the circular relationship between one’s understanding of “Nature” and the 
theological wisdom drawn from it. He tried to break that circle with the 
sharp observation that, if God acts according to the “Nature of Things,” 
then He most certainly acts according to His own nature, which is essen-
tially mysterious and beyond the coordinates of fi nite reason. Tindal’s ratio-
nalist reductionism was self-defeating. Law’s continuing critique of Deism, a 
theme in almost all his Behmenist books, might seem excessive. As a move-
ment, Deism was a minority affair, and the arguments of Tindal and others 
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struck too deeply at the orthodox assumptions of Anglican clergy. 48 Also, 
they were not particularly persuasive. Law, however, understood Deism as 
an extreme version of a more widespread theological decay. Like that much 
less orthodox reader of Boehme, William Blake, Deism stood for a spiritual 
condition. It is the distillation of worldly faith: an absent God derived from 
a mechanical nature who dispenses eschatological rewards for an outward 
obedience. 
 Not all Christian apologists who appealed to the book of Nature as an 
apologetic prolegomena to Christian practice were narrowly rationalist. In 
the same year that Law published the  Appeal , Edward Young began work 
on the 10,000 lines of his poem  Night Thoughts, on Life, Death, and Im-
mortality , later printed in nine books between 1742 and 1746. Much of the 
poem is apologetic. Young seeks to persuade the dissolute and free-thinking 
Lorenzo to attend to his soul and return to orthodox Christianity. Young 
appeals primarily, though, not to the story of Israel, Christ, and the Church, 
but to the sublimities of the night sky as a testament to God’s power. Young, 
who had the ability to yell in blank verse and never wrote a line not aspiring 
to the momentous, tries to overwhelm Lorenzo with theologically suggestive 
immensities: 
 An undevout astronomer is mad. 
 True, all things speak a GOD; 
 but, in the small, Men trace out Him; 
 in great, He seizes man; 
 Seizes, and elevates, and wraps, and fi lls 
 With new inquiries. 
 Young’s stargazers are rationally complacent; the night sky takes reason 
to new heights, quite beyond its quotidian self. Our souls, “wither’d, 
shrunk,/ Blighted by Earth’s unwholesome air,/ Will blossom here; spread 
all her faculties/ To these bright ardours.” 49 “How glorious then appears 
the mind of Man . . . great objects make/ Great minds enlarging as their 
views enlarge;/ Those still more godlike, as these more Divine.” 50 Young’s 
apologetic, though scarcely Deist, remains fundamentally, and for similar 
reasons, at odds with those “Truths of Nature” that Law presents “to com-
pel you to turn to Christ.” Young leaves intact the dualism between the 
books of “Nature” and “Revelation,” and even hints that the advantage 
lies with the former since the night sky is “Scripture authentic! Uncorrupt 
by man.” Most seriously from Law’s perspective, though, Young, like the 
Deists, perverts the structure of humanity’s belonging in nature and, there-
fore, the unity and form of God’s “one Work.” The poet ushers Lorenzo 
into Nature as a cosmic theater, a display of wonders for his admiration 
and intellectual enlargement. Emotional excitements follow, too, but they 
do not dissolve the structural distance between spectator and play. “O let 
me gaze!—Of gazing there’s no end. . . . An eye of awe and wonder let me 
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roll,/ And roll for ever; who can satiate sight?” 51 The soteriological meta-
phor here is not regeneration but elevation. Awe before “Nature’s system 
of divinity,” an expression that turns Law’s “working Nature” inside out, 
forces us, Young promises, to “think of more than man.” Such thinking, 
though, turns back to glorify the human: “boundless mind that affects a 
boundless space: That vast surveys, and the Sublime of things, / The soul 
assimilate, and make her great.” 52 From where Law stands, though, this is 
a grotesque self-complacency. 
 Nature, in Law’s reading of Boehme, is not theater but environment. 
Humanity fi nds itself within nature. There is no opposition of nature and 
spirit here and so no dividing as spectacle and spectator. After Adam, nature 
is the truncated nature of the fallen imagination, our desires and actions 
disordered from within by the civil strife that troubles the whole creation. 
In Christ, however, nature is opened to its origins in “Eternal Nature,” be-
coming the medium of grace, the one working of Christ within and without. 
Creation is thus returning to its purpose, as “the  Infi nity of Height and 
Depth” within which “boundless Love” forms expressions of divine glory. 
“All the striving and working Properties of Nature are only to give  Essence 
and  Substance , Life and Strength, to the  invisible hidden Spirit of Love , that 
it may come forth into outward Activity.” 53 The believer does not conclude 
to the workings of God from the evidence of her gazing upon the world. 
Rather, the believer suffers an inward recognition, the awakening of desire 
for that active, embracing context through which an inner transformation, 
the regeneration of the will, begins. Law’s critique of Deism applies also to 
apologetics of orthodox intent like Young’s  Night Thoughts , as well as to 
the more sober physico-theologies of design. All objectify nature, whether 
teeming with wonders or intricate in mechanical detail, as an evidential 
source that stands over against the human mind. Thus, humanity is divided 
from nature, nature from revelation and grace, and the spirit from partic-
ipation in God’s single and “universal Remedy of all Evil broken forth in 
Nature and Creature.” 54 Early in the following century, Coleridge would 
launch much the same attack on William Paley and the still lively trade in 
“evidences” for Christianity. 
 III BOEHME WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ORTHODOXY? 
 Joseph Trapp’s dismissal of Boehme as an “illiterate enthusiast,” from whom 
one could only expect “falsehood and frenzy,” stung Law to especially ful-
some praise of the “Teutonic Philosopher.” Jacob Boehme “may be placed 
among those who had received the highest Measures of Light, Wisdom, and 
Knowledge  from Above . He was no more a  human writer , spoke no more 
from  Opinion ,  Conjecture , or  Reason , in what he published to the world, 
than St.  John did, when he put his  Revelation into writing.” Unsurprisingly, 
Law is quick to qualify the comparison with the New Testament, and he 
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does so with a hermeneutic claim that places Boehme in relation to ortho-
dox Christianity. The shoemaker’s distinctive mission was to “open” up the 
“deepest Ground,” and reveal the innermost necessity of Christianity, as 
witnessed to in Scripture and taught by the Church. In no sense had Boehme 
anything “to alter, or add, either in the  Form , or Doctrine of Religion.” He 
neither innovated nor completed because he “had no new Truths of Religion 
to Propose to the World.” 55 
 If the distinction between “adding” and “opening” is one prong of 
Law’s defense of Boehme’s orthodox credentials, the other is his stress on 
the performative character of Boehme’s writing against any appearance 
of encouraging theological or philosophical speculation.  Academicus , the 
intellectual fall-guy in Law’s dialogues, exemplifi es this distinction. His ex-
citement at understanding something of Theophilus’s expositions is rou-
tinely slapped down as a desire for intellectual satisfaction and control. 
Boehme, Law argues, never sought to satisfy any speculative urge, nor to 
inform or build up knowledge. All his writings intend is to provoke the 
reader to open herself to “the Birth of . . . Light and Love.” Intellectual 
wrangling, or even the simple desire for explanation, misses the entire pur-
pose and character of these books: “to help anyone to work with his Brain 
for clear Notions, and rational Conceptions, of what he has written, is 
helping him to do and be that, which all his Works, from the beginning to 
the End, absolutely declare against, as contrary to the whole Nature and 
End of them.” 56 
 At one level, Law wants to head off in advance an assessment of Boehme 
from the perspective of theological controversy. He is also, though, returning 
to his critique of dualism—in this case, that of reason and desire or, in char-
acteristically eighteenth-century terms, rationality and enthusiasm. There is 
a more subtle point than his critics would allow behind Law’s sometimes 
vigorous and deliberately provocative dismissal of the productions of rea-
son. Theology seen as a body of truths that may be entertained, considered, 
and argued about, theology as the product of “reason,” is only possible be-
cause the desire to know has fallen apart from the desire for the good. Thus, 
in the internal war between desire and desire, of the divided will, knowing 
can insulate against loving, and intellectual stimulation can be mistaken for 
spiritual renewal. The truth of Boehme’s writings, according to Law, lies in 
that transformation that is the new birth of the will, but the working of that 
will reconciles knowing and willing as the believer now recognizes, working 
within her, the divine power active throughout nature. A merely intellectual 
apprehension of truth, a “notional Christianity,” is, therefore, a symptom of 
estrangement from God because the will to the good is severed from the will 
to truth, which results in, among other things, arguments over Boehme’s or-
thodoxy and accusations of frenzied enthusiasm. The “deep manifestations 
of the Grounds and Reasons” that Law fi nds in Boehme, effect, therefore, 
a transcending of the oppositional pairing of “rationality and enthusiasm,” 
and cannot be understood from within it. 
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 Law’s primary defense, then, against charges that Boehme had led him 
into heresy, charges made by Bishop Warburton and John Wesley among 
others, was to insist that Boehme was not an innovator of new doctrines, 
and that reading him for the purposes of doctrinal assessment was to mis-
read him at the most fundamental level. Law was also prepared, as we have 
seen, to dispute quite directly accusations of pantheism and of privileging 
the “Christ within” above the “Christ without.” 57 All that said, Law was 
also willing, under Boehme’s leading, to challenge some doctrinal elements 
considered normative in Anglicanism and creedal Protestantism. It is unfair, 
therefore, to dismiss him as a theological bowdlerizer. The most notorious 
instance in this regard is Law’s rejection of the almost universally accepted 
teaching that God created the world “out of nothing.” 
 Creation  ex nihilo denied that God created either an eternal and divine 
world out of his own “substance,” an essentially pantheist solution, or that 
he created out of some preexisting matter, a possibility that denied God as 
the sole ground of all being. The classical Christian position is that creation 
is an absolute gift. God did not have to create. He fi lled no lack in doing 
so, needed no help in doing so. Moreover, the creation has, thereby, its own 
integrity and relative independence: it is not illusion or mere appearance 
but real with all the reality and integrity needed to be the object of divine 
love. Nothing of this, however, would Law have rejected. Law’s version of 
“Eternal Nature” might have encouraged a verbal dispute with creation 
out of nothing, along the lines that creation is, in truth, not from nothing 
but from “Eternal Nature.” That, though, would be a rather weak motiva-
tion.  Ex nihilo in the classic sense did not—except in nominalist versions—
challenge the affi rmation that all the perfections of creation were contained 
beforehand in the divine Word. Claiming that creation manifests the Divine 
glory and eternal Wisdom does not contradict creation  ex nihilo . Boehme’s 
rejection of the doctrine was strongly motivated through his account of di-
vine self-constitution, which gives a theogonic background to “all qualities 
in nature are one in another as one  quality , in that manner as God is all, and 
as all things descend and come forth from him . . . the  heart or fountain of 
nature.” 58 Law abandons the intra-divine story, however, and so seems left 
with only weak grounds to abandon such a familiar Christian position on 
creation. Yet, he is hardly moderate in rejecting it: “it is a  Fiction , big with 
the grossest Absurdities.” 59 
 The force behind Law’s view takes us back to that dualism of nature 
and revelation, the book of creation and the text of Scripture. Law regards 
“from nothing” as implicitly denying that God in any way gives himself or 
manifests himself in creation: 
 [“Out of nothing”]  separates every thing from God, it leaves  no Rela-
tion between God and the Creature, nor any  Possibility for any  Power, 
Virtue, Quality , or  Perfection of God, to be in the Creature: for if it is 
created  out of nothing , it cannot have  something of God in it. 60 
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 If the world comes “from nothing,” Law reasons, then it refl ects nothing, 
manifests nothing beyond its own appearance. 
 If that which begins to be comes out of Nothing, it can only have the 
Nature of that out of which it comes; and therefore can have no more 
said about it, why it is this or that, than can be said of that Nothing, 
from whence it comes. 61 
 A creation “from nothing” can “bear no testimony of God.” In other 
words, if this creation has no precedent within the life of God, such as is 
given through “Eternal Nature,” then the character of the world, that it is 
this world rather than another, is entirely  arbitrary . That is the key term. 
In debates over the rationalist theology of the Deists, “natural” and “ar-
bitrary” were fundamental and opposing categories. The God who calls a 
particular people, sends his Son, and demands faith in Jesus’ saving work 
is an “arbitrary” God, whereas the God who demands only that we act ac-
cording to what we can reason out for ourselves is behaving “according to 
nature,” and his religion is “natural.” This reasoning was not limited to De-
ists; Hoadly deploys it in eliminating Christ’s presence from the Lord’s Sup-
per. Law read back into  creatio ex nihilo the mechanical philosophy that the 
Deists assumed, along with all Newtonians: that creation is a self-contained 
rational system of matter in motion. 62 He is determined to expose and un-
dermine the opposition natural/arbitrary as a rationalist rending of the Spir-
it’s “one working,” the fi ssure at the root of all “notional Christianity.” It 
is not, therefore, revelation that is arbitrary but the Deists’ distinction itself 
and, with it, their account of nature. Creation “out of nothing” must go 
since it favors this understanding of nature, which is arbitrary both in the 
sense of being a groundless fancy of the fallen imagination and also, in it-
self, a world fl attering to human reason, not a nature revelatory all the way 
down. The mechanical philosophy, Law argued, gives us only “ Facts and 
 Appearances ” and leaves humanity in a world that is, for all the appearance 
of intelligibility, an enigma that refers only back to itself. In such a creation, 
the soul must either be absorbed into the mechanism or be left without its 
true environment—a stranger among the cogs and wheels. 
 For many who have learned from Jacob Boehme, especially those of phil-
osophical or theosophical interests, Law’s interpretations of this “wonderful 
treasure” are underwhelming; he simply leaves out “all the best bits.” He 
also invites a graver conclusion. Comparing Law’s work with Freher’s stud-
ies of Boehme, Charles Muses concludes that Law simply did not understand 
either Boehme or his German expositor. 63 Some of Law’s appropriations 
give substance to this. Our restoration to Adamic glory, he claims, requires 
that Jesus not only take on our fallen fl esh but also have “veiled” under that 
fl esh “an holy humanity of heavenly fl esh and blood.” “Our common faith, 
therefore, obliges us to hold, that our Lord had the perfection of the fi rst 
Adam’s fl esh and blood united with, and veiled under that fallen nature, 
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which he took upon him from the blessed virgin Mary.” The genealogy 
of this probably goes back, via Boehme, to the sixteenth-century mystic 
Valentin Weigel (1533–1588), as well as to the “radical” reformer Caspar 
Schwenckfeld (1489–1561). 64 Law seems not to notice that this  undermines 
the integrity of Christ’s humanity and so threatens his recapitulatory doc-
trine of Christ’s work. Owing as much to Irenaeus as Boehme, that doctrine 
required a robust account of Jesus’s full humanity as that in which he re-
versed Adam’s disobedience and overcame the domination of “wrath and 
hell.” Stephen Hobhouse has noted, too, Law’s unsatisfactory adoption of 
the “seven properties,” which, though the fi rst three provide opportunity 
for arresting images of interior confl ict, remains truncated and poorly in-
tegrated. 65 Nevertheless, as his rebuffs to poor Academicus suggest, Law 
is not an exegete of Boehme, unlike the insightful and painstaking Freher. 
Law was inspired by Boehme and inspired to a theological and apologetic 
purpose of his own. To use a Coleridgean term, his reading of Boehme was 
“oceanic;” it spread widely, picking up, by and large with fair consistency, 
only what served its purpose. Law’s contribution and importance is more 
justly regarded if he is placed within an English tradition, critical of moder-
nity, and especially of its dualisms and its rationalist reductions of humanity 
and nature. This tradition provides a “radically conservative celebration 
of the mystical signifi cance of the cosmos, the human body, human sex-
uality and human language,” which, in its later representatives, has also 
strenuously opposed any reductive metaphysics generated out of the natural 
sciences. 66 Traherne, Burke, Coleridge, Keble, Ruskin, and Chesterton all 
belong in this line. William Law is one point, and not the only one, at which 
Boehme entered and informed that tradition, one otherwise so theologically 
at variance with his teaching. 
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 9  Boehme and German Romanticism 
 Kristine Hannak 
 Du wirst das letzte Reich 
verkünden,  
Was tausend Jahre soll bestehn;
 Wirst überschwenglich Wesen 
fi nden, 
 Und Jakob Böhmen wiedersehn. 1  
You will proclaim the last 
kingdom
Which will last a thousand years;
You will fi nd the abundance of 
being
And meet Jacob Boehme again.
 These lines, taken from the poem  An Tieck [ To Tieck ] (1800) by Novalis 
(Friedrich von Hardenberg), explicitly linked the Romantic hope for univer-
sal renewal with Jacob Boehme’s name. Indeed, Boehme’s writings played 
an important role in the literature of German Romanticism around 1800. 
It was Novalis’s friend Ludwig Tieck who had introduced Boehme’s works 
to the literary and philosophical circle of the young Romantics in Jena, 
thus preparing the ground for the texts’ revival and assigning them a key 
role in Romantic refl ections on new concepts of art, religion, and nature. 
 I  HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND PATHS OF TRANSMISSION 
OF BOEHME’S WORKS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 Although Boehme’s writings had been part of a Spiritualist and Pietist sub-
culture throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had, for 
over a century, been marginalized from the major philosophical and liter-
ary discourses as the outpourings of a “shoemaker-prophet.” Around 1800, 
however, a young generation of poets born in the 1770s, who lived at a time 
of profound social and economic change, rediscovered these texts. These 
poets and writers included, besides Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853) and Nova-
lis (1772–1801), the famous brothers Friedrich (1772–1829) and August 
Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845), their friends/wives Dorothea Veit (Schlegel) 
(1763–1839) and Caroline Böhmer (Schlegel, later Schelling) (1763–1809), 
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773–1798), the philosopher Friedrich 
Joseph Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854), and the painter Philipp Otto Runge 
(1777–1810). 
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 Around 1800, burgeoning industrialization accelerated the pace of life 
and shaped an understanding of nature and society that was increasingly 
technical, secular, and profane. 2 There was a concern that technical progress 
would deprive nature of its mystique and human experience of a deeper 
meaning beyond the constraints of economic necessities. The French Revo-
lution, which had inspired high hopes for personal and political freedom in 
the early 1790s, had turned increasingly violent from 1792 onwards. The 
German states were quick to implement strict social and political measures 
to counter the spread of revolution and, where necessary, to restore the 
old order. 3 Yet despite relative political stability, the late eighteenth century 
saw profound philosophical and social challenges that were perceived as an 
increasing disintegration of the early modern worldview. The traditional 
order of knowledge and art, the social hierarchies, and the entire Christian 
outlook were profoundly challenged by changes that unfolded during the 
eighteenth century, triggered and accompanied by philosophical criticism of 
the Enlightenment. 
 The young Romantics had grown up studying the philosophy of Kant, 
Fichte, Hemsterhuis, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Plato. 4 But while they were in 
many respects children of the Enlightenment, these young intellectuals dis-
tanced themselves from previous generations when it came to demands for 
rationality and utilitarianism, based on a Protestantism that rejected inner 
visions or the idea of a divine spark in the human soul. The sacralization 
of art and the fascination with the world of Catholicism and the Middle 
Ages, as depicted in Wackenroder’s and Tieck’s  Herzensergießungen eines 
kunstliebenden Klosterbruders [ Confessions of the Heart by an art-loving 
Friar ] (1797) or in Novalis’s  Die Christenheit oder Europa [ Christianity or 
Europe ] (1799), refl ect the search for a more emotional, intuitive approach 
to reality that might surpass the faculty of reason. In the intellectual circles 
of early Romanticism, the world of art became the idealized contrast to the 
world of rationality. Today’s theories about the autonomy of art, indepen-
dent from all demands of utility and from any kind of rules, can be seen as 
an outgrowth of this confl ict in the Romantic era. 
 To these thinkers and artists, however, the world of art not only offered 
an alternative realm where individuals might fi nd new wholeness and deeper 
meaning, but also promised to be a medium that might lead to a spiritual 
 renewal of society generally. In this respect, the Romantics’ hopes matched 
the aspirations of some of Boehme’s more notable readers during the fi rst 
phase of his reception. After the hopes of the French Revolution were shat-
tered in the German territories, the Romantics believed—just as Friedrich 
Schiller did—that a transformation of people’s consciousness would have 
to precede real political and social change. This historical context helps ex-
plain the Romantics’ belief in the power of art and also their rediscovery 
of Boehme’s works. Just as the seventeenth-century mystic had challenged 
church doctrines and had tried to inspire a theological completion of the 
Reformation, so too did the Romantic artists consider the philosophical 
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rationalism of the Enlightenment as the fi rst and still-to-be-overcome step 
of an emergent new era. And just as Boehme had predicted the dawn of a 
Golden Age, which he had called the time of lilies, so too did the Romantics 
long for the dawn of a Golden Age, one brought about by art. 
 While Boehme’s works had not been forgotten during the eighteenth 
century, they were certainly not included in dominant discourses. Lead-
ing Enlightenment thinkers such as Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–
1766) had considered Boehme and his readers to be part of a culture of 
 “superstition,” one that they hoped their generation would overcome. 5 Yet 
Boehme’s texts circulated in a strong subculture of Hermetic, mystic, and 
Paracelsian thought, kept alive largely by Pietist readers. 6 In fact, the novel 
 Theobald oder die Schwärmer [ Theobald, or: The Enthusiasts ] (1784) by 
Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling (1740–1817), a leading voice of the Pietist 
Awakening Movement, outlines the traditions of late eighteenth-century 
“enthusiasm” from a contemporary perspective and highlights three major 
sources: Jacob Boehme; the English Behmenists John Pordage (1607–1681) 
and Jane Lead (1624–1704); and the French-Flemish mystics Antoinette 
Bourignon (1616–1680), Madame Guyon (1648–1717), and Pierre Poiret 
(1646–1719). Jung-Stilling also mentions a variety of Pietist authors in-
fl uenced by these sources, such as the couple Johann Wilhelm Petersen 
(1649–1727) and Johanna Eleonora Petersen (1644–1724), Johann Con-
rad Dippel (1673–1734), and Ernst Christoph Hochmann von Hochenau 
(1760–1721). 7 
 In the second half of the eighteenth century, Friedrich Christoph Oet-
inger (1702–1782) acted as Pietist mediator between Boehme’s writings 
and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s philosophy. Oetinger read 
Boehme as an alternative to the rationalistic philosophy of Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz (1646–1716), Christian Wolff (1679–1754), and to the occa-
sionalism of Nicolas de Malebranche (1638–1715). Inspired by Boehme’s 
concept of a non-dualistic relationship between matter and spirit,  Oetinger 
developed the idea of bodily forms as the “end” and completion of God’s 
creative paths, thus preparing the ground for Schelling’s philosophy of 
nature, which is again set against the rationalistic transcendentalism of 
Immanuel Kant. 8 
 Thus, through the conduit of Pietism, leading philosophers and poets 
drew on an undercurrent of theosophical and Hermetic writings, although 
they often distanced themselves publicly from authors such as Boehme. The 
most famous example is certainly Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832). 
The young Goethe came into contact with Hermetic undercurrents in Pietist 
circles while convalescing in Frankfurt in 1768–69. Johann Friedrich Metz 
(1720–1782), an alchemist doctor, and Susanna Katharina von Klettenberg 
(1723–1774), a member of the pietistic Herrnhut sect, introduced him to 
alchemical and mystical literature. Furthermore, Goethe’s account of his 
reading list in  Dichtung und Wahrheit reveals that he read Paracelsus and 
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Basilius Valentinus as well as Gottfried Arnold’s  Unpartheiische Kirchen- 
und Ketzerhistorie [ Impartial History of Heretics ] (1699–1700). 9 When, in 
 Dichtung und Wahrheit , Goethe explains his so-called private religion by 
referring to the myth of Lucifer, he stresses the Hermetic idea of universal 
contraction and expansion, which resembles Boehme’s doctrine of the light 
and dark principle in all things. 10 
 Yet, despite a certain mediated infl uence, Boehme’s writings had no 
major impact on the leading discourses of the late Enlightenment. To the 
contrary: the term “Boehmenist” could even be used by late Enlightenment 
authors such as the literary critic Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811) to make 
fun of opponents—“Boehme” had become a synonym for someone who 
wrote in a bizarre and incomprehensible style. In Nicolai’s case in particular, 
this epithet was directed against the  Athenäum, the leading journal of the 
Romantics, and its editor, Friedrich Schlegel. 11 
 II  BOEHME AND THE POETIC IMAGINATION 
IN ROMANTIC POETICS AND LITERATURE 
 It was Ludwig Tieck, author of the novels  Geschichte des Herrn William 
Lovell [ The History of Mr. William Lovell ] (1795–96) and  Franz Sternbalds 
Wanderungen [ The Wanderings of Franz Sternbald ] (1798), who bought 
an edition of Boehme’s  Aurora in 1797. Tieck became a passionate reader 
of Boehme from 1799, introducing Boehme’s writings to his friend Nova-
lis and thus to the circle that became known as the early “Romantics” in 
Germany. 12 Inspired by Tieck, Novalis checked out nine volumes of the Am-
sterdam edition of Boehme’s works from the Dresden library in Novem-
ber 1800, 13 confessing that he had found a profound poetic inspiration in 
Boehme. In 1801, Tieck introduced Boehme’s writings to the painter Philipp 
Otto Runge, who used them to fl esh out what he called a “new art.” 14 In 
order to understand the fascination with Boehme among young poets and 
artists alike, it is helpful to reconstruct their refl ections on these disciplines 
together with their envisioned relationship to nature and religion. Let-
ters and theoretical treatises will illustrate the Romantics’ perspectives on 
Boehme. 
 “Read J. Boehme,” Tieck wrote to his sister Sophie in 1800, “there is 
abundance of life, there is the eternal spring that no longer blooms any-
where else. Boehme is the great authority on language. I convert everybody 
to him here, and I am his preacher.” 15 As a boy, Tieck had suffered from 
the sober and rational stance towards religion in his environment, and in 
Boehme he found what he longed for: a deep spirituality and a vivid poetic 
language. In a letter dated February 23 rd , 1800, Novalis shared his fi rst im-
pressions of Boehme with his friend Tieck, using metaphors similar to those 
that Tieck had chosen to describe his experience of Boehme: 
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 Now I am reading Jacob Boehme in context, and I begin to understand 
him as he has to be understood. You see perfectly in him the over-
whelming spring with its swelling, budding, creative forces mixing, to 
give birth to the world—a real chaos full of dark desires and wonder-
ful life—a true, expanding microcosmos. I am delighted to have got to 
know him through you. 16 
 Novalis, who was himself the son of a Pietist pastor, read Boehme while 
working on his novel  Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802), which was com-
posed as an homage to poetry. 17 He saw the seventeenth-century mystic as 
a poet and even planned to include him as a character in his novel, which 
remained a fragment, however, due to Novalis’s early death. 18 
 The most important transformation in the Romantic perception of 
Boehme is the understanding of Boehme as a poet. By perceiving Boehme 
no longer primarily as a shoemaker-prophet but rather as a poet, and in 
particular as a poet of nature, 19 Tieck and Novalis overcame the Enlight-
enment dismissal of Boehme as an obscure theosophist. In the winter of 
1799–1800, Tieck defended Boehme against the criticism of the philos-
opher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) by pointing out that Boehme 
combined philosophy and poetic vision, thus bridging the gap between ra-
tional analysis and imagination. 20 Friedrich Schlegel, the leading theorist 
of the early Romantics, argued along the same lines when he contextu-
alized Boehme in the age-old opposition between poetry and philosophy, 
as it was introduced by Plato and still upheld by Fichte. In his refl ections 
on Boehme in the  Philosophische Vorlesungen [ Lectures on Philosophy ] 
(1804–05), Schlegel even called Boehme’s work the greatest, deepest, and 
best philosophy of Idealism because it already merges the oldest and newest 
aspects of “true” philosophy, the speculative thoughts of Plato and Fichte, 
in its own words. 21 But in contrast to Plato’s and Fichte’s philosophical 
systems, Boehme’s theosophy is rich in allegories and offers profound inter-
pretations of Christian symbols and metaphors. Thus, Schlegel understood 
Boehme’s theosophy as a synthesis of philosophy and religion with strong 
affi nities to poetry: “In short, the philosophy of Jacob Böhme can best be 
characterized as follows: Its form is religious, its content philosophical and 
its spirit poetic.” 22 
 When the Romantics read Boehme as a poet, it is worth examining their 
concept of poetry with regard to its philosophical references in the history 
of ideas. In his  Gespräch über die Poesie [ Dialogue on Poetry ] (1800), 
Schlegel mentions Boehme together with Spinoza in the context of his re-
fl ections on art. Schlegel envisions art, in its truest sense, as a work of 
nature. Physics, Schlegel wrote, as long as it is not reduced to a technical 
science, is in its true nature Theosophy, a mystical science of the whole. 
True art, which Schlegel contrasts to the mere results of intellectual studies, 
therefore grows out of the mysteries of realism, as a revelation of the All 
in One in nature. 23 
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 Physics and metaphysics, nature and religion, are hereby closely linked 
and contrasted, not only with a mechanistic view of nature as well as the 
doctrines of the church, but also with traditional poetics. According to 
Schlegel, poetry may not be confi ned to a tradition or a set of rules, mas-
tered only by a  poeta doctus. Humans have ignored the fact that all of 
creation was God’s “poetry,” of which human beings, too, were not only a 
part, but also a “blossom.” Schlegel lamented the fact that the divine spark 
in the human soul had been almost suffocated by humanity’s self-made state 
of alienation in the present time. Dissociated from a numinous quality of 
reality and blind to the depth of their own being, humans have to be re-
minded that their true and deepest purpose in life was to be a conscious 
part of God’s cosmic poem—creation itself. 24 The motif of God expressing 
himself in all of creation harks back to the vision of the seventeenth-century 
mystic. In Schlegel’s view, it is essentially the poet’s task to make the beauty, 
abundance, and mystery of the spirit visible in the world. He quoted the 
popular motif of the dualism between the (dead) letter and the (living) spirit 
(2 Corinthians 3:6) from early modern Spiritualism when he insists that the 
magical quality of true art escapes all calculating attempts to grasp, quan-
tify, or explain it. On the contrary, to the true poet, the sacred spirit of true 
art always transcends the mortal beauty in which it veils itself and points 
to the Infi nite. It thus turns all mortal beauty into a hieroglyph of the one 
eternal love in abundant and creative nature. 25 Schlegel’s concept of art was 
based on a vision of nature as the All in One, so that nature and the work 
of art refl ect each other as two “expressions” of the creative spirit. Schlegel 
discusses this particular vision of nature, which is the cornerstone of his 
concept of art, in reference to Spinoza. But he observed that Spinoza was 
just one representative of this philosophy. With more time, he would have 
also traced its origin to “the great Jacob Boehme.” 26 
 The new interest in Boehme’s texts around 1800 thus arose in the con-
text of a highly ambitious artistic program with spiritual and political im-
plications. Since their own times appeared to the Romantics to be utterly 
devoid of a numinous quality, Schlegel and Novalis developed a program 
of “romanticizing” and “poeticizing” the world through art. This meant 
nothing less than making the visible world transparent for the invisible one 
and linking the realm of the mystical to everyday life. In contrast to the great 
contemporary philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte conceived by schol-
ars, the Romantic poets attempted to overcome the chasm between a purely 
rational world of the mind and reality with its living and material forms. 
Thus, they stated that the task of true art was a “trivialization of the divine 
and an apotheosis of the ordinary”. 27 In his famous explanation of Ro-
mantic poetry as a “progressive universal poetry” ( Athenäums-Fragmente, 
1798), Friedrich Schlegel envisioned poetry as the medium through which 
to overcome the fragmentation in all the arts, thus even making life and so-
ciety “poetic.” 28 In his collection of fragments, Novalis even called the ideal 
state “poetic.” This “poetic” quality, however, which is to be revealed and 
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integrated in humans, nature, society and even the state, is a spiritual qual-
ity, one with the power to overcome the contemporary experience of living 
in a time of dissociation and fragmentation: “The spirit is always poetic,” 
Novalis wrote, “the poetic state is the true ideal state.” 29 
 In their search for a deeper dimension of being not beyond but rather 
within reality itself, the Romantics were fascinated by Hermetic, Neopla-
tonic, and Kabbalistic texts as well as by contemporary Mesmerism. These 
interests prepared the ground for their reading of Boehme. Novalis bor-
rowed the idea from Paracelsus that all creatures were fragments of the 
absolute that bridged the dualism between spirit and matter, God and cre-
ation. 30 In Novalis’s  Lehrlinge zu Sais [ Apprentices of Sais ] (1798–99)—
written before he had read Boehme—he already dwells on the mystery of 
nature “speaking” in sacred “signatures” to those who have the intuition 
and poetic understanding to grasp it. Novalis sketched a vision of a healed 
relationship between humans, nature, and the divine in his metaphor of 
the soon-to-be-restored Golden Age. 31 In the  Lehrlinge zu Sais, it is the 
artist who, after a long journey, fi nds the veiled statue in Sais, and Isis, the 
“mother of all things,” reveals herself to him in the shape of his own bride 
who embraces him lovingly. 32 In this image, Novalis blends divine and 
human love, emphasizing the sacredness of human love as well as the mys-
tery of nature. In contrast to contemporary rationalism, Novalis’s image 
of the mystery of nature does not exclude nature’s material forms. Nor is 
the absolute envisioned as a purely transcendent (male) God. In the artist’s 
vision, the material forms of nature are turned into symbols that not only 
represent, but also manifest, the living presence. Spirit and matter, God 
and nature, are not separate entities in this vision, neither are they mere 
objects of philosophical speculation. On the contrary, the material forms of 
nature reveal the living presence in the present moment to the artist’s eyes. 
The artist is neither a  poeta doctus nor a dreamer, but instead resembles a 
priest able to decipher the sacred language of nature. In this priest-like role, 
the artist acts in humanity’s service and is thus seen to perform a deeply 
meaningful task. 
 Although the idea of sacred semiotics may also be found in Jewish Mys-
ticism and Florentine Neoplatonism, it is linked to a concept of rebirth in 
Boehme’s writings that proved consonant with the Romantics’ interests. 
 According to the seventeenth-century mystic, his fi rst-hand experience of 
the divine mystery had enabled him to develop a deeper understanding of a 
number of things, including those that became central to the concepts of art 
and nature around 1800: a theory of imagination as a world-creating, God-
like power; the idea of the world as the body of God; the concept of rebirth 
as the discovery of the paradise within; and last but not least, the motif of 
androgyny in God and in the primordial Adam, who had lost his androgyny 
during his fall but had to restore it through rebirth. 
 First, Boehme’s account of his mystical experience seemed to prove the 
Romantic concept of a spiritual realm in this reality. Boehme had described 
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his own mystical experiences as a profound breakthrough that utterly tran-
scended his rational faculties, allowing him to see into the depth of infi nity 
within himself and in nature: 
 I knew and saw in my selfe all the three Worlds; Namely, the Divine, 
Angelicall, and Paradisicall [World] and then the darke World; being 
the originall of Nature to the Fire: And then thirdly, the eternall, and 
visible World, being a procreation, or extern birth; or as a substance 
expressed, or spoken forth, from both the internall, and spirituall 
Worlds; and I saw, and knew the whole Being [or working Essence] in 
the Evill, and in the Good; and the mutuall originall, and existence of 
each of them. 33 
 In this light my mind could see through everything and recognized 
God in all creatures, in the weeds and in the grass, and I saw who He 
was and how He was and what His will was. 34 
 In fact, the Romantic concepts of the artist and nature strongly resemble 
Boehme’s understanding of the spiritually-reborn individual and of a lan-
guage of nature. Additionally, Boehme’s account of his own transforming 
experience proved to be an inspiration to those who hoped to work on a 
spiritual and “poetic” renewal of their age. 
 In Boehme’s  De signatura rerum, this concept of an individual break-
through was linked to the notion of a language of nature. According to 
Boehme, the prerequisite for speaking the language of nature is nothing less 
than a rebirth, a substantial transformation of the individual. This transfor-
mation does not consist in positive knowledge that can be studied or taught. 
Only after an essential change in their entire being are humans granted the 
faculty to “see magically,” as Boehme puts it. 35 Boehme describes reading 
the book of nature in oral and musical metaphors. The signatures are mute 
to those who try to understand them through reason. The reborn individual, 
however, is able to “tune himself” to the divine spirit speaking the language 
of nature. Boehme even goes so far as to compare nature to a lute concert 
played by the spirit. 36 This is rooted in the Kabbalistic idea of the language 
of Adam, who in his primordial state was able to see into the heart of things 
and to name them according to their true nature—a faculty lost with the 
Fall. According to Boehme, the language of Adam was not lost forever but 
could be regained by the spiritually reborn individual who had become one 
with Christ, the second Adam. Only then could the reborn gain the magi-
cal (in)sight into the heart of things that would enable them to “read” na-
ture. In Boehme’s writings, the book of nature is more than just a popular 
 metaphor of the early modern era: for him, it becomes a simile, a mirror 
of the spirit world. 37 God’s motif for the creation was to know himself. 38 
Therefore, the entire creation becomes a revelation. Boehme talks about the 
world as the body of God: in order to know itself, the creative word has to 
become visible in creation. 39 
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 Parallel to the debate among Boehme’s contemporaries about the rela-
tionship between the letter and spirit of scripture, Boehme claimed that 
the letters of nature appear dead to those dissociated from the living spirit 
within them. Only through rebirth is man able to overcome his fallen state, 
enabling him not only to “decode” the spirit lying dormant in nature, but 
also to participate in God’s ever-creative word, the logos. Rebirth therefore 
enables man to perform the ultimate task of human existence in Christ’s suc-
cession: to help regain the paradise within. It is noteworthy that Boehme’s 
synonyms for the spiritually reborn individual are not only “the magus” as 
in Florentine Neoplatonism, 40 but also “the artist”: 
 The artist searches for paradise. If he fi nds it, he has found a great trea-
sure on earth. But a dead person does not awaken another dead one. 
The artist has to be alive to say to a mountain: ‘rise and throw yourself 
into the sea’ [Mark 11:23]. 41 
 Boehme’s account of the spiritually reborn individual bears not only traces 
of the Renaissance concept of the magus, who is able to decipher God’s 
language in nature, but also appears like the religious blueprint of the 
 Romantic concept of the artist as sketched out in Novalis’s most famous 
novel  Heinrich von Ofterdingen . 
 III NOVALIS’S  HEINRICH VON OFTERDINGEN (1802) 
 One of the classical texts of German Romanticism, Novalis’s  Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen (1802), now serves as a case study for how Boehme’s ideas 
were picked up, transformed, and incorporated into a novel that traces the 
unfolding of the poetic spirit in the artist. First, it is important to note that 
Novalis wrote this in reaction to another recently published “classic”: vol-
ume one of Goethe’s  Wilhelm Meister (1795–96), a text that still remains 
the template for a  Bildungsroman . 42 Novalis had been a great admirer and 
an avid reader of Goethe. Yet the above-quoted letter to Tieck from Febru-
ary 1800 reveals his utter disappointment with Goethe’s novel and relief at 
fi nding in Boehme what he believed lacked in Goethe. 
 In Goethe’s novel, the protagonist Wilhelm Meister experiences a series 
of events that foster his development as a character. He spends some time as 
an actor with a traveling troupe of artists, where he meets the girl Mignon 
and an old harp-player, both prototypical artist fi gures. In the end, however, 
the artists prove to be of little importance to him, and instead of pursuing 
an artist’s life, Wilhelm settles down and decides to limit his aspirations to 
the practical life of a medical doctor. Novalis labeled the pragmatic end of 
the book “artistic atheism,” seeing it not as a work of art, but of reason. 43 
He wrote to Tieck: 
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 I don’t understand how I could have been blind for such a long time. 
Reason is in it [Goethe’s novel] like a naive devil. The book is infi nitely 
strange—but you are quite happy when you are released from the fear-
ful embarrassment of the fourth part and have reached the end. What a 
serene merriment you fi nd by contrast in Boehme, and in this alone we 
live like a fi sh in water. 44 
 Novalis cites Boehme as a remedy to Goethe’s novel and thus contrasts 
Goethe’s pragmatic stance with issues he considered crucial: the necessity of 
a humane sense for the divine, the striving for the infi nite, and the indisput-
able and transforming value of art. 
 Novalis’s own novel,  Heinrich von Ofterdingen, is also the story of a 
young man fi nding his way in the world, but with an important difference: 
in Novalis’s novel, the protagonist Heinrich follows a distinctive calling to 
become a poet. The novel itself, which integrates elements from traditional 
narrative, allegories, fairy tales, and poems, is a celebration of the magical 
power of poetry. 45 The protagonist’s path begins with an intense dream of a 
blue fl ower. While his father mocks Heinrich’s belief in dreams as glimpses 
into a world beyond ordinary consciousness, Heinrich takes the prophetic 
quality of his vision seriously. In the course of the novel, his calling to be-
come a poet becomes clearer as do the magical, theosophical, and mystical 
implications of being a poet. Novalis thus compares the work of a poet to 
a secret art, linked to the inner realm of existence. 46 Unsurprisingly, Hein-
rich learns that, “in the old days,” nature was much more alive than in 
the present. Furthermore, the poet’s work was intimately linked to nature’s 
secret life. Thus, the poet was not only a poet, but also a priest, a prophet, 
and a healer. As an artist, he could tune himself to the hidden sympathies 
of living creatures and decipher the signatures in the language of nature. 
The artist could even work magic—transforming the world with his words 
and songs. 47 Just as in Boehme’s understanding of the language of Adam, 
the poetic language of the “old days” is conceived of as being able literally 
to “create” worlds by (be)speaking a cosmic mystery in melodies and con-
juring the depths of reality by the power of words. Since Heinrich’s path 
follows a series of trials to be mastered, obviously the poet must regain 
this state of being in harmony with nature. He must live through profound 
transformations of his whole being; just the kind of transformation Boehme 
envisioned for the reborn Christian. 
 An important encounter on Heinrich’s path is the poet Klingsohr. He is 
not only the father of the woman Heinrich falls in love with, but also the nar-
rator of a highly sophisticated fairy tale in the center of the fi rst part of the 
novel ( Das Klingsohrmärchen) . In the fairy tale, certain allegorical characters 
represent the faculties of the human mind. Among them are Eros, represent-
ing love; Fable, representing the “spirit” of poetry; the mother, represent-
ing the heart; the father, representing the inner sense; the priestess, Sophie, 
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representing divine wisdom; and a grim and scheming writer, representing 
the petrifying forces of reason that Novalis saw in the technical side of the 
Enlightenment. 48 After the mother falls victim to an intrigue and is burned 
at the stake, the young Fable collects her ashes and brings them to Sophie, 
who puts the ashes in a chalice on the altar and performs a ceremony. Fol-
lowing the ceremony, she asks everybody to drink the transformed liquid. 
After all have drunk from the chalice, they become aware of the mystical, 
but very real, presence of the mother within their own hearts. 49 
 It is helpful to compare this scene with Boehme’s account of Adam’s 
fall and redemption, which is simultaneously the story of androgyny lost 
and regained. In contrast to traditional interpretations of Genesis 1:1–3, 
Boehme describes the loss of Adam’s pristine, prelapsarian state in the met-
aphor of his lost union with the divine Sophia, which precedes the creation 
of Eve and the cosmic fall. The soul, however, is not bereft of comfort after 
the fall. 50 Boehme’s  Von wahrer Buße [ Of true Repentance ] contains a re-
markable dialogue between the soul and divine Sophia, which is staged as 
an inner dialogue between the soul and Sophia’s voice, who speaks from 
the soul’s own hidden depths. The divine Sophia reminds the soul that it 
was the soul who broke their union during the fall and now exists in two 
rather ambiguous realms: in the spiritual realm of the dark principle and in 
the material world. 51 She, in contrast, is still the loving bride awaiting her 
husband, although he is not able to perceive her presence during this earthly 
existence. She also keeps the longed-for “little pearl”—a metaphor for the 
kingdom of heaven (Matthew 13:46)—while the soul dwells in its earthly 
existence. She does so because the soul will not be able to touch the heav-
enly gift without spoiling it while it still lives under the dark principle’s do-
minion. But Sophia comforts the soul with remarkable and, in that context, 
heretical words: she certainly may not descend into his earthly existence 
since she is the “queen of heaven” and her kingdom is “not of this world.” 52 
But she dwells with the pearl in the hidden depths of the heart, and the 
more the soul gives its will to her, the more she will guide it, her beloved 
bridegroom, to overcome the postlapsarian state of being. In tender and 
loving words, she assures him that she will stay with and within him until 
the end of time and that she will let him drink the water of eternal life from 
her fountain. Together, they will fulfi ll the purpose of existence, namely to 
serve God in the temple, which is the soul itself. 53 This remarkable dialogue 
is based on the Spiritualists’ premise of heaven as a ubiquitous, secret realm 
within the visible world and therefore also within the depths of the soul as 
sketched out in Valentin Weigel’s works, which Boehme knew. 54 But while 
the Spiritualists tried to overcome the traditional separation between God 
and the world by referring to Jesus’s words of the kingdom within (Luke 
17:21), Boehme took this concept one step further by assigning the role of 
a divine presence in the hidden depths of the soul to the female voice of So-
phia, who encourages the soul to surrender to her in order to become aware 
of her loving guidance. 
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 Just as Boehme had claimed that once Adam had overcome his fallen, 
separated state, he would regain his lost virgin bride, the divine Sophia, 
so too do the protagonists in Novalis’s novel—among them Fable itself, 
the “spirit” of poetry—experience a new state of being that is associated 
with the motif of androgyny regained. Signifi cantly, the priestess Sophie 
performs the ceremony and causes the others to drink the water of life that 
makes them aware of the mystical presence of the mother within. The gift 
of alchemical transformation in death, rebirth, and spiritualization does not 
entirely overcome the fallen state of being just as Boehme had envisioned 
it in the myth of Adam and Sophia, but it does lie in a new wholeness of 
existence, which integrates the female quality in the soul. In Novalis’s novel, 
the priestess Sophie comments on the transformation: 
 The great secret is revealed to all and yet remains eternally unfath-
omable. The new world will be born of pain, and the ashes will be 
dissolved in tears to be transformed into the drink of eternal life. The 
heavenly mother lives in everyone of us to eternally give birth to each 
child. 55 
 Novalis’s striking image of “the heavenly mother” in his Romantic fairy 
tale has no parallels with traditional Christian dogma or the myths of an-
tiquity. It does, however, recall Boehme’s account of the “queen of heaven,” 
Sophia, whose divine presence reveals itself in the depth of each soul that 
awakens. 
 Shortly before the novel breaks off, Heinrich meets the hermit Sylvester 
who teaches him to listen to his conscience as an inner guiding voice. In En-
lightenment discourse, the motif of an inner, moral sense was linked to the 
writings of the Dutch philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis (1721–1790), and 
Novalis was well acquainted with this motif. 56 Yet the hermit’s choice of 
words in the novel shows that the notion of an inner sense was not simply 
taken from a contemporary philosophical discourse but rather resembles 
Boehme’s concept of the inner Christ: “conscience is the inborn mediator 
in every human being,” Sylvester teaches Heinrich, explicitly ascribing the 
role of Christ to conscience, “it represents God on earth. [. . .] The con-
science is the most inherent essence of the human being in his full glory. 
It is the primordial Adam.” 57 Anthropologically speaking, the parallel be-
tween conscience, a Christ-like inborn mediator, and the primordial Adam 
indicates the presence of a prelapsarian quality that has not been entirely 
lost with the fall. Moreover, Sylvester identifi es conscience, not the intellec-
tual faculties of reason, with the role of this “inborn mediator.” Heinrich 
has to learn to trust his inner, intuitive sense absolutely. In contrast to the 
faculties of reason, the inner sense has never lost its connection with the 
divine realm at a deeper level of reality. Sylvester’s words echo Boehme’s, 
who had envisioned the new Adam in his virgin state as lying hidden deep 
within the old Adam, so that he had to be “grown out” of the fallen state of 
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being. 58 Boehme had been very clear that the primordial Adam and Adam 
in the fallen state were not ontologically separate beings, but “that the 
new reborn individual, who lies hidden in the old one like gold in stone, is 
made of a heavenly tincture, of divine, celestial fl esh and blood; and that 
this fl esh’s spirit was no foreign spirit, but its own, born out of its own 
essence.” 59 
 Since in Boehme’s cosmology the fall and the loss of paradise were caused 
not by God’s curse but by a misdirection of Adam’s imagination, the pro-
cess of rebirth and of regaining paradise is also a matter of the right use of 
imagination’s creative power. 60 In Novalis’s novel, Sylvester’s anthropology 
draws not only a parallel between the voice of conscience—virtue—and the 
“primordial Adam” that evokes Boehme’s concept of the inner Christ lying 
deep within human existence, but it also explicitly links this concept to the 
essence of art itself: “So the true spirit of the fable is the spirit of virtue in 
a friendly disguise.” 61 For Novalis, art is Spirit, packaged in a “friendly” 
form. The Christ-like, primordial quality of virtue as the voice of conscience 
is thereby associated with the quality of poetic vision. Thus, the “true” spirit 
of the fable—as a work of imagination—is characterized by the transforma-
tive power Boehme had ascribed to the imagination as the faculty that not 
only had caused the fall, but could also help regain paradise. 
 Poetry and art are thereby associated with the sacred in a way that recalls 
Boehme’s anthropology and his concept of nature. The young poet Heinrich 
has to learn that the “true” spirit of his deepest self is simultaneously the 
true spirit of the cosmos. To the poet who has developed the sense to lis-
ten to it, this spirit transforms everything in nature into the so-called Holy 
Scriptures of sacred poetry, which the poet in turn may express through his 
art. In Sylvester’s words: 
 You will now understand that all of nature exists only through the spirit 
of virtue [. . .] It is the all-kindling, life-giving light within its earthly 
veil. [. . .] The innocence of your heart makes you a prophet. [. . .] Ev-
erything will become comprehensible to you; the world and its history 
transforms itself for you into the Holy Scriptures. 62 
 While Boehme still had to justify himself when he talked about rebirth and 
the sacred semiotics in nature, 63 Sylvester’s words refl ect the impact of this 
idea during the next century. According to Novalis’s novel, being a poet 
amounts to a divine call to act as prophet and therefore to work toward 
regaining the lost abundance for humanity in the face of an increasingly cold 
and technical world. The poet’s authority derives from his participation in 
nothing less than a work of redemption: “The higher voice of the cosmos 
speaks in the poet as well, and it calls with enchanting words in more beau-
tiful and better known worlds.” 64 
 The high hopes and daring speculations of the Romantic poets did not 
come to fulfi llment. Novalis died in 1801, aged 29, before he could even 
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fi nish his novel that would inspire the classical symbol of German Roman-
ticism: the blue fl ower that Heinrich saw in his dream. He did not live to 
see the conservative turn of Romanticism during the Restoration period 
after the Napoleonic wars, nor the accelerated industrialization in the 
nineteenth century. However, both his novel and poems are remembered 
not only as some of the “classical” texts of German Romanticism, but 
they also show the impact of Boehme’s writings around 1800. The same 
can be said about Friedrich Schlegel’s theoretical refl ections on art and 
nature or about Ludwig Tieck’s novels. The literature and theory of art 
of early Romanticism stand next to Schelling’s and Hegel’s contemporary 
philosophies of Idealism as substantial contributions to European intellec-
tual history, which are indebted to the writings of the seventeenth-century 
mystic. 
 IV CONCLUSION 
 Boehme’s texts mattered to this generation of young artists because they 
provided a blueprint for the hoped-for spiritual and “poetic” revolution 
that was thought to succeed where the French Revolution had failed. They 
provided a model to stress the sacredness of creation in the face of an ac-
celerating industrialization and increasing rationalization of all aspects of 
society. And they provided in many aspects important inspiration for the 
Romantic sacralization of art. In contrast to Immanuel Kant’s transcenden-
tal philosophy (the most prominent philosophy in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century), the Romantics’ ideas of art insisted on the necessity to 
strive for the infi nite. They also dismissed the rationalistic notion that rea-
son alone could count as the mind’s highest capacity. Drawing on—among 
other sources—Boehme’s concept of the primordial Adam, they stressed in-
tuition, moral feeling, and imagination as humanity’s divine heritage. The 
artist, who is connected with his inner voice, may be creative out of himself 
like God. The central role of the (poetic) imagination as a world-creating 
power in Romantic treatises echoes Boehme’s theosophy where not only 
God created the world by imagination, but Adam’s fall and redemption are 
also seen as the result of his wrong or right use of it. 
 Boehme’s texts also mattered to this generation because they helped to 
transfer the concept of speaking “truth”—a privilege still ascribed to the-
ology and philosophy and administered by clergy and academics—to the 
metaphorical language of poetry. The turn of the century saw the emer-
gence of the modern concept of autonomous art. In Romantic portraits 
of the artist, he performs his role not as a student of tradition, but as a 
student of nature and his own inner guidance. The artist’s path becomes a 
way of listening intimately to the inner nature of things and calling them 
forth in language, thus building a bridge between the visible world and 
the invisible one for his fellow human beings. Boehme’s vision of the unity 
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of God, nature, and humanity became an important means by which to 
counterbalance Cartesian dualism and its implied split between matter and 
spirit, nature and God, senses and ratio, body and mind. The Romantic 
program of “romanticizing” the soul and “poeticizing” the world would 
be unthinkable without the premise of a ubiquitous secret realm within 
this reality that Boehme had called “heaven,” the “paradise within” or 
the “inner Christ.” Just as Boehme had envisioned the transformation in 
rebirth as necessary to overcome the fallen state of man, so too did the 
Romantics suggest that humanity’s full potential was still to be realized. 
While Boehme had set his hopes on the transformative process of rebirth 
that would restore the reborn to his lost wholeness, unveil the spiritual 
qualities of nature, and complete the  Renovatio Christianismi begun in the 
Reformation, so did the Romantics set their hopes on the artist as a pioneer 
on the way to a spiritual renewal of society. Their metaphor of androgyny 
to describe this state of wholeness was indebted to Boehme’s interpretation 
of the creation myth as a story of androgyny lost and regained. In 1800, his 
texts still inspired a young generation to imagine the poet as the one who, 
in a time of rapid change, awakes to testify to the holy, to that which helps 
to make the soul whole. 
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 10  Boehme and the Early English 
Romantics 
Elisabeth Engell Jessen
 Amongst the early English Romantics, two writers in particular were 
 infl uenced by Boehme: William Blake (1757–1827) and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge (1772–1834). Along with William Wordsworth (1770–1850), 
these men are often listed together as avatars of the early Romantic move-
ment in English poetry. Although Wordsworth owned copies of Boehme and 
occasionally paraphrased him, it was Blake and Coleridge who displayed 
the deeper affi nity with his theosophy. 1 In this chapter, I examine fi rst how 
Blake’s reading of Boehme infl uenced his works, and conclude by contex-
tualizing Blake’s engagement with Boehme within English Romanticism at 
the turn of the eighteenth century, with particular reference to Coleridge’s 
response to Boehme. 2 
 I BLAKE AND BOEHME 
 We do not know when Blake fi rst read Boehme, and no edition of Boehme 
owned by him is known today. 3 Blake nowhere discusses Boehme criti-
cally. We have no annotated copy belonging to him, and there are only 
two  direct references to Boehme in all of Blake’s works and known  letters. 4 
A note made by the journalist and diarist Henry Crabb Robinson in 1825, 
two years before Blake’s death, indicates that Blake, like his contemporary 
Coleridge, knew the Law edition: Crabb Robinson here notes that Blake 
praised “the fi gures in Law’s transl.n as being very beautiful,” thought 
that “Mich:Angelo co d not have done better,” and called Boehme “a di-
vinely inspired man.” 5 This, however, is the only known contemporary 
source directly quoting Blake on Boehme. 6 We do not know exactly which 
of Boehme’s works Blake knew, although there are indications that he 
owned more than one edition: in a letter from 1864, Frederick Tatham 
(who inherited many of Blake’s books from Blake’s wife Catherine) notes 
that Blake owned “a large collection of works of the mystical writers, 
Jacob Behmen, Swedenborg, and others,” but no specifi c titles are men-
tioned. 7 Given the availability of Boehme’s works in English, it is not hard 
to imagine that Blake would have owned other Boehme editions than the 
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“huge quartos” of the Law edition 8 —perhaps some of the cheap, readily 
available collections of mystical or prophetic texts in which Boehme was 
often included. 9 
 What we can discern, however, is an original and imaginative appropria-
tion of Behmenist motifs in Blake’s texts and images, a reception of Boehme 
through creative engagement with his writings. It seems that Blake—like 
Coleridge, as we shall see—engaged with Boehme from early on. In one of 
the two direct references to Boehme in the Blake corpus, Blake mentions 
him in a letter to his friend, the artist John Flaxman (1755–1826). Flaxman 
was, as Blake himself had briefl y been, connected with the Swedenborgian 
New Jerusalem Church in London, and in a poem that is included in the let-
ter and intended to praise Flaxman, Blake lists some of his poetic-prophetic 
infl uences: 
 Milton lovd me in childhood & shewd me his face 
 Ezra came with Isaiah the Prophet, but Shakespeare in riper years gave me 
his hand 
 Paracelsus & Behmen appeard to me. 
 [. . .] 
 The American War began[.] 10 
 We note here that Blake mentions Boehme together with Paracelsus and that 
the two are placed in the company of the poets Milton and Shakespeare as 
well as the prophets Ezra and Isaiah (all of whom Blake admired) as sources 
of inspiration—early sources, that is, since he appears to have been familiar 
with them from before “The American War” began in 1775, when he was 
seventeen. 11 
 Further indications that Blake engaged with Boehme at an early age are 
found in the Behmenist complexion of Blake’s fi rst two illustrated books 
 All Religions are One and  There is No Natural Religion (both 1788). 12 In 
 All Religions are One —the title alone is quite a statement—Blake proposes 
that “As all men are alike (tho’ infi nitely various) So all Religions & as all 
similars have one source/ The true Man is the source he being the Poetic 
Genius” (E2). These lines may be understood as echoing the ecumenical, 
inclusive outlook of Boehme and the Behmenists. 13 But they have also been 
argued to refer to Boehme’s concept of  der rechte Mensch in the phrase 
“the true Man.” 14 Furthermore, there might be visual connections between 
the Behmenist tradition and  All Religions are One , in that this is where 
Blake—probably for the fi rst time—uses the visual trope of a centrally 
placed hovering bird with extended wings. 15 This bird is similar to the dove 
shown, for example, on the title page of Boehme’s  Three Principles of the 
Divine Essence in  Theosophia Revelata (1730) and later seems to become 
partly translated into one of the central fi gures in Blake’s visual language: 
namely the hovering fi gure with extended arms, which denotes  (divine) 
creativity. 16 
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 Blake’s early engagement with Boehme is also evident a few years 
later, when Blake produces his fi rst illuminated book,  The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell (1790–93). Here we fi nd the second of Blake’s two 
direct references to Boehme. Blake once again puts Boehme in distin-
guished company, mentioning him (as in the letter to Flaxman) together 
with Paracelsus and Shakespeare. As before, this occurs within a Swe-
denborgian context. Indeed, one of the central themes in  The Marriage is 
Blake’s critique of Swedenborg, whom Blake accuses of having degener-
ated from an original living religious  vision to a hardened and unimagi-
native religious  system . Blake’s critique comes immediately after his own 
period of involvement with the New Jerusalem Church in London and 
represents Blake’s break with Swedenborg. 17 “Any man of mechanical 
talents,” Blake writes, 
 may from the writings of Paracelsus or Jacob Behmen, produce ten 
thousand volumes of equal value with Swedenborg’s. and from those 
of Dante or Shakespear, an infi nite number. But when he has done this, 
let him not say that he knows better than his master, for he only holds 
a candle in sunshine. 
 ( The Marriage 22, E43) 
 Although the reference has been understood by some as a denigration of 
Boehme—placing him as a lesser poet than Dante and Shakespeare and 
claiming that any person of “mechanical talents” could produce works 
of “equal value” with him 18 —the point seems to be rather the opposite: 
namely, that even if a person of “mechanical talents” had produced these 
works, they would still only be of inferior value to the originals. As in the 
rest of  The Marriage , the joke is on Swedenborg. 19 
 II BEHMENIST PATTERNS IN BLAKE: THE PRESENT 
 Apart from these few direct references, however, where do we fi nd echoes 
of Boehme in Blake’s works, and how might Boehme have inspired Blake? 
One place to start would be to observe that the center of both Boehme’s 
writings, unpublished during his lifetime (except for  The Way to Christ ), 
and Blake’s home-printed illuminated books is  the present . This is the 
present of the reader, or Blake’s “Eternal Now” ( Annotations to Lavater 
407, E592), in which the reader appropriates the transforming message of 
the book, opens his or her “Center” ( The Four Zoas 98.11, E370) and is 
spiritually and intellectually changed. Even though the vision that Blake 
poses in his works is more loosely connected with what we might call 
traditional Christian thought than that presented by Boehme, more radi-
cally critical of institutional Christianity and less specifi c with regards to 
directing the reader spiritually and intellectually, the underlying premise 
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and theological anthropology in both Blake and Boehme is the same: the 
way of the human subject back to God proceeds via the continual seeking 
of God within, the opening of the divine senses, the annihilation of the 
selfhood, and the use of the divine imagination to navigate in a universe 
of moving, energy-creating opposites. Thus in both Blake’s and Boehme’s 
works, Paradise and the Last Judgment are always present and available: 
as Boehme writes, Paradise “is only withdrawn from our Sight and our 
Source; for if our Eyes were opened, we should see it” ( Aurora 10.98). 20 
Placed between these two available locations, the subject’s turning to the 
divine is based on a choice of direction that he or she must make contin-
ually. For, according to Blake, “whenever any Individual Rejects Error & 
Embraces Truth a Last Judgment passes upon that Individual” ( A Vi-
sion of The Last Judgment 84, E562). This choice of the believer—and 
reader—is also clearly staged in the treatises that appear in Boehme’s  Way 
to Christ. Here the reader is positioned “at this Hour and Instant . . . be-
fore the Face of the  holy Trinity ” and must “fi rmly know and believe” and 
“resolve that he will this very Hour turn the Eyes and Desire of his Soul 
towards God again, and with the poor,  lost , and  returning Son , come to 
the Father” ( Of True Repentance ). 21 It is in this undecided state, where 
the reading subject feels “a  Hunger , or  Desire to  repent , and yet feeleth 
no true  Sorrow in himself for his  Sins ” ( Of True Repentance ), 22 that the 
text has its place, urging the reader to come forward and walk the “nar-
row bridge” ( Aurora 19.22) 23 with the narrator and follow his (spiritual) 
example. And although Blake does not share Boehme’s focus on sin and re-
pentance, a thread runs through Blake’s works that asks the reader to turn 
from “Single vision & Newtons sleep” 24 to life in “the Imagination. that is 
God himself” ( Laocoön , E273); “England! awake! awake! awake!,” Blake 
urges in  Jerusalem (77, E233). 
 III THE OPENING CENTER 
 The trope of the opening of the center, which, as Kathleen Raine fi rst 
showed, Blake may well have inherited from Boehme, is central for both 
of them and represents the transforming event in the life of the reader that 
their respective works attempt to realize. 25 This opening is the moment and 
place in which eternity breaks through temporal and spatial boundaries and 
opens up an experience of divine being. The center is at the same time eter-
nal and present, visible even in the smallest part of created being, and when 
it is opened, the subject is likewise opened to perceiving eternity and the di-
vine as being present everywhere. As Blake puts it, “in your own Bosom you 
bear your Heaven/ And Earth, & all you behold, tho it appears Without it is 
Within” (  Jerusalem 71.17–18, E225). As with Paradise and the Last Judg-
ment, the opening of the center is an always-available event; or, to quote 
Bryan Aubrey, human life is always “pregnant with divinity” in Boehme’s 
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works. 26 This event is latent in the smallest part of being—as Blake writes on 
the sweet smell of fl owers, “none can tell how from so small a center comes 
such sweets/ Forgetting that within that Center Eternity expands” ( Milton 
31.47–48, E131). Similarly, Boehme writes that “If thou conceivest a small 
 minute Circle, as small as a Grain of Mustard-seed, yet the Heart of God 
is wholly and perfectly therein” ( Threefold Life of Man 6.71). 27 And Blake 
responds: 
 To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
 And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
 Hold Infi nity in the palm of your hand 
 And Eternity in an hour[.] 
 ( Auguries of Innocence 1–4, E490) 
 IV NATURE 
 Despite the sentiment expressed here, Blake—uncharacteristically for a 
 Romantic poet—is not generally inclined to pick up on the tendency in 
Boehme to see the divine as revealed in nature without qualifi cation; nature 
is not in itself inherently good or bad, but can appear to us differently ac-
cording to how we see it. 28 Whereas Boehme gladly represents nature as a 
means through which to understand the divine mysteries, Blake ultimately 
values (human) form over nature’s formlessness: “Where man is not nature 
is barren,” he posits in  The Marriage (10, E38). Although the divine is not 
absent from nature as such, it is not in nature per se that we meet, recog-
nize, and perceive the divine reality (just as it is not in rational or abstract 
thought, or “cloudy vapour,”  Descriptive Catalogue 37, E541). Instead, we 
perceive the divine in human form, imagination, outline, and “minute par-
ticulars”—as Blake writes in  Jerusalem , “General Forms have their vitality 
in Particulars: & every/ Particular is a Man; a Divine Member of the Divine 
Jesus” (91.29–30, E251). Thus: 
 the Sanctuary of Eden. is in the Camp: in the Outline, 
 In the Circumference: & every Minute Particular is Holy: 
 Embraces are Cominglings: from the Head even to the Feet; 
 And not a pompous High Priest entering by a Secret Place. 
 (69.41–44, E223) 
 In order to perceive the divine reality, we therefore need to expand our 
senses and see every minute particular in the world (be it in nature or 
culture) with the eyes of the imagination that give form to everything 
they see: “As a man is So he Sees. As the Eye is formed such are its Pow-
ers.” 29 Only by seeing with the “Imaginative Eye” ( A Vision of The Last 
Judgment 70, E554) are we able to understand the world, or being, in its 
divine form. 
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 V GOD, CHRIST, AND FORM 
 This philosophy of form and minute particulars also informs Blake’s views 
on God and Christ. Whilst he is often ambivalent towards God the Father 
as distant, authoritative, and judgmental, 30 Blake’s main positive focus, like 
Boehme’s, is on the fi gure of Christ, who comes to us as the “human form 
divine” ( Songs of Innocence , “The Divine Image” 11, E13). It is in Christ 
that we, according to Blake, experience being “mutual in love divine” (  Jeru-
salem 4.7, E146), entering into a close relation with Christ that is different 
from the potentially abstract and distant relation with God the Father. As 
Blake has Christ proclaim in the beginning of  Jerusalem : “I am not a God 
afar off, I am a brother and friend” (4.18, E146). Without the intervention 
of Christ, God remains unapproachable and potentially oppressive: “God 
out of Christ is a Consuming Fire” ( Epitome Hervey , E691), Blake notes, 
echoing both Hebrews 12:29 as well as Boehme’s God in the fi rst principle, 
who is also “a consuming fi re” ( Treatise of the Incarnation 1.40). 31 Christ’s 
incarnate form is not experienced and appropriated through reasoning 
(“Rational Truth is not the Truth of Christ but of Pilate,”  Annotations to 
Bacon 1, E621), but through affect and experience: 
 Think of a white cloud. as being holy you cannot love it but think of a 
holy man within the cloud love springs up in your thought. for to think 
of holiness distinct from man is impossible to the affections. Thought 
alone can make monsters, but the affections cannot[.] 
 ( Annotations to Swedenborg 11, E603) 
 Ultimately, nature is also enclosed in this grand divine form (an echo, per-
haps, of Freher’s three “Tables” in the third volume of the Law edition). To 
speak in Pauline terms, everything created is a member of the body of Christ 
(1 Corinthians 12:12–14). Blake’s “One Man” is the divine form that holds 
everything together—and outside it there is only formlessness and void (as 
in Genesis 1), which is similar to Boehme’s still formless  Ungrund . As “the 
Divine Family” articulates it in  Jerusalem : 
 Mutual in one anothers love and wrath all renewing 
 We live as One Man; for contracting our infi nite senses 
 We behold multitude; or expanding: we behold as one, 
 As One Man all the Universal Family; and that One Man 
 We call Jesus the Christ: and he in us, and we in him, 
 Live in perfect harmony in Eden the land of life, 
 Giving, receiving, and forgiving each others trespasses. 
 (34.16–22, E180) 
 The central components of Blake’s theology are all present here: his focus 
on mutual human-divine love, on brotherhood in Christ, and on the 
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forgiveness of sins above all. As Blake writes elsewhere, “The Gospel is For-
giveness of Sins & has No Moral Precepts” ( Annotations to Watson 108, 
E619), and as Boehme writes, “Christ himself is the Forgiveness of Sins” 
( Of the Election of Grace 13.37–38). 32 Thus, in Blake’s works (which, we 
must remember, are dialectical and demanding works of fi ction, not doc-
trinal tracts), we often note the absence of any moral implications of the 
divine-human relationship or any particular notion of sin in itself—apart 
from its forgiveness, which is central: “Mutual Forgiveness of each Vice/ 
Such are the Gates of Paradise” ( For The Sexes: The Gates of Paradise 1–2, 
E259). As Blake plays down the moral side of Christianity, he conversely 
emphasizes the antinomian, energetic, human, and revolutionary side of 
Christ. This is seen, for example, in  The Everlasting Gospel (ca. 1818), 
where he conjures up an image of a radical, anti-establishment Christ. 33 
“The Vision of Christ that thou dost see/ Is my Visions Greatest Enemy,” 
Blake writes, continuing: 
 Thine has a great hook nose like thine 
 Mine has a snub nose like to mine 
 Thine is the Friend of All Mankind 
 Mine speaks in parables to the Blind 
 Thine loves the same world that mine hates 
 Thy Heaven doors are my Hell Gates 
 [. . .] 
 [. . .] thou readst black where I read white[.] 
 ([e]1–14, E524) 
 Blake also experimented visually and textually with tropes connected with 
Jesus’s death and crucifi xion, which also occur in Boehme’s works, for ex-
ample in  The Way to Christ . In the fi rst two decades of the 1800s, Blake 
explored ways of representing Jesus’s wounded, open body, before shifting 
in around 1822 to portraying visions of the crucifi xion that focus on the 
glorifi ed (not wounded) body of Jesus. 34 This development, however, does 
not so much represent a change in Blake’s Christology as a continuing ex-
ploration of the body (or form) of Christ as a salvifi c space—a salvifi c space 
that we recognize also from Boehme, who in  Of True Repentance urges his 
reader to follow the narrator into the death of Jesus: “I sink myself down 
into the  Death of my  Redeemer Jesus Christ, and wait for thee, whose Word 
is Truth and Life.  Amen .” 35 
 VI SELFHOOD AND SELF-ANNIHILATION 
 This period of more intense preoccupation with the cross and death of Jesus 
seems connected with Blake’s increased use of the tropes of selfhood and 
self-annihilation, which he may very well have derived from Boehme. 36 In 
fact, despite having known Boehme’s work for a long time, it is not until the 
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two long, illuminated books  Milton and  Jerusalem (both initiated in 1804) 
that these concepts begin to play a key role. It is unclear why Blake did not 
explore them earlier, but it remains the case that the two spiritual portraits 
of the characters Milton and Albion provided a setting in which Blake could 
explore the concept of selfhood and its annihilation in all its complexity. 
Both of these illuminated books describe the journey of a divided protago-
nist towards restoration and unity—in  Milton , it is the journey of an indi-
vidual, the poet “Milton” as recast in Blake’s imagination; in  Jerusalem , it 
is the journey of a collective body personalized as “Albion.” In both works, 
Blake’s new emphasis on the death of Jesus, 37 the self, and self-annihilation 
underscores a possible Behmenist infl uence. This Behmenist infl uence is fur-
ther emphasized by the fact that  Milton in particular indicates that Blake 
probably took visual inspiration from Freher. 38 In the text of  Milton , the 
spiritual, intellectual, and emotional development that the character under-
goes leads him from acknowledging his inner division, to his experience of 
self-annihilation, and fi nally to restoration to a united existence. Just after 
Milton has realized the way he has to go, he lays out a spiritual route that 
will take him through a self-annihilation similar to that yearned for by the 
narrator in Boehme’s  Of True Repentance (“cast my whole  Self-hood down 
to the Ground in thy Death”): 39 
 I go to Eternal Death! 
 [. . .] 
 When will the Resurrection come; to deliver the sleeping body 
 From corruptibility: O when Lord Jesus wilt thou come? 
 Tarry no longer; for my soul lies at the gates of death. 
 I will arise and look forth for the morning of the grave. 
 I will go down to the sepulcher to see if morning breaks! 
 I will go down to self annihilation and eternal death, 
 Lest the Last Judgment come & fi nd me unannihilate 
 And I be siez’d & giv’n into the hands of my own Selfhood 
 The Lamb of God is seen thro’ mists & shadows, hov’ring 
 Over the sepulchers in clouds of Jehovah & winds of Elohim 
 A disk of blood, distant; & heav’ns & earth’s roll dark between 
 What do I here before the Judgment? 
 [. . .] 
 I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil One! 
 He is my Spectre! in my obedience to loose him from my Hells 
 To claim the Hells, my Furnaces, I go to Eternal Death. 
 ( Milton 14.14–32, E108) 
 This moment of self-annihilation or temporary destruction before an expe-
rience of restoration or rebirth recurs frequently in Blake, and in particular 
in those works that seem to refer most directly to a Behmenist universe, 
namely  The Marriage ,  Milton , and  Jerusalem (and to some extent,  The Four 
Zoas ). In these works, a series of transformations or conversions within 
each book, crafted as moments similar to the progress taking place through 
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Boehme’s fourth property, leads to a fi nal moment of transformation to-
wards the end. This often, like the fourth property, consists of an annihi-
lation in fi re 40 (both  The Marriage and  Jerusalem end with the protagonist 
throwing himself into fl ames or furnaces) followed by an individual and/or 
collective rebirth—in  Jerusalem even, unusually for Blake, a longer vision 
of life in the restored world. In  Jerusalem ’s restored reality, self-annihilation 
now becomes identifi ed with the crucial forgiveness of sins as the “covenant 
of Jehovah,” as everything is 
 rejoicing in Unity 
 In the Four Senses in the Outline the Circumference & Form, for ever 
 In Forgiveness of Sins which is Self Annihilation. it is the Covenant of 
Jehovah[.] 
 (  Jerusalem 98.21–23, E257) 
 These fi nal moments of transformation in Blake’s works, however, read not 
as ultimate conclusions to the narrative of each book, but as openings to-
wards a new existence or, indeed, another narrative (as evident, for exam-
ple, in the very last lines of  Milton ). 41 
 Milton’s restoration in Blake’s work consists of two main interconnected 
components: his annihilation of his selfhood and his restoration to unity 
with his female counterpart, Ololon. According to Blake, part of the prob-
lem with the historical fi gure of Milton was that he insisted on keeping 
 separate what ought not to be separated: man and woman, earthly and 
divine. 42 The transformation that Blake proposes in his works is thus more 
explicitly sensually grounded than in Boehme’s. 43 He develops Boehme’s 
concept of the separation of the sexes after the fall into a thought system 
in which the subject’s way to restoration is explicitly manifested in images 
focusing on the body, the relationship between genders, and the senses. Per-
haps this functions for Blake as a substitute for the positive and sense-based 
understanding of nature that Boehme shows to a larger degree—or perhaps 
it is as an echo of Blake’s familiarity with Moravian spirituality, in which 
the senses, physical experience, and joy played a central part. In either case, 
physical pleasure and engagement with the (naked) “human form divine,” 
as seen in both Blake’s texts and designs, are not morally suspicious ac-
tivities, but rather represent involvement with divine reality as it is man-
ifested in the minute particulars of the human body: “ourselves in whom 
God dwells” (  Jerusalem 38.13, E184). Joy and delight, in other words, are 
not sinful and should not be avoided: “every thing that lives is holy, life de-
lights in life” ( America a Prophecy 8.13, E54). Following on from this, self-
annihilation in Blake’s works does not consist in annihilating a sinful or 
morally corrupted self, but in annihilating the “spectre” as the rational 
power in the subject—a position similar to Boehme’s distrust of any hege-
mony of “blind reason, which sitteth in the dark, and seeketh God in the 
Darkness” ( Threefold Life of Man 3.32). 44 As Blake puts it in  Milton : 
6244-139-010-2pass-r02.indd   188 5/31/2013   10:33:16 AM
Boehme and the Early English Romantics 189
 The Negation is the Spectre; the Reasoning Power in Man 
 This is a false Body: an Incrustation over my Immortal 
 Spirit; a Selfhood, which must be put off & annihilated alway[.] 
 (40.34–36, E142) 
 The annihilation of the spectre in Blake’s works brings the human subject 
closer to communal life in Christ and further away from divided, isolated 
existence in selfhood. Furthermore, it must be experienced continually: “All 
Life consists of these Two Throwing off Error [. . .] continually & receiving 
Truth [. . .] Continually” ( A Vision of The Last Judgment 84, E562). 45 In 
other words, in Blake, as in Boehme, the turning towards God (conversion) 
is continual, and experienced, it seems, as an oscillating movement between 
poles. And, as in Boehme, the reader of Blake’s works is addressed and 
inserted into the very center, which can be opened, and in which the turn-
ing or transformation might happen: “There is a Moment in each Day that 
Satan cannot fi nd” ( Milton 35.42, E136). In these moments of continual 
turning towards God—who is both “within, & without” (  Jerusalem 12.15, 
E155)—life in the divine imagination, or Paradise, is realized: “our own 
Imaginations, those Worlds of Eternity in which we shall live for ever; in 
Jesus our Lord” ( Milton 1, Preface, E95). 46 
 There are many more specifi c points in Blake’s works where he might 
have been inspired by Boehme. Several have previously been pointed out. 
There is, for example, Blake’s devaluation of the importance of formal ed-
ucation; his insistence on the spiritual capacity of children; his use of fi re 
and light as markers of divinity; his exploration of monism and rejection of 
theological dualism; his insistence on his works as anti-elitist and accessible 
to any reader (a point which both Boehme and Blake stubbornly insist on, 
despite their convoluted style and complex narrative universes); a certain 
anticlerical or anti-establishment tendency; his concept of a fallen divine 
language which will one day be restored; his idea of the prelapsarian subject 
as androgynous, a state which is to be required again after the resurrection 
(as indeed illustrated by Milton’s journey towards unity with Ololon in  Mil-
ton ); his idea of different spheres of the universe relating energetically to 
each other as illustrated in the concept of necessary “opposites” or “con-
traries,” and so on. 
 But more important than these minute particulars is the sense that the 
actual focal point of both Blake’s and Boehme’s works is not the elaborate 
and complicated narrative systems that they describe. The representation of 
these systems or universes in texts and images (described in alchemical, reli-
gious, philosophic, and psychological terms) is not meant as an end in itself, 
to be fully understood in the intellectual sense only by the uttermost stretch-
ing of one’s rational power. Instead, they are intended as ways in which to 
stir the reader towards a more immediate spiritual or affective engagement 
with the divine existence they point towards. Thus, the works of both Blake 
and Boehme might seriously challenge their readers’ interpretative powers 
AuQ 1
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and need intellectually to apprehend a text—but more importantly, they 
both address the reader exactly at that moment of reading and engaging 
imaginatively with the text. In doing so, they attempt to insert the reader 
directly into that center in the fourth principle where transformation is pos-
sible and facilitate this transformation precisely through both their content 
and their demanding, but also curiously open, form. This is the moment 
where eternity breaks through, where the reader, through the act of reading, 
is opened up towards communal life in the divine body—and indeed, where 
the poet’s work is done: 
 For in this Period the Poets Work is Done: and all the Great 
 Events of Time start forth & are concievd in such a Period 
 Within a Moment: a Pulsation of the Artery. 
 ( Milton 29.1–3, E127) 
 VII COLERIDGE, BLAKE, AND BOEHME 
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge was one of the few illustrious contemporaries of 
Blake to have admired his work during his lifetime. In a letter dated Feb-
ruary 1818, Coleridge described his reading of  Songs of Innocence and of 
Experience , and concluded that Blake was “a man of genius”, or rather “a 
mystic,  emphatically .” He continued: 
 You perhaps smile at  my calling another poet, a  Mystic , but verily I am 
in the very mire of commonplace common-sense compared with Mr 
Blake, apo- or rather anacalyptic Poet, and Painter! 47 
 This comment hints at Coleridge’s slightly detached and complacent attitude 
towards Blake, but also at a kinship between them. They would later meet, 
by early 1826, introduced by a mutual friend, Charles Augustus Tulk, who 
was probably, fi ttingly, a Swedenborgian. 48 An article published in 1830, 
soon after Blake’s death, reported that “Blake and Coleridge, when in com-
pany, seemed like congenial beings of another sphere, breathing for a while 
on our earth; which may easily be perceived from the similarity of thought 
pervading their works.” 49 
 Boehme’s work was one of the places where the mystical interests of 
Blake and Coleridge converged. Coleridge engaged critically but sympa-
thetically with Boehme over a long period. He owned and annotated the 
Law edition of Boehme’s works, which Thomas De Quincey (1785–1859) 
had given him in 1808, 50 but he claimed to have read Boehme as early as 
his schooldays: in a letter to Ludwig Tieck from 1817, he mentions “Beh-
men’s Aurora, which I had  conjured over at School”. 51 Boehme’s infl uence 
on Coleridge can be detected in particular passages in his poetic works, 
such as the line “A light in sound, a sound-like power in light” from “The 
Eolian Harp,” which, it has been suggested, referred to Boehme’s  Aurora , 
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chapter 10. 52 But Boehme’s infl uence can also be detected in the more gen-
eral development of Coleridge’s thought. In particular, Boehme might have 
informed such crucial themes in Coleridge’s religious writings as his con-
cept of the will, his views on the Trinity, the positive value he placed on self-
annihilation and the imagination, and his ideas about dynamic relations 
being based on the energy arising from “opposites.” 53 What Coleridge per-
ceived as Boehme’s pantheism, on the other hand, remained a problem for 
him. Thus, in a marginal note to  Mysterium Magnum from 1819, Coleridge 
expressed his “great delight [. . .] that Behmen guided by the light of a sin-
cere love of truth, worked himself out of the Pantheism (God = Chaos) of 
his earlier writings: and seems in this Tract to have emerged into the full 
Day.” 54 As early as the following day, however, a disappointed Coleridge 
had to conclude that “as I read on, I [. . .] found that this fi rst Chapter is a 
deceptive Promise: that Behmen soon deviates into his original error [. . .] 
and places the polarities  in the Deity. [. . .] In short, Behmen remains, I fear 
and as far as I have hitherto read, a Cabiric Physiotheist.” 55 
 But beyond the particulars of Boehme’s “system,” of which Coleridge 
remained at least partly critical, he seems to have valued what he consid-
ered Boehme’s curious combination of visionary power and philosophical 
clarity, and being “a poor unlearned man.” 56 “What wonder then,” asks 
Coleridge, 
 if in some places the Mist condenses into a thick smoke with a few 
wandering rays darting across it [. . .] The true wonder is, that in so 
many places it thins away almost into a transparent Medium, and Jacob 
Behmen,  the Philosopher , surprizes us in proportion as Behmen, the 
Visionary, had astounded or perplexed us. 57 
 Likewise in a letter from 1810, Coleridge may well disparagingly comment 
on Boehme’s “ridiculous Analysis of the word, Mercurius, with the separate 
meanings of Mer, Cu, Ri, and Us” 58 and tell the recipient of the letter, Lady 
Beaumont, that he does “not think, you will derive any advantage from 
[Boehme’s] works—the worst and most suspicious circumstance in them is 
that they dwell so much in  shapes &  fancies & things which if true would 
delight the  curiosity. ” 59 But in the same letter, Coleridge calls Boehme “an 
extraordinary man” and notes that even though he thought Boehme to be 
“ignorant of Logic & not versed in the Laws of the Imagination, he ren-
dered many  Intuitions in his own mind, perhaps of very profound Truths, 
and, as it were,  translated them into such  Images and  bodily feelings as  by 
accident were co-present with his Intuitions.” 60 Despite Coleridge’s impres-
sion of Boehme’s lack of formal learning—or perhaps even because of it—he 
seems to have been struck by Boehme’s ability to propose a written vision 
that addressed the “head” as well as the “heart” of the reader (even though 
he found Boehme to have had “but a scanty store of Words,” so that he 
was “obliged to repeat the same word with various predicates where more 
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learned men would have established distinct Terms”). 61 Thus in the autobi-
ographical  Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge notes with  reference to 
Boehme, William Law, and the Quaker leader George Fox (1624–91) that 
 the writings of these Mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my 
mind from being imprisoned within any single dogmatic system. They 
contributed to keep alive the  heart in the  head ; gave me an indistinct, 
yet stirring and working presentment, that all the products of the mere 
 refl ective faculty partook of DEATH. 62 
 The two features of Boehme’s work that Coleridge notes above—his trans-
lation of “truths” into “images and bodily feelings” and his equal address-
ing of the “heart” and the “head” of the reader (a sometimes infuriating 
authorial choice when trying to understand Boehme’s works)—seem also to 
have been picked up by Blake some years earlier. Indeed, one could say that 
Blake (in a way which few other Boehme readers have done) reacts precisely 
to the pictorial quality in Boehme’s works. This pictorial quality, which is 
also refl ected in Dionysius Andreas Freher’s illustrations, 63 manifests itself 
in the way that Boehme’s concepts are given form in his writings; Sophia, 
for example, is not an abstract concept, but a woman, as is Blake’s fi gure 
 Jerusalem . 64 Blake, unlike Coleridge, refuses to resort to abstractions to in-
terpret Boehme. For Coleridge, there is always an intellectual and coherency 
test, the test of orthodoxy, which he must pass: his ignorance of logic and 
of “Laws of the Imagination” are his weakness rather than his strength. It is 
Blake’s instinctive understanding of Boehme’s three-dimensional world that, 
arguably, makes him the more faithful, and potentially the more radical, 
reader of the Teutonic philosopher. 
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1.  The author would like this to be Spectre, as in the quotation above - I 
imagine because it is a specifi c trope in Blake, and always rendered thus?
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 11  The Russian Boehme 
 Oliver Smith 
 The colossal infl uence of Jacob Boehme on Russian culture has been ac-
knowledged for some time. 1 While there are names that feature more reg-
ularly in the largely one-sided conversation in which Russian thinkers 
began to engage their Western peers and forebears from the end of the 
seventeenth century, the relative unanimity of adulation that characterizes 
Boehme’s reception is striking. Hegel and Schelling are by turns exalted 
and denounced in the fi ckle world of the Russian intellectual, yet Boehme 
can be ignored but almost never reviled. The exceptions to this rule in-
clude certain “offi cial” parties in state and church, although both spheres 
contained sympathizers. 2 His writings, as well as his life and personality, 
form one of the most consistent backdrops to the birth of the Russian 
literary tradition as well as Russian religious philosophy, from the early 
mason-mystics to consummate philosophers such as Vladimir Soloviev 
(1853–1900) and Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948) and from early Gothic 
novelists such as Vladimir Odoevsky (1803–69) to symbolist experiment-
ers like Fyodor Sologub (1863–1927). Many of these fi gures, unlike in the 
West where readers of the German mystic tended to belong to heterodox 
communities outside the mainstream churches, were Orthodox Christians 
who regularly attended the divine liturgy, a fact that lends a particular 
temper to the Russian reception of Boehme and which points toward a 
certain inner resonance between the cobbler-mystic and Orthodox liturgi-
cal culture. Indeed, Boehme’s texts often appear to perform a function not 
dissimilar to the ceremonial absorption of the individual believer within 
liturgical space, enfolding not only the mind and will of their Russian 
reader but also his very sensual being. In this context, Boehme’s writ-
ings not only take on properties of sacred utterances; 3 they themselves 
are treated as instruments of transformation which, in the right hands, 
can lead their reader to an experience of the authentically divine. For 
this reason, the account that follows necessarily involves recognizing the 
dynamic relationship between the text and its readers as well as simple 
source analysis. 
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 I 
 The beginning of Boehme’s infl uence in Russia dates to the 1670s, when 
there existed a Behmenist circle in Moscow under the leadership of 
Kondratii Norderman (d.1689), who appears to have translated some 
of Boehme’s writings into Russian and even sent a letter to Tsar Alexei 
Mikhailovich in 1669 replete with his own prognostications as to the fu-
ture of humanity. 4 This circle was for a short time invigorated by the ar-
rival of the prominent Behmenist Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651–89) who, 
convinced that “the light will arise from the East” and that there “a new 
kingdom and a new people shall be formed,” arrived in Moscow to preach 
his message of the “Fifth Monarchy” to co-regents Ivan and Peter. Kuhl-
mann and Nordermann were, after a desultory investigation, executed by 
burning, having been accused of the distribution of “certain prophetic 
books,” 5 which were duly incinerated alongside them. Although these 
books, besides Kuhlmann’s own works, may have included translations 
of Boehme, it was most likely the challenge to political authority that the 
group represented rather than any inherent distaste for German mysticism 
that motivated the authorities to act. 6 
 Indeed, the ability of highly positioned fi gures within the state appara-
tus to engage in esoteric activities with seeming impunity is illustrated by 
one James Daniel Bruce (1669–1735), an early scientist of Scottish descent 
and an infl uential statesman under Peter the Great. While it is diffi cult to 
separate truth from myth in the case of Bruce, whose name had already in 
his lifetime become synonymous with sorcery and the occult, it is known 
that his library, alongside numerous other esoteric writings, contained at 
least four German volumes of Boehme. 7 Given the paucity of evidence 
surrounding Bruce’s fi nal years spent on his beloved estate Glinki, as well 
as the insuffi ciency of his written legacy in forming an opinion as to his 
worldview, it is diffi cult to ascertain the extent of Boehme’s infl uence on 
him. Nevertheless, the connection between the writings of Boehme and the 
birth of Russian freemasonry, of which Bruce was a notable representative, 
seems to be borne out by developments in and around his estate from the 
mid-eighteenth century. Glinki was the fi rst stone estate in Russia (outside 
the imperial complexes of the tsars), and has been called the fi rst “nest of 
masonry” in Muscovy. It included a pavilion, which may have been used as 
a lodge, and masonic symbols proliferated in the architectural details of the 
house as well as in the sculptural ensembles that lined the grand pathways 
of its gardens. At the same time that Russia was busily absorbing centuries 
of Western religious, philosophical, and scientifi c thought—a process if not 
initiated then certainly given added urgency by Peter—its managed land-
scapes were undergoing a similar breakneck journey through the preceding 
decades of European horticulture. 
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 It seems fi tting, therefore, that the early reception of Boehme, who had 
in his teaching on the “signature of things” set out what was to become 
one of the foundational premises of later Russian religious thought—the 
contiguity of the visible and invisible worlds—should fi nd refl ection in 
the changing patterns of the Russian estate garden. Bruce’s Glinki stands 
at the transition point between a fondness for Dutch and French models, 
characterized by wide boulevards, trimmed hedges and statuary and, by 
the mid-1760s, a desire to mirror English horticultural methods with their 
unexpected, open vistas and intimate spaces. 8 It was necessary, writes one 
commentator, to “renounce the idea of seeing ‘a piece of heaven on earth,’ ” 
which the gardens of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had 
striven to demonstrate in Europe. Instead, one had to understand the gar-
den as a “place, where one can visibly perceive the entire signifi cance of the 
Divine creation in its totality.” 9 This meant doing away with the symmetry 
and self-contained lines of enlightened reason—the human mind placing its 
own, rational schema onto untamed nature—and instead becoming part 
of the “divine enthusiasm” that penetrates all things. Space was not to be 
enclosed within alleys or symmetrical fi gurations, but extended, giving the 
illusion of stretching into infi nity. The garden was thus to embody the living 
experience of the paradoxical indwelling of that which cannot be contained 
within any given thing. Here, the human being did not reveal the content 
of eternity through device but rather the Eternal Being; as Andrew Weeks 
explains, Boehme’s concept of the “signature” became “self-transparent 
through its works of self-revelation.” 10 Such a development, involving a 
withdrawal of the human from its external setting, can be understood as 
the refl ection in externality of what Rémi Brague, in relation to Bernard 
of Clairvaux, has called the “anthropology of humility,” 11 and whose pre-
eminent representative in Russian masonic circles at this time was Jacob 
Boehme. 12 
 Through their move away from the exertion of control over their envi-
ronment toward a model where, far from bringing the limitless within the 
limit, the fi nite human mind itself was opened up to the infi nite, Russians 
signaled their early departure from the Cartesian mindset with its preten-
sions to the absolute possession of reality. In the process, the garden ceased 
to be a product of human ingenuity geared toward embodied perfection 
and instead began to refl ect the stages of a journey undertaken by the soul. 
The philosopher and agronomist Andrei Bolotov (1738–1833), for exam-
ple, valued the garden precisely as such a journey into the unknown and was 
opposed to the imposition of strict geometrical form and symmetry since it 
“enables the stroller to grasp the plan of the whole garden at once, in an 
act of totalizing viewing,” something he considered inherently sinful for the 
humble Christian. 13 
 Nowhere was this Christian symbolism to be made more explicit than 
at the estate Savinskoe, belonging to the Lopukhin family (with whom 
Bruce was on close terms) and a short walk away from Bruce’s estate to 
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the north along the River Voria. Although, as with Glinki, nothing today 
survives of its park and gardens, we have several accounts of their compo-
sition. Here, a number of recent trends observed in Western Europe came 
together. First, like their Georgian counterparts, the gardens at Savinskoe 
refl ected a “specifi c iconographic program relating to the personal con-
cerns of [their] creator,” 14 wherein, as the poet Dolgorukov wrote after a 
visit to the estate, “every glance is a teaching/ Every step a hieroglyph.” 15 
Second, there was a need to see this “program” arise organically, from 
the creative work of the divine in nature, rather than through human en-
deavor. Third, the garden was to be constructed narratologically, as a jour-
ney that builds a consonance between inner experience and external form. 
Savinskoe, whose gardens fi rst began to take shape in the 1780s under 
the infl uence of Ivan Lopukhin, was in this way in intention similar to the 
rock garden Sanspareil near Bayreuth where, in the words of its creator 
Margravine Wilhelmine, “die Natur selbst war die Baumeisterin.” 16 Yet 
Savinskoe was different from Sanspareil in one crucial respect. Sanspareil 
was based on the adventures of Telemachus (son of Odysseus), especially 
as depicted in the French Quietist François Fénelon’s  Les Aventures de 
Télémaque , which the author had written as a moral tale on good ruler-
ship. The garden, therefore, like the novel, was highly didactic and was 
intended to convey the more exigent aspects of benevolent governance 
to its visitor. 17 Following the rarefi ed mores of the epoch, archetypes for 
these ideal qualities were sought in the ancients, and the statuary was over-
whelmingly focused on classical themes. 
 Savinskoe, as well as other masonic estates of the time, operated on a 
completely different level, and in this, it owes a debt to Boehme. Its sym-
bolism was not didactic but veiled, depending on the “individual perception 
of the onlooker, capable of discerning esoteric meaning and speculatively 
transforming the customary elements of Russian estate life into mysterious 
signs.” 18 Here, it was not the designer of the garden that controlled the vis-
itor’s experience, but nature itself that opened up to each viewer according 
to his or her capacities. A stroll around the garden thus amounted to a kind 
of “spiritual wandering,” 19 where the soul was enabled to read its inherent 
potentialities from the environment surrounding it. 
 The centerpiece of the park was Young’s Island (named after the English 
poet Edward Young, discussed in chapter 9), described by contemporaries 
as a “pantheon to pietism” and containing monuments and buildings ded-
icated to fi gures of signifi cance to the Russian masons. Although one could 
fi nd here monuments to Socrates and Diogenes, these were not the classically 
inspired busts and statues that littered other European estates of the time. 
Each fi gure was identifi ed with a particular object-symbol, which was in-
tended not to memorialize the persons themselves but rather the  path along 
which they called humanity to follow. One passed over the waters separat-
ing the body of the park from the island (symbolizing baptism as well as the 
path of unknowing), thence over a small bridge where one was immediately 
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met by a cross dedicated to Jacob Boehme. This monument was described in 
some detail by Alexander Koval’kov, a student of Lopukhin who may have 
assisted in the planning of the park. 20 
 The Cross [. . .] is the fi rst sight that one encounters upon crossing 
over to this blessed island. It is simple; but in its simplicity resides that 
 majesty which is foreign to even the most magnifi cent obelisks [. . .] 
 This Cross is dedicated to the great Theosopher Jacob Boehme, 
whose image is depicted in marble at its foot. Roses and violets, which 
grow around it, bring him their fragrance as tribute. 21 
 Two things stand out here as being of signifi cance. First, the monument 
to Boehme was the very fi rst encountered upon crossing the bridge onto 
Young’s Island after the path of unknowing. Second, unlike the other mon-
uments, which included obelisks and bas-reliefs (Fénelon and the Bavarian 
mystic Karl von Eckhartshausen were both commemorated in the form of 
urns), Boehme was immortalized not through classical motifs but through 
the cross of Christ. 22 These two facts speak of both Boehme’s preeminent 
position as well as the peculiarity of his Russian reception. Amongst all eso-
teric writers, it was he who was considered the most authentically Christian. 
As Nikolai Berdyaev, who himself praised the early Russian masons as the 
fi rst freethinkers on Russian soil, 23 would later write, Boehme “is the great-
est of the gnostics, but also the most Christian of them all.” 24 This was an 
opinion held throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not only by 
representatives of the non-churched Russian philosophical community, but 
also by prominent fi gures within the most enlightened strands of Russian 
Orthodoxy itself. 25 This seems puzzling at fi rst, given the alleged absence of 
the redemptive power of the cross in Boehme, as well as the much greater 
amount of material dedicated to practical matters of Christian spirituality in 
writers such as Johann Arndt or Thomas à Kempis. Justifi ably or otherwise, 
the authenticity of Boehme’s Christianity was associated with his “simplic-
ity,” a characteristic ascribed not so much to his writings (for not even the 
Russians were eccentric enough to believe this to be true) but to the  style or 
spirit of his philosophizing. 26 
 Alexander Koval’kov (1795–1852), the exuberant describer of Savins-
koe, seemed to model himself on such Boehmean “simplicity.” Unique in 
Russian masonic circles as coming from peasant stock, Koval’kov was one 
of the fi rst mystics outside the schismatic tradition to lay claim to the role 
of prophet (a role increasingly assumed by those inspired by Boehme in the 
nineteenth century), beginning to publish his “revelations” from the age 
of fourteen. Now largely forgotten, in his time Koval’kov was regarded 
with devotion by a minority and suspicion by the majority as a channel 
for Lopukhin’s ideas about the “inner church.” I think the age needs to be 
shifted from the Works to Koval’kov himself—perhaps ‘Yet by the time of 
the publication of the Mystical Works of Alexander Koval’kov in 1815, 
he had, at the tender age of twenty-one, developed into a mature religious 
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thinker whose work demonstrates a profound knowledge of the Euro-
pean mystical tradition, enlivened by a palpable spiritual experience that 
is lacking in the more prominent writings of Lopukhin. The inner con-
sonance between Koval’kov and Boehme is felt on almost every page of 
these volumes, and in particular in the former’s “Thoughts on Mysticism 
and its Writers.” Here, Koval’kov unfolds a sort of diagnostics of mystical 
experience. Most interesting is his recommendation of the study of differ-
ent mystical writers in accordance with the  varieties of human personality: 
 The inner paths leading to the true Light differ from soul to soul, ac-
cording to their differences in levels of state and abilities. Some are 
moved by the purity of Love, the way of living Faith in the inwardness 
of souls. These fi nd their true enjoyment and treasure in the works of 
Madame Guyon. Others are roused by the Wisdom of Love, its order, 
and its mysteries in the heavenly Nature: such as these are fi lled with 
reverence, gratitude and the pure fl ame of zeal, receiving into them-
selves mystic food in the writings of the divinely wise and heavenly 
crowned Jacob Boehme, that light to the world kindled directly from 
the fi re of Divine love itself, that man of mysteries, I say, in whom 
 Wisdom, as in her own true Temple and element, spoke forth the law 
of Her Nature. 27 
 Koval’kov later restates this comparison between Guyon and Boehme, add-
ing that the former is most suited to those who wish to tend above all to 
their inner life while “in the works of the divinely wise Jacob Boehme, souls 
will fi nd all levels both of the external, lower nature, as well as the inner 
spiritual and Mystic-Divine.” 28 
 This interpretation of Boehme as synthesizer of the external and inter-
nal natures takes Koval’kov beyond Lopukhin’s conception of the “inner 
church” and anticipates the treatment of the same problem in later think-
ers such as Vladimir Soloviev and Sergii Bulgakov. Most arresting in this 
respect is Koval’kov’s adumbration of what Bulgakov was to call the 
 “primary sophiological antinomy”—the identity and distinction of Sophia- 
Wisdom in God on the one hand and in creation on the other—through his 
development of two central terms from Boehme’s corpus: quintessence and 
tincture. 29 
 Though these two categories are often confl ated by other alchemical 
thinkers (such as Paracelsus) and, as a result, by Boehme commentators, 
the cobbler-mystic is clear in separating the concepts of quintessence (or 
 quinta essentia ) and tincture. In a passage from  Theosophic Questions , for 
example, Boehme enumerates the multiple layers separating created matter 
from the godhead: 
 The four elements are what is outermost; next after them is the astral 
body; the third in order is the  quinta essentia , as the principle of the 
emanated holy Element; the fourth is the tincture, viz. the highest power 
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Figure 11.1 The only known surviving monument from Young’s Island on the Sav-
inskoe Estate, dedicated to Quirinus Kuhlmann. It was found on the estate territory 
in the 1920s and is now held in the Noginsk Museum of Local History in the Mos-
cow Region. The inscription reads: “Quirinus Kuhlmann was tortured and burnt as 
a heretic in Moscow in 1689 . . . Passer-by, stop and sigh over this sufferer; bless the 
enlightenment that scattered the gloom of the ferocity of these times; and learn to 
be attentive in the very striving toward truth.” © Copyright Aleksandr Poslykhalin, 
2012
of the emanated word, in which the two inner central fi res lie in one 
ground. After this, the pure clear Deity is understood. 30 
 Quintessence, then, may be described as the heavenly principle inherent in 
all created matter, a  product of the heavenly economy, whereas tincture is 
the “power by which things are changed [. . .] the Word in act;” 31 a kind 
of “spiritual form that stands betwixt ideal and real being.” 32 Koval’kov 
unfolds precisely this Boehmean understanding of the quintessence and 
tincture yet adds to this a framework for the further elaboration of their 
relation. Unlike Boehme, for whom sophianic consummation equated to 
the reunion of the two tinctures—the tincture of fi re and the tincture of 
light—in the virginal, androgynous Adam, Koval’kov posits the same in 
the reunion of the tincture (associated with the Son) with the quintessence 
(associated with the Father), which tincture and quintessence in unity in 
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the One yet in separation in the creature. The author then sets out the task 
of “grasping the character of both tincture and Essence, understanding the 
means of their union [. . .] and then, with the help of the tincture of sub-
stances, purifying and resurrecting bodies.” 33 
 In this argument, subtly different from that of Boehme yet employing 
the same terminology, Koval’kov introduces an important alteration to the 
German mystic’s original conception. If, for Boehme, everything “external 
is a type of the internal” 34 and, in the apposite words of Cyril O’Regan, 
“sanctifi cation is eternal self-glorifi cation of the divine  in and by the eternal 
divine milieu ,” 35 Koval’kov adapts Boehmean thinking to reserve a space 
for a history of the cosmos that is not merely a fi guration of the eternal but 
a temporal movement toward the Divine through conscious human agency. 
Salvation thus becomes the overcoming of the internal-external division, 
not through divine fi at but through the mediation of a humanity united 
with God. 
 In this process, Boehme and his works themselves take on a distinctly 
soteriological character. Koval’kov describes the cobbler-mystic as a “mes-
senger” and a “weapon of good news about the heavenly mysteries.” 36 
Boehme, as “true” mystic, himself becomes the door through which the 
initiate steps into authentic knowledge of the mystery of God. “The main 
thing in the teaching of the errant mind consists in theory alone, but in 
 Figure 11.2  An etching of Young’s Island included in an 1809 edition of the journal 
 Herald of Europe . To the left can be seen the urn commemorating Fénelon, while the 
building in the center is most likely a bell-tower. Boehme’s cross was located imme-
diately upon crossing over the bridge on the right-hand side of the picture onto the 
island.  Vestnik Evropa , February 1809, No. 4. (out of copyright) 
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 Figure 11.3  An 1815 edition of  Christophia, oder Weg zu Christo , published in St. 
Petersburg with an introduction by Ivan Labzin (out of copyright). 
Mysticism ( Mistika ) 37 the very spirit speaking is practice.” 38 In other words, 
to read the works of Boehme is not to imbibe the theoretical postulates of 
the created and uncreated realms, but rather to hear the spirit speaking 
from its own source, unmediated by human agency. Or, to put it another 
way, the goal was not so much to master Boehme as to see what he saw 
and to experience what he experienced. As another member of Lopukhin’s 
circle, Nikolai Kraevich, put it: “the Kingdom of God will not dawn in us 
through the reading of enlightened authors. We should in ourselves be our 
own Boehmes.” 39 
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 II 
 By 1815, the year in which Koval’kov’s collected works were published and 
the Russian version of Boehme’s  Christosophia released in St Petersburg, 
the German mystic was fi rmly established as the lodestar of Russian intel-
lectual and religious life. So much so that, in that very same year, the noted 
poet Ivan Dmitriev complained that he was unable to acquire any novels 
whatsoever through his book dealer since the latter was no longer import-
ing literature but ordering “Boehme and his comrades” from Paris. 40 The 
explanations for this are multiple: the heady atmosphere of the early years 
of Alexander I’s reign, under whose rule mystical trends of all kinds were 
encouraged and materially supported; 41 the perceived closeness of Boehme’s 
writings, with their striking imagery, relating not only to the visual but also 
to taste and smell, to the richly sensual liturgical life of Orthodoxy; and the 
general tenor of early Russian freemasonry, which one twentieth-century 
representative, Boris Ermolov, has described as a “healthy response of the 
best Russian cultural forces against spiritual dissipation and atheistic cur-
rents adopted from without.” 42 
 The rapid ingestion of Enlightenment ideas, particularly under Catherine 
the Great (who greatly admired the  philosophes ), undoubtedly went hand-
in-hand with a diminishment of the spiritual authority of the Church after 
the transference of its powers to the secular Holy Synod under Peter the 
Great. A fi gurehead was therefore needed from outside the Russian tra-
dition who could, through his intellectual might, counter the specious ar-
guments of the Deists and atheists while at the same time embodying the 
kind of personal sanctity and zeal that had been all but exterminated from 
Russian church life. All the same, that amongst the legion of Pietist writers 
this fi gurehead should be Jacob Boehme was due in no small part to an 
elite group of mystic-intellectuals from Moscow who gathered under the 
aegis of the so-called Learned Society of Friends and met at a number of 
masonic lodges. In the half-century extending from the last years of Cather-
ine’s reign to the peak of Alexandrine mystical enthusiasm and ending with 
the banning of freemasonry in 1822, their frenetic activity in the realms of 
publishing, public speaking, and education laid the foundations for a pecu-
liarly Russian Rosicrucianism, often referred to in the literature, somewhat 
misleadingly, as “Martinism” (after the French Behmenist Louis Claude de 
Saint-Martin). 
 The lectures of Ivan Shvarts (1751–1784) demonstrate a profound know-
ledge of—though not complete dependence on—the teachings of Boehme. 43 
Shvarts sets Koval’kov’s belief in the salvifi c power of Boehme’s writings 
in an historical perspective, promoting the notion of an Adamic revelation 
preserved from the time of the fi rst human being to the present day by cer-
tain “friends of God,” amongst whom he highlights in particular Boehme 
and Johann Lavater. 44 Meanwhile, Koval’kov’s later accommodation within 
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a Boehmean schema of a cosmic history with its own independent being and 
dignity can be observed, albeit less emphatically, in a lecture by Shvarts dat-
ing to 1782. Here, Shvarts follows Boehme in unfolding an understanding 
of the human being as an “instrument of God.” Yet whereas, for Boehme, 
the human being is an instrument on which the divine  plays , for Shvarts, the 
human being is an “instrument, through whom and in whom God Himself 
wishes  to act .” 45 Again, the difference is a subtle but important one. For 
Boehme, as we have said, salvation is fulfi lled within the divine environment 
and, if human beings are participants, it is only insofar as they enter wholly 
into the resignation of the will that allows the heavenly tincture contained 
within them to “spring into action.” Although Shvarts is not yet as daring 
as Koval’kov, he builds a scriptural foundation for regarding the material 
world as a genuine participant in salvation history. In this vein, and surely 
infl uenced by the Orthodox veneration of relics, he writes that 
 God, having created the perishable and the imperishable, desired 
through the human being to bring the dark and perishable into the light 
and imperishable. This imperishable matter is contained in our bones. 
Carefully inspecting the bone one may see within a certain luminous 
tint. 46 
 This inclusion of the material body within God’s salvifi c economy al-
lows Shvarts to suggest a concrete role for the temporal activity of the 
human being: “we should try to refi ne or purify our body to make it less 
perishable.” 47 
 Nevertheless, the central human activity that Shvarts highlights in the 
lecture—imagination—coincides almost entirely with its treatment in 
Boehme. “Imagination,” he writes, “is our most fundamental power. It 
is the mouth of our soul, through which we taste of spiritual and moral 
knowledge.” 48 Shvarts goes on to outline two types of imagination: one he 
calls “tasting” and the other “visual,” the fi rst leading to the disintegration 
of the soul and the second to its integration with God. The “main responsi-
bility” of the human being, from this perspective, is to “recognize in oneself 
the diverging ways of the imagination,” 49 and from there, consciously to 
strive along the path that leads to the divine. 
 A counterpart of Shvarts, Semyon Gamaleia (1743–1822), together with 
the most tireless mason of the age, Nikolai Novikov (1744–1818), con-
ceived a scheme to build a “hermetic library” of some fi fty volumes, consist-
ing of Russian translations of esoteric philosophy. The project was brought 
to an abrupt end by Novikov’s arrest in 1792, after which he and Gamaleia 
worked in solitude on the translations at the former’s estate, Avdot’ino. 
Here, Gamaleia undertook the central aspect of this project: a translation 
of the complete works of Boehme, which he completed in twenty-two vol-
umes between 1790 and 1795. Because of the prohibition on the activities 
of this group, these translations were never published, although several have 
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survived in manuscript. 50 Nevertheless, they were copied by hand multiple 
times and held in the proliferating number of masonic libraries across Rus-
sia by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In one collection alone (that 
of Vasilii Arseniev), Boehme’s works numbered sixty volumes. 51 
 Gamaleia left little behind by way of original work, yet in his role as 
translator and model of sanctity, he was greatly esteemed by Russian ma-
sons. As Raffaella Faggionato has noted, the “traditional medieval con-
cept of the writer who humbles himself completely in his text to become 
a divine instrument retained a sense of relevance and importance for the 
Rosicrucians.” 52 In this context, Gamaleia, perhaps more than any other 
fi gure of his age, was the archetype of the aforementioned “anthropology of 
humility,” inspiring many by his example. The prominent historian Vasily 
Kliuchevsky even went so far as to claim that Gamaleia “deserves a hagiog-
raphy rather than a biography [. . .] Blessed in the best sense of the word, his 
contemporaries justifi ably called him a ‘man of God.’ ” 53 Gamaleia’s letters 
bear witness to the centrality of humility to his worldview (the true Chris-
tian, he wrote, must “constantly immerse himself in humility”), 54 as well as 
his adoption of a peculiarly Boehmean approach to the description of the 
 via mystica , which draws on the full range of human sensual experience. 
Consider, for example, the following passage: 
 Whatsoever the human being is inwardly concerned with, with that he 
communes, and from that receives the qualities, just as when someone 
prepares various fragrant oils and balsams, she bears the smell of them. 
So that whoever with his entire soul is forever meditating on the life, 
example and teaching of Christ our Lord invariably gives off the smell 
of humility, meekness and tolerance. 55 
 Gamaleia’s use of the sense of smell here, which Boehme employs in abun-
dance, 56 sounds peculiar indeed outside the alchemical context of the latter’s 
writings. It is indicative of the seriousness given to Boehme’s corpus, as well 
as the Russian tendency to read the German mystic as synthesizer of inner 
and external natures, that the empirical data of sensuality should be em-
ployed so readily for the purpose of disclosing the spiritual. 
 Gamaleia was also amongst the fi rst to elucidate the role of Sophia, or Di-
vine Wisdom, in his worldview. Although Shvarts had spoken, in Boehmean 
terms, of the “marriage of Sophia” in which Wisdom, in the most inward 
space of the heart, “gives [to the soul] the heavenly tincture,” he refrained 
from further speculation on the matter by noting that “this transition is so 
great that it is impossible to have any conception of it.” 57 Gamaleia, on the 
contrary, went into some detail on the subject in a 1782 speech to members 
of the Devkalion lodge, to which he belonged. While his treatment of So-
phia-Wisdom leans more on Kabbalistic teaching and scriptural precedent, 
he adds to these former some elements of Boehmean discourse surround-
ing the idea of “eternal Nature” ( die ewig Natur ). Thus, his statement that 
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“before creation Divine Wisdom played in the eternal Nature in upwardly 
soaring and mutually penetrating powers,” 58 has the disconcerting effect of 
co-opting Boehme into the creation account of Proverbs 8. 
 In many of Gamaleia’s letters, he takes on the role of mentor, constantly 
discouraging pupils from engaging in their own mystical speculations and 
redirecting them toward prayer, the reading of scripture, and conversion of 
heart. In a particular letter, he advises that “some authors wrote (particu-
larly one of them) purely for the reborn, and not for everyone [. . .] This 
is why we’re better leaving certain authors until such a time as we become 
more able to receive them.” 59 In another, he advises a friend that it is more 
fi tting for his wife to read the New Testament and that “to give her the 
notebooks, it seems, is not necessary.” 60 The particular author to whom 
Gamaleia alludes was certainly Boehme, translations of whose works were 
passed from hand to hand in small, annotated notebooks. His comments 
expose a conscious strategy on the part of Russian mason-mystics to control 
the writings of certain authors, especially Boehme, making access to them 
dependent on having reached a certain stage of spiritual maturity; a practice 
echoing the hierarchical approach to knowledge acquisition of the masonic 
degrees. 61 
 One document that commanded tremendous authority in masonic circles 
was that containing the transcripts of talks given by Iosif Pozdeev (1746–
1820), 62 a pupil of Gamaleia who later severed ties with Novikov in an 
argument over the direction of Russian freemasonry. In these talks, Pozdeev 
outlines a conception of God permeated by Boehmean dynamism: “in eter-
nity one can fi nd birth, for His desire consists only in a ceaseless fecundity 
or, so to say, a desire to ceaselessly give birth to himself.” Pozdeev then 
permits himself a delightful paraphrase of Boehme’s doctrine of creation, 
saying that “God became Creator in order to see himself in miniature,” just 
as “human beings love to see themselves in their miniatures.” 63 Through the 
circulation and reading of texts such as these, Boehme’s view of creation 
not as the establishment of an independent “Other,” but rather as a form 
of divine self-generation and self-perception, made a profound mark on the 
psyche of Russian freemasonry. 
The infl uence of Gamaleia and his school was so large that he even saw 
fi t to appear to people in their dreams, appearing in 1810 to the mason 
Kondrat Lokhvitsky (1774–1849). 64 Two years previously, Lokhvitsky 
had recorded in his diaries a conversion experience that had occurred 
while reading Boehme’s  Christosophia , a translation of which had been 
sent him by Labzin. Upon reading the words “Spirit of God,” he was 
“possessed both inwardly and externally with an inexplicable yet pleasant 
spiritual dread,” thanking “God the Saviour for his mercy in sending this 
word” to him “through the righteous Jacob,” whom he elsewhere calls “St 
Boehme.” 65 Lokhvitsky’s account is merely the most striking of an infl u-
ence that had, by the early nineteenth century, begun to reach beyond the 
masonic context. 
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 III 
 From the 1820s onward, two different German thinkers—Schelling and 
Hegel—were to exercise ever greater command over the minds of Russian 
intellectuals. This was a time of immense hardship for freethinkers, with the 
ban on freemasonry in 1822 and the thirty-year reign of the über-autocratic 
Nicholas I, under whose police state all publications were rigorously cen-
sored, and the rights of free association wholly disbanded. Not all believed 
that German idealism represented a step forward, however, and esoteric 
currents of thought continued to win over new recruits. On the question 
of Boehme, upholders of the old ways of Christian theosophy often made 
uneasy bedfellows with adherents of the new, “scientifi c” thinking. 
 Stepan Shevyrev (1806–64), a conservative writer and critic, believed 
that Hegel had ignored the warnings of Boehme, “the true Founder of 
German Philosophy and Theosophy,” in confl ating the “principle of 
nature with nature itself.” For, as Boehme had shown, Shevyrev count-
ers Hegel in distinctly Hegelian terms: “the realization of the idea, as 
being-for-itself, is conditioned through the being of the principle of na-
ture not-for-itself.” 66 Meanwhile, Alexander Herzen (1812–70), a radi-
cal Hegelian, wished no less to reserve a place of honor for the German 
mystic, whose “mystical contemplation, deriving from a holy source, led 
him to a conception of a breadth the likes of which the science of his time 
could only dream.” 67 
 Herzen seemed to esteem Boehme almost despite himself and was at 
pains to point out that, despite the greatness of the man, all manner of 
detritus took its source from him, including the thought of Swedenborg, 
Eckhartshausen, Jung-Stilling, and other “hysterics of sundry unreadable 
journals and madhouses.” 68 In opposition to these peddlers of esoteric non-
sense, Boehme, for Herzen, is the founder of a scientifi c method, a precursor 
to the Hegelian dialectic, where “the  yes cannot exist without the  no .” 69 
In his restless search to discover movement in every principle, Boehme had 
demonstrated beyond any doubt that “exclusive, inner being is unbearable; 
the inner strives to be external.” In such a way, Herzen perpetuates the view 
of Boehme as synthesizer of inner and external natures that he shares with 
his forebears. Seen in this light, Schelling is no more than “Boehme stood on 
his head.” 70 To be sure, it was unfortunate that Boehme had used the ridic-
ulous language of alchemy to expound his ideas; yet, despite everything, he 
had “arrived at a profoundly philosophical worldview.” Schelling, by con-
trast, had gone in the reverse direction, descending from “a pseudo-scientifi c 
conception to mystical somnambulism.” 71 
 The cobbler-mystic was exercising not only the minds of philosophers 
and critics, but making an appearance in Russian literary life as well. During 
the 1830s, Vladimir Odoevsky, novelist, music critic, and member of the 
secret society of Wisdom-Lovers, assiduously studied Boehme alongside 
his successors Pordage and Gichtel. His short story  Salamandra (1841) 
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provides a striking narrativization of the diverse worldviews that battled for 
the heart of the Russian enlightenment, from the scientifi c on one hand to 
a form of prelapsarian naïveté on the other. The representative of the latter, 
the Finnish Elsa, whose apparent simplicity conceals her alter-ego Salaman-
dra (the “fi re-spirit”), utters words toward the end of the tale that strongly 
recall Boehme’s metaphysics of will and desire: “There’s nothing . . . that’s 
impossible . . . for the human will,” she explains, “you just have to desire.” 72 
 The infl uential poet and literary critic Apollon Grigoriev (1822–64) 
fl irted with Boehme’s writings as a young man. In 1842, he wrote to his 
friend Sergei Soloviev, father of the philosopher Vladimir, that he had 
“I have greedily thrown myself into reading all the mystics I could fi nd 
in our library, particularly Boehme,” the result being the “conviction that 
mysticism is just as far from the Truth of Christ as pantheism” and that 
“venerating the inner life of  man leaves the same emptiness in the soul as the 
veneration of the external world.” 73 
 Perhaps more than any other literary fi gure of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, however, it was the poet Fyodor Tiutchev (1803–73) whose work most 
resonated with that of Boehme. 74 In a letter of the early 1860s, Tiutchev 
referred to Boehme as “one of the greatest minds to have ever lived on 
this earth,” and situated him on the “intersecting point between two en-
tirely contradictory teachings—Christianity and pantheism.” Tiutchev was 
amongst the fi rst to give due attention to the rich language of Boehme, com-
menting that to do him justice in Russian would mean to adopt some of 
the linguistic devices found in the expressive language of Russia’s sectarian 
communities. 75 The verse of Tiutchev, whom Berdyaev would later call the 
“poet of elemental night,” 76 proliferates with imagery of the “abyss” and 
“chaos,” whose contours are more than reminiscent of Boehme’s  Ungrund . 
Like Odoevsky, Tiutchev points to the instability of modern civilization’s 
accommodation with, even occlusion of, the darker, irrational aspects of 
being. In some of his most famous lines, he warns: “Do not awaken storms 
long stilled / For under them chaos stirs.” 77 
 At the same time, Boehme was beginning to infi ltrate the spiritual acad-
emies of Russia, where Orthodox clerics prepared students for the priest-
hood or religious life. Petr Avsenev (in monastic life, Archimandrite Feofan; 
1810–52) taught History of German Literature at the Kiev Spiritual Acad-
emy, in the process gaining a substantial knowledge of mystical literature, in 
particular Boehme, to whose “fundamental ideas, character and direction of 
thinking,” if not “the form of exposition” he was extremely sympathetic. 78 
In one section of his lectures on psychology, Avsenev notes that contact 
with certain materials can produce a “certain, almost magical, effect on 
the nerves and, through them, the soul,” offering his students the following 
example: “just a glance of a shiny surface of metal once led an inspired 
tradesman-philosopher (Boehme) into a state similar to clairvoyance.” 79 In 
another section, Avsenev provides a pseudo-scientifi c explanation for the 
diffi culty of Boehme’s language. The most elevated state of clairvoyance, 
asserts Avsenev, lifts its possessor above the life of the soul and into a certain 
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“spiritual consciousness [. . .] in union with the purely spiritual world.” In 
this context, the “loftiness of the language” is a “natural consequence of the 
disclosure in them of such a higher consciousness.” 80 
 Avsenev’s lectures are written in the style of contemporaneous German 
philosophy but give away several likely points of convergence with Boehme, 
amongst them his advocacy of the original androgynous condition of hu-
manity, and the innate striving to reunite the male and female principles. 81 
A student of Avsenev’s in Kiev, Pamfi l Iurkevich (1826–74) later introduced 
his own version of religious idealism, again not uninformed by Boehme, 
into the heady environment of Moscow intellectual life from his academic 
position there. One of his students recalled a conversation in 1873 in which 
Iurkevich issued the rather counter-intuitive declaration that real philos-
ophy had ceased with the birth of Kant and that its last genuine repre-
sentatives had been Boehme, Leibniz, and Swedenborg—a comment that 
carries added resonance in the light of Kant’s dismissal of Swedenborg’s 
writings as “dreams of a spirit-seer.” 82 This student, Vladimir Soloviev, was 
to place Boehme at the very center of the Russian religious renaissance of 
the early twentieth century that followed his death, and which he in large 
part instigated. 
 Soloviev, for whom both Iurkevich and Tiutchev were central infl uences, 
was an archetypal product of the Russia of his time: a theoretical philoso-
pher with an unparalleled command of classical and modern thought, he 
was at the same time the father of Russian poetic symbolism and a mystical 
visionary. Inspired by three visions of Sophia, the fi rst at the age of nine 
in a Moscow chapel and the others in 1873 while studying in the Reading 
Room of the British Library and wandering the Egyptian desert respectively, 
Soloviev’s philosophical works can be understood in part as an attempt to 
explicate his visions of a transfi gured nature. It was with this purpose that 
he set about studying esoteric literature on Sophia from Gnostic, Kabbalis-
tic, and mystical sources in the following years. In a letter of 1877, he sums 
up these studies: 
 In the mystics are many confi rmations of my own ideas, but no new 
light. Moreover, almost all of them are incredibly subjective by nature 
and, so to say, drivelling. I found three specialists on Sophia: Georg 
Gichtel, Gottfried Arnold and John Pordage. The most interesting 
thing is that all three have had personal experiences almost the same 
as mine. But in theosophy proper all three are quite weak; they follow 
Boehme but are below him. I think that Sophia had dealings with them 
more for their innocence than for anything else. As a result, only Para-
celsus, Boehme and Swedenborg are real people, which leaves me with 
a rather open ballpark. 83 
 Seeking to build on the teachings of Boehme and Swedenborg, which he 
calls the “full and highest theosophic expression of old Christianity,” the 
early Soloviev strove to create a “new,” universal religion of the Holy Spirit, 
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whose embryonic form he found in Schelling. 84 The infl uence of Boehme 
is writ large over Soloviev’s unfi nished  Philosophical Principles of Integral 
Knowledge , where he attempts to practice a new kind of “organic logic” by 
coaxing out the determinations of the absolute principle. Soloviev rejects 
the notion that ultimate reality can be entirely contained within the human 
mind, instead beginning his account from a statement, taken largely as a 
matter of faith, of the absolute’s own putative division within itself: 
 The absolute in all eternity necessarily divides itself into two poles or 
two centers: the fi rst, the principle of absolute unity or oneness as such, 
the principle of freedom from all forms, all manifestation and, conse-
quently, from all being; the second, the principle or productive power of 
being, i.e. the multiplicity of forms. 85 
 The term “two centers” is taken directly from Boehme, 86 and the overall 
intention of Soloviev’s early project is resolutely Boehmean: namely, to 
avoid what he considered the hubris of the Hegelian dialectic, which sought 
to produce the entire content of thought from its own resources; Soloviev 
would instead operate within the context of divine  self -revelation. The fi rst 
motion in Soloviev’s system was to remain, not the dialectical or a priori 
unfolding of the human mind, but, as in Boehme, the prior motion of the 
absolute in its desire for perceptibility. 
 Many other points of convergence with Boehme can be found in Soloviev: 
his development of androgyny, which no doubt also drew on the  Kabbala, 
which he knew well; his determination to posit an anti-divine principle 
within the divine itself; speculation on the existence of a certain kind of 
ethereal, holy corporeality that humanity might eventually inherit; and the 
richly sensual depiction of mystical experience. 87 
 Nevertheless, Soloviev was a consummate synthesizer, and to reduce 
his thought to the infl uence of any one thinker would be mistaken. If, 
as it appears, he fi rst turned to Boehme for traces of experiential contact 
with Sophia that would help explain his own, it should be said that Solo-
viev’s Sophia is very different from that of Boehme. He might not have 
fully agreed with his successor Sergii Bulgakov’s (1871–1944) defi nition 
of Boehme’s Jungfrau Sophia as “faceless and impersonal, just as the deity 
itself is impersonal in Boehme’s system.” 88 However, the Russian philoso-
pher’s deeply eroticized vision of Sophia is surely located at some distance 
from her Boehmean counterpart. A greater distance is opened up between 
the two when one considers Soloviev’s embracing of the doctrine of  apo-
katastasis (universal salvation) and denial of the eternity of hell. Most im-
portant, perhaps, is the attempt that Soloviev makes to give real substance 
to world history. 
 This last distinction between Boehme and the Russian sophiological 
school emerges most strongly when we consider a thinker who falls out-
side this tradition, indeed outside any defi nite school of thought, and in 
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whom Boehme fi nds his most consistent champion on Russian soil: Niko-
lai Berdyaev. Berdyaev’s reception of Boehme betrays both continuity and 
discontinuity with the fate of the cobbler-mystic in Russia up to that point. 
He explores more deeply than ever before the question of the Boehme-event 
itself: how such an apparent depth of penetration into the core of the divine 
mysteries was realized by a simple cobbler. Strange indeed to the modern 
ear sounds his review of Alexandre Koyré’s 1929 monograph on Boehme 
where, in a distinctly precritical vein, Berdyaev objects to the French au-
thor’s distance from his object of study and his dryly academic lack of spir-
itual sympathy with Boehme. Challenging Koyré’s appraisal of Boehme as 
primarily a metaphysician, Berdyaev counters that “Boehme was above all a 
visionary and theosopher” and even questions how an author who is “alien 
to the Spirit” of Boehme could write such a book. 89 
 Yet Berdyaev’s approach did not issue exclusively from a bygone form 
of medieval religiosity. The Boehme-event for him did not simply involve 
grace acquired through simplicity as it did for Gamaleia. Berdyaev sought 
to provide a philosophical foundation to the question of how there can exist 
a personal sanctity that has only itself as its own guarantee, outside of any 
institutional or social framework: 
 The problem which is posed by the phenomenon of Boehme is the prob-
lem of gnostic giftedness, a peculiar gift of vision which does not exist 
in direct proportion to the level of sanctity endowed by the Church. 90 
 This problem was made all the more acute as it was being simultane-
ously posed in disputes over the role of the prophet as the ideal of human 
activity in Soloviev’s thought and life. 91 Although Berdyaev was one of 
very few to see a positive side to Soloviev’s development of prophecy 
within the framework of a “free theocracy,” the two thinkers parted ways 
on the question of the individual path to its realization. Soloviev and 
other sophiologists, grounded in the theanthropic (divine-human) Chris-
tology that he had fi rst outlined in his  Lectures on Godmanhood , tended 
to foreground the self-renunciation of will as a condition of participa-
tion in God. Berdyaev instead saw the condition for true gnosis (which 
for him amounted to the same thing) as contained within a “particular 
cognitive charisma” of a highly individualized nature. 92 In Soloviev, he 
believed, the “eternal signifi cance of the principle of personality had not 
been suffi ciently recognized” and his pretensions to prophetic authenticity 
as a result severely compromised. 93 Boehme’s personalistic vision, on the 
contrary, meant that the German mystic “should enter into our spiritual 
life as an eternal element, for never before has human gnosis risen to such 
superhuman heights.” 94 
 Berdyaev’s critique of the Russian intellectual tradition that had preceded 
him can only be adequately understood within the context of his interpre-
tation of Boehme. It is only, for example, when we make the comparison 
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with the cobbler-mystic that the meaning of Berdyaev’s at fi rst puzzling crit-
icism that Soloviev had “objectivized his own subjectivity” becomes clear. 95 
For Boehme, writes Berdyaev, “knowledge of the spiritual world [. . .] was 
a dwelling in that spiritual world [. . .] Being for him did not turn into 
an object opposed to the subject.” 96 Yet while Soloviev, Berdyaev grants, 
possessed a certain prophetic charisma, it was one insuffi ciently strong 
to withhold from transforming the experiential data gained from “gnos-
tic” perception into an objective, and thus static, presence in transcribed 
thought. Boehme, for him, was so great precisely because he consistently 
refused to turn the absolute into a possession, forever seeing it in the  dyna-
mis contained within the perpetual striving that united his own subjective 
being to the being of God. 97 
 Strangely enough, Sergii Bulgakov’s critique of Boehme arises from the 
same ground as Berdyaev’s but arrives at precisely the opposite conclu-
sion. It, too, is best understood in the context of Bulgakov’s critique of 
Soloviev. Yet instead of distancing the German mystic from his Russian 
successor, Bulgakov fi nds in both the self-same malaise. Boehme, accord-
ing to Bulgakov, suffered from a kind of self-delusion: imagining himself 
the channel of divine revelation, he had no idea that he was in actual 
fact “in captivity to  l’ésprit de systême .” 98  Aurora , which Boehme later 
considered his fi rst, immature attempt at articulating his vision, was for 
Bulgakov characterized by an “immediacy of ‘inspiration.’ ” If he had 
stopped writing here, Bulgakov refl ects, he would never have arrived at 
the unfortunate brand of “mystical rationalism” or “theosophism” with 
which his remaining work is permeated. 99 As it is, Boehme, for Bulgakov, 
turns the central mystery of Christianity into a rational schema, failing to 
realize that “hypostacity is not a ‘deducible’ moment in the godhead but 
its living essence.” 
 Bulgakov’s attention to apophatic (negative) theology was on this point 
infl uenced by his recognition of Soloviev’s fl awed approach, whose teaching 
he had previously followed more unrefl ectively and whom in the same work 
he criticizes from a similar perspective: “although [Soloviev] characterizes 
the transcendental absolute [. . .] in the terminology of negative theology, 
he then rationally deduces, unlawfully and without any explanation of its 
application to the fi rst hypostasis, its relationship to the world and, as a 
consequence, their mutual determination.” 100 In the same way, Boehme’s 
handling of the “leap from impersonality to personhood” on the part of the 
putatively Christian godhead is therefore for Bulgakov a “very dark teach-
ing,” 101 and results in the opposite effect: the dissolution of personhood in 
abstract schematizing. 
 Berdyaev, in sharp opposition to Bulgakov, saw Boehme’s metaphysics 
as grounded in a type of personalism that had subsequently “disappeared 
from German Idealism in its tendency toward monism.” 102 Central to this 
personalism was Boehme’s concept of the  Ungrund , to which he dedicated 
the fi rst of two “études” published in 1930, and which he equates with 
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a certain kind of “meonic [from the Greek,  me on , non-being] freedom 
undetermined even by God.” 103 The signifi cance of this concept is that the 
 Ungrund should be understood as more fundamental even than the Trin-
itarian godhead; as a result, God’s being must be viewed  tragically , as a 
necessary “battle with the darkness of nonbeing” that eternally overshad-
ows it. 104 Yet this tragic battle is one waged not only by God; all being par-
ticipates in it, within that faculty Berdyaev calls the “will,” which he again 
takes from Boehme and sees as synonymous with “freedom.” Human be-
ings, too, must enter into the “tragedy of the groundless will-desire, to be 
tinctured by Christ only to lose themselves in darkness once more.” Only 
Boehmean voluntarism has made possible the “philosophy of freedom,” 
Berdyaev wrote. 105 
 Among the Russian Behmenists, Berdyaev was the most faithfully Boeh-
mean, yet he viewed himself as no mere disciple. In 1940, near the end of his 
life, he felt confi dent enough to proclaim his superiority over his great pre-
decessor: “The particular distinction of my philosophical type,” he wrote, 
“is that I have put at the foundation of philosophy not being, but freedom 
[. . .] In such a radical form, it seems, this has not been done by any other 
philosopher.” 106 
 Berdyaev’s philosophical statements often suffer from hyperbole and 
betray a tendency to underplay affi nities with other thinkers. Yet, in one 
respect, he is surely right to distinguish himself so defi nitively from other 
Russian religious philosophers. Berdyaev, like Boehme, was principally a 
metaphysician of the will, an epithet one can only apply to other Russian 
sophiologists with a great number of qualifi cations. Soloviev’s thought, for 
example, evolved from wholesale acceptance of Boehme’s positing of a pri-
mordial will at the heart of being to a certain distance from the concept in 
his middle period. His repulsion from Nietzschean voluntarism was surely a 
factor here. The sophiologists’ attempt to build a religio-philosophical sys-
tem that would do justice to a God in whom eternity and time are already 
one, without abrogating the rights of temporal becoming, took them away 
from an association of will with the “fi rst mover.” 
 Their approach did not necessarily jar with the notion of meonic free-
dom at the core of being, though it does mark sophiology off as a dis-
tinctly unvoluntaristic teaching. Nevertheless, that both strands of this 
argument—the Berdyaevian and Solovievian—should draw on Boehme and 
that the assessment of Soloviev’s legacy should so closely parallel that of 
the cobbler-mystic is indicative of the latter’s consummate ability to inspire 
 diverging trends in thought. 
 IV 
 By the fi rst decades of the twentieth century, Boehme had become such 
an integral part of the Russian intellectual and cultural landscape that to 
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enumerate all who fell under his infl uence would amount to a roll call of 
most of the representatives of the Russian Silver Age. They included the 
majority of those who looked to Soloviev as the progenitor of Russian 
symbolism, such as the poets Alexander Blok (1880–1921) and Fyodor 
Sologub, the philosopher-novelists Andrei Belyi (1880–1934) and Dmitry 
Merezhkovsky (1865–1941), philosopher Semyon Frank (1877–1950), and 
the “peasant poet” Nikolai Kliuyov (1884–1937). The cobbler-mystic was 
even beginning to make incursions once more into the royal court, with 
the wife of Nicholas II, the Empress Alexandra, reading and  appreciating 
Boehme. 107 
 One of the more surprising statements of support for Boehme was made 
by the founder of the Soviet system himself. No doubt infl uenced by the 
positive treatment of the German mystic in Herzen and Feuerbach, Vladimir 
Lenin calls Boehme a “materialistic theist” insofar as “he divinizes not only 
spirit but also matter. For him God is material; in this is his mysticism.” 108 
Despite Lenin’s personal respect for him, however, the ideological consol-
idation of Marxism-Leninism in the late 1920s and the distaste for mysti-
cal writings of all kinds meant that those who wished publicly to discuss 
Boehme mainly had to do so in émigré settings. 
 From his adoptive home of Kulu, India, the painter and orientalist Ni-
kolai Rerikh (1874–1947), whose ideas continue to infl uence the New Age 
movement in Russia, saw a direct correlation between mundane “labour” 
and supernatural revelation as embodied in Boehme, who “worked out his 
philosophical systems whilst making boots.” 109 Meanwhile, in Milan, the 
émigré poet Georgii Eristov penned a poem called “Misterium magnum” 
in which he exalted the dual nature of the cobbler and mystic in similar 
tones. 110 
 The infl uence of Boehme was, however, once more to spring up in the 
unlikely conditions of Moscow under the Soviets, just as it had in the same 
city 350 years earlier. The so-called “Moscow esoteric underground” that 
emerged at the end of the 1950s has received sparse attention, largely be-
cause it was so very different from the other alternative, “dissident” culture 
that emerged at the same time. Yet fi gures such as Yuri Stefanov (1939–
2001) and Evgenii Golovin (1938–2010) in Moscow and, a little later, 
Elena Shvarts (1948–2010) in Leningrad were tremendously infl uential in 
battling for the rights of the numinous in poetic, religious, and academic 
discourse. These were gifted poets with an immense breadth of inter-
ests who were drawn toward contemporary esoteric trends in European 
thought. Writers such as René Guénon and Algernon Blackwood, who had 
found new  avenues for the esoteric in the modern age, were among their 
most admired authors. Yet they turned to Boehme not as a precursor to 
these modern authors but as a thinker whose relevance was no less dimin-
ished than it was in seventeenth-century Germany. Golovin, for example, 
disputes both Bulgakov’s contention that the earthly realm has no value for 
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Boehme and Berdyaev’s classifi cation of the German mystic as “gnostic,” 
writing that, in opposition to the Gnostics, Boehme does not hold that 
creation is the “work of an evil demiurge or the result of the degradation 
of the Deity. Instead, for Boehme, this world is called to a greater or lesser 
extent to “apply the brakes” to Adam’s fall into demonic chaos.” 111 Golo-
vin ends his article with a quote from Boehme that conjures up the terrors 
of the twentieth century, as well as Dostoevsky’s comparison of communist 
society to an anthill: “And the human being will acquire an ant’s face and 
say: there is no god or gods, though there is a piece of straw on my back. It 
would be good to burden another back with this straw.” For Golovin, such 
words are “more comprehensible today than they were in the seventeenth 
century.” 112 
 The religious poet Elena Shvarts has also added another layer to the mod-
ern Russian interpretation of Boehme, this time not in the context of the 
tragic twentieth century, nor the esoteric penetration into the mysteries of 
the cosmos; rather, the reverse: Shvarts brings the mysterious in Boehme 
down to the level of the mundane and familiar. In a delightful short essay 
titled “Any Old Borscht,” Shvarts writes: 
 Boehme wrote (as anyone will recognise as true) that the sweet, the 
bitter, the sour and the salty are the primary elements, the bricks of the 
universe. From this point of view even a bowl of borscht, in the battle of 
these elements, hints at the mystery of life. Food can be an adventure. 113 
 These few lines are testament to the fact that the Russian reception of 
Boehme continues to draw on new sources of creative energy. Indeed, in 
recent decades, Russian translations of the German mystic, as well as mono-
graphs and dissertations, have proliferated. 114 The Russian Boehme may 
have more to tell us yet. 
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 stikhami , ed. V. Kreid (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), 554. The poem begins: 
“The summer evening in a purple cloak, / In the shop the acerbic smell of 
leather, / And the echo of the inspired speech / Of the sage-cobbler” (my 
translation). 
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6244-139-011-2pass-r02.indd   223 5/31/2013   10:31:42 AM
 12  Hegel’s Reception of Jacob Boehme 1 
 Glenn Alexander Magee 
 I INTRODUCTION 
 Hegel’s relation to Jacob Boehme is a controversial topic among historians 
of philosophy. As I shall demonstrate, it is undeniable that Hegel had a 
strong interest in Boehme. However, Hegel scholars have often been eager 
to minimize this and have, in some cases, misrepresented the available ev-
idence in order to make him seem harsh or dismissive in his treatment of 
Boehme. There is no mystery behind this. Historians of philosophy are 
trained philosophers, and Hegel scholars tend to be self-identifi ed Hege-
lians. Many fi nd it simply unacceptable that Hegel might have been seri-
ously interested in (or—worse yet—infl uenced by) one of the most obscure 
mystics in the Western canon. To most professional philosophers, mysti-
cism is not merely a non-rational enterprise, but an  irrational one: one 
contrary to reason. Thus, their attitude tends to be that we must save Hegel 
from Boehme. 
 Part of the problem here is that Hegel does indeed send mixed signals. It 
is obvious from what has come down to us that Hegel made a careful study 
of Boehme, and he continually compliments Boehme on his profundity—
while simultaneously criticizing him for the “barbarity” of his mode of ex-
pression. (At some point Hegel seems to have decided that  Barbarei would 
be his standard term of disapprobation for Boehme, because he uses it again 
and again.) As we shall see, Hegel fi nds in Boehme ideas quite similar, in 
certain respects, to his own. And here we run up against some legitimate 
problems of interpretation and of questions concerning the provenance of 
ideas. First, does Hegel interpret Boehme correctly, or does he read himself 
into Boehme? This is a diffi cult question to answer, owing mainly to the 
obscurity of both Boehme’s and Hegel’s writings. Further, if Hegel’s inter-
pretation of Boehme is defensible, is he being honest when he suggests (as he 
clearly does) that Boehme’s ideas are anticipations of his own philosophy? 
Or is Hegel indebted to Boehme for certain insights? Would his philosophy 
have been the same had he not encountered Boehme? 2 
 It seems likely that Hegel took up Boehme for the fi rst time in Jena in 
the period 1801–07. This was the period during which Hegel formulated 
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his philosophical system, leading to the writing of  The Phenomenology of 
Spirit in 1806. But our questions cannot really be settled by determining 
when it was that Hegel fi rst read Boehme, or even by taking into account 
his considered judgment about Boehme in the  Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy . One reason has to do with another problem for historians 
of philosophy: the infl uence of Boehme on Schelling, who was in turn, of 
course, a major infl uence on Hegel. As I shall argue, it is highly probable 
that Boehmean ideas were communicated to Hegel by Schelling in Jena and 
that they exercised a strong infl uence on him. Indeed, during this period, 
Jena was a major center of interest in Boehme. A brief sketch of the Jena 
“Boehme revival,” and specifi cally of Schelling’s interest in his writings, 
seems in order here. 
 Many of the greatest fi gures of the German Romantic movement were as-
sembled in Jena in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: Fried-
rich Schlegel (1772–1829); August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845); Novalis 
(1772–1801), Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853); Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–
1814); and, of course, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) 
himself, whose career would peak during his time there. It is probable that 
Ludwig Tieck introduced Schelling, Novalis, and the Schlegel brothers to 
Boehme’s writings in 1799. The fi rst mention of Boehme by a member of the 
Jena circle comes a year earlier, in a letter from Friedrich Schlegel to Nova-
lis, dated December 2 nd , 1798, in which Schlegel mentions that Tieck has 
been studying Boehme. Tieck had discovered Boehme’s  Aurora in a Berlin 
bookstall. Informed that it was despised by the rationalists, he immediately 
purchased the volume and proceeded to devour its contents. As a result, one 
of Tieck’s biographers states that “None of his works written between 1799 
and 1801 is free of Boehme . . . ” 3 
 Under Tieck’s infl uence, Novalis began to study Boehme carefully in the 
winter of 1799–1800. It has been conjectured that Boehme was being read 
aloud at meetings of the Jena Romantics’ circle during this period. 4 Fried-
rich Schlegel also fell under Boehme’s spell, calling his work “the greatest, 
most profound, most individual, most admirable work of idealism.” 5 He be-
lieved there were correspondences between the ideas of Boehme and Fichte 
(who, for his part, dismissed Boehme as an “enthusiast”). 
 Speaking years later about his time in Jena, Tieck recalled that he found 
Schelling particularly receptive to Boehme’s ideas. 6 Indeed, over the course 
of several years, Schelling set about trying to obtain Boehme’s writings for 
his own library, fi nally acquiring a complete set only in 1804 (or so his 
correspondence would indicate). Interestingly, years later, in 1809, Schelling 
was faced with the problem of acquiring  another edition of Boehme since he 
had given his away to his friend Franz von Baader (1765–1841), who was 
one of Boehme’s principal interpreters (often referred to as “Boehmius redi-
vivus”). Schelling wrote to a friend imploring him to obtain a replacement 
edition of Boehme “at any price.” 7 Needless to say, it is certainly very likely 
that Baader encouraged Schelling’s interest in Boehme. 
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 There is a possibility, however, that Schelling may have encountered 
Boehme’s ideas well before 1799, through the works of the Swabian “specu-
lative pietist” Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782). The story of 
Schelling’s connections to Oetinger, who was himself heavily infl uenced by 
Boehme (and Emmanuel Swedenborg), is an interesting one. We know that 
Schelling’s father owned Oetinger’s works, which means that he could have 
delved into them at a very early age. Schelling’s fi rst published work was 
a poem written on the occasion of the death of P. M. Hahn, an important 
follower of Oetinger. Schelling’s friend Christian Pregizer (1751–1824), the 
founder of a Pietist sect called the “Joyous Christians,” reported that when 
he fi rst met Schelling in 1803, they spent almost their entire meeting dis-
cussing Boehme and Oetinger. 8 Schelling is also known to have remarked to 
one of his students in Jena that Oetinger was “clearer” than Boehme. 9 And 
it has also been argued that Schelling’s terminology (especially in the 1809 
 Freiheitschrift ) shows his familiarity with Oetinger’s work. 10 Ernst Benz 
has demonstrated, furthermore, that in his work, Schelling occasionally 
employed unorthodox translations of biblical passages made by Oetinger 
without attributing them to him. 11 
 In sum, the Jena that Hegel encountered in 1801 was one where Boehme 
was “the latest thing” in prominent intellectual circles. And Schelling, 
Hegel’s best friend and roommate, was one of the leading “Boehme en-
thusiasts,” one who had likely been interested in Boehmean theosophy 
years prior to his appointment in Jena. There is thus abundant  prima 
facie reason to believe that Hegel would have received a hefty dose of 
Boehme upon moving to Jena. Furthermore, we must note that Hegel was 
initially, for all intents and purposes, Schelling’s follower, and that his 
intellectual (and personal) debt to Schelling was very great. It is therefore 
likely that Hegel—at least at fi rst—would have been predisposed to take 
Boehme very seriously and to have allowed Boehmean ideas to enter into 
his own thinking. (As we shall see, the documentary evidence bears this 
out—though the story of Boehme’s “infl uence” on Hegel is a far from 
simple one.) 
 Hegel came to Jena after some depressing experiences as a household 
tutor in Bern and Frankfurt. He wrote to his old friend Schelling—his for-
mer classmate at the Tübingen theological seminary—asking if he could 
secure for him a position at Jena. The two men had certainly followed dif-
ferent paths after leaving the seminary. In contrast to the unhappy Hegel, 
Schelling (who was fi ve years younger) had already published several 
important works and had come to be seen as the rising star of German 
philosophy. (In fact, he had taken Fichte’s place at the University of Jena 
after the latter was dismissed due to accusations of atheism.) Schelling 
responded to Hegel’s request by inviting him to Jena and offering him 
a place to stay. Hegel accepted with great relief, and relocated there in 
 January of 1801. 
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 In Jena, Hegel managed to get his degree from Tübingen, counted as 
a doctorate, and began giving classes to university students. He was paid 
nothing by the university itself (which was the practice then with junior 
academics), though he could charge students individually for instruction. 
Schelling himself left Jena for a post at the University of Würzberg in 1803. 
To some extent, his departure seems to have had a liberating effect on Hegel. 
From 1803 to 1806, he produced a large amount of work, setting out vari-
ous versions of a new “system of philosophy.” In the process, Hegel took a 
good deal of inspiration from Schelling’s ideas but he recast them in a new, 
more rigorous form, and greatly amplifi ed them. 
 I would argue that Hegel’s dalliance with Jacob Boehme played a signif-
icant role in this formative period of his philosophical career. The real evi-
dence for this is in the fragmentary manuscripts Hegel produced during this 
time. However, I will deal initially with another text, Hegel’s  Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy , delivered for the fi rst time to students in 1805–06 
but not published until after Hegel’s death. They contain an entire chapter 
on Boehme, which is the only material Hegel wrote on him that has come 
down to us in its entirety. 
 II THE LECTURE ON BOEHME 
 Hegel’s discussion of Boehme in the  Lectures comes at the beginning of his 
treatment of modern philosophy, which Hegel links to the Reformation. For 
Hegel, modern philosophy, like the Reformation, challenges authority and 
accepts only “the inward personal spirit.” 12 Hegel argues, plausibly, that 
modern philosophy proceeds from the idea of self-consciousness. We can 
see this dramatically illustrated, of course, in Descartes’s  Meditations on 
First Philosophy (1641), in which no philosophical progress is made until 
Descartes recognizes the indubitable truth of his own existence. In modern 
philosophy, Hegel tells us, the individual is the “absolute beginning point of 
determination” ( absoluter Anfang des Bestimmens ). 13 Modern philosophy’s 
emphasis on self-consciousness is highly signifi cant for Hegel because his 
own system (which he sees as the culmination of the history of philosophy) 
argues that in human self-consciousness, God and nature are brought to 
completion. 
 Hegel argues that modern philosophy initially divides into two streams. 
The fi rst he calls “realism” ( Realismus ), though it would be called empir-
icism today. The second is “idealism” ( Idealismus ), which would include 
what we now call rationalism. Hegel’s account of modern philosophy begins 
with two fi gures representative of these streams. The fi rst, who represents 
“realism,” is Francis Bacon. Surprisingly, the second fi gure, representing a 
kind of proto-idealism, is Boehme. It may seem surprising to fi nd Boehme 
termed a “modern philosopher” at all (he is, of course, often referred to as 
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a mystic or theosophist, precisely, so as to set him apart from the philos-
ophers). 14 This is not eccentricity on Hegel’s part, however, but a genuine 
insight. Hegel sees Boehme’s thought as issuing from that same “inward 
personal spirit” that is the fountainhead of all modern philosophy. Hegel 
writes that Boehme 
 is the fi rst German philosopher; the content of his philosophizing is gen-
uinely German [ echt deutsch ]. What makes him excellent and notewor-
thy is the aforementioned Protestant principle of placing the intellectual 
world within one’s own heart [ Gemüt ] and in one’s self-consciousness 
gazing upon, knowing, and feeling all that formerly was [conceived as] 
beyond. 15 
 Like Bacon and the rest, Boehme does not appeal to authority; his ideas fl ow 
from his own peculiar, authentic soul-searching. Further, Hegel goes on to 
argue that Boehme also makes self-consciousness and the  Ich (ego) central 
to his thought as well. 
 Hegel’s juxtaposition of Bacon and Boehme is meant, of course, to sug-
gest that they are opposites and represent opposite philosophical tendencies. 
This is obviously true, in that no philosopher could be further from empir-
icism than Jacob Boehme. 16 It is also obvious where Hegel’s sympathies lie. 
It is clear from Hegel’s account of Bacon that he regards him as a shallow 
philosopher. The account of Boehme is much longer (close to thirty pages 
in a recent edition) and much more respectful. It is also very apparently the 
result of a good deal of work and careful study. Hegel’s account of Boehme’s 
ideas is remarkably detailed (indeed, but for the obscurity of some of He-
gel’s sentences, one could almost recommend it as a good, brief outline of 
Boehme’s thought). Further, Hegel quotes from or cites several of Boehme’s 
works. His main source is  Aurora , but he also relies upon  Theosophische 
Sendbriefe ,  Beschreibung der drey Principien Göttliches Wesens ,  Mysterium 
Magnum , and others. Anyone who reads these pages with an open mind 
will be struck by the fact that Hegel’s interest in Boehme was quite serious. 
 Hegel makes his transition from Bacon to Boehme by referring to the 
latter as “philosopho teutonico,” and insisting that “we” (namely, “we Ger-
mans”) have no reason to be ashamed of him. Right away we therefore get 
the suggestion that Hegel recognizes that many will object to his decision to 
include Boehme in an account of modern philosophy. But Hegel is obviously 
concerned here, at least in part, to rehabilitate Boehme in the eyes of his stu-
dents and colleagues. Hegel notes that the Enlightenment caused Boehme’s 
name to lapse into obscurity in most learned circles, as a result of which he 
came to be dismissed as an enthusiast. It is only recently that Boehme’s pro-
fundity has come to be recognized. Hegel is clearly thinking of the Romantic 
movement. It may seem at this point as if Hegel has been swept up into the 
Romantic celebration of Boehme, but he immediately signals that he intends 
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to be even handed. “It is certain, on the one hand,” Hegel writes, “that he 
did not merit the disdain accorded to him; on the other, however, he did not 
deserve the high honor into which he was elevated.” 17 
 Hegel notes that “philosophia teutonica” was an older term for mysti-
cism. It would be useful here to pause by briefl y considering Hegel’s basic 
understanding of mysticism. His most signifi cant statement on the subject 
occurs in a remark appended to a paragraph in the  Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1817): “It should also be mentioned here that the 
meaning of the speculative is to be understood as being the same as what 
used in earlier times to be called ‘mystical’ [ Mystische ], especially with re-
gard to the religious consciousness and its content.” 18 This is a striking as-
sertion, because in fact speculation ( Spekulation, spekulative Philosophie ) 
is the term Hegel uses to describe his own philosophy, and here he seems 
to be identifying speculation with mysticism. Hegel defi nes speculation as 
the “positive moment” of reason ( Vernunft ) itself (the “negative moment” 
being dialectic). Ordinary thought (what Hegel calls “the understanding,” 
 Verstand ) is preoccupied with conceptual “either-ors” and unable to think 
beyond them. Speculation transcends opposites, reconciling them in some 
greater whole. This is a description of Hegel’s philosophical “method” (if 
it can be called that), and he sees the same approach at work in mysticism. 
Hegel makes it clear that he sees Boehme as a speculative philosopher in this 
sense, though one with a crucial fl aw. 
 Hegel’s attitude toward the mysticism of Boehme and others is precisely 
analogous to his attitude toward religion in general. Like religion, mysticism 
has the same content or the same object as philosophy—but it can only im-
perfectly approximate to a truth that philosophy alone can fully articulate. 
Hence, the study of mysticism, like religion, may offer the philosopher im-
portant signposts pointing the way to philosophy’s goal. Hegel states that, 
“It is the distinctive task of philosophy to transform the  content that is 
in the representation of religion into the  form of thought; the content [of 
religion and philosophy] cannot be distinguished.” 19 Hegel’s treatment of 
Boehme is fundamentally no different from his treatment of any number 
of other fi gures in the history of ideas: he sees him as in certain ways ap-
proaching the ideas that only he, Hegel, fully and adequately articulates. 
 So what are those ideas? I will summarize them here for the uninitiated 
(though the reader should bear in mind that there are fi erce disputes among 
Hegel scholars about what the Master “really meant”). In brief, Hegel’s 
philosophy holds that the ultimate goal of existence is its coming to con-
sciousness of itself through human beings. Hegel articulates this process into 
three moments, and he makes it clear that these correspond to the Christian 
Trinity. The fi rst is an absolutely self-related Idea, which Hegel identifi es 
with God  in himself ; God considered apart from creation. God in this form 
is not truly God, because he is still  merely idea. In nature, the second mo-
ment, we fi nd a concrete expression of God. Hegel treats nature as a great 
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chain of being approximating to the perfect self-relatedness of Idea. How-
ever, it is only in the third moment, Spirit (or humanity) that God/Idea fi nds 
its true embodiment. In Absolute Spirit, the self-related Idea becomes a self-
thinking, self-conscious thought. Thus, Hegel weaves a tale in which God 
begins as inchoate and comes to full expression through creation and, ulti-
mately, only through humanity (though Hegel is careful to tell us that this is 
not a temporal process). 
 As we shall see, there are rather striking parallels between these ideas 
and Boehme’s—at least as presented by Hegel. Though Hegel sees Boehme 
as a philosopher, and a speculative one at that, Hegel’s major objection to 
Boehme is that he expresses ideas in “sensuous” form. In Hegel’s philoso-
phy, this is called  Vorstellung (or  das vorstellende Denken ), often translated 
into English as “picture thinking”: the tendency to think in terms of images 
rather than abstract concepts. Earlier, I noted that, for Hegel, the  content 
(i.e., inner truth) of religion and philosophy is identical. The form, however, 
is quite different. Philosophy is purely conceptual, whereas religion uses 
“picture-thinking”: myths, allegories, images, and the like. For Hegel, what 
keeps Boehme from being a great philosopher is his almost complete, and 
often singularly bizarre, reliance upon sensuous images to express ideas. 
Hegel refers to Boehme as being, in this respect “a complete barbarian” 
( vollkommen Barbar ). 20 In Hegel, oppositions are normally seen to conceal 
an underlying identity, and we are now in a position to see the fundamental 
identity between Bacon and Boehme. Both are “sensuous” philosophers: 
Bacon with his empiricism and insistence on sensory observation, and 
Boehme with his much more profound philosophy, which nevertheless relies 
upon the sensuous image as a vehicle to know the supersensible. 
 Following his introductory remarks, Hegel offers a brief biographical 
sketch of Boehme, including a long, vivid account of Boehme’s mystical 
visions. Hegel’s treatment of these visions is devoid of both sarcasm and 
skepticism. This is in keeping with his attitude of open-mindedness—best 
exemplifi ed by passages in the later  Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sci-
ences —toward paranormal phenomena in general. 21 Hegel speculates that 
Boehme must have read “mystical, theosophical, and alchemical writings,” 
including those of Paracelsus. 22 He begins his actual account of Boehme’s 
ideas by saying that “Boehme’s profoundest interest is in the Idea, and he 
struggles hard to express it.” 23 In Hegel’s philosophy, “the Idea” has a spe-
cial, technical meaning, one which I alluded to earlier. The Idea is, in fact, 
the fi nal major division of Hegel’s  Science of Logic . In it, subject and object 
are overcome, so that Idea is ultimately idea of itself (or Absolute Idea, the 
fi nal category of the  Logic ). However, this self-related Idea becomes truly 
actual only in self-related  thought (i.e., self-consciousness). So, when Hegel 
refers to Boehme being profoundly interested in the Idea, we are again deal-
ing with the issue of self-consciousness and the nature of the “I.” 
 Hegel is famous for having said (in  The Phenomenology of Spirit ) that 
“the true is the whole [ Das Wahre ist das Ganze ].” And the whole must 
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include the negative: the whole contains evil as well as good, darkness as 
well as light. Negativity is one of the leading motives of Hegel’s system. The 
dialectic is driven by confl ict; within it, concepts spar against one another in 
order to generate new concepts. Hegel sees history as driven by negativity, 
as well. Hegel’s famous concept of the “cunning of reason” involves war, 
confl ict, and destruction, all tending to advance the revelation of the Ab-
solute in time. Indeed, at the root of all forms of human Spirit, Hegel sees 
Desire ( Begierde ) as a kind of negative will to absolutize the self, to annul 
the subject-object distinction. This negative force is actually made use of 
in the coming into being of science and philosophy; the negative in a sense 
is transmuted into the positive, into an essential part of the whole. Hegel 
sees the same basic thought-pattern at work in Boehme. He sees Boehme as 
struggling to articulate a conception of God that draws unity out of opposi-
tion, fi nding everything within God, even the Devil. Hegel writes: 
 The fundamental idea in Boehme is the effort to comprise everything 
in an absolute unity—the absolute divine unity and the union of all 
opposites in God. Boehme’s chief, and one may say, his only thought, 
is the divine threefoldess; to perceive all things as the revelation and 
representation of the Holy Trinity, so that it is the universal principle in 
which and through which everything exists; in such a way, moreover, 
that all things have only this Trinity in themselves, not as a Trinity of 
the ordinary conception [ Vorstellung ], but rather as the actual [trinity 
of] the Absolute Idea. 24 
 Hegel is here noting the similarity between the Trinitarian structure of 
Boehme’s thought and his own. (As I will discuss later, however, Hegel 
had only recently arrived at the familiar tripartite structure of system—
and Boehme may have infl uenced him in this.) Hegel claims, however, that 
Boehme’s particular use of the Trinity is part and parcel of his picture think-
ing. Hegel believed that he himself had  not modeled his philosophy on the 
Trinity. He held that the true form of philosophy resembles the Trinity sim-
ply because the Trinity is an anticipation of true philosophy, in the form of 
a sensuous image. Of course, this may be an instance (of which there are 
many) of a philosopher failing suffi ciently to understand himself. 25 
 Hegel then launches into a detailed discussion of the Trinity he fi nds in 
Boehme. God the Father contains an internal division. Hegel quotes Boehme 
as saying that God is simultaneously “darkness and light, love and wrath, 
fi re and light,” etc. God is one essence or substance, separated by anguish 
( Qual ). What this represents for Hegel is the “absolute self-related nega-
tivity” of the Absolute Idea, which is simultaneously absolute affi rmation. 
The self-relation of Absolute Idea is negativity because, in it, subject and 
object have been overcome and all externality banished. Anguish is the du-
ality of self-consciousness in God. Yet this duality is also one and simple: 
“I = I.” In God the Father, however, there is still only an unactualized  will 
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to self-consciousness. Hegel mentions that Boehme refers to God as  salitter 
or  salniter, saying “this great salitter is the hidden, unrevealed essence.” 26 
It contains all powers or qualities  in potentia . Hegel charges that Boehme’s 
attempts to defi ne these qualities are exceedingly obscure (as any honest 
reader of Boehme will readily admit). And he offers a long quotation from 
Boehme seemingly in order to illustrate this. 
 Commentators on Boehme always seem to differ in their lists of his 
“qualities” or “source spirits.” Hegel lists the following: “cold, hot, bitter, 
sweet, wrathful, sour, rough, soft quality [ weiche Qualität ], sound, etc.” 27 
Hegel’s chief criticism of the doctrine of source spirits is that Boehme fails to 
show that there is any necessity to there being just these spirits or qualities, 
rather than some others. There is a loose parallel to be drawn here between 
Boehme’s qualities and the categories of Hegel’s Logic. Hegel argues that his 
categories are all part of an organic system, in which each is necessary and 
each is what it is in relation to all the others. He is looking for that same sort 
of necessity in Boehme and fi nds it lacking. 28 
 Hegel reports that Boehme characterizes the second person of the Trin-
ity not just as “Son” but as “the Word, the Separator [ der Separator ], the 
anguish, the revelation, and generally the “I”ness [ Ichheit ], the source of 
all difference, of will and being-in-itself.” 29 The Son is a necessary comple-
ment to the Father because, as Hegel puts it, expounding Boehme’s ideas, 
“God as the simple, absolute essence is not the absolute God; in him is 
nothing to be recognized.” 30 Whereas God the Father is “source and germ” 
( Quellen und Keimen ) of all powers and qualities, the Son is their unfold-
ing. Compare this to what Hegel has to say in the later  Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences when he discusses the relation between God, as 
Absolute Idea, and nature: “God, as an abstraction, is not the true God, 
but only as the living process of positing his other, the world, which, com-
prehended in its divine form is his Son; and it is only in unity with his other, 
in Spirit, that God is subject.” 31 As we shall see, Boehme’s Trinity works 
differently from Hegel’s, but obviously both the language and ideas here 
are strikingly similar. 
 In any case, for Boehme’s God to be revealed to himself, a kind of sep-
aration must take place. Hegel quotes Boehme as saying “Nothing can be 
revealed to itself without opposition.” Just a year or so after giving his lec-
ture on Boehme, Hegel would write his own account of self-consciousness 
in  The Phenomenology of Spirit , in which he argues precisely that self- 
consciousness is achieved through the opposition of otherness. Fichte, in 
his  Foundations of Natural Right (1797), argued that opposition is a nec-
essary condition of self-consciousness—specifi cally the opposition of other 
self-conscious human beings. So, it is unlikely that Hegel derived this view 
from Boehme—but he must have found this coincidence between Fichte and 
Boehme to be remarkable. Hegel goes on in the lectures to quote Boehme 
at length, speaking of the necessity of confl ict and adversity to the develop-
ment of self-consciousness, and everything else. 
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 As Hegel tells it, Boehme’s “Son” is the refl ection of the powers within 
the Father. In the Son, God contemplates himself, and Boehme identifi es this 
as “knowledge of the  Ichts .” As Hegel points out,  Ichts is a play on  Nichts , 
“nothing,” but also upon  Ich , “I” or “ego.” Hegel states that “the  Ich of 
self-consciousness is contained within it.” 32 Hegel writes that “The Son, 
the something [ das Etwas ] is therefore I, consciousness, self-consciousness; 
the abstract neutral is God, the gathering himself together into the point 
of being-for-self [ Fürsichseins ] is God.” 33 The Son is the great Separator, 
who takes the qualities and powers that are bound into one within God the 
Father and “separates” them so that God comes face-to-face with himself. 
Hegel mentions in this context that Boehme also refers to the Son as Lucifer 
and remarks, “This is the connection of the devil with God; that is to say 
other-being and then being-for-self, being-for one [ Für-Eines-Sein ], so that 
the other is for one. And that is the origin of evil in God and out of God. This 
is the highest profundity of thought of Jacob Boehme.” 34 The “fall of Luci-
fer” involves the inward-fashioning [ Hineinbilden ] and inward- imagining 
[ Hineinimaginieren ] of the I as the fi re which consumes all. This is the neg-
ative aspect of the Separator and the “wrath [ Zorn ] of God.” Hegel com-
ments that “This is very bold and speculative. . . . Indeed Boehme has here 
penetrated into the entire depth of the divine being; evil, matter, or however 
it is called, is the I = I, the being-for-self—this is the true negativity.” 35 
 However, God’s othering or self-revelation is not complete until his pow-
ers are expressed in creation. And this, according to Hegel’s account, is the 
coming-into-being of the Spirit, the third person of the Trinity. Spirit is the 
unity of the light (the Son or Lucifer) with the powers latent in God the Fa-
ther: the creation of an independent world that is a continual revelation or 
expression of the powers of God. Hegel notes that, for Boehme, the Trinity 
is continually born in all things. All of reality is the revelation or unconceal-
ing of God. 
 Hegel concludes his account of Boehme by summing up what he takes to 
be his most profound ideas. Hegel names two: “the generation of the light, 
of the Son of God out of the qualities” and “the diremption [that is, tearing 
apart or separating] of [God] himself.” He then goes on yet again to com-
ment on the “barbarism” of Boehme’s form of expression, to which he says 
he cannot reconcile himself. But he closes the chapter by insisting on the 
profundity of Boehme’s ideas and by saying that “we cannot fail to see the 
profound craving for speculation which existed in this man.” 36 In the fore-
going, I have chosen to limit myself to Hegel’s account of Boehme’s Trinity, 
as it is the major focus of his discussion, but there is more to Hegel’s discus-
sion of Boehme in the  Lectures . For example, Hegel also discusses Boehme’s 
treatment of philosophy, astrology, and theology. And he deals with “three 
kinds of powers or  Spiritus ” in Boehme, which may provide the key to 
 decoding the mysterious “triangle diagram” found in Hegel’s  Nachlass . 37 
 In the fi nal analysis, what is clear in the  Lectures is that Hegel admires 
Boehme and takes his thought very seriously but is concerned to distance 
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himself from it at the same time. Hegel treats the parallels between his 
thought and Boehme’s as merely, it would seem, accidental: Boehme  antic-
ipates much in modern, speculative philosophy. But Hegel never once says 
anything that would indicate that he is indebted to Boehme or that Boehme 
in some way infl uenced him. To build a case for this infl uence, we must look 
at the fragments from the Jena period. 
 III THE JENA THEOSOPHIC WRITINGS 
 We know that, beginning in the Frankfurt period and while he was at Jena, 
Hegel was struggling to develop a philosophical style all his own. What we 
fi nd when we turn to the Jena fragments and notes, none of which were 
published until many years after Hegel’s death, is Hegel essentially “try-
ing on” the ideas and vocabulary of Boehme. It is clear that, despite his 
reservations, Hegel was strangely attracted to Boehme’s way of expressing 
himself. He admits this, in a way, in the  Lectures . After noting that Boehme 
uses the term  Urstand (which might be translated “original condition”) for 
“substance,” Hegel remarks “it is a shame that we cannot use this and many 
other such striking expressions.” 38 In fact, as we have already seen and will 
see again, Hegel did go on to employ some Boehmean expressions and now 
and then what can be characterized as a vaguely Boehmean “style.” 
 The fi rst Jena fragment we shall consider is a “myth” about Lucifer 
thought to have been composed by Hegel in 1804–05 (prior to the compo-
sition of Hegel’s lecture on Boehme—though precise dating of some of these 
texts is impossible). Hegel writes in this text: 
 God, having turned toward nature and expressed himself in the pomp 
and dull repetition of its forms, became aware of his expansion . . . and 
became angry over it. Wrath [ Zorn ] is this formation, this contraction 
into an empty point. He fi nds himself in this way, with his being poured 
out into the unending, restless infi nity, where there is no present but 
an empty transcendence of limit, which always remains even as it is 
transcended. 39 
 In Hegel’s “myth,” God externalizes himself in nature but becomes 
“angry” over it, and through this becomes conscious of himself. God’s wrath 
becomes the spirit of Lucifer, which refl ects God back to himself. Hegel crit-
icized his own myth as “the intuitions of barbarians” ( die Anschauungen 
der Barbarei ) because of its reliance on “picture-thinking.” The language 
and style of this fragment are echoed in the “Revealed Religion” section 
of the  Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). David Walsh states accurately that 
this section is “from start to fi nish identical with the theosophic Christi-
anity of Boehme.” 40 There, Hegel writes of the “fi rst-born Son of Light” 
(who is  Lucifer), “who fell because he withdrew into himself or became 
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self-centered, but that in his place another was at once created.” 41 (Walsh 
has also argued that Hegel’s use in the  Phenomenology of Spirit of such 
terms as “element,” “aether,” “expansion,” and “contraction” has its roots 
in his acquaintance with Boehme and Paracelsian alchemy.) 42 
 In the same period (1804–05), Hegel produced a work that has come to 
be called the “divine triangle fragment.” The original text no longer exists, 
but Hegel’s early biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, quotes from it and describes 
it at length. 43 Rosenkranz maintains that the text was heavily infl uenced by 
Boehme (and Franz von Baader) and he summarizes it as follows: 
 To express the life of the idea, [Hegel] constructed a  triangle of trian-
gles , which he suffered  to move through one another in such a way that 
each one was not only at one time extreme, and at another time  middle 
generally, but also it had to go through this process internally with each 
of its  sides . And then, in order to maintain the ideal plasticity of unity 
amid this rigidity and crudity of intuition, to maintain the fl uidity of the 
distinctions represented as triangle and sides, he went on consistently 
to the further barbarity of expressing the totality as [a]  square resting 
over the triangles and their process. But he seems to have got tired in the 
following out of his labour; at any rate he broke off at the construction 
of the  animal . 44 
 Hegel’s fi rst triangle (“God the Father”) describes a “Godhead” closed 
inside itself, similar to Boehme’s primordial trinity of confl ict within God, 
preceding his manifestation. In “God the Son,” the second triangle, God 
recognizes himself in the form of otherness. This otherness must be brought 
into unity with God, or it has the potential to become evil. Hegel states that 
“the Son must go right through the earth, must overcome evil, and in that he 
steps over to one side as the victor, must awaken the other, the self-cognition 
of God, as a new cognition that is one with God, or as the Spirit of God; 
whereby the middle becomes a beautiful, free, divine middle, the Universe 
of God.” 45 A third triangle, that of the Holy Spirit, then comes into being. 
Hegel writes that “the Earth as the self-consciousness of God is now the 
Spirit, yet it is also the eternal Son whom God intuits as himself. Thus has 
the holy triangle of triangles closed itself. The fi rst [triangle] is the Idea of 
God which is carried out in the other triangles, and returns into itself by 
passing through them.” 46 
 It seems clear that in this fragment (as well as in the “Lucifer myth” 
of the same period), Hegel is developing the outlines of his philosophical 
system. And to do so, he is employing the language and style of Boehme. 
Hegel’s fi rst triangle, “God the Father,” is analogous to the later  Logic 
(with its threefold structure of Being-Essence-Concept), while the second 
triangle, of the Son or earth, corresponds to the  Philosophy of Nature 
 (Mechanics-Physics-Organics). And the relationship between the two tri-
angles is strikingly similar to the relationship between Hegel’s Logic and 
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Nature: it is the  telos of Idea to become embodied as the natural world. 
(In Hegel’s words, the “Idea of God” becomes “the universe of God.”) In 
the third triangle, God intuits the Son, or earth, as himself, and achieves 
self-consciousness, a moment that approximates the role played by Spirit in 
Hegel’s mature system. Spirit—human Spirit—brings the system, and reality 
itself, to completion when it recognizes that it itself is the embodiment of 
Idea, and that all of nature (as well as history) is intelligible as a kind of 
progressive unfolding of its own being. 
 What is particularly odd about the triangle fragment is that it is so close 
to Hegel’s own description in the  Lectures of Boehme’s Trinity. We know 
that during roughly the same period in which he wrote the triangle frag-
ment, Hegel altered his philosophical system from four divisions to the fa-
miliar triad of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit—the 
same triad seemingly depicted in mythic, Boehmean style in the fragment. I 
would like to suggest the possibility that Hegel’s study of Boehme’s Trinity 
played a role in helping him to formulate his system as tripartite. I do not 
mean that Hegel got from Boehme merely the idea of a three-part system. 
Rather, I am suggesting that it may have been Boehme’s peculiar interpreta-
tion of the Trinity that helped Hegel to see specifi cally  how his own system 
could be unifi ed in a tripartite form. 
 To put things in the starkest possible terms (and at the risk of repetition), 
the tripartite system that Hegel eventually arrived at in Jena: 
 (1)  begins with the  Logic , which expresses a self-related Idea that is 
nevertheless  mere Idea; an inchoate reality (“God in himself”), 
which then, 
 (2)  “freely releases itself” as nature, a scale of forms (described in  The 
Philosophy of Nature ), imperfectly expressing or embodying Idea, 
culminating in, 
 (3)  Spirit (the subject of  The Philosophy of Spirit ), which understands 
itself as the fi nal fl ower of all that has gone before—as the fully ad-
equate embodiment of Idea; self-related Idea made fl esh in the form 
of living, human self-awareness. 
 Stated in its essentials, this tripartite system of thought is strikingly remi-
niscent of Boehme’s Trinitarian speculations. Given Hegel’s close reading of 
him, the resemblance between their philosophies cannot easily be attributed 
to coincidence. It thus seems quite plausible that Hegel was positively infl u-
enced by Boehme, and in a signifi cant way. 
 Of course, there are serious diffi culties with such a claim. Hegel’s system, 
in its broad outlines,  is strikingly reminiscent of Boehme—as interpreted 
by Hegel. It remains an open question as to whether Hegel has simply read 
himself into Boehme. If so, then it is entirely possible that Hegel arrived at 
the basic form of his system (described above) quite independently of his 
encounter with Boehme and that he is simply viewing Boehme in a distorted 
manner, through the lens of that system. 
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 The question of whether Hegel has read himself into Boehme remains un-
settled largely due to the fact that Boehme’s writings are so obscure and open 
to a variety of interpretations. The only way, therefore, to make the above 
argument fully convincing would be by supplementing it with a careful and 
unbiased study of Boehme, taken on his own terms. Anyone undertaking 
such a study would have to be fully attuned to the danger of reading Hegel 
(or any other thinker) into Boehme. (For this reason, studies of Boehme 
produced by scholars who are relatively  unfamiliar with Hegel are actually 
more valuable to those who wish to explore the Hegel–Boehme connection.) 
My own study of Boehme’s writings inclines me to the view that Hegel  has 
accurately described his Trinity, and that the ideas he attributes to Boehme 
are really to be found in the mystic himself. Needless to say, however, that is 
not a point I can prove in the present essay. 
 IV BEYOND JENA 
 Hegel’s interest in, and sympathy for, Boehme must have been widely 
known. In 1811, one of Hegel’s former Jena students, Peter Gabriel van 
Ghert (1782–1852), a Dutchman, sent him Boehme’s collected works as a 
gift. Van Ghert would not have done this unless it was plain to those who 
knew Hegel in Jena that Boehme was very important to him. Hegel thanked 
van Ghert in a letter of July 29 th , 1811: 
 Now I can study Jacob Boehme much more closely than before, since I 
was not myself in possession of his writings. His theosophy will always 
be one of the most remarkable attempts of a penetrating yet unculti-
vated man to comprehend the innermost essential nature of the absolute 
being. For Germany, he has the special interest of being really the fi rst 
German philosopher. 47 
 Hegel writes further in the same letter that Boehme’s endeavor “constitutes 
the most arduous struggle both to bring the deep speculative [content], 
which he holds in his intuition, into representation and so to master the 
element of representational [thinking] in order that the speculative content 
might be expressed in it.” 
 There are those who might prefer to believe that Hegel’s interest in 
Boehme was an aberration of youth, but that does not appear to be the 
case. Hegel never wrote extensively on Boehme again, but in addition to the 
1811 exchange with van Ghert, there is ample reason to believe that Hegel 
remained interested Boehme and never changed his evaluation of him. 
 A case in point is Hegel’s preface to the 1827 edition of the  Encyclopedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences . Introducing some of his basic ideas, Hegel 
mentions Boehme more than once. He writes, “The spirit is essentially con-
sciousness, and hence [consciousness] of the content made into an object. As 
feeling, the spirit is just the not yet objective content itself (only a  quale , to 
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use an expression of Jacob Boehme); it is just the lowest stage of conscious-
ness, in the form of the soul, which we have in common with the lower 
animals.” 48 Hegel goes on to write of Boehme: 
 The name ‘Teutonic Philosopher’ has rightly been conferred upon this 
mighty spirit. On the one hand, he has enlarged the basic import of reli-
gion, [taken] on its own account, to the universal Idea; within that basic 
import he formulated the highest problems of reason and tried to grasp 
spirit and nature in their determinate spheres and confi gurations. [All 
this was possible] because he took as his foundation [the thesis] that the 
spirit of man and all things else are created in the image of God—and, 
of course, of God as the Trinity; their life is just the process of their 
reintegration into that original image after the loss of it. On the other 
hand (and conversely), he forcibly misappropriated the forms of natu-
ral things (sulphur, saltpeter, etc.; the sharp, the bitter, etc.) as spiritual 
forms and forms of thought. 49 
 In the same text, Hegel also makes several admiring references to Franz von 
Baader. In support of his own attempt to “rationalize” religious doctrine, 
Hegel quotes volume fi ve of Baader’s  Fermenta Cognitionis (1824). There, 
Baader claims that the treatment of religion as only a “matter of the heart” 
is a view dear to atheists, who know that to undermine religion they must 
undermine the notion that a rational theory of religion is possible. 50 After 
quoting Baader, Hegel goes on to state that: 
 What is most sublime, most profound, and most inward has been called 
forth into the light of day in the religions, philosophies, and works of 
art, in more or less pure, in clearer or more obscure shapes, often in 
very repulsive ones. We can count it as a particular merit of Franz von 
Baader that he not only goes on bringing such forms to our recollection, 
but also with a profoundly speculative spirit he brings their basic im-
port expressly into scientifi c honor because on that basis he expounds 
and confi rms the philosophical Idea. 51 
 In an extraordinary footnote, Hegel writes “I am certainly delighted to learn 
that Herr von Baader agrees with many of my propositions—as is evident 
both from the content of several of his more recent writings and from his 
references to me by name. About most of what he contests—and even quite 
easily about everything—it would not be diffi cult for me to come to an un-
derstanding with him, that is to say, to show that there is, in fact, no depar-
ture from his views in it.” 52 Hegel then goes on to take issue with a criticism 
Baader made of one aspect of his  Philosophy of Nature . 53 
 Although Baader does make some favorable remarks about Hegel in the 
fi rst volume of  Fermenta Cognitionis , Hegel’s assessment of his relationship 
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with Baader seems to have been highly unrealistic. Baader, for his part, ap-
pears to have been simply puzzled by Hegel’s attention, and his insistence 
on their ability to “come to an understanding.” Clark Butler has referred to 
“Hegel’s abortive courtship of von Baader,” writing, “despite apparent dif-
ferences, Hegel sought to persuade both the public and von Baader himself 
that their positions were reconcilable. . . . Von Baader responded negatively 
to such overtures, though he respected Hegel as a critic of Kant, Fichte, 
and Schelling.” 54 It is not unusual for one prominent scholar to “court” 
another, for career advancement or often simply to establish an intellectual 
friendship. Baader, however, was a decidedly strange and marginal fi gure 
for Hegel to court. Nevertheless, this is in keeping with what I see as an 
increased openness in Hegel’s later career concerning matters relating to 
mysticism and esotericism. 
 We fi nd a further illustration of this pattern in Hegel’s revision of the 
fi rst book of his  Science of Logic , which he completed not long before his 
death. In the original 1812 edition, Hegel offers the following in a remark 
concerning “quality” in the section on  Dasein : 
 Qualierung or  Inqualierung , [which are terms from] a philosophy which 
goes deep but into a murky depth, refers to determinacy as in itself, but 
at the same time is another in itself. Or it refers to the familiar nature 
of opposition, as it is in its essence. In this respect, opposition consti-
tutes the inner nature of quality and is essentially its self-movement in 
itself.  Qualierung means therefore, in the aforementioned philosophy, 
the movement of a determinacy in itself, in which respect it situates and 
fastens itself in its negative nature (in its  Qual ) from out of another, 
signifying in general the quality’s own internal unrest through which it 
produces and holds itself only in confl ict. 55 
 In the revised 1832 edition, the above passage has been signifi cantly al-
tered and now mentions Boehme by name. The new version reads as follows: 
 Qualierung or  Inqualierung , an expression of Jacob Boehme’s, whose 
philosophy goes deep, but into a turbid depth, signifi es the movement 
of a quality (of sourness, bitterness, fi eriness, etc.) within itself in so far 
as it situates and fastens itself in its negative nature (in its  Qual ) from 
out of an other—signifi es in general the quality’s own internal unrest by 
which it produces and maintains itself only in confl ict. 56 
 Perhaps Hegel felt that he could not mention Boehme openly in the original 
edition. In the last years of his life, however, he had established himself as 
the leading philosopher in Germany and so seemed to feel more comfortable 
acknowledging his interest in Boehme. Thus we are faced with exactly the 
opposite of what many commentators on Hegel’s relationship to Boehme 
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would have us expect: instead of moving away from Boehme in his mature 
period, Hegel actually seems to be moving, in a very public manner,  to-
ward him. Hegel’s attempt to ally himself with Baader only reinforces this 
impression. 
 To conclude, it is worth noting that, during Hegel’s lifetime and in the 
years following his death, it was quite common for him to be linked with 
mysticism in general, and Boehme in particular. Friedrich Theodor Vischer 
(1807–1887) remarked that the Hegelian philosophy had come forth “from 
the school of the old mystics, especially Jacob Boehme.” 57 In his 1835 work 
 Die christliche Gnosis , Ferdinand Christian Bauer claimed that Hegel was 
a modern Gnostic and argued for his philosophical kinship with Boehme. 
Finally, and most amusingly, we must note the words of Schelling. In a 
lecture given in the 1830s, Schelling remarks disdainfully, “Jacob Boehme 
says: divine freedom vomits itself into nature. Hegel says: divine freedom 
releases nature. What is one to think of this notion of releasing? This much 
is clear: the biggest compliment one can pay to this notion is to call it 
‘theosophical.’ ” 58 
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 13  H. L. Martensen on Jacob Boehme 
 George Pattison 
 The main focus of this chapter will be the interpretation of Boehme by the 
nineteenth-century Danish theologian Hans Lassen Martensen. In addition 
to producing what was intentionally a “popular” book on what many re-
garded as an exceptionally obscure body of writings, 1 Martensen is signif-
icant and perhaps even unique amongst Boehme’s post-1800 theological 
interpreters in the extent to which he interprets and appropriates some of 
the most speculative elements in Boehme’s thought as being essentially com-
patible with an ecclesiastically orthodox theology. 2 However, even though 
he also shows awareness that Boehme is not an entirely unproblematic fi gure 
in relation to the mainstream of Christian dogmatic thinking, Martensen’s 
work exemplifi es the perils as well as the attractions of using Boehme as a 
resource for doctrinal theology. I shall conclude this chapter by using two 
other theological appropriations of Boehme, by William Law and Paul Til-
lich, to bring into focus how Martensen ultimately succumbs to these perils. 
 I 
 But who was Martensen, and why should his work on Boehme attract our 
special attention? Martensen is chiefl y remembered today as being the ob-
ject of many of Kierkegaard’s attacks on Hegelianism—Jon Stewart’s  Ki-
erkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered singles him out as the most 
frequent target of Kierkegaard’s most bitter sarcasm. 3 Martensen, born in 
1808 (and thus fi ve years older than Kierkegaard, whom, at one point he 
tutored on Schleiermacher’s  Glaubenslehre ), had a brilliant early theological 
career and went on to even greater success when, in 1854, he was appointed 
Bishop of Sjelland and Primate of the Danish People’s Church. 4 A blurb by 
T. & T. Clark, who published the English translations of his  Christian Ethics 
and  Christian Dogmatics , declared him to be “the greatest Scandinavian, 
perhaps the greatest Lutheran, divine of our century”. 5 That Martensen has 
been reduced to a footnote to Kierkegaard should not therefore lead us to 
minimize his signifi cance for his own time or the value of taking him as a 
case-study for the nineteenth-century theological reception of Boehme. Part 
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of his interest in this latter regard is, as we shall see, how his intellectual 
career stretched from the post-Hegelian debates of the 1830s through to the 
very different horizons of the later nineteenth century. 
 A key term in Martensen’s reading of Boehme is “speculation,” a notion 
that was central to the intellectual context in which he made his academic 
debut. In 1836, he returned to Denmark after a study tour of Germany. This 
had exposed him to a range of contemporary infl uences, including not least 
the Catholic mystical writer Franz von Baader and the speculative theo-
logian K. Daub, although Martensen’s biography suggests that an interest 
in speculation on the “inner life-process” of God was already established 
by 1834, when Hegel, Schelling, Baader, and Boehme were amongst those 
occupying his thoughts. In lecture series in 1837 and 1838, he was largely 
responsible for introducing Hegelian terminology and method into Danish 
theology, causing an effect not dissimilar to the vogue for postmodernism 
on American campuses in the 1980s. Martensen himself was probably not 
far from the truth when in rather self-satisfi ed terms he described the impact 
of these lectures as follows: 
 The effect of my lectures can certainly without exaggeration be char-
acterized as great and exceptional. A new life and feeling showed itself 
among the theological students. Philosophical studies worked their en-
ticing power, and the students were constantly discussing the highest 
problems. Certainly there were those, who are unavoidable in such cir-
cumstances, for whom the whole thing was just a matter of fashion. 
Hegel was the man of the moment, and if one had his stamp of ap-
proval, one stood at the summit of the age. Others were more serious 
about Hegel and studied him deeply. 6 
 Hegel subsequently disappeared from Martensen’s work, although, in truth, 
even in these early lectures Martensen did not so much identify himself as a 
Hegelian but, in the terminology of the day, as a “speculative theologian,” 
a term that encompassed both Hegelian and non-Hegelian thinkers. The 
latter included I. H. Fichte, P. Marheineke, J. G. Erdmann, K. Rosenkranz, 
and K. Daub, several of whom published work in Fichte’s  Zeitschrift für 
speculative Theologie . What, in this context, did “speculative” essentially 
mean? Basically, the claim was that the structures of human knowing—the 
forms and modes of human consciousness—were appropriate receptors of 
divine knowledge and that the phenomenological analysis of the content of 
the religious consciousness could yield an objective knowledge of God. 
 In the opening paragraph of the doctoral thesis that established his 
reputation in Denmark, Martensen claimed that such “speculative under-
standing of God and the divine things” was in basic accord with “the philos-
ophizing Fathers of the Church, as well as with the scholastics of the Middle 
Ages who taught that theology was philosophy, that true philosophy was 
theology, and thus claimed a unity of both.” 7 Both philosophy and theology 
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are rooted in the desire for knowledge of the truth, and if one distinguishes 
them on the grounds that one approaches truth through faith and the other 
through knowledge, this runs the risk of splitting truth into two, as hap-
pened in “a bad scholasticism.” 8 To avoid this, the search for truth begins 
neither in “pure thought” nor in doubt; rather philosophy itself must be 
relocated to the “ inside of faith.” 9 This means that a modern philosophi-
cal approach to God will have its starting-point in human beings’ religious 
self-consciousness. In Descartes, Kant, and Schleiermacher, this approach is 
unable to overcome the limits of subjectivity. Hegelianism, however, lays the 
basis for a genuine and objective speculative knowledge of God. In accor-
dance with this program, his early lecture series had titles such as  Lectures 
on the Introduction to speculative dogmatics (Winter Semester 1837–8) and 
 Speculative Dogmatics (Summer 1838). 
 At the same time, and like many contemporaries (again including Kierke-
gaard), his interest in the latest ideas from Germany was closely connected 
with issues of literature and aesthetics. The notion of “fantasy” played an 
important part in bridging these two fi elds (i.e., logic and ontology on the 
one hand and aesthetics on the other), and it is striking that he himself says 
of his late book on Boehme that, more than any other of his works, it ex-
emplifi es his belief in the positive role of fantasy in the representation and 
understanding of Christian truth. In the specifi c sense used by Martensen, 
“fantasy” is what Romantic philosophers and poets understood as the ac-
tive power of imagination and which they saw as integral to any act of 
consciousness, including knowledge of the external world. In other words, 
knowledge is not just a matter of organizing and reproducing the data of 
sense-experience, passively received, but is itself constructive. Against accu-
sations that this was “fantastic” in a merely negative sense, the argument 
was that such a procedure was the only way to do justice to the freedom 
that was the basic reality of human and divine life. At the same time, the 
image-making power of fantasy legitimates the use of myth and symbol in 
theology and gives them a role greater than providing mere “illustrations” 
to truths known more appropriately in a purely intellectual way. 
 Martensen’s “discovery” of Boehme was part of this ferment of ideas—
Hegel himself had, after all, identifi ed Boehme as “the fi rst German phi-
losopher,” and references to Boehme are found in Martensen’s early 
lectures—paradoxically most accessible today in Kierkegaard’s lecture 
notes—where, for example, he is used to illustrate the basic difference be-
tween Catholic and Protestant views of Christ (with Anselm offered as the 
counter-pole to the  philosophus teutonicus ). 10 But Boehme was also part of 
a larger reappropriation of mystical sources, including preeminently Meis-
ter Eckhart, to whom also Martensen dedicated a monograph (published 
1840). 11 
 It is, in fact, in this monograph that we fi rst encounter a signifi cant com-
ment on Boehme in Martensen’s published writings. Boehme is introduced 
as the “foremost representative” of mysticism in the evangelical churches. 
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As in Kierkegaard’s lecture notes, the distinctively Protestant nature of 
Boehme’s thought is emphasized, as is its difference from the mysticism of 
the Middle Ages: his “contemplation could only appear on the basis of Prot-
estantism and is saturated by the Reformation’s principle.” 12 Like the medie-
val Catholic mystics, “he knew that it was egoity which removed the human 
being from God” (“egoity” in the sense of both oral and epistemological 
self-centeredness). 13 But whereas the medieval thinkers understood this in 
a “one sided ascetic self-preoccupation,” Boehme “considered this from its 
universal, cosmic aspect and expressed his conception as a representation 
of Lucifer’s falling away from and struggle against God. The unfolding of 
this struggle, the light’s gathering triumph over the darkness, is world his-
tory.” And, adds Martensen, it is “this universal and objective tendency” 
that earns Boehme’s thought the epithet “theosophy.” 14 
 However, despite references to Boehme in these early works, there is lit-
tle extensive engagement with his work. Again, there is relatively little di-
rect discussion in the  Christian Dogmatics , the work that in 1847 gave a 
rounded exposition of Christian doctrine in terms that were in signifi cant 
continuity with the earlier lectures. Nevertheless, here too, and with the 
benefi t of being able to look back from the later monograph on Boehme, 
we can see several aspects of Martensen’s theology where there is a clear 
infl uence from Boehme. Take the case of Martensen’s Trinitarian specula-
tions. Whereas Schleiermacher had seen the doctrine of the Trinity as an 
attempt to explain and interpret the Christian experience of God as love 
and not to encourage any speculation as to the internal life of the Trinity 
over and above that general affi rmation, Martensen believes that there is a 
“knowledge” given in this experience and that it is possible to explicate this 
knowledge speculatively. The economy of Trinitarian revelation—human 
beings’ historical experience of God—also reveals God’s “essential relation 
to himself.” 15 Whilst our human limitations mean that we can only attain a 
“shadowy knowledge” of the essential Trinity, this same shadowy knowl-
edge is nevertheless said to be “ontological,” that is, a knowledge of the real 
being of God. 16 “God could not be the revealed, self-loving God, unless He 
had eternally distinguished Himself into I and Thou (into Father and Son), 
and unless He had eternally comprehended Himself as the Spirit of Love.” 17 
 All of this could be said within the parameters of Hegelianism, how-
ever. 18 But the way in which Boehme has helped lead Martensen beyond 
a purely Hegelian speculation can be seen in his sophiology. Sophiology 
is best known today in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Russian religious philosophy 19 and relates to speculation as to the status of 
the divine Wisdom (Greek:  sophia ). In full-blown sophiology, “wisdom” is 
not a mere attribute of divine nature but a distinct divine principle, possibly 
constituting a fourth divine entity in addition to the Trinity of Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. We encounter Martensen’s own sophiological tendencies 
when, in §56, in a section on “The Divine Hypostases,” he describes how, in 
contemplating “the heavenly image of the world as it arises out of the depths 
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of His own nature,” the primal Ego of the Father “sees the image of His 
own essence, His own Ego in a  second subsistence.” This divine refl ection 
on the “heavenly ideal world” is possible only when God knows Himself 
not only as Ego but as Logos, as speaking and spoken Word, as revealed and 
revealing. This “inner revelation,” in which God reveals Himself to Himself, 
is the dividing line between Christianity and Judaism. At its maximum, the 
Old Testament could only conceive of this self-revelation of the divine life 
as occurring via the divine Wisdom that as an eternal image of the world 
spoken by God in the act of creation is not itself divine but a kind of middle 
term between creator and creation. In Christianity, however, God is in Him-
self Logos, in Himself Wisdom. Divine self-consciousness does not require 
there to be anything other than God, merely for God “to think of Himself 
as another.” 20 In an earlier treatment of Wisdom in the section on the attri-
butes of God, Martensen speaks of Wisdom as “what speculation calls the 
idea, the world-forming thought.” 21 He also notes that “the theosophists” 
(which is how he characteristically refers to Boehme) speak of her as “the 
heavenly maiden, the divine  sophia ,” 22 and he depicts this Wisdom as the 
“artist” who worked with the Most High in creation but which completes 
its work only in human beings, in holy souls that know Christ. 23 Recalling 
again Martensen’s affi rmation of myth and symbol as legitimate modes of 
the knowledge of God, the implication lies near at hand that the creative 
 poiesis (that is, productive activity) of the imagination is the ultimate means 
in and by which the “divine depths” are revealed to human beings. And it is 
somewhere in this area, we might say, that speculation changes from being 
a way of stating the intuitive dimension of any act of knowledge to being 
a means of extending knowledge beyond the range of experience. Knowl-
edge of God derived from the revelation of divine love in the experience of 
redemption is on the edge of being transposed into something else, into an 
essentially poetic and imaginative mythology—but one that is at the same 
time being proposed as having genuine cognitive and ontological purchase. 
 II 
 Despite the evidence for the early and signifi cant infl uence of the German 
sage, it is not until 1881, 40 years later, that Martensen publishes his mono-
graph on Boehme. He states that, in the meantime, since his younger days, 
Boehme had “gradually faded away” from his attention, “although,” he 
adds, “modern philosophy and theology still kept me in contact with his 
ideas, during the whole of my life.” 24 Now, however, “a point in Böhme 
which has formed the subject of much philosophical discussion, and with 
which I had long been occupied, compelled me to return to the fountain 
head, to seek for myself grounds of a more solid and independent convic-
tion.” 25 He does not directly state what that “point” is, but the fact that he 
then goes on to discuss the subtitle “theosophical studies” and that both the 
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beginning and end of the book focus on the theme of theosophy suggest that 
the point is the nature or possibility of “theosophy.” It is suggestive that the 
Theosophical Society had been founded in 1875, six years before the pub-
lication of Martensen’s book, although I have not as yet been able to trace 
any direct connection. However, it is a striking thought that a career that 
began by reworking Hegel for theologians, might, at its conclusion, have 
engaged with the followers of Mme. Blavatsky. 26 
 Central to Martensen’s study are the claims that Boehme the man and 
Boehme’s main ideas—not least the idea of theosophy—are both essen-
tially Protestant and essentially congruent with orthodox Christian teach-
ing. Like Hegel, Martensen acknowledges the possible distortions that arise 
from Boehme’s vivid, materialistic, and unschooled language. “Many have 
regarded him as a visionary,” he notes, “and have placed his teaching in 
the history of human follies. In many libraries his writings are to be found 
under the rubric ‘ Fanatici .’ ” 27 However, Martensen’s own view soon be-
comes apparent, namely, that Boehme “combined with simple Christian 
faith and piety the most profound philosophical speculation” and that “one 
is surprised, amidst the obscurity and the gloom, by lightning which now 
gladdens and anon appals by the glimpses it affords us of Time and Eter-
nity, of the Divine, human, and demonic depths.” 28 Moreover, “he sought 
to promote a true and practical Christianity which should not be confi ned 
to the ‘sphere of the letter’: in this he coincides with the nobler pietism.” 29 
After listing his subject’s infl uence on Hegel, Schelling, Franz Baader, Saint-
Martin, and even Charles I, Martensen then gives a brief outline of Boehme’s 
life, emphasizing that his ecclesiastical enemies were driven more by malice 
than by any actual heterodoxy on Boehme’s part, and that both the phil-
osophical and personal qualities of Boehme’s thought were essentially in 
accord with Christian doctrine. 
 This remains a guiding thread of the exposition of Boehme’s ideas that 
follows. Martensen begins, as I have said, with the notion of theosophy 
itself. “[I]ts form,” he writes, is “that of intuition, immediate perception, 
central apprehension of God and existence.” 30 This might seem to make it a 
branch of speculative theology, but, he states, “Theosophy seeks to embrace 
far more than Theology. Out of the idea of God it seeks to apprehend the 
world, in all the circles of the universe to see things as they are in God.” 31 By 
this means it seeks to prove “that the principles of Christianity are identical 
with those by which the world itself subsists, and on which the foundation 
of the world is laid.” 32 As such, it bears comparison with the positive phi-
losophy of Schelling. 
 As in the brief comments in the Eckhart book, this kind of “objective, 
theoretical mysticism” is contrasted with the typical mysticism of the Mid-
dle Ages, which is seen as “subjective” and “practical”: “it is the mysticism 
of the mind as distinguished from that of the heart.” 33 It looks to under-
stand nature, the macrocosm, and yet “there is no genuine theosophy which 
is not qualifi ed by the mysticism of the heart.” 34 Martensen reiterates this 
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point by appealing once more to biographical data, saying of Boehme that 
he had “from the fi rst, sought only the Heart of Jesus Christ” until his vi-
sion of “the gracious maiden,” “the Eternal idea, the precious Sophia, the 
heavenly Wisdom,” who opens up the realm of theosophic knowledge. 35 
As a Christian thinker, Boehme is essentially scriptural and, even though 
some of his interpretations are clearly eccentric, “he lives and breathes in the 
fundamental perception of Scripture” as he seeks in it “a cohesion between 
the historical and the metaphysical.” 36 He is, as has been said, essentially a 
Protestant phenomenon, and yet his focus on super-historical principles also 
makes him a “super-confessional” thinker, a claim that Martensen backs up 
by reference to Baader, a Catholic thinker, having called Boehme “his real 
teacher.” 37 
 Martensen proceeds to give a broad-brush setting of Boehme’s thought in 
a history of ideas that involves the Kabbalah, Gnosticism (of which Boehme 
is cleared), and the intellectual life of the Renaissance with its interest in 
alchemy and magic. In connection with the infl uence of Paracelsus, we see 
in Boehme the interrelationship of microcosm and macrocosm focusing on 
the idea of life: “in this natural philosophy, Boehme is confronted by a  living 
intuition of nature . . . ” 38 Nature is not only object, but subject: “a universal 
life is diffused throughout nature. Will and imagination are everywhere at 
work, although not self-conscious, but plastically-working will and imag-
ination.” 39 Because these are not merely harmonious but develop through 
discord, the outcome is precisely  life. 
 It is this understanding of life as the dynamic interplay of difference that 
is also encountered in Boehme’s idea of God, where his central concern is 
“ the apprehension of the God of Revelation as the Living God .” 40 In mak-
ing this claim, Martensen once more adverts to the essentially Protestant 
nature of Boehme’s project. Insisting (again) that Boehme’s God “is the God 
of Christianity, the God of revelation and of the Church,” and emphasizing 
Boehme’s Trinitarian orientation, Martensen asserts that “whereas the Ref-
ormation had contented itself with reviewing and refashioning the dogmas 
that belong to practical soteriology, Boehme took up the speculative dog-
mas which the Reformation had passively accepted from Catholicism, at the 
head of which stands the doctrine of the Trinity.” 41 
 These comments implicitly ascribe an enormous importance to Boehme’s 
role in the history of modern Protestant dogmatics. Martensen is in effect 
claiming that Boehme is pointing the way to the theological completion of 
the Reformation and, as such, also defi ning the trajectory of future Protes-
tant theology. Furthermore, if we look back to the earlier work, especially 
the  Christian Dogmatics , with these remarks in mind, we can see that it is 
Boehme, even more than Hegel, who powers Martensen’s attempt to expli-
cate the inner divine life of the Trinity. Given the turn to Trinitarian thinking 
in Protestant theology in the twentieth century, one might regard this as 
fulfi lling Martensen’s prognosis, even if it was Barth rather than Boehme or 
Hegel who directly initiated this turn. 42 
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 As Trinitarian, Boehme’s God is fundamentally different from the God 
of mysticism: “while Mysticism, from Dionysius Areopagiticus down to 
Schleiermacher, defi nes God as the unvarying nameless One . . . Boehme 
demands a God who manifests Himself in differences, in contrasts, in defi n-
ing relations; and only this God is to him the true God” 43 —and readers are 
scarcely in any doubt that Martensen agrees. 
 It is this dynamic view of God and of God’s inner, living drive to man-
ifestation in and through “differences” that provides the theoretical basis 
for Boehme’s positing of “nature in God.” Here too, Martensen defends 
Boehme’s orthodoxy against the charge of confl ating God and nature. It 
is not a question of “matter” in God, “but rather a source for matter, a 
plenitude of living forces and energies.” 44 Nor is it a matter of a developing 
or emergent God—for which Jacobi had reproached Schelling. Christianity 
(and Boehme) “proclaims a God who is perfect and blessed in Himself from 
all eternity, and where love is not the  result of the world’s development, but 
its postulate.” 45 Hegel is criticized for interpreting Boehme in a pantheistic 
way, and Schelling is also found wanting. Only Baader (it seems) correctly 
sees that “Böhme’s God . . . is the God who is perfect in Himself, prior to 
creation and the world.” 46 Martensen now sets out to show that, despite 
Boehme’s use of alchemical terms such as salt, mercury, sulphur, and so 
forth, his doctrine of the divine life is authentically Christian. 
 I shall not now renarrate Martensen’s entire exposition, but it is worth 
noting how he gives special emphasis to the question of wisdom. In the 
section on “God and the Uncreated Heaven,” he explains how Boehme’s 
system begins with the simple indifference of the Abyss, within which “ mys-
terium magnum , there is a bottomless unoriginated Will.” 47 Since nothing 
else is, the only possible object for this will is itself: it can and must only 
desire itself. Yet in order to desire itself, it must in some way represent itself 
to itself; therefore, “the fi rst thing it does is to fashion for itself a Mirror, in 
which it can behold itself.” 48 In Boehme’s thought—as opposed to that of 
Kant—this “is not only a reason-mirror, a thought-mirror, but also a mirror 
of imagination and fancy.” Therefore, “To the imaginative Eye that looks 
into the mirror it reveals the whole pleroma,—shapes, colours, and fi gures; 
indeed as we shall fi nd in the sequel, it refl ects the image of the Triune God 
Himself. There is nothing either in heaven or upon earth which did not, at 
the beginning, become manifest in this mirror.” 49 However, as Martensen 
also goes on to point out, Boehme not only refers to this mirror as the 
eternal wisdom or eternal idea, but he “also calls this idea a Maiden . . . 
who stands, in the dawn of eternity, before the God who gives himself up to 
Self-manifestation, and who, so to speak, allures Him to manifest Himself, 
by showing Him the exceeding riches of His glory.” 50 This, of course, is So-
phia, “co-eternal with God” but “not God of God, but simply the friend of 
God.” 51 This maiden Sophia “stands before God as if in a vision, a morning-
dream of Eternity, which prophetically reveals to Him what He  can become, 
what He  can make Himself.” 52 Aroused to the desire of manifestation by the 
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“Magia” of sophianic maidenhood, a process is set in motion that issues in 
the full Trinitarian development of the divine life. 
 However, this does not exhaust the role of Sophia since, thus far, all that 
has been discussed is the immanent development of the Trinitarian life or 
how God becomes manifest to himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But 
how does God become manifest in creation, and how does God therefore 
become manifest to the creature, that is, to us? Here too, Sophia plays a vital 
part, since what the divine will chooses to bring to manifestation in creation 
is only what it has already beheld in the internal, primal, esoteric “mystical 
self-contemplation” or the “magical self-mirroring, the tranquil wisdom, 
where God, in pure introspection, converses only with Himself.” 53 If “eter-
nal nature” is the material in which this manifestation occurs, the eternal 
wisdom or idea is the pattern that shapes it in its manifestation. “There is 
here,” writes Martensen, “an eternal going-forth and an eternal entering-in. 
God eternally goes forth out of His inwardness to manifest Himself again 
in externality, and from this externality He again returns, enriched, into the 
tranquil inwardness.” 54 
 In reviewing this account, Martensen returns to the matter of the unfi n-
ished business left by the Reformation. Boehme’s Trinitarian speculation, 
he states, represents a real advance on the Athanasian Symbol, of which 
Martensen says that its God is “a god for mere thought,” whereas Boehme’s 
God is “a living Trinitarian God” who is not only capable of loving but of 
being love. 55 As such, his is a God corresponding to the evangelical break-
through and capable of founding the ethical consequences that follow. That 
God is revealed as the eternal overcoming of darkness by light, grounds 
the dynamics of the religious life itself : “the contrasts of manifestation, 
which constitute the regenerated personality.” 56 Whereas Calvin and Luther 
seemed to allow for a distinction between the secret and the revealed will of 
God, Boehme’s God is as He is in His manifestation, and His manifestation 
manifests Him as He is. This God is the living God, the God who is love, 
the God who grounds reconciliation. Therefore, this God “is, in his inmost 
Being, kindred to man, as man is kindred to God.” 57 But this, after all, was 
always the implicit assumption that allowed speculative theology to regard 
the analysis of human beings’ religious self-consciousness as a reliable guide 
to the real essence of the divine Being. 
 Nevertheless, Martensen also has a number of critical objections to 
Boehme, not least the fact that the latter begins his account with the Abyss 
or absolute indifference, something that, despite generally clearing Boehme 
of charges of Gnosticism, he does see as essentially Gnostic. Against this, he 
says, “Unless we begin with Consummate Love in perfect reality, we shall 
never fi nd it. The commencement must be ethical.” 58 Moreover, Boehme 
generally gives far too great a role to nature, which Martensen regards as 
merely “a condition and medium” for God’s self-manifestation, 59 but not 
itself divine. This is especially problematic with regard to Boehme’s discus-
sion of a “dark nature-principle” in God. 
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 Martensen’s approach to Boehme’s theogonic and Trinitarian writings set 
the tone for the rest of his exposition. Leaping over much of his discussion, I 
turn to the concluding sections and especially to the section dealing with the 
state of the soul after death, in which Martensen allows his own speculative 
tendencies fullest rein. 
 What Martensen fi nds decisive in Boehme’s teaching on the state of the 
soul after death is the latter’s description of this state as “a state of Inward-
ness and of the Kingdom beyond as a Kingdom of Inwardness, in which there 
is no outward corporeity.” 60 Not that there is  no corporeity, since “spirit 
and nature, the inward and the outward, cannot be entirely separated [but] 
Böhme teaches . . . that there is an inward and fi ner corporeity impercepti-
ble to the senses,—a corporeity which we do not acquire beyond, but take 
with us from this world.” 61 This is linked by Martensen to Paracelsus’s idea 
of a “sidereal” or “Light-body, which the pious and blessed develop into 
greater perfection as their heavenly attire.” 62 Martensen declines to pursue 
these questions further, “because they lead us into obscure subtleties,” 63 but 
he nevertheless affi rms the idea of the soul existing in what he calls “a certain 
intermediate corporeity . . . or, as modern students have called it, a symbolical 
body, which can only make itself known by shining and sounding, and which 
is destined to be succeeded by an actual body, when the hour of Resurrection 
arrives.” 64 The dead are like dreamers, “They are in a ‘ magia ,’ that is, they 
are self-conscious in a condition of relative non-corporeity; they perceive and 
comprehend, independently of a material sense-apparatus.” 65 The analogy 
with the dream-state is strengthened, he claims, by scriptural references to the 
dead as “those that sleep.” A “symbol” for this “magical” post-mortem state 
may also be found in “the dream which takes place in the Mesmeric sleep . . . 
the so-called clairvoyant and ecstatic states, in which the soul is, as it were, 
rapt from the body.” 66 However, he characteristically goes on to warn against 
confusing the two since there is no idea of eternity operative in the magnetic 67 
and mesmeric states, so the analogy is merely formal. Bound as we are to the 
corporeal forms of this world, we cannot comprehend the magical condition 
of the soul after death, in which time-space relations as we know them are ab-
rogated. And yet, he insists, even in heaven itself there is “a contrast between 
 near and  far ,  here and  yonder .” 68 Against Boehme, who, according to Mar-
tensen, distinguishes solely between heaven and hell, we may suppose there 
to be “many mansions” beyond death, and many “intermediate regions.” 
Furthermore, where Boehme supposes that the soul can no longer change its 
mind after death, Martensen argues that we cannot exclude the possibility 
 that the world and the scenes that surround the soul [after death] 
may not set it new tasks, inasmuch as time is not, in every sense, ex-
cluded. . . . How does [Böhme] know that, in that higher world, there 
may not be new manifestations of the Divine Will, with regard to which 
the soul may have to determine itself? And how does he know but that 
fresh problems may arise out of the native depths of the soul itself? 69 
6244-139-013-2pass-r02.indd   253 5/31/2013   10:23:55 AM
254 George Pattison
 Martensen focuses these questions on the issue of Christ’s descent to the 
Dead. Here, Boehme follows the standard Lutheran view that sees this as 
having a solely judicial and not a redemptive signifi cance, that is to say, 
that Christ went only to confi rm judgment on the devil and destroy his 
power, not to redeem the righteous kept until then in the underworld (as 
in Catholic and Orthodox teaching). In fact, Boehme effectively excludes 
the idea of such a descent because of the perfect reconciliation of wrath by 
love effected on the cross. However, Martensen deems Boehme’s defi ciency 
on this point to have been corrected by another theosophical theologian, 
Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782). Oetinger not only allows for 
the possibility of post-mortem repentance, but says that even the saved do 
not immediately enter into the fullness of eternal blessedness. “[H]e teaches 
that they advance from class to class, from grade to grade, from Abraham’s 
bosom, or the lower Paradise, to the higher heavenly region. After death 
we shall most certainly not at once be at home with the Lord, but there are 
many degrees of progress. Jesus guides us from station to station with his 
shepherd’s staff.” 70 
 Oetinger fi nds support for “his doctrine of the great diversity of souls and 
of spiritual states after death” in reports of appearances of departed spirits, 
a source of information that, as Martensen notes, is continued in contempo-
rary spiritualism. As for Martensen’s own view, he comments at the outset 
that “unless one professes pure materialism, and denies the conceptions of 
spirit and the spirit-world, one cannot deny the possibility that spirit may 
be able to manifest itself to spirit; nor is it possible to perceive what natural 
laws can prevent a purely spiritual ‘commercium’ ” 71 —a position for which 
he also fi nds support in Kant. However, he also notes that the majority of 
these reports concern spirits that are in one way or another incapable of 
entirely freeing themselves from their earthly bodies and that must therefore 
be presumed to be positioned rather low in the hierarchy of post-mortem 
states. More advanced souls will have more completely separated themselves 
from their earthly bodies and will therefore not appear in such sensuous 
forms. “[C]oming into closer relations with these souls” cannot therefore be 
expected to lead to “deeper insight into the mysteries of the world beyond, 
and perhaps even apprehend eternal truths, which one cannot already know 
from Revelation”. 72 It also follows that such spirit-phenomena as spiritual-
ism concerns itself with cannot be “a consoling substitute for that Christian 
faith in immortality which many have lost.” 73 Nevertheless, Oetinger’s view 
is both a corrective to his master, Boehme, and “betokens a new momentum 
of development in Protestant eschatology, which has attained wider expan-
sion only in the dogmatics of the present century.” 74 
 In fact—but without mentioning the infl uence of theosophy on his own 
thought—the points developed here are very much the points Martensen 
made in his own name in the  Christian Dogmatics , especially in §276 “The 
Intermediate State in the Realm of the Dead” where he argues for a Prot-
estant analogue to purgatory, albeit one purged (so to speak) of the “many 
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crude and false positions” associated with the “Romish” doctrine. 75 As 
often with regard to Martensen, it is once more Kierkegaard who supplies 
the clearest counter-position. In one of his Christian Discourses of 1848, 
“There will be the Resurrection of the Dead, of the righteous—and of the 
unrighteous,” Kierkegaard states that the Christian position effectively says: 
 ‘Nothing is more certain than immortality; you are not to worry about, 
nor to waste your time on, not to seek an escape by—wanting to 
demonstrate it or wishing to have it demonstrated. Fear it, it is only all 
too certain; do not doubt whether you are immortal—tremble, because 
you are immortal’. 76 
 Why “tremble”? Because the resurrection is a resurrection to judgment: 
 Immortality is not a continued life, a continued life as such in perpetu-
ity, but immortality is the eternal separation between the righteous and 
the unrighteous . . . immortality and judgment are one and the same. 77 
 The outcome of preaching immortality, then, is to direct the question back 
to the whole manner of a person’s life, so that Kierkegaard effectively re-
peats in modern form the teaching of the  Imitation of Christ : “Very soon the 
end of your life will be at hand: consider, therefore, the state of your soul.” 78 
The topic of immortality is not to offer a subject for speculation, but is there 
to incite us to self-examination and amendment of life here and now! 
 There is no evidence that Kierkegaard is intentionally rebuking Mar-
tensen in the discourse on Resurrection, although it is possible, but the ques-
tion itself was one of the earliest explicit points of contention between them. 
In 1841 Martensen had published a review of a collection of poetic works 
by J. L. Heiberg, who had been the fi rst major fi gure in Danish intellectual 
life to explicitly align himself with Hegelianism. One of these, the dramatic 
poem  A Soul After Death , tells in a rather humorous fashion the peregrina-
tions of a recently deceased soul who, refused entrance to both heaven and 
Elysium, is accosted by Mephistopheles who invites him back to his place, 
assuring him that everything there is just like what he is used to in Copen-
hagen, and many of his neighbours are indeed already there. It is entirely 
boring and in bad taste, but what’s to worry about in that? Martensen, 
perhaps extravagantly, compared Heiberg to Dante, and even ranked him 
higher with regard to his understanding of the metaphysical relationship be-
tween essence and appearance. In the fi nal line of his thesis  On the Concept 
of Irony , Kierkegaard remarks that, if any reader wants further “food for 
thought” on the question of the relationship between irony and actuality, he 
recommends they read Martensen’s review. I take this remark as itself ironic 
and as indicative that Kierkegaard did not regard either Heiberg’s poetic 
irony or Martensen’s speculative interpretation of  A Soul after Death as 
being able to deal with the real issues of life in all its complex and diffi cult 
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actuality. Or, to put it otherwise, the speculations offered by Heiberg and 
Martensen were a matter of myth, symbol, imagination, and poetry and 
not, as they themselves believed, a signifi cant contribution to knowledge: it 
is not the mythology or the poetic that is the problem, but simply its being 
confused with knowledge and with life. 79 
 III 
 I should like to bring out further the problematic features of Martensen’s 
use of Boehme by contrasting it with that of two other major theological 
fi gures, one from the eighteenth century and one from the twentieth: Wil-
liam Law and Paul Tillich. 80 Doing so will help us see what is distinctive in 
the Danish theologian’s approach and also to identify in external terms the 
weaknesses that, otherwise articulated, were already apparent to his one-
time student, Kierkegaard. 
 Law sees Boehme (whom he calls God’s “chosen instrument”) 81 as help-
ing to resolve major issues of doctrinal theology, particularly with regard, 
fi rst, to the relationship between reason and revelation and, second, to the 
nature of the atonement—both of which were prominent in the ecclesiasti-
cal disputes of Law’s time. In both cases the key is found in God’s consistent 
and persistent character and presence as pure, unqualifi ed love. 
 Law sees the question of reason and revelation as hinging on a proper 
understanding of the relationship between God, creation, and fall. In clas-
sic Christian theology, God’s original creation was, of course, good and, as 
such, testimony to the goodness and wisdom of its creator. However, Chris-
tian theologians diverged signifi cantly with regard to how far this testimony 
remained valid subsequent to the Fall. For those in the mainstream Catholic 
tradition, the fall diminished but did not eclipse or annihilate the image of 
God in human beings nor did it alter the fundamental relationship of crea-
ture and creator that provided the basis for an analogical knowledge of God 
from our knowledge of created things. This tradition was signifi cantly trans-
formed but, in its way, also continued in early modern English natural the-
ology, with the new “experimental” science of Bacon and the Royal Society 
playing the part assigned to Aristotelian metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas. 
However, a further development of this tendency led some in the direction of 
deism, namely, the view that nature has been constituted as a self-contained 
system subject to unalterable laws. In this situation any intervention or reve-
lation by a supernatural being could only occur as an act of violence against 
the normal course of nature. A very different approach, however, had been 
developed in the Augustinian tradition, an approach that was radicalized 
and acquired normative status in the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. 
This view saw the fall as not merely marring but utterly destroying the image 
of God in human beings, and also distorting the non-human creation in such 
a way as to render knowledge of God apart from revelation impossible. 
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 In works such as  The Spirit of Love , Law deliberately uses Boehme to 
help his readers through the impasse offered by the implacable opposition 
between deism and supernaturalism. The error of both, he suggests, is pre-
cisely to think of God and the world as related only in an external way. 
Even natural theology falls into the same trap and therefore cannot provide 
a secure defence against deism (a point that Law’s contemporary, David 
Hume, would also argue). However, “creation” is not an ensemble of beings 
outside of or external to God in any simple way, although neither is it a di-
rect manifestation of the divine life itself. Rather, the basis of creation is an 
“eternal nature” that is the “outward Manifestation of the invisible Riches, 
Powers, and Glories of the Deity.” 82 Moreover, “creation” is not a once-
for-all act that occurred at a specifi c point in the past: it is “not  once done , 
but ever doing, ever standing in the  same Birth , for ever and ever breaking 
forth and springing up in new Forms and Openings of the abyssal Deity.” 83 
The implication of this is that we can, in fact, have no full or adequate 
knowledge of fi nite, temporal nature without also taking into account its 
grounding in the eternal nature that, in turn, is a manifestation of the in-
visible life of God. The testimony of nature to the divine life is not a matter 
of external testimony or inference, as in natural theology, but it itself is one 
aspect of what is essentially a “twofold state”: in its perfection, nature “is 
Nature, and it is God manifested in Nature.” 84 Ultimately, reason and rev-
elation are therefore two approaches to the same basic reality and the basis 
for an opposition between them is carried away. 
 The same logic extends into Law’s treatment of the interrelated topics 
of the fall and the atonement. Here, he uses Boehme to argue that even 
in its most chaotic and “dark” states, creation is never without a possi-
ble connection to the mystery of the divine life: “all that is called  Nature , 
 Darkness , or  Self , not only has no Evil in it, but is the only Ground of 
all possible Good” 85 —except when it disconnects itself from its relation 
to God. Equally, God never ceases to be love in His dealings with fallen 
nature. Where the Reformed tradition—strongly refl ected in the Church 
of England’s Book of Common Prayer—consistently portrayed God as re-
vealing Himself to sinners in the form of wrath, Law emphasizes that both 
in creation and in redemption God is nothing but love: it is not, as in both 
medieval and Reformation teaching, that a wrathful Father needs to be pla-
cated and propitiated by the sufferings of His obedient Son. Rather, the Son 
is nothing other than the expression of the Father’s constant and enduring 
love. Such a God of love is only to be known through love, that is, through 
the heart giving itself over to the “spirit of love.” But this is possible only be-
cause Christ is not given to us in a merely external way, as in the Reformed 
doctrine that Christ’s righteousness is merely imputed to the ungodly, but, 
as Law puts it, “Christ given  for us , is neither more nor less, than Christ 
given  into us .” 86 The work of redemption thus continues the work of cre-
ation, bringing to perfection the twofold inter-involvement of creature and 
creator. 
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 Now I am not saying that Law does not affi rm and make extensive use 
of the speculative aspects of Boehme’s thought—he does—but the point is 
that he does so precisely in order to resolve specifi c and controversial points 
of doctrine. Moreover, as the titles of such works as  The Spirit of Prayer 
and  The Spirit of Love suggest, Law saw his own task in essentially practi-
cal terms, perhaps intuitively if not actually applying Luther’s dictum that 
theology is a practical rather than a speculative science. In other words, the 
questions he addresses and his manner of addressing them relate directly 
to concrete issues in living the Christian life. To the extent that his work is 
“speculative” it is so only in the service of practice. It is not knowledge of 
the abyssal being of God that is at issue, but whether it is really possible to 
live our lives in loving response to the experience of God’s love. 
 Paul Tillich (1886–1965) is a thinker of a very different kind from Law, 
and Boehme is only one of many sources fl owing into his mature theology, 
especially, we may say, Boehme as mediated by Schelling. However, whilst 
we can fi nd in Tillich elements that use Boehme in something like a specula-
tive way, he seems especially to emphasize what we might call the apophatic 
element in Boehme. 87 He typically sees Boehme as representing a mystical 
tradition that also includes Plotinus, Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, and Spi-
noza and he says of this tradition that: 
 it is the permanent function of mysticism to point to the abysmal char-
acter of the ground of being and to reject the demonic identifi cation of 
anything fi nite with that which transcends everything fi nite. 88 
 Tillich sees human existence as structured according to a sequence of in-
terconnected polarities, primarily individuality and participation, dynamics 
and form, and freedom and destiny. In these terms, all of us are, for example, 
individuals but also participants in a larger social reality and although the 
balance will be constantly shifting, there can never be a purely individual 
human being or a human being entirely without individual character. Simi-
larly, everything is both in a process of becoming and to that extent cannot 
be tied to or grasped by any particular form we impose upon it, but, equally, 
nothing is ever entirely without any element of form, since this would mean 
that there was simply nothing there to be talking about at all. In discussing the 
dialectics of dynamics and form Tillich says of “dynamics” that it represents 
“the  me¯ on , the potentiality of being, which is non-being in contrast to things 
that have a form, and the power of being in contrast to pure non-being . . . It 
underlies most mythologies and is indicated in the chaos, the  tohu-va-bohu , 
the night of emptiness, which precedes creation. It appears in metaphysical 
speculations as  Urgrund [sic] (Böhme), will (Schopenhauer) will to power 
(Nietzsche), the unconscious (Hartmann, Freud), élan vital (Bergson), strife 
(Scheler, Jung).” 89 And, he adds, this dynamic element “is open in all direc-
tions; it is bound by no a priori limiting structure.” 90 Although he does not 
make the connection with Boehme explicit (mentioning Kant and Schelling), 
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this  Ungrund is also akin to what he calls “the ‘ Unvordenkliche ’ (that prin-
ciple prior to which thought cannot take place, the  Prius of thinking).” In 
all these ways, then, Boehme’s thought is used to indicate that which sets a 
limit to all thought and speculation, to what cannot be thought conceptually 
or can only be thought negatively, paradoxically, or apophatically. It is that 
with which thought must reckon, but which cannot itself be thought. 
 If I am correct in characterizing Law’s and Tillich’s relations to Boehme 
as, respectively, practical and apophatic, they offer a clear counterpoint to 
Martensen’s approach, which is unashamedly speculative. However, this 
is also a pointer to what—from the point of view of the Christian ortho-
doxy he claims to expound—is problematic in his approach. Although, as 
author of a three-volume Chr istian Ethics , Martensen was well aware of 
Christianity’s practical dimension, he was consistently drawn by theoretical 
speculations and by the intellectual desire to advance cognition beyond the 
boundaries of pure reason set down by Kant. At the same time, he was al-
most gratuitously dismissive of the apophatic element in theology. 
 In his  Christian Dogmatics he argues that “if God is personal, we should 
expect Him to reveal Himself in the realm of personality, in a sphere of 
created spirits, by whom He can be believed in, known, and loved.” 91 The 
God who is believed in the covenantal relationship made concrete in the 
Church, the community of faith is therefore a God who, in faith, is  known . 
In the Spirit, the believing community becomes capable of searching out the 
hidden things of God. This leads Martensen to some critical remarks on 
apophatic theology: 
 When Dionysius the Areopagite and John Scotus Erigena teach that 
God is absolutely incomprehensible, not merely for us, but also in Him-
self, on the ground that if He were known, the comprehension of Him 
would subject Him to fi nitude, antagonism, limitation; when they assert 
God to be an absolute mystery, above all names, because every name 
drags Him down into the sphere of relations; when they refuse to con-
ceive of God save as the simply one ( to haplo¯s hen ), as pure light, which 
does not differ from pure darkness, in which neither way nor path is dis-
cernible; when they object to calling God anything but “pure nothing,” 
not because of His emptiness, but because of His inexpressible fullness, 
in virtue of which he transcends every “something,”—on which ground 
they also defi ne Him as super-essential ( huperousios )—they give utter-
ance, no doubt, to their sense of the unfathomable depth of the mystery; 
but still such a mystical, neo-platonic mode of looking at the subject is 
an error—is a falling back on the indeterminate absolute of pantheism. 
By excluding the idea of understanding the Divine nature, mysticism 
excludes also the possibility of a revelation. For to comprehend a being 
is to know it in its relations; and if it did not pertain to the nature of 
God to enter into relations, to make Himself intelligible, He would not 
have revealed Himself. 92 
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 It is, I suggest, precisely the problem with Martensen that not only does his 
work pursue a speculative interest that has become separated out from its 
practical context, but he does so without retaining what has been called the 
“apophatic marker” that, in my view, should accompany all good theology. 
This also suggests that I believe that Kierkegaard was right to see Martensen 
as having signally failed to recognize the necessary limitations of human 
knowledge with regard to God and, for all his brilliance, as having been 
“speculative” in a derogatory sense. That, however, does not foreclose on 
the question as to the value of a creative and visionary approach to theology 
that is appropriately balanced by the wisdom of unknowing. 
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 14  The Place of Jacob Boehme in 
Western Esotericism 
 Arthur Versluis 
 Historically, one can fi nd many efforts to label or “place” the vast and com-
plex work and thought of Jacob Boehme. For some, Boehme is best un-
derstood in the context of Pietism; 1 for others, he exemplifi es enthusiasm, 
often more or less synonymous with irrationalism; 2 for others, there is a 
Boehme most important for his philosophical infl uences; 3 for others, he rep-
resents mysticism; 4 and at least in the case of Romanian physicist Basarab 
Nicolescu, 5 his work is even interpreted as shedding light on some discov-
eries of modern physics! One could say that there is a Boehme for every 
generation and purpose. While recognizing that no label or categorization 
schema is suffi cient for a fi gure of Boehme’s magnitude, nonetheless, when 
we survey Boehme’s place in the growing literature on Western esotericism, 
we fi nd many contradictions. In fact, Boehme’s inconvenient place in the 
study of Western esotericism is both central and revealing. 
 The academic fi eld of Western esotericism, for its part, is comparatively 
recent, dating to the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty- 
fi rst centuries. 6 In this fi eld, different scholars have offered alternative mod-
els for understanding or mapping what is included and what is excluded. 
Virtually every model includes Jacob Boehme. Yet even here, interpretations 
of Boehme’s work and its signifi cance differ. Boehme has a central place in 
the fi eld of Western esotericism because of the historical role that he played: 
he represents the confl uence and synthesis of a whole array of esoteric cur-
rents, including alchemy, astrology, Christian Kabbalah, magic, and mysti-
cism, into a sophisticated body of work infl uential not only for all those in 
the subsequent tradition of Christian theosophy, but also for many others 
outside that current as well. Boehme looms so large in the history of esoter-
icism that he cannot be excluded from it, yet his inclusion actually compels 
scholars to reconsider what a term like “Western esotericism” demarcates. 
Boehme’s role in histories of Western esotericism is signifi cant, to be sure. 
But he also presents a very real challenge for understanding what these latest 
labels, “esotericism,” and even more, “esoteric,” really mean. 
 Historically, Boehme has been in a category termed “mysticism,” but 
in the period from the 1990s to the present, some scholars have sought to 
create a new category, “Western esotericism,” and to place Boehme as an 
6244-139-014-2pass-r02.indd   263 5/31/2013   10:21:41 AM
264 Arthur Versluis
exemplary fi gure within that. Why create this new category, and how is it to 
be distinguished from “mysticism,” if indeed such a distinction holds? And 
if one accepts this new category, what advantages does it offer for under-
standing a complex fi gure like Boehme? To answer questions like these, we 
fi rst must consider Boehme as a mystic. 
 I BOEHME AS MYSTIC 
 Let us begin with an overview of the secondary literature “placing” Boehme 
as a mystic. Secondary literature of the early twentieth century tended to 
position Boehme as central among mystics, albeit often with various ca-
veats. Rufus Jones (1863–1948), a professor at Haverford College, author 
of various books on mysticism, and a Quaker, emphasized as central to 
Boehme’s work his “way of salvation” or experiential “process of salva-
tion.” 7 For Jones, Boehme is not so much a nature mystic as he is a premier 
exponent of “spiritual religion,” exemplifi ed best for him by the Quakers. 
And Rudolph Steiner (1861–1925)—founder of the spiritual/occult philos-
ophy of Anthroposophy, and of its allied movement, the Anthroposophical 
Society—emphasized about Boehme his possession of the keys to nature, 
although Steiner did also acknowledge and indeed directly “place” Boehme 
in the tradition of European mysticism going back to Eckhart and Tauler. 8 
Evelyn Underhill also refers frequently to Boehme in her seminal work 
 Mysticism . 9 
 Indeed, Boehme, during much of the twentieth century, was placed by 
most scholars into the perhaps nebulous category of mysticism. But “mysti-
cism,” as is well known, is a category often freighted with opprobrium. Stan-
dard defi nitions of mysticism, even into the twenty-fi rst century, included 
connotations like irrationalism and delusion. Many scholars of mysticism, 
in response, overcompensated with what we might term hyperanalysis of 
categories and types of mysticism. In secondary literature that analyzes mys-
tical literature and phenomena, Boehme is largely noticeable by his absence. 
Classical examples of this literature include the pugnacious R. C. Zaehner, 
as well as W. T. Stace and Paul Marshall. 10 Some, in analyzing mysticism, 
so intensify their rational faculties as to attempt to analyze mysticism more 
or less out of existence, as Steven Katz does, claiming it as fundamentally a 
constructed or, in other cases, a linguistic phenomenon. 11 
 Here, too, Boehme is either peripheral to the respective authors’ cases or, 
in fact, entirely ignored. Boehme is notoriously diffi cult for the creativity 
and density of his language, for the volume of his writings, for his unique 
vocabulary drawn from sources as varied as astrology and alchemy, and for 
the magisterial quality of his declarations. For these and many other rea-
sons, Boehme is often problematic as an example. Furthermore, if one’s case 
is that Boehme’s work is largely or purely a linguistic construct, such a claim 
goes entirely against Boehme’s own clear assertions that in fact he possessed 
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direct spiritual knowledge and that those who would judge him unfairly 
would be better off not opening his works at all. 12 That is, Boehme empha-
sizes his own spiritual authority and direct gnostic experience. 13 When a sec-
ondary author contravenes these claims, he effectively places himself above 
his subject, claiming in effect to know more than Boehme about Boehme’s 
claims to knowledge. Such implied scholarly claims of supervenience of 
their subjects come freighted with their own issues. 
 Boehme is a reference point for Paul Marshall, for instance, who includes 
him in a list of “extrovertive” mystics. The term “extrovertive,” coined by 
W. T. Stace, presumes that there is a class of mystical phenomena to be dif-
ferentiated from “introverted” or inward experiences of transcendence. 14 
Marshall lays great emphasis on this notion, claiming that “a special cate-
gory of experience deserves to be recognized, a type of experience in which 
the world is seen anew, transformed by unity, knowledge, light, love, eter-
nity.” 15 “To qualify as extrovertive, a mystical experience should bring a 
transformed apprehension of the natural world,” Marshall continues, 
through such experiential qualities as “unity,” “intuitive comprehension 
of the world,” “luminous transfi guration of the environment,” and/or “an 
altered temporality that includes all times and places.” Boehme, he thinks, 
exemplifi es an extrovertive mystic because his mysticism emphasizes insight 
into hidden aspects of nature. 16 
 Other secondary literature on mysticism emphasizes direct individual ex-
periences of unity. Here we might mention especially Robert K. C. Forman, 
who emphasizes Pure Consciousness Events, or PCEs, as central to mys-
ticism. 17 Allied in some respects to Forman is some of the neuroscientifi c 
literature on mysticism, notably works written or coauthored by Andrew 
Newberg, who, from the 1990s onward, advanced a model of understanding 
mysticism as the progressive transcendence of subject-object differentiation, 
during which process emotional attachments drop away. This “deafferenta-
tion” can occur as a function of aesthetic experience, but it becomes stron-
ger or more complete as one approaches what Newberg and d’Aquili term 
“Absolute Unitary Being” (AUB). 18 
 Physicist Basarab Nicolescu, a central fi gure in the transdisciplinary 
movement, in turn regards Newberg as a preeminent example of a transdis-
ciplinary researcher who is open to transcendence and is not a reductionist. 
Nicolescu is author of  Science, Meaning, and Evolution: The Cosmology of 
Jacob Boehme , among other works, and interprets Boehme through a lens 
rather akin to that of those who claim him as an “extrovertive” mystic, that 
is, as primarily offering insights into nature and cosmology. 19 Such a per-
spective on Boehme does ignore the nondual aspects of Boehme’s work—in 
particular, concepts like the  Ungrund (not-ground) and  Nichts (Nothing-
ness), which signify different aspects of sheer transcendence of self-other. 
But the importance of Nicolescu’s work is that for him, even more than for 
a scholar of mysticism like Marshall, Boehme provides the ideal exemplar 
of cosmological insight or gnosis. 
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 There is, of course, a very different mode of “placing” Boehme, which 
is to condemn him as “heretical.” From the seventeenth century onward, 
Boehme in particular and Protestant “enthusiasts” more generally were 
sometimes derogated as akin to the Gnostics of antiquity. Richard Baxter 
(1615–1691), for instance, the bitterly anti-enthusiast author of the well-
known  Reliquiae Baxterianae (1696) regarded Boehme’s “cloudy nonsense” 
and “enigmatical expressions” as having their roots in the “hideous bom-
bardical words” of the “fi rst heretics,” Basilides and Valentinus. 20 These 
kinds of condemnations correspond to the classifi cation “mysticism” for 
Boehme, who is placed in a cluster of other authors, some of whom were 
clearly mystics, like Johannes Tauler, and others of whom are more ambig-
uous. The category “mysticism” is thus typically allied with “heresy” and 
“Gnosticism,” as well as with individualist “enthusiasm,” and opposed to 
Baxter’s Puritanism or to some other doctrinal constellation represented as 
synonymous with “orthodoxy,” “faith,” and “truth”. 21 
 Even more specifi cally, for a recent anti-Gnostic theorist like Cyril O’Re-
gan who writes in the tradition of anti-Gnostics Eric Voegelin and Hans Blu-
menberg, Boehme represents the reintroduction of Valentinian Gnosticism 
into the early modern and modern periods. Like his predecessors Voegelin 
and Blumenberg, O’Regan is keen on the scent of “Gnosticism” as that 
projected category for heretics which “modernity” has to vanquish once 
again, and he sees Boehme as pivotal for the surreptitious reintroduction of 
Valentinian Gnosticism into the modern period. 22 O’Regan’s work demon-
strates once again how Boehme’s mysticism can become a kind of screen for 
a projected image. But once again, Boehme is the required screen. Even as a 
foil in O’Regan’s prolix argument, Boehme is central. 23 
 These remarks on (sometimes polemical) scholarship on mysticism pro-
vide a context for understanding how Boehme subsequently appears in 
scholarship on Western esotericism. Boehme’s mysticism is depicted often 
as cosmological, as nature-mysticism, or as “extroverted,” but the category 
“mysticism” defi nitely comes fi rst. Indeed, even in the early twenty-fi rst 
century, Boehme remained classifi ed fi rst as a mystic and only secondarily 
as a fi gure in Western esotericism. Why is this important? To answer this 
question, we should survey how Boehme appears in scholarship on Western 
esotericism. 
 II BOEHME AND WESTERN ESOTERICISM 
 The founding fi gure of the academic study of Western esotericism as its 
own category is Antoine Faivre, who had published a great deal on  natur-
philosophie and related subjects before turning his attention more specif-
ically to an area he termed “Western esotericism.” The slightly ungainly 
suffi x to “esoteric,” “icism,” came about because “esoterism” was already 
in use by Traditionalists in the line of René Guénon (1886–1951) to signify 
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the esoteric center or essence of religion. “Traditionalism” is a loose term 
applied to Guénon, A. K. Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), Frithjof Schuon 
(1907–1998), and others of this school, who assert an esoteric  prisca theolo-
gia or  religio perennis at the center of the world’s great religious traditions. 
Since “esoterism,” in this school, designated an approach to the hidden pri-
mordial center of all religions, “esotericism” became a preferred term so as 
to demarcate an area of academic inquiry without the Traditionalist conno-
tations of “esoterism.” Those who use the term “esoterism” “tend,” Faivre 
writes, “just like mystics, to maintain a discourse marked by subjectivity.” 
He demarcates, rather, an “historical survey” that “treats essentially the 
modern period of Western esotericism” based on a “methodological base” 
of “guiding criteria.” 24 
 Why are both mysticism and Traditionalism a problem here, right at the 
founding of the modern study of “Western esotericism”? Both mysticism 
and Traditionalism tend to make truth claims—and mystics in particular 
do so as a matter of course. To establish the fi eld of “Western esotericism” 
within late twentieth-century academic discourse, it was necessary to clearly 
differentiate it from mystics and from Traditionalists, that is, from those 
who assert that there is the possibility of direct spiritual insight or realiza-
tion, or gnosis. But that is in some respects an ironic distinction because 
some central fi gures (including Boehme) who are included by Faivre as ex-
emplary of “Western esotericism” in fact assert quite boldly that they are in 
possession of direct cosmological and metaphysical insight into the hidden 
aspects of nature and the divine. They make “truth claims.” But the term 
“Western esotericism” was invented to avoid the “mysticism” and “subjec-
tivity” implied by “esoterism” and its truth claims, so there is an implicit 
confl ict between the category “esotericism” and its exemplars. We will re-
turn to this question. 
 But fi rst, let us see how Boehme appears in various surveys of West-
ern esotericism, beginning with Faivre’s own  Access to Western Esotericism 
(1993), a founding work for the fi eld. For Faivre, notwithstanding the un-
derlying problem that Boehme is frequently categorized as a mystic, Boehme 
and Boehmean theosophy play a central role in what he construes as West-
ern esotericism. Indeed, after the term “gnosis,” comes for Faivre, “theos-
ophy,” which “confers on esotericism this cosmic, or rather cosmosophic 
dimension.” 25 Boehmean theosophy, writes Faivre, “renders possible a phi-
losophy of nature.” Yet at the same time, it is in itself “an amalgam between 
the medieval mystical tradition (that of fourteenth-century Germany) and 
the  Naturphilosophie inspired by Paracelsus.” And in fact, Faivre explic-
itly acknowledges not only Boehme’s debt to fourteenth-century German 
mysticism, but also refers specifi cally to the importance of the  Ungrund in 
Boehme’s esotericism. 26 
 Faivre uses a typological approach that proposes Western esotericism to 
consist in (1) a practice of correspondences, (2) living nature, (3) imagina-
tion, (4) transmutation (5) a praxis of concordance, and (6) transmission. 27 
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A predominance of these characteristics marks a work or fi gure as belonging 
to the category “Western esotericism.” Although he does allude to a piv-
otal  via negativa concept like  Ungrund in Boehme’s work, nonetheless, both 
Boehmean theosophy and Western esotericism are defi ned by Faivre in such 
a way as to exclude mysticism and to emphasize esotericism as cosmological 
in nature. To use the term derived from Stace’s assertions about mysticism, 
Faivre in effect characterizes Boehme’s esotericism as “extrovertive.” The 
fundamental question, of course, is why Boehme in particular, or Christian 
theosophy more broadly, should be classifi ed as belonging to the category 
“Western esotericism” as opposed to the category “mysticism.” 
 Faivre writes that “the difference with mysticism appears especially, of 
course, in the fact that the contemplative claims to abolish images, while for 
Boehme and theosophers generally, the image is the fulfi llment.” 28 Theoso-
phy is, he continues, “a theology of the image,” for “each being possesses a 
fi nality of perfection, which passes through the image and its incarnation.” 29 
Hence, Faivre lays primary emphasis on the symbolic aspects of Boehmean 
theosophy and on Boehme as a philosopher of Nature. 30 These aspects are 
certainly there in Boehme’s work. However, there remains a fundamental 
question as to why, nonetheless,  in toto Boehme’s work should not belong 
to the category of “mysticism” to which it had long been assigned in schol-
arship. For that matter, Boehme could be classifi ed as “visionary religion”; 
it is not clear why the category “esotericism” is actually necessary. After all, 
a theology of the image is another way of describing  via positiva mysticism 
from Dionysius the Areopagite onward. 
 In a later work, in French  Accès de l’ésotérisme occidental, Tome II (Paris, 
1996) and in English  Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition (2000), Faivre 
again returns to the centrality of Boehme and theosophy for the category 
“Western esotericism,” and once again grapples with the awkward category 
of “mysticism.” In this case, he draws on the work of Bernard Gorceix, 
and in particular on Gorceix’s  Flambée et agonie , a work whose subtitle is 
 Mystiques du XVIIe siècle allemand. 31 Gorceix inconveniently and clearly 
describes Boehmean theosophy in terms of mysticism, and hence Faivre has 
to remark that “Not that the theosophical element is always absent among 
these mystics, but mysticism is not theosophy.” 32 Yet the “theosophical tra-
dition is presented in  Flambée et agonie as inseparable from the religious 
context, principally mystical, in which it could fl ower.” 33 Gorceix, in other 
words, demonstrates that the seventeenth century is in fact “the third peak 
in the history of German mysticism.” 34 Hence, the fundamental problem of 
developing a distinction between mysticism and esotericism, or even mysti-
cism and Boehmean theosophy, remains unresolved here for Faivre. 
 Subsequently, in his revised version of an earlier brief handbook, 
 L’Ésotérisme (1992), published in 2010 as  Western Esotericism: A Concise 
History , Faivre seeks to demarcate “mysticism” from “esotericism,” noting 
various cosmological themes like “transmutation” that he fi nds character-
istic of esotericism, and then noting that “certain [of his ideal] components 
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can be common to several forms of thought, for example, both to ‘mys-
ticism’ and to ‘esotericism.’ ” 35 But here he does not further explain how 
those characteristics might correspond to anything like  via positiva or  via 
negativa mysticism. And in a subsequent chapter, he places Boehme in the 
broader current of Germanic  Naturphilosophie , remarking that “Christian 
theosophy shares the characteristics enumerated above with the other West-
ern esoteric currents. It nevertheless possesses certain characteristics that, 
taken together, serve to specify its originality.” 36 These characteristics are 
(1) a God-Humanity-Nature triangle, (2) direct access to higher worlds lead-
ing to a “central vision,” and (3) the primacy of the mythical. 37 In Faivre’s 
discussion of Boehme in this book, he takes care never to use the word 
“mysticism,” and although he makes mention of Boehme’s important con-
cept of the  Ungrund , it is primarily in an attempt to distinguish him from a 
mystic like Meister Eckhart. Thus, here too, many foundational questions 
regarding efforts to distinguish “mysticism” and “esotericism”—especially 
as regards the pivotal fi gure of Boehme—are elided. 
 For a resolution to such questions, we might turn to a book with the 
promising title of  Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition of Mystical Visions and 
Unions (1993) by Canadian scholar Dan Merkur. Merkur’s fi rst chapter 
is entitled “The Study of Mystical Experiences,” and he briefl y surveys 
the twentieth-century history of the study of mysticism without showing 
whether or how mysticism and esotericism might coincide or differ. Later 
in the book, Merkur does refer to Boehme (or Boehme’s philosophy) at the 
end of a chapter on spiritual alchemy, as well as in relation to Merkur’s 
discussion of Gnosticism. 38 But Boehme remains more or less clearly here an 
example of a mystic, and the relationship between Boehme and terms like 
mysticism and esotericism remains unexamined. 
 Might we fi nd clarifi cation in Kocku von Stuckrad’s  Western Esotericism: 
A Brief History of Secret Knowledge (2005)? He offers a new approach to 
the study of esotericism, one deeply infl uenced by (de-)constructionist ap-
proaches to the study of religion, arguing that “esotericism” does not really 
exist except as a discursive concept in the heads of scholars, and that one 
would be better off using a term like “the esoteric.” 39 Von Stuckrad argues 
for the study of the esoteric as a discourse analysis that focuses on particular 
motifs like “the dialectic of the hidden and revealed” or “eternal knowl-
edge.” 40 As regards Boehme, he straightforwardly places him in the tradi-
tion of German mysticism, remarking “the infl uence of the German mystical 
tradition (Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler) . . . is clearly evident.” 41 Hence 
von Stuckrad resolves the “problem” of Boehme’s place in Western esoteri-
cism fairly simply: Boehme is a mystic; one can analyze his work  as esoteric, 
and one does not need to resort to “tautological”  Idealtypen like Faivre’s 
cosmological characteristics to do so. 42 
 A subsequent survey of Western esotericism was offered by Joscelyn 
Godwin in a work with the title  The Golden Thread: The Ageless Wisdom 
of the Western Mystery Tradition (2007). Originally published as a series of 
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lapidary essays in  Lapis (New York Open Center), this collection was even-
tually published as a book by the Theosophical Society Press. Characteristi-
cally elegant, Godwin’s prose offers us not an academic model for the study 
of Western esotericism, like the other titles more or less do, but rather a 
graceful introduction for the general reader to a variety of esoteric subjects. 
He offers some succinct observations on Boehme and theosophy, remarking 
that “what most differentiates Christian theosophy from the mainly Catho-
lic tradition of mysticism is that, as an experiential path, it addresses the in-
tellect as well as the emotions.” 43 Further, “the intellectual side of theosophy 
is more than the mere satisfaction of curiosity: it is a gnosis, that is to say the 
conscious integration of the human subject with its own transcendent na-
ture.” 44 In Godwin’s work, one fi nds no taxonomical anxieties, but instead 
highly unusual, provocative, thoughtful essays in which Boehme naturally 
has his place in the broader currents of the “Western mystery traditions.” 
 Akin to Godwin’s work in at least some respects is my own  Magic and 
Mysticism: An Introduction to Western Esotericism (2007). This survey of-
fers a different solution for “placing” Boehme and mysticism in relation 
to Western esotericism: rather than avoiding the category “mysticism,” I 
foreground it as one of two organizing themes, the other being “magic.” 45 
Mysticism, in this schema, is associated with what I term “metaphysical 
gnosis,” characterized by  via negativa language, whereas magic is associ-
ated with what he terms “cosmological gnosis,” characterized by the use of 
symbols and images as well as by efforts to produce results in the physical 
world. 46 Both of these broad categories can be esoteric, but I use this term 
in a dynamic and functional sense akin to what von Stuckrad has proposed. 
Further, I observe that both categories have historically been marginalized, 
“in part because of the longstanding anti-esoteric bias in the West, and by 
the related desire to turn both subjects into objects of rationalist discourse 
and manipulation.” 47 Hence, I encourage an open, empirical approach to 
the esoteric, whatever “vectors” one uses to defi ne it in terms of social dy-
namics or otherwise. 
 In any case, in this model, Boehme inherits the German mysticism of Meis-
ter Eckhart and Tauler, and “maintains a balance between imagery and the 
transcendence of imagery, the  via positiva and the  via negativa .” 48 Boehme, 
I suggest, represents the union in one fi gure’s work of both cosmological and 
metaphysical gnosis. Boehme thus becomes not a problematic fi gure, but 
an emblematic one: seen functionally, his work in its baroque complexity, 
even majesty, is certainly esoteric or initiatory, and indeed Boehme himself 
emphasizes that it is intended only for some people, not for all; while histor-
ically, Boehme represents the synthesis of numerous prior esoteric currents, 
including alchemy, astrology, mysticism, and perhaps a mediated (Christian) 
Kabbalah. He thus is categorizable without confl ict both as a mystic and as 
a primary fi gure/exemplar of Western esotericism. 49 Of course, this begs the 
question of whether a new category of “Western esotericism” adds to our 
understanding of Boehme. 
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 The fi nal survey of Western esotericism we will cover here is that of Nich-
olas Goodrick-Clarke,  The Western Esoteric Traditions: A Historical Intro-
duction (2008). Goodrick-Clarke, since his is the fi nal survey among these 
books, helpfully and elegantly summarizes the works of his predecessors, 
including Faivre, Versluis, and Stuckrad, alluding, like several of the oth-
ers, to Wouter Hanegraaff’s empirical methodology and to Pierre Riffard’s 
taxonomy of the esoteric. 50 But Goodrick-Clarke’s approach is that of an 
historian, and because he does not offer a model or particular taxonomy of 
his own for esotericism or the esoteric, he is free simply to place Boehme and 
Christian theosophy within their historical contexts from the seventeenth 
century onward, and that is that. Earlier terms that situate Boehme, like “Pi-
etism,” are still employed here. For instance, Goodrick-Clarke asserts that 
“given its emphasis on interior spirituality, Pietism fostered an intellectual 
atmosphere receptive to esotericism.” 51 
 Goodrick-Clarke does begin his chapter on Boehme by remarking forth-
rightly that Boehme “early established his reputation as a leading Protestant 
mystic.” But Goodrick-Clarke, following Faivre, by and large avoids the 
term “mysticism” in his discussion of Boehme and Christian theosophy. 
Instead, we fi nd references to Boehme’s “interior spirituality,” his “spiritual-
philosophical system,” his “inner vision,” and grounding in “individual vi-
sionary experience.” 52 The particular kinds of questions we have been pur-
suing are mostly elided by this elegantly told historical approach: Boehme as 
a mystic is acknowledged, but so is his importance as a major fi gure in the 
history of Western esotericism. Once again, the various categories overlap 
without too much diffi culty. 
 From our survey of these surveys, we can see that, while there is some 
minor disagreement, broadly speaking, the majority of these scholars have 
no diffi culty in placing Boehme and Christian theosophy in both the cate-
gories of mysticism and Western esotericism. Certainly there is no disagree-
ment at all that Boehme represents a major fi gure in the history of Western 
esotericism, whatever taxonomy or historical demarcation is used. But the 
implications of Boehme’s work as esoteric are another matter, and it is to 
those that we turn in the fi nal section. 
 III BOEHME AS ESOTERIC 
 Ultimately, the problem that Boehme exemplifi es in much of this academic 
discourse is taxonomic, but underlying the terminological questions are 
methodological ones. Fundamentally, the challenge Boehme represents—
and of course, not Boehme alone—rests in the nature of Boehme’s work as 
esoteric and in the way one “places” or interprets him and his signifi cances. 
Here we are taking up the idea—put forward by both von Stuckrad and me 
in different ways—that, as von Stuckrad has it, it may be better to refer to 
“the esoteric” than to “esotericism” as a construct. And further, as I have 
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suggested, it may be important to think about the esoteric dynamically or 
functionally. The case of Boehme is instructive for exactly these kinds of 
approaches. 
 Here, of course, we cannot offer a complete analysis of Boehme’s work 
as esoteric using these ideas: his work is simply too vast and too complex. 
But we can begin to point out how Boehme’s work can be understood fi rst in 
terms of social dynamics. With regard to the social dynamics that produce 
the esoteric, elsewhere I suggested as examples esoteric/exoteric, gnostic/
rationalist, and heterodox/orthodox as types of dynamic social polarities 
that shape esoteric discourse. 53 All of these dynamics are clearly visible in 
Boehme’s work and life. We will recall that Boehme himself frequently der-
ogated those who merely attended “stone churches” and insisted on the 
central importance of direct inner spiritual rebirth, awakening, and trans-
mutation; that he was during his life and afterward attacked as an “en-
thusiast” or irrational without regard to the subtleties of the gnosis that 
he encouraged; and that he was opposed and forbidden to write by his 
Lutheran pastor, Gregor Richter. 54 I offer these only as famous instances of 
exactly these kinds of social dynamics at work in the case of Boehme be-
cause he would seem to be an ideal subject for understanding more clearly 
and deeply how they operate. But these kinds of analysis, although they may 
augment historical study, still do not address the more fundamental meth-
odological and taxonomic questions raised by a fi gure like Boehme. 
 Signifi cantly more provocative is what I am terming a “functional” anal-
ysis of Boehme’s work. By that I mean the way that his work encodes and 
discloses secret knowledge and/or gnosis. In Boehme’s case in particular, but 
in many other works of Christian theosophy as well, the text is itself initia-
tory. The text largely consists in spiritual guidance. Sometimes these texts 
are epistolary, like Boehme’s own letters, or the letters of Johann Gichtel, 
and sometimes they describe a sequential process, for instance an alchem-
ical process using astrological, that is, planetary symbols and associations 
as signposts for inner ascending stages of purifi cation, transmutation, and 
illumination. 55 Other texts describe “travel” through visionary landscapes 
or intermediate realms rather like those by Suhrawardi and others as elu-
cidated by Henry Corbin. 56 Still others are straightforward descriptions in 
the form of an experiential journal chronicling the transformative process 
undergone by an individual or a group. 57 
 But virtually no attention to date has been given to these kinds of texts 
as initiatory documents. 58 Clearly, they are describing changes in conscious-
ness, sometimes also expressed as visionary experiences. But if we think 
about them functionally, we have to ask questions like: How do they reveal 
such changes or a larger spiritual process? What signals and means do they 
use? What are the more subtle aspects of their disclosures? The more we en-
gage in close reading of these dense and often mysterious texts and images, 
the more profoundly and clearly we may begin to understand them. In some 
respects, this kind of reading is similar to working with literature. 
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 But there is a difference. In the case of Boehme, and of theosophy more 
generally, the authors make clear that in their view, the stakes are much 
higher. Literature often has a ludic aspect, and one cannot so easily say 
that one particular reading of  Moby Dick is absolutely correct, and another 
wrong, if both can be corroborated. However, the assertions of Boehme 
himself are not ludic, and he is relatively clear in many of them. There is, in 
his experience, he claims, a particular kind of spiritual awakening. It is, he 
says, necessary to experience it for oneself. Rationalists should not attempt 
to analyze it via logic-chopping, and religious opponents ought to let it go 
and not comment on it. Boehme unambiguously tells us that he has direct 
spiritual knowledge both cosmological and metaphysical. He unambigu-
ously makes what has become known as “truth claims.” 59 
 Hence, Boehme offers a particularly strong example in “Western esoteri-
cism”—however one happens to construe that term, if one accepts it at all—
of assertions concerning cosmological and metaphysical truth. The problem 
this poses for the contemporary scholar would seem self-evident. It is the 
same kind of issue that confronts scholars of Platonism and Neoplatonism, 
which, frankly, is no doubt why these areas are not exactly well represented 
in the contemporary academy. Contemporary scholars of religion are fre-
quently told that there is no such thing as religion in itself, that to commit 
“essentialism” is a mortal sin, and that even mystical experiences themselves 
are merely discursive constructions. 60 Boehme’s own work represents the 
exact antithesis of this kind of refl exive, timid rhetoric, and hence is actually 
somewhat inconvenient if we begin to take any part of it seriously on its 
own terms. 61 
 But a functional reading of the initiatory dimensions of a text means 
that, in some sense at least, one has to accept it as at least provisionally 
real, as describing, let us say hypothetically, an actual inner process and set 
of experiences. One has to engage at minimum in the kind of suspension of 
judgment, the “willing suspension of disbelief” that Coleridge said was vital 
to reading literature. Because to understand the text on its own terms, one 
has to set aside one’s own layers of interpretive opposition, “postmodern” 
or otherwise, even if “religionism” or “essentialism” remain mortal sins for 
many in contemporary academic orthodoxy. This, of course, is Boehme’s 
challenge for us; this challenge is his “place” in the study of Western esoter-
icism. He is not the only one who poses such a challenge, but he does pose 
it very clearly nonetheless. 
 The challenge that Boehme’s work poses is still to be addressed in at 
least two different ways. One is a close reading of how a particular work 
functions as an initiatic text, that is, what its markers and keys are, what 
it appears to be alluding to in kinds of consciousness, and so forth. This is 
not particularly easy, and even it requires at minimum what I am terming a 
hypothetical approach to the text as refl ecting and, to some extent, itself em-
bodying or evoking particular changes in consciousness. At the very least, to 
engage in such a reading, one has to accept the possibility that such changes 
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in consciousness hypothetically could exist. Already, this threatens to go 
beyond a mere “suspension of disbelief”; and it is also more than a matter 
of empathy or seeking to “think like” another, because what is under con-
sideration may include but is not necessarily limited to discursive thought. 
Such a reading accepts the possibility of changes in consciousness not acces-
sible to (exoteric) discursive thought or analysis. But the second answer to 
the challenge is more diffi cult and is suggested by the fi rst. It is the question 
of how and to what extent one accepts as real or, if one prefers, “real,” the 
claims of, for instance, Boehme. 
 Although one does not fi nd much concerning this line of inquiry in recent 
scholarship on either mysticism or Western esotericism, at least as yet, that 
is not the case with neuroscientifi c literature. A succession of recent articles, 
books, and multivolume series on neuroscience and religion have tended 
to focus on the study of mysticism or mystical phenomena, often with ex-
tremely interesting implications. 62 Whereas most works belonging to the 
academic study of religion stay far away from the “experiential” questions 
that Boehme’s work might raise, for the neuroscientifi c study of religion, the 
“experiential” is in fact closer to the starting point, the actual starting point 
for neuroscience of course being that which can be measured, for instance, 
via functional magnetic resonance imaging of brain activity. I allude to the 
rapidly developing area of neuroscientifi c research because it may well, over 
time, encourage scholars to more forthrightly address the fundamental ex-
periential kinds of questions that Boehme’s work raises. 
 For ultimately, it is in answering the looming challenge posed by Boehme’s 
work that we may begin to understand what a term like “esoteric” means in 
a particular case, not only in terms of historical context and categorization, 
but also as describing the esoteric process whereby the reader engages with a 
mystical text. Ultimately, whether one classifi es Boehme under the category 
“mysticism” or as exemplifying “Western esotericism” is not so import-
ant—what matters most is whether these categories or contexts shed light 
on Boehme’s work. Much scholarship on both “mysticism” and “Western 
esotericism” has elided essential aspects of Boehme’s challenging work, in 
particular those aspects that exhort the reader toward what we might term 
changes in consciousness. 
 Should Boehme’s work be labeled “mysticism,” “esotericism,” both, or nei-
ther? In the end, the value of such categories for scholars is the light they shed 
on the author and his work. It may well be that the category “mysticism” is 
more appropriate than “esotericism” if it offers the scholar a greater purchase 
on the peculiar challenges posed by Boehme’s work, and Christian theosophy 
more broadly. By contrast, if the study of “esotericism” genuinely demarcates 
a separate fi eld of inquiry, what does that fi eld contribute to our understand-
ing of history, philosophy, literature, and religion? An obvious answer is that 
it contributes the study of what is distinctively “esoteric,” meaning also “ini-
tiatic,” in a particular author’s work. And while much has been written on 
Boehme in various contexts from Pietism to mysticism to Western esotericism, 
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we still await investigation of his work as esoteric; how, and in what senses 
this is so; and ultimately, what “esoteric” means in such a case. Despite all that 
has been written, that is still a challenge that lies, not behind us, but ahead. 
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 15  Conclusion
Why Boehme Matters Today 
 Bruce B. Janz 
 In the almost 400 years since Boehme’s death, he has been revived, reappro-
priated, and rediscovered repeatedly. For someone often seen as marginal 
in Western thought, he has certainly reappeared regularly over the years 
as intellectually signifi cant. And yet, it still seems necessary to consider the 
question of whether Boehme continues to matter today. In my own fi eld of 
philosophy, I have sometimes encountered quizzical looks and questions 
from other philosophers wondering why anyone would be interested in this 
seemingly incidental fi gure. Why should a philosopher be concerned with an 
undisciplined “picture-thinker,” to quote Hegel? Why indeed. But my sense 
of philosophy has always been that it is sometimes found in unexpected 
places, and fi nding philosophy in a fi gure generally situated in the history of 
mysticism and spirituality should not, after all, be a surprise. More impor-
tantly, for philosophy at least, is this: an encounter with Boehme potentially 
brings philosophers back to the well-spring of philosophy, the question of 
what makes philosophy what it is. Philosophy turns to fi rst things, in a va-
riety of ways, and Boehme, too, drives us in that direction. That is not yet 
a guarantee of philosophical usefulness or profundity, but it is an intriguing 
start. 
 Even if Boehme potentially matters to philosophy, though, this does not 
in itself tell us much yet about academia in general. For whom does he 
matter? For what reason might he matter? These are always the fi rst ques-
tions. We could look at this in terms of different disciplines—historians will 
ask different questions of him from those of philosophers, or linguists, or 
cultural theorists, or those looking for spiritual insight, even though there 
may be and has been some overlap. This does not yet guarantee that he  does 
matter now, but again we move closer to asking a useful question about 
Boehme’s place today. 
 The mattering of someone like Boehme will, of course, be different de-
pending on the kinds of questions your discipline has trained you to ask. I 
hope to suggest that Boehme’s way of mattering today goes beyond just the 
historian’s impulse to “get him right,” or to trace the lines of infl uence and 
connection, important as that is. Moreover, it is not just a matter of getting 
the texts about Boehme straight so that we can understand other texts more 
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clearly, important as that also is. The texts, and the concepts, are interesting 
in their own immediate context, but that does not mean that they might not 
also be interesting for other reasons and in other settings. And, it is more 
than just decoding him—despite what Herman Vetterling in  The Illumi-
nate of Görlitz might have thought, when he compiled his massive, limited- 
edition work, there is no prize for the intellectual cryptographer deciphering 
some esoteric code. 1 It is also more than the philosopher’s impulse to sketch 
out a contained and coherent system. No, “mattering” has to do with what 
Boehme might make possible today, what doors he might still open for us 
now. One must be true to him, but being true means being faithful to his 
creative impulse as much as it means expounding correctly the details of 
his system or his place in an intellectual genealogy. 
 Mattering starts with one thing, in my mind, and it is going to be some-
thing that is not intuitively obvious. It is this:  mattering means to work as 
Boehme worked, that is, to learn to create as he both described and modeled 
the creative process . This does not, of course, mean that we should go out 
and get a pewter dish and stare at it until something happens. Working as 
Boehme worked means focusing on at least three issues: Boehme’s intellec-
tual strategies, his creation of concepts, and his formulation of questions. 
We will consider each in turn. 
 I INTELLECTUAL STRATEGIES THAT MATTER 
 My fi rst introduction to Boehme was as an undergraduate by a German 
culture professor who told me that Boehme should be avoided because he 
was “too diffi cult and kind of strange.” He was, I think, trying to spare me 
some frustration, but all he did was to give me a reason to look deeper. I 
started reading and found at the time that, yes, he was both diffi cult and 
strange to my twentieth-century eyes. And yet, his strange syntax, myriad 
allusions, and apparent leaps of logic had a kind of order and rhythm to 
them. I eventually came to recognize the word-play, neologisms, and par-
allelisms— Ichts/Nichts, Vernunft/Verstand, Gefassete, Ungrund, and so 
many others (terms which we will shortly consider in more detail), which 
gave evidence of a structured and disciplined mind. This did not necessarily 
require the elaborate linguistic work that some, such as Stephen Konopacki, 
have done, but it was enough to pique my interest. 2 It seemed to me that 
he was willing to create concepts when needed, in response to the central 
vision that stayed with him ever since he set his eyes on that pewter dish (if, 
indeed, he ever did). 
 Boehme’s incredible creativity seemed to spring from the necessity of 
creating concepts that were adequate to his circumstances. Of course, his 
creation of concepts does not necessarily begin with him—the list of his 
precursors and infl uences is long, as is the list of his intellectual children and 
grandchildren. But the creation of concepts (and I use “creation,” rather 
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than “production” or “adaptation,” in a manner similar to Gilles Deleuze, 
which we will discuss shortly) does not necessarily mean creation  ex nihilo . 
It is tempting with almost any historical fi gure to construct a narrative of 
change or crisis to which they were responding, but in Boehme’s case, it 
seems clear that he was faced with shifts in theology and epistemology that 
required a new set of intellectual tools to express and explore. We can, 
in retrospect, chart the development of those tools, those strategies that 
allowed him to address the problem of evil in a new way, that allowed a 
new sense of the  ex nihilo of creation, and that related individuals to the 
divine in a manner not seen before. This gets more interesting, though, when 
we consider what it would be like to make similarly daring moves today, 
in the face of our own questions. If Boehme is not just giving us a set of 
propositions that fi t together like architecture, but a chart that allows us to 
act as he acted, we may fi nd him mattering to us today as something more 
than the historical curiosity that much of the academic world sees him to 
be. To use an analogy, Nietzsche excoriated Christians, not because they 
believed in Jesus, but because they derived the wrong message from him: 
that it was his words and system that were to be followed, rather than his 
creative and affi rmative manner of life that was to be emulated (incidentally, 
I think Nietzsche is one of the most indebted nineteenth-century thinkers to 
Boehme in his style of thought despite, to my knowledge, never having read 
Boehme). 
 As this volume illustrates, we have any number of examples of thinkers 
who have seen Boehme as a creative force. It seems he made an appearance 
everywhere, as an infl uence on major fi gures, even if in some cases they 
saw in him only what they wanted to see. The results of a quick survey 
of philosophers and theologians over the past hundred or so years (and 
the list would be much longer with literary and artistic fi gures) would turn 
up references to Boehme as a precursor to or infl uence on at least the fol-
lowing: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), 
Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Rudolph Otto (1869–1937), Nicolai Berdy-
aev (1874–1948), Carl Jung (1875–1961), Martin Buber (1878–1965), 
Paul Tillich (1886–1965), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Gabriel Mar-
cel (1889–1973), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), Emmanuel Levinas 
(1906–1995), Simone Weil (1909–1943), Thomas Altizer (1927- ), Gilles 
Deleuze (1925–1995), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), and Giorgio Agamben 
(1942- ). And beyond these individuals, one can sense the effect of Boehme’s 
questioning and concepts in phenomenology and hermeneutics in general. 
Paul Tillich is surely correct when he says that Boehme has had “an aston-
ishing infl uence on the history of Western philosophy.” 3 
 Boehme, then, has mattered a great deal in our intellectual history. The 
interesting issue, though, is not whether we can in fact draw a direct line of 
infl uence between Boehme and any of these fi gures just listed, but is rather 
the question of how a creative thinker like Boehme is used to create con-
cepts adequate to circumstances after his own time. There are reasons why 
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Boehme keeps showing up, but those reasons shift at different times. At one 
time, it is his form of dialectic that provides a suggestive mode of thought. 
At another, it is his voluntarism, and at another again, it is his way of mak-
ing individuals productive without losing that which brings them into being. 
And at still other times, it is his way of radicalizing ontology, forcing us to 
ask the most basic questions about existence in perhaps the most original 
way since Aristotle. We can see this modeled at the beginning of  Mysterium 
Magnum 4 as he gives a sense of an emergent God that does not negate the 
myriad of wills striving for their own emergence and that are allowed to 
realize that desire through the collaboration with that emergent God.  Lust , 5 
a blind, free, affi rmative force, does not, in fact, overcome and negate  Begi-
erde , that is, a craving for manifestation and fl ourishing, but fulfi lls it and 
brings it into manifestation. Individuals have some form of status, then, as 
far back as their roots in  Begierde . In the chaos of confl icting forces that is 
the  Ungrund ,  Lust emerges through the myriad forces of  Begierde as the 
foundation for the Godhead, while the forces Boehme describes as  Begierde 
become actual through the infl owing and dynamic creation of  Lust . 
 Boehme’s own creativity, then, is rooted in his sense that creativity is the 
very nature of reality, and so that must be refl ected in how one engages in 
thought. And, that creativity manifests itself through Will and Understand-
ing as “color, power, and virtue” ( Farben, Kraft und Tugenden ), or as the 
drive to differentiation, manifestation, and creativity (since for Boehme, cre-
ation is just virtue, and un-creation, the move back to  Turba or destructive 
Chaos, is the essence of evil). In other words, while some have seen him as 
restless, always looking for a new system adequate to express his mystical 
insight, I think it is more likely that his thought is a model of creation it-
self, which is always to create anew. It is, of course, true that some of his 
later works develop earlier concepts, in some cases, replacing them with 
richer ones (his move from his early use of  Abgrund in the  Aurora to the 
later  Ungrund in  Mysterium Magnum is a case in point), but this seeming 
restlessness can just as well be seen as successive manifestations of a central 
 Lust . 6 All existing intellectual systems are, for Boehme, craving to be com-
pleted and brought into reality. He works his way through the currents of 
thought available at his time, showing that they all have the creative spark 
within them that allows something new to emerge (and, at the same time, 
they all have the ability to become ossifi ed and inert, a shadow of their real 
potential). 
 As we look at the fi gures who have seen Boehme as interesting, we see some 
who self-identify as “Behmenists,” that is, followers of Boehme’s method or 
cosmology, and some who do not. The second group is in some respects the 
more interesting one, and in fact, those whose minds Boehme changed, or 
at least challenged, as opposed to those who “applied” Boehme’s thought to 
some problem or issue, are particularly rewarding to examine. This, I think, 
is what he did for thinkers such as Buber, Berdyaev, Koyré, Tillich, and even 
Hegel. In all these cases, the thought of the individual became an updated 
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dialogue with Boehme. These thinkers used aspects of Boehme to address 
questions that were at least partially different from those that Boehme him-
self had struggled with. 
 There is, in fact, another subgroup—those who used or absorbed ele-
ments of Boehme without acknowledging it. This is perhaps an even more 
interesting group, and would include thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Jacques Derrida, and probably Gilles Deleuze. This approach will not nec-
essarily lead to traditional historical analysis, for how do we know that 
these fi gures used Boehme if there is no direct or textual evidence? What I 
have in mind, though, are the concepts that pass from Boehme into more 
general cultural usage, at least within intellectual culture. The specifi cs of 
Boehme’s system may require careful study, but some Behmenist version of 
God as negation (different from classic apophatic approaches), some ver-
sion of signatures in which Boehme (along with others such as Paracelsus) 
had a hand, would owe at least partial debt to the general cultural dis-
semination of Boehme’s thought. He was, after all, popular enough among 
preachers and lay scholars that his ideas were disseminated from pulpits and 
circulated in compilations, annotated texts, and pamphlets in several coun-
tries. Not everyone took the radical steps that the Philadelphians took of 
weaving Boehme explicitly into the warp and woof of a theology. For some, 
it simply became part of what I call the “conceptual ecology” of the time. 
This, clearly, is not enough to argue for any specifi c infl uence of Boehme, 
but what is noteworthy is that as concepts become part of the intellectual 
currency of a place, they both enhance and limit the development of other 
concepts. 
 In that regard, it is worth thinking about who those people were, and 
are, who mediate that ecology, and which Boehme they are mediating. Who 
were the intermediaries from whom people would learn about Boehme? 
Around the turn of the twentieth century in the English-speaking world, it 
might have been A. J. Penny or Evelyn Underhill, which would have given 
us a particular kind of Boehme, one who might have been useful to those 
who saw mysticism as fundamental to religion (this is the same time as 
Baron von Hügel was doing similar work, and William James talked about 
mysticism in  Varieties of Religious Experience in almost phenomenological 
ways). 7 Before that, at least in Germany, Boehme was in every history of 
philosophy text, so that would have accounted for his transmission there. 
He was in Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s histories of philosophy, as well as oth-
ers. 8 We might describe that version of Boehme as the idealist, or perhaps 
as the Romantic thinker. In France, it would have partly been the work of 
Alexandre Koyré, in which case it would have been the phenomenologi-
cal Boehme, or perhaps the cosmologist, but also still Saint-Martin, which 
would have shown Boehme as the esoterist. 9 Mid-twentieth-century in the 
English-speaking world, it might have been Howard Brinton, in which case 
we would have Boehme as evolutionist. 10 Surely John Joseph Stoudt would 
have been one access point, in which case it is Boehme as a good Lutheran 
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after all, with a system to rival anything the neo-Thomists were coming up 
with. 11 Sheldon Cheney, who gives us Boehme as a holy, almost evangelical 
fi gure, might be another version that resonated with some. 12 And today? 
Perhaps the most common access point would be Andrew Weeks’s intellec-
tual biography, in which case we would have Boehme, the man of his time, 
the thinker embedded in his religious and social context. 13 We would also 
have Boehme as transmitted by the Internet, in which case we see him in 
many different lights, from mystical seer to theosophist to esoterist to pre-
cursor of quantum theory. 14 The point is, the mattering of Boehme today has 
to do with what kind of Boehme we are talking about, and how that partic-
ular Boehme became part of the conceptual ecology of the time in question. 
Boehme is not infi nitely malleable, despite what some might think, but his 
work has been taken as inspiration for thinkers of vastly different agendas 
and interests. The most interesting Boehme today is the one we don’t know 
is there, the one who has become part of the backdrop against which other 
concepts strive for manifestation. 
 II CONCEPTS THAT MATTER 
 Intellectual strategies produce concepts that are adequate to a place. Boehme 
is a model of a thinker who did not allow the minor inconvenience of the 
lack of a concept stop him from producing one that would accomplish a 
task. Of course, we can trace his infl uences through a myriad of sources such 
as Paracelsus, Weigel, and Schwenckfeld. Weeks’s intellectual biography is 
an excellent account of those sources. But it is my view that Boehme was no 
mere cataloguer of others’ ideas, or even a translator of those ideas into his 
modern idiom. He did have concepts at his disposal that might have been 
adapted, in the hands of a less skilled, less imaginative thinker.  Urgrund and 
 Abgrund existed in the tradition, for instance—did he need  Ungrund ? Of 
course he did—it is not quite the same, and it is a concept adequate to the 
attempt to establish the plenitude of forces striving for manifestation. Why 
does he invent  Ichts as a counterpart to  Nichts , why not just use  Etwas , or 
at least, why take so long to get around to  Etwas ? Why create a new word? 
It is not an arbitrary choice— Ichts , far better than  Etwas , captures the pos-
sibility of some rudimentary level of subjectivity. Is what he does with signa-
tures just a version of the medieval “book of the world” theology we fi nd in 
earlier in Alan of Lille and later in Paracelsus? The ties are there of course, 
but he is doing something new. When I began looking into Boehme’s work, 
I had been led to believe that he was undisciplined, erratic, and that his use 
of words and concepts was inconsistent. When one actually considers his 
concepts and the alternatives he had before him, though, it seemed to be 
anything but erratic. The evident care I saw convinced me that his concepts 
were not just derivative of all the infl uences we can rightly see in him, but 
that he was doing something new and creative every time he appropriated 
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a term or concept. This creative impulse was often an experimental one 
(Boehme’s concepts do not come fully formed, and some are discarded along 
the way in favor of other, better adapted concepts in his ecology), and as 
such, not part of a linear or deliberate process. But this experimental cre-
ativity is far from the image of the undisciplined and erratic writer. 
 We fi nd this constantly in Boehme’s work, and the fact that we fi nd it 
should provide for us a model of creativity, not merely a model of a creation 
that has already happened and is now settled. Boehme, despite what Hegel 
might have thought, does not subsume individuals under a more general 
universal. Those individuals, the diverse manifestation that springs ulti-
mately from  Ungrund , never leave behind the productive capacity of those 
individuals. There is, of course,  Verstand , which for Boehme, suggests the 
difference between a surface and depth understanding of the world ( Ver-
nunft being the surface knowledge that Boehme continually rails against, 
and which Hegel eventually sees as the genuine form of reason in contrast to 
Boehme’s “picture-thinking”), but one must never forget that for Boehme, 
all parts of the creative moment are present at all times in all things. The 
place of the individual in creation, the will that chooses to move with  Lust 
into manifestation, is always there. This is new, but what it means, past the 
signifi cance of a concept like that for Boehme’s own work, is that Boehme 
gives us a model of conceptual creation, even as he describes ontological 
creation. In other words, while his system is explicitly about the nature of 
creation, he shows that that creation is not just the creation of entities or 
beings. It is also the creation of ways of understanding.  Verstand is simul-
taneously the understanding of the common thread that makes all life pos-
sible and the extreme diversity of both life and thought that allows God to 
emerge in concert with beings. We should think about what it would mean 
to work as Boehme worked, not to emulate his specifi c ontology, but to be 
creative in this manner. In the midst of the cross-currents of infl uences that 
existed in Görlitz, Boehme found successive ways throughout his writings to 
put those infl uences into productive relationship. 
 Boehme’s choice of  Ungrund is an interesting case in point. A scan of the 
history of philosophy makes clear that there were many versions of nega-
tion and nothingness available to him. He created something new (although 
he clearly drew on existing elements to formulate that new concept). Why 
did he do that? Because nothing that had come before was adequate to the 
world in which he found himself.  Ungrund, as already mentioned, is not the 
same as earlier concepts such as  Abgrund or  Urgrund —“un” can designate 
plenitude rather than lack. “ Unmasse ” is an uncountably large number of 
things, and “ Unmaessig ” happens whenever one has had a little too much 
to drink. And so, in the chaos of  Ungrund , there is an infi nite plenitude. 
Of what? Of wills, all striving for manifestation, all unable to achieve it. 
Boehme calls these wills  Begierde , or craving, and they wait for  Lust to 
come and, in a kind of divine creative economy, agree to fl ow through those 
who would allow it and bring them to manifestation.  Lust consolidates into 
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God, and the familiar development of the Trinity happens in conjunction 
with this. The myriad wills of  Begierde show  Lust in all the ways it can be 
shown. They are the mirror. And so, individuals in some form go back much 
further than previous accounts. The unfolding of God goes forward, in the 
three principles and seven spirits, and comes prior to the full realization of 
creatures. And, along the way, the problem of evil is also solved—it is now 
a matter of uncreating. A fake  Lust comes along, Lucifer, and tries to in-
fuse those elements of  Begierde that did not cooperate at the beginning and 
“uncreate” the rest. That is what Boehme calls  Turba , the chaos that comes 
from uncreating. Evil is uncreation, not just a matter of disobeying some 
random rule that God decided to institute for our own good. 
 So, Boehme offers a system, surprisingly (although not completely) con-
sistent despite its complexity, but it is a system in which he feels free to 
create concepts, partly from intellectual necessity and partly from an aes-
thetic sensibility that connect the beauty and balance in his thought to its 
intellectual utility. 
 One example of a contemporary fi gure who exemplifi es Boehme’s cre-
ative mode is Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze and his colleague Felix Guattari, with 
whom he sometimes wrote, did not talk about Boehme, to my knowledge. 
A friend of Deleuze’s told me that he thought Deleuze would probably have 
avoided Boehme based on a stereotypical sense that he was primarily a reli-
gious fi gure. Yet, Deleuze was both a philosopher of creativity and a creative 
philosopher, and he wrote on other fi gures, such as Henri Bergson, who had 
clear religious agendas. Explicit connections have rarely been made between 
Boehme and Deleuze (the only recent attempt was by Mark Bonta), but 
Boehme’s relevance becomes apparent as we see a similar appropriation and 
creation of concepts, and a similar model of creativity in both. 15 
 In  What is Philosophy? , Deleuze and Guattari’s fi nal work, the philoso-
pher is called the “friend of the concept” and also the “potentiality of the 
concept.” 16 Deleuze, in his work before  What Is Philosophy ?, had assembled 
a cast of characters whom he did not think of as infl uences, but as thinkers 
who contributed something central to the way concepts developed. Leibniz, 
for instance, contributed “the fold” ( le pli ), which is perhaps best exempli-
fi ed by the way that sculptors treated draped cloth—folding back on itself, 
doubling over yet continuous. Deleuze was interested in the path the con-
cept took as it developed and changed, and the fold was an element of that. 
Other thinkers he focused on included Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Freud, 
Kafka, Bergson, and Francis Bacon (the painter, not the philosopher). Each 
was in some way or other heterodox, and each contributed some element 
that was useful in thinking about how concepts take on a life of their own. 
Strange terms, almost Behmenist in their complexity, emerge—exteriority, 
intension, lines of fl ight, rhizomatic thought, schizoanalysis, deterritorial-
ization, reterritorialization, and so forth. It becomes a story about life and 
creativity—resolutely materialist, and yet vitalist in a way not seen before 
(that is, not a vitalism that posits a soul in all things, but rather a vitalism 
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that posits inorganic life in a process of emergence). It is a story about the 
“becoming” of all things. Deleuze shows the continual creation of things, 
the reality of both the virtual and the actual. He does not pit humanity 
against nature, such that if one is free the other is not. 
 Now, what I have just described is all Deleuze, but there are echoes of 
Boehme here as well. There is a sense that life exists in these concepts, that 
they could easily be covered over, put into a narrative of some sort, and ren-
dered impotent. These concepts must create their own ecologies, gathering 
other concepts around. I almost expect to see the word  Gefassete when I 
read Deleuze, Boehme’s portmanteau word that connects  Gefaß (container) 
with  fassen (to grasp). Deleuze’s concepts, like Boehme’s, create their own 
container in their grasping. And, potentially, this same action also ossifi es 
them. Boehme has his signatures for that reason, and Deleuze has his de-
territorialization and reterritorialization. But as important as the concepts 
are, both Boehme and Deleuze are concerned with the emergence of life 
itself. Howard Brinton saw Boehme as an evolutionist, and in a way, he 
was correct. 17 Brinton’s version of evolution, though, was far more mech-
anistic than either Boehme or Deleuze would have considered correct. He 
imagined in Boehme a sort of teleological panentheism (that is, the position 
that God exists in and through nature as well as beyond and before it) and 
redemption of nature, whereas it can be argued that in fact both Boehme 
and Deleuze are more interested in the emergence (actualization) of virtual 
beings into actuality. 
 As I said earlier, Boehme never let the lack of a concept stop him from 
writing. He engaged in portmanteau, he played with words, he made up 
etymologies, he used Latin—all of it meant that he could allow concepts to 
live, which is to say, the concepts, like the cosmology he described, were one 
of profound and diverse new production. Whatever differences there may 
be between Boehme and Deleuze, the impulse to explicate life itself, and not 
just the markers or signifi ers of life, is something they share. 
 Another example of a concept that Boehme pressed into service, and 
which has been altered and adapted to contemporary purposes, is the “sig-
nature.” Boehme adapts it most directly from Paracelsus, 18 but also from 
the older “book of the world” tradition extant in the Middle Ages in theo-
logians like Alan of Lille and Hugh of St. Victor.  Signatura Rerum is gener-
ally understood as his version of inner/outer signifi cation. There is, though, 
something more provocative suggested here, that contemporary thinkers 
such as Giorgio Agamben develop. But fi rst, a reminder about Boehme’s 
treatment of signatures. 
 Signatura Rerum was written in 1622, two years before Boehme’s death. 
It is addressed to physicians in the broadest sense of the word—all who 
are concerned with healing in any part of creation. Boehme’s therapeutic 
program is an alchemical one that recognizes that physical suffering has 
a metaphysical cause and that cure is effected through the transformative 
powers of the elements. Boehme’s particular alchemical structure is in one 
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sense not novel. It is a seven-fold set of properties that describe creation. 
There is an upper and lower ternary separated by a Schrack, a lightning 
stroke; the fi rst three properties describe the genesis of spirit, while the last 
three describe the genesis of body. The properties all worked in harmony in 
the prefallen state, or in eternal nature; however, since the fall into temporal, 
tainted nature, these properties have been out of tune. Boehme uses a meta-
phor of music several times to make this condition clear. Each existing thing 
is like an instrument, which God plays. The Fall “broke” the world and all 
the instruments in it. It was therefore up to God to fi x the creation, to repair 
the instrument. This is the meaning of redemption. But, that repair does not 
mean that all creation works properly again. The instruments must still be 
tuned. That tuning is Boehme’s concern in  Signatura Rerum . The various 
forms or properties are at present out of balance. It is the job of the healer 
to understand how the forms are out of balance and to bring them back into 
balance. Then there will be something like sympathetic vibrations that run 
through all creation. God is the movement of the strings and the wind in the 
organ and, ideally, all creation responds in perfect harmony. 19 
 This is a more or less standard version of Boehme’s concept of signatures. 
Boehme is taken as sketching out a hermeneutic of divine presence, one in 
which those who have the eyes to see the signatures have access to a “true” 
version of the world. And yet, it is possible to see something else happening, 
if we allow ourselves to be nudged out of the metaphysical framework of 
presence. 
 There is a classic tension in theories of meaning between those derived 
from or related to structuralism (semiotics, post-structuralism) and those 
derived from phenomenology (e.g., hermeneutics). The tension is between a 
set of theories that locates meaning in a network of some sort, and a set of 
theories that locates meaning within human existence. Both of these families 
of theories are powerful and useful, and they are not easily reducible to each 
other. Each, in a certain sense, fundamentally questions the starting point of 
the other. Structuralist theories treat the subject as another signifi er in a sys-
tem, not privileged in any way (a challenge to phenomenological theories, 
which begin from human experience), whereas phenomenological theories 
start from the premise that the subject is revealed through its encounter with 
other meaningful entities. The fi rst has as its central model the system, while 
the second has the text in mind, along with related skills such as reading. 
 The clear usefulness of both of these approaches to theorizing meaning 
has prompted some to seek rapprochement between them. This is not as 
easy as it sounds, though, since each questions the foundational assump-
tions of the other. Paul Ricoeur solved the problem by putting the two in 
a dialectical relationship. 20 Gadamer and Derrida found themselves in a 
discussion over exactly this issue, one that many see as having ended in-
conclusively and unsatisfactorily. 21 Foucault addressed the impasse as well, 
or rather attempted to move past it, while acknowledging the pull of both 
structuralism and hermeneutics. 22 
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 Giorgio Agamben sees in Boehme’s notion of signatures another answer 
to the problem. For Agamben, the signature stands before the signifi er and 
the signifi ed. It is “what makes the sign intelligible.” The signature is “what 
makes the mute signs of creation, in which it dwells, effi cacious and expres-
sive.” 23 Agamben sees in Boehme’s idea of the signature not a dialectical 
move to bring together the hermeneutic and semiotic ( à la Ricoeur), but an 
attempt to link signs to ontology in a new manner. Agamben walks a careful 
line between the potential problems inherent in using theories only derived 
from structuralism or theories derived entirely from phenomenology. In the 
fi rst case, there is the risk of the endless freeplay of the signifi ers. Signifi -
cance is the meaning assigned by the relations in a network, the signifi cance 
that comes from having the most Facebook “likes” or YouTube hits or ad 
views. It is a signifi cance that tells us nothing about what made the thing 
signifi cant, only that it was signifi cant. On the other hand, meaning within 
the phenomenological sphere is constructed differently. It tends to be mean-
ing that does not rely on network connections but on interpretation, the 
kind that brings order (i.e., a single narrative, a sense of the whole) to the 
chaos of particularity. What is the risk with this? It is the risk that comes 
from multiple versions of the whole that can never come to a clear resolu-
tion. How can these coexist? Must one predominate? What if my synoptic 
and comprehensive truth differs from yours? How can it do this, in the 
end, other than through a mystical sense of a narrative’s “rightness”? The 
hermeneuticist’s answer to this is dialogue, but it is worth noting that this is 
a process rather than a guide for decision-making and does not necessarily 
guarantee a resolution. 
 The signature stands prior to both of these modes of understanding. It is 
meant to address both the problems that come with too much particularity 
and the problems that come with potentially arbitrary or incommensurable 
versions of the whole. But does this solution not simply put a third entity 
prior to the structural and phenomenological approaches, which settles the 
impasse by fi at? No, because, in the process, Agamben essentially redefi nes 
the problem at hand. It is no longer a matter of enabling two paradigms of 
interpretation to coexist. It is now a matter of showing how both require 
something more to be other than “inert and unproductive.” Signatures do 
not so much show us what matters, but how mattering happens. They are 
fundamental to creative activity. One reviewer speaks of it as the “prob-
lem that every scholar today faces concerning the ‘selection criterion’ for 
everything from a particular document in an archive, to an entire fi eld of 
research, to which book I should read next, even how should I live if I am 
to think something new and creative.” 24 The analogy here is the creation 
of knowledge within a discipline. We can either become overwhelmed by 
the profusion of information available today, or we can approach the prob-
lem of creating knowledge by holding to a preexisting narrative. Neither of 
those, in the end, are a successful solution to the creation of knowledge that 
is adequate to the questions at stake in the discipline. In other words, it is 
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one thing to have a pure signifi er, but quite another to have signifi ers that 
are attuned to particular kinds of outcomes, to creative potential. 
 One might just see Agamben as a particularly astute interpreter of Boehme’s, 
one who sees the potential of Boehme’s concept of signatures as something 
more than just an element of a mystical cosmology. And he certainly is that. 
But what he demonstrates is that Boehme’s concepts can be brought into 
contemporary conversations, not anachronistically but creatively. Those con-
cepts exist in an ecology of other concepts (and Boehme’s ecology is extremely 
rich and nuanced). When concepts are carefully introduced into other ecolo-
gies, not as invading species but as new elements in tension and cooperation 
with existing concepts, what results is creative growth. In the example given 
here, Boehme’s notion of signatures is used to interrogate a contemporary 
problem. It helps us to recognize some of the limits of current answers to 
that problem and suggests a way forward. This is the way that Boehme’s rich 
ecology can continue to help us engage our thought-world. 
 III QUESTIONS THAT MATTER 
 These intellectual strategies lead to concepts adequate to their place. Ade-
quate concepts lead to new questions. Boehme, I think, allows us to think 
those new questions, not because he was a visionary, or someone who was 
“ahead of his time,” but precisely because he was in his time. He asked the 
right questions of and for his time, and the concepts that came out of those 
questions were adequate to his place. “Adequacy” does not mean that no 
one disagreed with them, or that everyone immediately recognized them to 
be true and correct, or that their adoption was universal. Adequacy means 
that he kept the creative momentum alive. He was not interested in merely 
consolidating the gains of previous intellectual revolutions (that is what he 
saw the Lutherans as doing, particularly Gregor Richter, his adversary in 
Görlitz), but rather, he laid the groundwork for the next creative shifts by 
asking new questions. 
 What kind of new questions? Here are a few: 
 1. What is freedom? Boehme re-asks this very old question in the context 
of an ontology that posits freedom as existing everywhere. Boehme does 
not prefi gure the later Enlightenment versions of freedom, which are rooted 
in choice along with the absence of barriers for the will’s exercise of that 
choice. Freedom is not earned through hard work, nor is it realized through 
the self-understanding that God comes to. Freedom is part of the system 
from the beginning. And, everything—every will, every person—chooses. 
We sometimes think that what differentiates humans from the rest of nature 
is that our choice still lies before us. But we must not forget that all parts of 
the emergence of God and of nature are simultaneously present at all times 
in all things. In this sense, the choice, for Boehme, is being made at each 
moment. There is not as radical a version of freedom until Sartre. 
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 2. What does it mean to know something? This is not just a Platonic 
dialectic, moving toward a unifi ed truth currently covered over by opinion. 
Boehme does, of course, rail against those who have a superfi cial and frag-
mentary knowledge of things. And yet, despite this, I think we would be too 
restrictive to see him as advancing the position that there is only a single 
form of knowledge in the end. I read him as setting the table for us, or as 
preparing the way for the vast diversity of creation to show the infi nite kinds 
of knowledge possible. Of course, there is still  Verstand , the understanding 
that sees the unifi ed nature of things. But there is also  Vernunft , Boehme’s 
term for reason about discrete particulars. Whereas he seems to reject this 
form of reason in favor of  Verstand , he in fact recognizes its necessity. 25 
 3. How do we account for evil in the world? Again this is an old question 
to which Boehme gives a new answer. The classic problem, of how we might 
avoid laying evil on God’s doorstep, is given a new strategy. If all that exists 
does so because God fl ows through it, and if it is all constituted by will, then 
the move toward un-creation, toward unraveling the creative cooperation 
between the joyful  Lust and the desiring  Begierde that produces the wild 
diversity we see, would be evil, it would be  Turba . It makes one wonder 
whether Boehme might have an interesting response to the contemporary 
environmental crisis, which surely must be seen as a move to un-creation if 
ever there was one. At any rate, whether or not his “theodicy,” or defense of 
God in the face of the presence of evil is successful, it does represent a new 
question: How does evil relate to God if we conceive of God as an eternally 
creative impulse? 
 4. How can creativity occur continually, and not just as an initial act? 
This is a question that we have already been dealing with. Signatures fi gure 
into this, and a new explication of Boehme’s use of  Weisheit would also help 
to explicate creativity. Boehme extends and makes practical the question of 
creativity. It is not just a description of the divine economy, but it is a model 
for how humans live at their best. They remain, in every way, creative. 
 Now, these new questions are his. They are new not because they’ve never 
been asked before, but because they have never been asked in this way be-
fore, with this set of concepts available, with this set of social and cultural 
forces bearing down. We have to fi nd our own new questions. But I think 
this happens. We hear the echoes of Boehme as Nietzsche defends and elab-
orates the will, and those echoes come down through Derrida, and even 
more through Deleuze, in his philosophy of creativity. We hear the echoes 
of Boehme in Heidegger, as he describes a world that requires us to learn to 
see, almost as if we look for signatures, and almost as if we are apprehending 
truth as “ alethia ,” or uncovering/unforgetting. We hear the echoes in the 
current wave of philosophy of religion, which is untethering itself from using 
analytic Christian theology as its starting point, and reimagining the central 
questions as they might be asked from a different set of reference points. 
 The point is, we have new questions, and those questions force us to appro-
priate concepts from different places, to adapt them to new circumstances, 
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and to recognize the inadequate questions we have worked with in the past. 
We need not just to study the creative thinkers who appropriated Boehme. 
We can, in fact, ask a new question, one appropriate to our place, and we 
can create the concepts adequate to that question, and to that place. This is 
why Boehme matters today: he gives us a model, and a reason, for creative 
thinking. 
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